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Abstract 
 
The thesis demonstrates how Wallace Stevens' poetry utilises pre-Socratic 
philosophy in overcoming post-Kantian dislocation from the 'thing-in-itself'. I 
initially consider Stevens’ poetry in terms of Hans-Georg Gadamer's ontological 
conception of the 'play' of art, an interactive existence overlooked by Kant. Through 
the ‘play’ of Stevens’ poems the reading audience are implicated in their reduction to 
being. The origin of this conception leads Gadamer back to Parmenides who Stevens 
had read. I argue that Stevens’ poetry ‘plays’ its audience into an ontological ground 
in an effort to show that his ‘reduction of metaphysics’ is not dry philosophical 
imposition, but is enacted by our encounter with the poems themselves. 
Through an analysis of how the language and form of Stevens’ poems 
attempt to reduce mind and world to concepts that parallel Parmenides’ poetic sense 
of being, and Heraclitus’ notion of becoming, the thesis uncovers the ground in 
which Stevens attempts a reconnection with the ‘thing-in-itself’. It is through the 
experience of reconnecting to an ontological centre, which his poetry presents as the 
human project, that Stevens’ poetry also presents itself as a means of replacing 
religion. 
From here we turn to Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida for an 
exposition of how such a reduction reduces the ‘Other’ to ‘otherness’ and their worry 
that this reduction legitimates violence within the thought of Martin Heidegger and 
Parmenides. From this I make a case for how such reductions are connected to what I 
refer to as 'the play of violence' in Stevens' poetry, and to refer this violence back to 
the mythology Stevens' poetry shares with certain pre-Socratics and with Greek 
tragedy. This shows how such mythic rhythms are apparent within the work of 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Heidegger and Gadamer, and how these rhythms release a 
poetic understanding of the violence of a ‘reduction of metaphysics’. 
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Introduction 
 
Road Map 
The following thesis will attempt to demonstrate how Wallace Stevens’ 
poetry consciously enacts a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to the conceptual first 
beginnings of the ‘it is’, as used by the pre-Socratic philosopher Parmenides of Elia, 
and ‘flux’, as found in the fragmentary writings of Heraclitus of Ephesus.1 I will 
predominantly refer to the ‘it is’ under the more general term of being, while the 
term becoming will be used to describe ‘flux’.2 The thesis will investigate how the 
language and form of Stevens’ ontologically conscious poetry generates a sense of 
these conceptions that arguably reduce metaphysics.3
                                                          
1 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1930), pp. 173 & 139. I will 
primarily use Burnet as my source for direct quotations from the pre-Socratic fragments because it is 
the source that Stevens is known to have read. Burnet provides a translation of Parmenides' 
poem according to the arrangement of Hermann Diels (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker - The 
Fragments of the Pre-Socratics, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1903) and a version 
of Heraclitus' fragments according to the arrangement of Ingram Bywater (Heracliti Ephesii 
Reliquiae, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1877). However, I will also be guided by the more 
contemporary translations of Jonathan Barnes (The Presocratic Philosophers, London & New York: 
Routledge, 1982) and Peter Kingsley (Reality, Inverness, CA: The Golden Sufi Centre, 2003). 
2 I will use the terms being and becoming to allow for the most encapsulating sense in which pre-
Socratic concepts have been interpreted by subsequent philosophers and artists, while remaining 
faithful to the concepts found in the original pre-Socratic texts. For example, Julian Marias suggests 
that with Parmenides ‘philosophy changes from physics to ontology’, which Marias, like Martin 
Heidegger and Jonathan Barnes, refers to as being. (Julian Marias, History of Philosophy, trans. by 
Stanley Appelbaum & Clarence C Stowbridge (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1979, p. 24). 
Marias also uses the general term becoming for describing Heraclitus’ conception that ‘everything 
runs, everything flows’, and again it is the succinct quality of the term becoming that I will make use 
of here. (Julian Marias, History of Philosophy, p. 27). 
3 By ‘ontologically conscious poetry’ I mean a poetry that is concerned with the nature of being. 
Unless otherwise stated the word ‘ontology’ is used in terms of: the branch of metaphysics concerned 
with the nature of being as such. 
 The analysis will also 
determine why the poetic philosophy of the pre-Socratics may prove attractive to the 
post-Kantian philosopher of art, or poet, in attempting to reconnect with the ‘thing-
in-itself’. The term 'reduction of metaphysics' is used in the sense Jacques Derrida 
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applies to the concept of being.4 The term 'play' refers at once to Hans-Georg 
Gadamer's sense of 'play', as connecting ontologically with a work of art, and a 'play' 
in the sense of Greek tragic theatre.5 The term thus implies Derrida's sense of 'play' 
as well by alluding to the oscillation between the two different senses of the word.6
The first chapter, entitled The Experience of the ‘Thing-In-Itself’ through an 
Ontological Art, begins by assessing the role of 'play' in Stevens’ poetry according to 
Gadamer’s terms. The point is to show that Stevens fulfils Gadamer's sense that an 
encounter with a work of art shows art to appear to have a truth-telling function, 
because its 'play' recalibrates our being when we encounter it as an audience.
 
7 This 
will allow us to begin with the language and form of Stevens’ poetry to demonstrate 
how we as a reading audience are conceptually included in the ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’. Stevens and Gadamer, like the post 'turn' (Kehre) Martin Heidegger, 
view poetry as a means of expressing being. My effort is to connect this idea with 
Stevens’ consciousness of the pre-Socratics, and with Gadamer's sense that his 
theory in Truth and Method (1960) marks a return to pre-Socratic conceptions.8
Having shown that certain elements of Heraclitean philosophy and 
Parmenides' poetry of being are historical points of reference for Gadamer, and that 
Stevens was fully aware of them, the chapter attempts to establish how the language 
and form of Stevens' poetry is concerned to produce a sense of fundamental being 
and becoming, to which poetry is also subject as a ‘thing-in-itself’. This reduction in 
Stevens' early poetry is presented as the centre into which Stevens' poetic 'play' 
 
                                                          
4 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, trans. by Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 1978), p. 81. 
5 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, second, revised edition, trans. revised by Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London & New York: Continuum, 2004), p. 102. 
6 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’, Writing and 
Difference, pp. 278 - 293. 
7 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 102. 
8 Ibid., p. 456. 
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draws an audience on the ontological terms that Gadamer had suggested. The 
emphasis is not on providing a source-based connection between Stevens and the 
pre-Socratics. Rather it is to demonstrate how Pre-Socratic poetic philosophy was 
useful to post-Kantian philosophers of art, and poets, in experiencing the 'thing-in-
itself'. 
This analysis allows the thesis to plot Stevens’ development while also 
engaging with debates concerning Stevens’ debt to romanticism: whether he stands 
in a Kantian lineage, seen in a romantic light, as Simon Critchley argues in his 
Things Merely Are - Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens (2005), or is 
seeking to overcome Kant via the rhythms of Pre-Socratic poetic philosophy as I 
argue. The ontological perspective also allows the thesis to revisit Frank 
Lentricchia's argument, presented in his Modernist Quartet (1994),
Stevens' later phase is concerned with what he calls an 'accord with reality'.
 that Stevens is a 
socially detached aesthete. Contrary to this view I propose that a fundamental 
reduction of the social sphere to the Heraclitean sense that all is 'struggle' exists in 
Stevens, particularly in his ‘committed writing’ of the late 1930’s and early 1940’s. 
9
                                                          
9 A Letter to Charles Tomlinson, June 19th, 1951. Letters of Wallace Stevens, selected and ed. by 
Holly Stevens (New York: University of California Press, 1966), p. 719. 
 I 
argue that this post-war poetry attempts to forge the physical and the metaphysical 
into the oneness of the vision of the 'rock', devoid of the fundamental ‘struggle’ and 
becoming of the disparate ‘parts’. It is with the establishment of the ‘rock’ as a 
universal ‘thing-in-itself’ that Stevens' final poems are shown to be conscious of a 
re-composing out of the satisfaction of that vision of total oneness. The poems 
follow a Yeatsian pattern to a degree in that they look back to earlier creative 
moments, but they also present Stevens’ ‘earlier’ poems as eternally connected to a 
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sense of being as the universal ‘thing-in-itself’, of which all ‘historical’ things (and 
thus all poems) are presented as being part, in the eternal ‘now’. One of the key 
developments of Stevens’ poetry therefore is the transition from poems as ‘things in 
themselves’ subject to being, to all poems as part of the universal ‘thing-in-itself’ 
that is being. It is the dominance of the thought of being that produces the ‘reduction 
of metaphysics’ in Stevens’ poetry. 
The second chapter is entitled Major Man and the Supreme Fiction: The 
Transvaluation of Religion with Poetry. Having demonstrated how Stevens raised 
the status of poetry to an expression of the 'truth' of being, through which the ‘thing-
in-itself’ could be ‘experienced’ as a single totality, chapter two considers how 
Stevens used his ontological poetry to replace religion as the centre. The chapter 
argues that Stevens began his pursuit of the 'supreme fiction' and ‘major man’ in a 
post-Nietzschean world. However, I argue that the concept of 'major man' appears to 
most faithfully follow a Xenophanean model of un-grounding religion. Xenophanes 
had said that all deities were a projection of the imagination from the ego of man.10 
Stevens had said the same thing many times, which, since he had read Xenophanes, 
is not surprising perhaps.11
                                                          
10 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 119. 
11 Wallace Stevens, ‘Two or Three Ideas’, Collected Poetry and Prose (New York: The Library of 
America, 1997), p. 846. 
 I argue that Stevens' sense of 'major man' is comparable 
to an inversion of Xenophanes' philosophy. I show that Stevens collapses the 
imagined deity back into a renewed ‘idea’ of man (along with all things) and 
presents a sense of 'man' as the massiveness and extent of his own imaginings. 
Stevens is putting the ‘gods’ back into the mind of man (along with everything else) 
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to create a totalizing 'immanence', which brings my argument close to that of David 
R. Jarraway, though I follow the Xenophanean model of ‘immanence’.12
The third chapter, entitled The Violence of a Reduction of Metaphysics in 
Wallace Stevens’ Poetry, questions the effects of Stevens’ radical ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’ to being, and his sense of a 'poesis' as the means of uniting all things in 
being.
 
The analysis then extends the theory to investigate the idea of the 'supreme 
fiction' as an effort to create poetry out of existing poetry, just as Xenophanes says 
that man imagines gods to look like himself. This radical effort to un-ground religion 
is shown to owe much to George Santayana, whose comments on Xenophanes 
Stevens had read in Interpretations of Poetry and Religion (1900). As evidence is 
given that Stevens' sense of the 'rock' is presented as a replacement of the Biblical 
sense of Christ as 'The Rock', the chapter provides examples of how the 'supreme 
fiction' is a fiction grounded in Stevens' own conception of what the 'rock' is, namely 
a totalized sense of the here and now that has collapsed the physical and the 
metaphysical into a reductive oneness. As such ‘major man’ and the ‘supreme 
fiction’, founded upon Stevens’ ‘rock’, become the means of ‘healing’ humanity 
from religious delusions by connecting them to the ‘reality’ of being. 
13 I use the thought of Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas who have written 
against a Heideggerian and Parmenidean sense of being, because they see it as a 
‘violent’ reduction of the subjective 'Other' that is associated with primal myth.14
                                                          
12 David R. Jarraway, ‘Stevens and Belief’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, ed. by 
John N. Serio (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 195. 
13 Wallace Stevens, ‘Large Red Man Reading’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 365. 
14 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, pp. 79 - 97. 
 For 
Levinas, the form of the 'face' precedes all ontologies and is always and already in 
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advance of any reduction, which if attempted, is violence.15
Chapter four, entitled The Mythological Structure of Stevens’ ‘Rock’, seeks 
to find reasons for the reductive violence associated with the concept of being as a 
‘oneness’, from within its mythological history. The attempt is made to show that the 
mythology that underlies Stevens’ sense of the ‘rock’ and Parmendes’ sense of 
complete being is the same. Also that this mythology is the ultimate origin of the 
reductive violence associated with both ontological philosophy and Stevens’ 
reductive poetry. Through an analysis of the Greek tragic references and structures in 
Stevens' poetry, in parallel with Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy (1872), 
the attempt is made to show how Stevens’ sense of the 'rock' is comprised of what 
looks like a unifying of the Dionysian and the Apollonian ‘art-worlds’, in the 
oneness of the 'first idea', that is opened by a poesis. This model, which is shared by 
Attic Greek tragedy, is shown to correlate with the mythology that underlies 
Parmenides' conception of 'truth' and 'seeming' as united in the ‘goddess’, according 
to Heidegger.
 The analysis attempts to 
show how the reductive elements in Stevens' poetry share the same characteristics as 
those found in Parmenidean poetry, and in Heidegger and Gadamer, and that they are 
without ethics. 
16
The conclusion considers that the language of Stevens’ ontological poetry, 
and the implications of that poetry, can begin to be understood when placed in a pre-
 The implications of this argument suggest that it is the mythological 
origin of Stevens’ conception of being that explains the violence produced by a 
‘reduction of metaphysics’, while also raising questions as to the extent that 
Heidegger had overcome Nietzschean philosophy as he said he had. 
                                                          
15 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 1969), p. 51. 
16 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, trans. by André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 5. 
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Socratic context, a period when poetry and ‘truth’ were considered to be more 
synonymous. It is not surprising that 'violence' and reduction are at work in Stevens 
because logos is given up entirely to a ground of mythos, which itself has 
implications for post-Kantian philosophers of art who apply a truth-telling function 
to poetry. 
 
Wallace Stevens and Pre-Socratic Poetic Philosophy 
In her 1986 biography of Stevens, Joan Richardson pointed to the 
‘importance’ of what she called the ‘fainter notes from Heraclitus and the other pre-
Socratics’ in Stevens’ work.17 Bart Eeckhout has noted that though the connections 
between Stevens and the pre-Socratics are rarely mentioned in Stevens scholarship, 
they account for ‘an important part of the poet's intellectual background.’18 In a letter 
of 1940 Stevens, at the age of sixty one recalls how: ‘When I was young and reading 
right and left, Max Müller was the conspicuous Orientalist of the day’.19
                                                          
17 Joan Richardson, Wallace Stevens A Biography: The Early Years, 1879 – 1923 (New York: Beech 
Tree Books, 1986), p. 24. 
18 Bart Eeckhout, ‘Stevens and Philosophy’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, p. 107. 
19 A Letter to Leonard C. van Geyzel, December 9th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 381. 
Stevens’ reading of Max Müller and his referencing him in this letter of 1940 has been mentioned by 
Joan Richardson in an essay entitled ‘Wallace Stevens: A Likeness’, collected with a number of 
essays on Stevens published in 2007 (The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, pp. 12 - 13.) 
 The 
Oriental context may be accounted for by Müller’s translation of the Rig-Veda (1849 
– 1874) and The Sacred Books of the East (1879). However, Müller had also written 
in detail on the Pre-Socratics in his Lectures on the Science of Language (1864), 
making reference to intricate aspects of the writings of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, 
Heraclitus, Xenophanes and Pythagoras. Richardson has observed that in his 
speculative writing, The Science of Thought (1887), Müller ‘postulated a purely 
linguistic basis for any future philosophy, looking back to the early Greek 
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philosophers who, in their study of Logos, made no separation between language and 
thought.’20 In the letter of 1940 recalling his reading of Müller, Stevens assumes that 
his correspondent, Leonard van Geyzel, ‘must know his [Müller’s] things’.21 
In view of Stevens' conscious use of the term being, much has been written 
with regard to Stevens and the twentieth century thinker, Martin Heidegger. For 
example, Krzysztof Ziarek’s essay entitled “‘Without human meaning’: Stevens, 
Heidegger and the Foreignness of Poetry”, collected in Wallace Stevens Across the 
Atlantic (2008), Paul A. Bové's Destructive Poetics: Heidegger and Modern 
American Poetry (1980), and Thomas J. Hines' reflections on The Later Poetry of 
Wallace Stevens: Phenomenological Parallels with Husserl and Heidegger (1976). 
The British literary critic, Frank Kermode, has also addressed the question of 
Heidegger and Stevens in ‘Dwelling Poetically in Connecticut’, from Wallace 
Stevens: A Celebration (1980). J. Hillis Miller, an early champion of Stevens' 
abilities as a poet, was among the first to consider Stevens' notable consciousness 
and use of the word being. Hillis Miller offered several analyses of Stevens, early in 
his career, which show the influence of Heidegger, such as his essay entitled 
'Wallace Stevens' Poetry of Being', from The Act of the Mind: Essays on the Poetry 
of Wallace Stevens (1965), as well as in his work entitled 
However, a direct influence of Heidegger on Stevens which would account 
for his consciousness of the concept of 
Poets of Reality (1965).  
being seems impossible, as Hines duly 
notes.22
                                                          
20 Joan Richardson, ‘Wallace Stevens: A Likeness’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, 
p. 12. 
21 A Letter to Leonard C. van Geyzel, December 9th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 381. 
22 Thomas J. Hines, The Later Poetry of Wallace Stevens - Phenomenological Parallels with Husserl 
and Heidegger (New Jersey & London: Associated University Presses, 1976), pp. 23 - 24. 
 Stevens mentions Heidegger in a late letter to Paule Vidal, referring to him 
as 'the Swiss philosopher’, which seems to terminate the possibility of a source-
13 
 
based reading.23 The connections between Stevens and the father of 'ontology' (the 
branch of metaphysics that deals with being as such), Parmenides, are more concrete. 
In a letter of 1944 to José Rodríguez Feo Stevens said that he had been ‘fortunate 
enough’ to procure a copy of John Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy (1892), and by 
6th April 1945, he had read it. Richardson suggests that ‘Stevens would follow 
Müller’s lead, carefully reading the contributions of the pre-Socratics’.24 In the letter 
of 6th April 1945 Stevens mentioned that Burnet's account had ‘said all there is to say 
in respect to the supremacy of a figure like Parmenides'.25
In reading Burnet, Stevens would have read the fragmentary remains of the 
whole period of pre-Socratic philosophy, considering that their remaining works are 
not vast volumes, but short treatises, often, as with Parmenides, written in verse. And 
herein is the question that I initially wish to pursue, why does Stevens think that 
Parmenides is supreme? Stevens is no builder of philosophical systems in verse, not 
a ‘philosopher hiding in poet’s laurels’: he is an artist, first and foremost.
 
26 He just 
happens to be, along with T.S. Eliot, the most 'philosophically' inclined Anglophone 
poet of the twentieth century. Stevens continues his appraisal of Parmenides by 
saying that 'Burnet says he was the only philosopher to write his system in verse'.27
                                                          
23 A Letter to Paule Vidal, July 29th, 1952. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 758. 
24 Joan Richardson, ‘Wallace Stevens: A Likeness’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, 
p. 12. 
25 A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
26 Thomas J. Hines, The Later Poetry of Wallace Stevens - Phenomenological Parallels with Husserl 
and Heidegger, p. 18. 
27 A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
 
Here, it seems, is the key to Stevens' appraisal of Parmenides, in the meeting of the 
philosophic and the poetic. It is upon the threshold between philosophy and poetry 
that Stevens seems content to operate, for his own part, always appearing to move 
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from philosophy towards poetry. As Stevens himself observes, 'I like my philosophy 
smothered in beauty and not the opposite.'28
In his 1951 Moody Lecture entitled ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, given at the 
University of Chicago, Stevens stated that: ‘A poem in which the poet has chosen for 
his subject a philosophic theme should result in the poem of poems. That the wing of 
poetry should also be the rushing wing of meaning seems to be an extreme aesthetic 
good.’
  
29
Parmenides was writing his philosophy concerning nature and 
 This is a telling statement, showing that both philosophy and poetry are 
interdependent for Stevens’ sense of ‘an extreme aesthetic good’. There is no doubt 
that it is the aesthetic, the artistic, that Stevens is seeking, but the way in which that 
should come to fruition is reliant upon philosophic ‘meaning’, for the ‘good’ of the 
art, for its elevation. 
being, truth 
and opinion (seeming) in poetic form. This, it would seem, is a very early example of 
the happy coexistence of poetry and philosophy, prior to Plato's famous rending in 
Protagoras. Andrew Bowie is not the first to consider that: “Questions about 
‘poetry’ and literature are in fact inseparably connected to the history of Western 
philosophy”.30
Stevens would have had further encounters with the pre-Socratics, at some 
level, within the pages of Arthur Kenyan Rogers’ A Students History of Philosophy 
(1908) and in Matthew Arnold’s Notebooks (1902). However a direct source-based 
 Yet Parmenides pre-dates Plato, pre-dates the division of art and 
philosophy at this particular juncture, and may, thereby, provide an example of how 
those two sometime strangers could dwell together.  
                                                          
28 Milton J. Bates, “Stevens’ Books at the Huntington: An Annotated Checklist,” Wallace Stevens 
Journal 2.3/4 (1978), p. 50. 
29 Wallace Stevens, ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 854. 
30 Andrew Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory – The Philosophy of German Literary 
Theory (London & New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 1. 
15 
 
reading of Stevens' consciousness of being
For example, the concept of 
 as derived from the pre-Socratics still 
seems impossible. Despite having read the works of the pre-Socratics, even 
encountering them 'as a young man' through Max Müller's writings and in the works 
of George Santayana, who Stevens knew personally from Harvard, too many other 
philosophies in the thousands of intervening years, many of which are known to 
have been familiar to Stevens, have had opportunity to colour the philosophical ideas 
of the pre-Socratics. 
becoming, which I intend to treat as the second 
reductive notion in Stevens, has its philosophical origin with Heraclitus, who Burnet 
deals with at length. However, Stevens has also read Nietzsche extensively, as B.J. 
Leggett's work entitled Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext (1992) makes clear. 
The concept of fundamental becoming, relieved of its Hegelian baggage and prized 
highly by Nietzsche, is evident throughout Stevens’ poetry. Stevens, we know, has 
read both Nietzsche and Heraclitus, but the extent to which he is using one or the 
other as a consistent source, short of the instances of direct quotation or paraphrase, 
becomes a matter of subjective opinion, which inevitably evokes mis-readings. For 
example, when Stevens says in ‘This Solitude of Cataracts’, a poem collected in The 
Auroras of Autumn (1950): 'He never felt twice the same about the flecked river', it 
seems, as Eleanor Cook suggests, to be a 'Textbook example of the pre-Socratic 
philosopher Heraclitus, "You never step twice into the same river," i.e., the world is 
governed by perpetual flux.'31 However, when Stevens consistently applies the 
general notion of flux or becoming throughout his poetry, we cannot know
                                                          
31 Eleanor Cook, A Reader’s Guide to Wallace Stevens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 
p. 245. 
 that 
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Heraclitus was the ultimate source, as opposed to Nietzsche or perhaps Henri 
Bergson, of whom again Stevens shows awareness.32  
For that reason I will deal more generally with the concepts of being and 
becoming as they are 
Wallace Stevens and Pre-Socratic Terminology 
consciously evoked through the creation of Stevens' poetry, 
pointing to possible sources that present themselves along the way, while remaining 
conscious of their origin in pre-Socratic poetic philosophy. In this sense the pre-
Socratic conceptions provide a model for dealing with Stevens as a post-Kantian 
poet, who is conscious of the relationship of being and art. This reliance upon pre-
Socratic thought as a tool for questioning the point of relationship between being and 
art will also remain open to pre-Socratic ideas in the hands of post-Kantian 
philosophers and poets, with whom Stevens is known to have been familiar. 
To guide the fundamental pre-Socratic thought I intend to use Burnet and 
Müller, as examples of sources Stevens had encountered, in conjunction with more 
contemporary commentators on that period, such as W.K.C. Guthrie, Julian Marias, 
Jonathan Barnes and Peter Kingsley. In terms of post-Kantian sources that deal with 
the pre-Socratics at some level, particularly in relation to art, I will mainly engage 
with F.W.J Schelling, Friedrich Hölderlin, George Santayana, Martin Heidegger, 
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean-Luc Nancy and Gianni Vattimo, with critical input 
derived from Theodor Adorno, Jacques Derrida and Emanuel Levinas. 
 
As we progress in the analysis of Stevens and Pre-Socratic poetic philosophy, 
I will make use of the same terms that Stevens would have had access to in Müller 
                                                          
32 For an exposition of Stevens and Bergson, see: Temenuga Trifonova. “The Poetry of Matter: 
Stevens and Bergson.” Wallace Stevens Journal 26.1 (Spring 2002): 41-69. 
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and Burnet. For example, Müller had used the conception of phusis as the origin of 
language for Heraclitus, as opposed to thesei: 
When we are told that the principle difference of opinion that separated the 
philosophers of old with regard to the nature and origin of language is expressed by 
the two words phusei and thesei, 'naturally' and 'conventionally', we learn very little 
from such terms. We must know the history of those words, which were watchwords 
in every school of philosophy, before they dwindled down to mere technical terms.33
 Jonathan Barnes, a prominent pre-Socratic scholar, says of the term
 
 
The chapters ahead will investigate how seriously Stevens may have attempted to 
unearth the pre-Socratic concept of phusis (nature), as designating the ‘nature and 
origin of language’ and to rescue it from becoming a ‘mere technical’ term. 
 phusis 
that: "The noun derives from a verb meaning 'to grow'."34 However, the definition of 
phusis can include 'Trees and plants and snakes (and perhaps also rain and clouds 
and mountains)'.35 Yet in another sense “the word 'nature' designates the sum of 
natural objects and natural events; in this sense to discourse on nature or peri 
phuseos is to talk about the whole natural world - phusis and kosmos come to the 
same thing.”36 It is in this wider sense that Heidegger seems to have interpreted 
phusis,
the emerging sway, and the enduring over which it thoroughly holds sway. This 
emerging, abiding sway includes both “becoming” as well as “Being” in the 
 and his definitions are useful for highlighting the breadth that the term held 
for the early Greek philosophers. In his lecture series, Introduction to Metaphysics, 
presented at the University of Freiburg in the summer semester of 1935, Heidegger 
defines phusis as: 
                                                          
33 Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language Vol II (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1871), 
pp. 332 - 333. 
34 Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1987), p. xx. 
35 Ibid., p. xxi. 
36 Ibid., p. xxi. 
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narrower sense of fixed continuity. Phusis is the event of standing forth, arising from 
the concealed and thus enabling the concealed to take its stand for the first time.37
Heidegger further suggests that, ‘phusis originally means both heaven and earth, 
both the stone and the plant, both the animal and the human, and human history as 
the work of the gods; and finally and first of all, it means the gods who themselves 
stand under destiny.’
 
 
38
As we progress we will continue to read through the language and form of 
Stevens’ poetry to evaluate the extent to which other terms and debates, comparable 
to pre-Socratic thought, may be at work in Stevens’ oeuvre. It seems logical to begin 
where others have already sensed that such terminology may be in use. Touching 
upon the perennial mind/world epistemological debate in Stevens scholarship, Hillis 
Miller has suggested that: ‘Stevens uses the word “idea” in its original meaning of 
“direct sense image.”’
 Though Heidegger strongly re-reads the pre-Socratics, the 
term phusis, defined as the ‘arising from the concealed’ that is akin to kosmos, would 
certainly have been available to Stevens from his reading of Müller and Burnet.  
39
 The study ahead will allude to other pre-Socratic terms and debates, such as 
the apparent tensions between phusis and nomos (nature and culture) and between 
tuche and technê (chaos/chance and art/skill). In the pre-Socratic writings the term 
 For the Greeks in the days before Plato, the term eidos was 
used to describe exactly that, a ‘direct sense image’, an appearance, and was not 
indicative of a merely subjective ‘idea’ born in the mind. I will question as to 
what Stevens may have meant by the phrase, 'ideas of order', in light of his pre-
Socratic knowledge. 
phusis (as 'nature') is also often contrasted with the term technê 
                                                          
37 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. by Gregory Fried & Richard Polt (New 
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 16. 
38 Ibid., p. 16. 
39 J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 1966), p. 248. 
(art/skill). Barnes 
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confirms that the pre-Socratics make a 'distinction between nature and artifice (in the 
Greek between phusis and technê)'.40
because art, in a distinctive sense, brings Being to stand and to manifestation in the 
work as a being, art may be regarded as the ability to set to work, pure and simple, as 
technē. Setting-to-work is putting Being to work in beings, a putting-to-work that 
opens up. This opening-up and keeping open, which surpasses and puts to work, is 
knowing.
 Heidegger’s more radical interpretation 
suggests that technê is the practice of art, as a kind of knowledge, not because it 
involves “technical” skills, tools and materials, but:  
41
 Surround that hill.
 
 
Again, as we proceed in the enquiry ahead I will entertain the definitions of both 
Barnes and Heidegger, in attempting to encompass the sense in which this debate 
may be consciously evoked through the language and form of Stevens’ poetry. 
Indeed, we will need to question as to whether it is really the strains of this pre-
Socratic debate of technê verses phusis that we can hear in Stevens’ own art, for 
example in this famous example?: 
 I placed a jar in Tennessee, 
 And round it was, upon a hill. 
 It made the slovenly wilderness 
42
 The Greek term 
 
  
archê is also integral to the pre-Socratics and has an 
affiliation with phusis for them. The term means 'beginning' or 'origin', though it is 
sometimes used in the sense of ‘to rule’ or 'to govern’.43 Barnes suggests that the 
term archê is 'apt, providing the reader keeps in mind the Latin etymology of the 
English word: a principle is a principium or a beginning.'44 The pre-Socratics applied 
the term to the universe as a whole
                                                          
40 Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, p. xxi. 
41 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 170. 
42 Wallace Stevens, ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 60. 
43 Jonathan Barnes, Early Greek Philosophy, p. xxii. 
44 Ibid., p. xxii. 
: 'an inquiry into the principles of the cosmos is 
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thereby an inquiry into the fundamental constituents of all natural objects.'45 John 
Miles, in a 1998 article in The Wallace Stevens Journal (that refers to Barnes), has 
raised the fact that questions ‘about the nature of things’ within Stevens ‘are the 
questions with which the pre-Socratic philosophers began their treatises.’46 
Parmenides and Heraclitus speak of concepts akin to being and becoming as the 
archê of phusis
However, the archê conceived by Parmenides and Heraclitus reveal deeper 
nuances that also appear to parallel the structure of Stevens’ poetics. For example, in 
his poem 'On Nature' (
. An archê then can be viewed as a ‘first idea’ and I will suggest that 
Stevens’ own sense of the ‘first idea’ closely resembles the pre-Socratic sense of 
archê. 
peri phuseos), Parmenides had described the way of aletheia 
(truth) and the way of doxa (seeming/opinion), both of which are proposed as parts 
of the ‘it is’ of complete reality. The key here is that seeming (doxa) can be read as 
having been elevated to the ‘truth’ of Parmenidean being, on the basis that whatever 
is in being is 'true'.47 For Parmenides, and perhaps Heidegger also, what seems so is 
in being, and because being
 Heraclitus’ view of phusis extends beyond a mere archê of becoming. He had 
also left fragments that suggested a more fundamental level of universal struggle, 
stating that: ‘Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an 
 is ‘truth’, seeming (or in Stevens' own terms the 
imagination), is considered to be a legitimate part of ‘reality’. Such a perspective 
becomes useful for assessing how Stevens attempts to connect the imagination and 
reality through a poesis, in terms reminiscent of Parmenides’ poem. 
                                                          
45 Ibid., p. xxii. 
46 John Miles, ‘An Encounter with the Firecat: Wallace Stevens’ “Earthy Anecdote”’, The Wallace 
Stevens Journal, Vol. 22 No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 116 – 132. 
47 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, 174. 
21 
 
attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre.’48 Heraclitus’ 
word for ‘attunement’ is harmoniē, which suggests a harmonious struggle. He had 
said that: ‘Homer was wrong in saying: “Would that strife might perish from among 
gods and men!” He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the 
universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away.’ 49
Homer and Hesiod, the pre-eminent wise men and teachers of the Greeks, represent 
the general folly of mankind in failing to perceive the “unapparent harmoniē” in 
which the tension between opposing powers is as indispensible as the reconciliation 
within a larger unity.
 Gregory Fried, 
in a work entitled Heidegger’s Polemos – From Being to Politics (2000), quotes 
from Charles Khan as follows: 
50
Heraclitus had also said that ‘war is the father of all and the king of all’.
 
 
51 
Heraclitus’ word for ‘war’ is polemos, which is ‘one of the key concepts in 
understanding Presocratic thought’, and it means ‘strife’ or ‘struggle’.52
Reading Stevens’ Poetry of Being 
 As we 
progress in the analysis we will investigate the extent to which Stevens’ poetry 
engages with a concept like the Heraclitean polemos, in order to depict a universal 
harmoniē of struggle between the imagination and reality, particularly in times of 
world war. 
 
A tremendous amount of material has been written concerning the notable 
emphasis in Stevens' poetry upon the concept of being. Roger Gilbert has 
maintained that there are 2,997 verbs of being in Stevens' Collected Poems (1954) 
                                                          
48 Ibid., p. 136. 
49 Ibid., p. 136. 
50 Gregory Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos – From Being to Politics (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2000), pp. 22 – 23. 
51 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 136. 
52 Mihai I. Spariosu, God of Many Names – Play, Poetry and Power in Hellenic Thought From Homer 
to Aristotle (Durham & London: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 58. 
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out of a total word count of 80,772, making one in every twenty seven words in the 
collection some form of ‘to be’.53 The question of the relationship of poetry and 
being raises a key issue which Timothy Clark has addressed admirably in his work, 
Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot - Sources of Derrida's Notion and Practice of 
Literature (1992). Clark argues that Heidegger's transformation of 'art' to 'truth', 
through an interpretation of poetry as the manifestation of 'true' philosophy in his 
later phase, changes a reading of literature. This change detaches art from 'the 
reductive notions of "feeling", "creative genius", "aesthetic consciousness" dominant 
in the neo-Kantian tradition of aesthetics.'54 A Heideggerian reading changes 
Dichtung (poetry, fiction) to 'a mode in which truth "happens".'55 In taking account 
of the neo-Kantian concerns and attempting to engage with Stevens' poetry through 
questions of its "aesthetic consciousness", my intention is, to some extent, to divert 
from a Heideggerian reading that transforms the meaning of language as the 'imitator 
of the signifier' to that which 'summons to presence that which it names, a force that 
brings the apparent into its own to stand unconcealed before us.'56 
Clark clearly states the issues of what must be carefully handled in the case 
ahead, if aesthetic concerns are not to be quashed in the pursuit of a reading that 
gives priority to poetry as the unveiling of being 
A Heideggerian reading, therefore, could not or should not argue or reach 
conclusions 
over literature itself:  
about a poem in the manner of representational thought, affirming a, and 
denying b etc. On the contrary, the way into the question of language must become a 
transformation of this path itself.57
                                                          
53 Roger Gilbert, ‘Verbs of Mere Being: A Defense of Stevens’ Style’, The Wallace Stevens Journal, 
Vol. 28 No. 2 (Fall 2004), p. 193. 
54 Timothy Clark, Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot – Sources of Derrida’s Notion and Practice of 
Literature (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 24. 
55 Ibid., p. 24. 
56 Ibid., p. 28. 
57 Ibid., p. 46. 
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However, Stevens’ poetry shares a very similar view to the relationship of poetry and 
being as that advocated by Heidegger, and expressed in the ontological poetry of 
Parmenides; namely that poetry, through the making of an appearance (poesis), is the 
appropriate mode for the expression of being. Such a conception is more overt in 
Stevens’ later poetry, though I will argue that it was there in essence from the 
beginning. In terms of the later poetry, Stevens writes the following in ‘Large Red 
Man Reading’, collected in The Auroras of Autumn
 Poesis, poesis, the literal characters, the vatic lines
:  
                           as he sat there reading, from out of the purple 
  tabulae, 
 The outlines of being and its expressings, the syllables of its 
  law: 
58 
 
This raises hugely important concerns for how we should read Stevens in view of 
Clark's assessment of a Heideggerian reading. My intention is to begin by reading 
Stevens through the presentation of language and form, but only as a means for 
elucidating the ground of Stevens' poetry, to ascertain if it is a consciousness of the 
thought of being
This leads us to the question of how to read Stevens in a wider sense than just 
in terms of the relationship of poetry and 
 that determines why Stevens' poems crystallize themselves in the 
forms in which we have them. We will further investigate, as I have suggested, if this 
sense of being owes more to the historical translation of pre-Socratic concepts than 
specifically to Heidegger. Heidegger is entertained here as a post-Kantian 
phenomenological ontologist, who was concerned with art and profoundly 
influenced by the pre-Socratics. 
being
                                                          
58 Wallace Stevens, ‘Large Red Man Reading’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 365. 
, or if indeed it is possible to read 
Stevens accurately at all. Hillis Miller in an essay written in his more de 
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Manian/Derridian period, 'Stevens' Rock and Criticism as Cure', collected in Theory 
Now and Then (1991), has suggested that the activity of criticism only adds to 'the 
Rock' (as he interprets it), that criticism only adds another strand to the textual web 
of which poetry is part.59 In this essay Hillis Miller defines two essential types of 
critic, the ‘Socratic, theoretical, or canny critics’ on the one hand, as opposed to the 
'uncanny' critics such as one of Stevens’ foremost canonical readers, Harold Bloom, 
as well as Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy on the other. The latter are seen as 
adding to 'the Rock', making new insights which only add to the labyrinth of the text. 
The easy part, for Hillis Miller, is getting into that labyrinth; the hard part is getting 
out.60 Similarly, Bloom in his Map of Misreading suggests that a strong reading 'is 
always a misreading'.61
In arguing that Stevens shows an awareness of being and that this impacts the 
language and form selected, it will first be necessary to read through the language 
and form of the poetry in order to sketch the ground from which I will argue the 
poems emerge. If we do not read through the poems, then we are in danger of 
negating the literary aspect, while applying a psychologically 
 
knowing reading, 
which is of little value. Just as Gadamer is critical of Friedrich Schleiermacher for 
his psychologically knowing hermeneutics, so we will initially use Gadamer’s 
thought in investigating the concept of 'play' in Stevens, in order to demonstrate 
how the reader stands in respect to 'understanding' Stevens' poetry.62
                                                          
59 J. Hillis Miller, Theory Now and Then (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), p. 123. 
60 Ibid., p. 122. 
61 Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 3. 
62 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 158 – 159. 
 This type of 
reading, influenced by Heidegger, will seek to uncover ways in which 
Stevens demonstrates consciousness of his reader reading. The analysis will aim to 
bring us into view of the point at which ontology and art are interfacing in Stevens. 
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As Jean-Luc Nancy suggests, it is art that touches us and it is through Gadamer's 
understanding of the ways in which poems connect with us, that we will be able to 
uncover the 'understanding' of the poems.63
                                                          
63 Ibid., p. xxviii. 
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Chapter One 
The Experience of the ‘Thing-In-Itself’ through an Ontological Art 
 
The Ontological Experience of the Work of Art 
In his magnum opus, Truth and Method, Gadamer attempts to restore truth to 
aesthetics. His move towards this function is in response to Kant’s ‘radical 
subjectivization’ of aesthetics. Kant’s key position in the Critique of Judgement 
(1790) considered that if we judge something to be beautiful or sublime, we expect 
others to share our conception.64
With Gadamer, the experience of a work of art becomes an event of 
ontological understanding, ‘understanding belongs to the being of that which is 
understood’.
 However, if the aesthetic is distinct from scientific 
truth-telling, as mere expression, then how can it be possible to demonstrate that 
others should share our judgement that something has aesthetic value? If science is 
the arbiter of truth and art merely an expression, as Schleiermacher and Wilhelm 
Dilthey both suggest, then any judgement of the work of art will be subjective, and 
lack the general validity of science. Gadamer, in a strain of thought that originates 
with Heidegger, seeks to enlarge the sense of ‘hermeneutics’ from that of a method 
or science, rooted in psychologism and a historicism defined by relativism, to a 
universal hermeneutics of experience.  
65
                                                          
64 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement, trans. by J.H. Bernard (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 2005), p. 54. 
65 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xxviii. 
 Gadamer seeks to demonstrate that the work of art is capable of truth-
telling by drawing attention to the concept of ‘play’, a concept that a subjectivization 
of the work of art negates. The ‘play’ of a work of art is ‘the mode of being of the 
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work of art itself.’66
William E. McMahon, in a work entitled The Higher Humanism of Wallace 
Stevens (1990), suggests that important connections ‘exist between Stevens and 
Gadamer’.
 ‘Play’ is not what the artist once placed into the work of art it is 
what gets up out of the dark every time we encounter a work of art. ‘Play’ places 
something new into the world and subsequently it puts us into ‘play’. We are played 
by the work of art, which for Gadamer, has the effect of reconstructing our being.  
67 McMahon considers that ‘Gadamer, like Stevens, has chosen to make a 
harmonious nest on the ragged contours of modern experience.’68
It would be difficult to find a modern writer who more perfectly reflects Gadamer’s 
ideas than Stevens, and Gadamer helps us understand why Stevens moved in brazen 
 Though pointing 
to the similarities that exist between Stevens and Gadamer, McMahon does not build 
a case that demonstrates their affinities, particularly with reference to the concept of 
‘play’ as the mode of being of the work of art. It is to this objective that I now wish 
to turn, to demonstrate how the ‘beauty’ in which Stevens smothers his ‘philosophy’, 
is in Gadamer’s terms, itself philosophically orientated. Further that this ‘play’ of 
consciously placing something new into the world is designed to bind the audience 
into the philosophy that Stevens says lies beneath the beauty. This ‘philosophy’ is 
not dry discourse or trite aphorism; it is presented as being as such, expressed 
through language, form and direct meaning. I will initially argue on a thematic rather 
than on a chronological basis that as the artist, Stevens consciously plays his 
audience into connection with the ontological ground of his poetry, by utilizing a 
range of art forms. 
McMahon considers that: 
                                                          
66 Ibid., p. 102. 
67 Willam E. McMahon, The Higher Humanism of Wallace Stevens – Studies in American Literature 
Volume Twelve (Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), p. 156. 
68 Ibid., p. 156. 
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optimism with no sense at all of any impasse or paralysis in finding an authentic 
connection between reality and thought or between life and poetry.69
For Gadamer, it is the example of theatre that serves to demonstrate how the 
audience participates in the ‘communion of being present’
 
 
I would argue that through his use of ‘play’, Stevens includes his audience in the 
connection of ‘reality and thought and life and poetry’. Stevens actively connects his 
audience in the ‘play’ of art by ensuring that his own poetry becomes a stage for 
presenting a range of art forms such as music, painting, language and theatre. 
Equally, for Gadamer, the concept of ‘play’ is not limited to a particular art form, but 
is necessarily indiscriminate. Poetry for Stevens can become a stage upon which to 
act out the ‘play’ of art. 
70:
Thus it is not really the absence of a fourth wall that turns the play into a show. 
Rather, openness toward the spectator is part of the closedness of the play. The 
audience only completes what the play as such is.
  
71
                                                          
69 Ibid., p. 156. 
70 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 128. 
71 Ibid., p. 109. 
 
 
In ‘Of Modern Poetry’, collected in Parts of a World (1942) Stevens opens poetry up 
as a theatre, playing an instrument that sounds ‘two/ Emotions becoming one’: 
It has 
To construct a new stage. It has to be on that stage 
And, like an insatiable actor, slowly and 
With meditation, speak words that in the ear, 
In the delicatest ear of the mind, repeat, 
Exactly, that which it wants to hear, at the sound 
Of which, an invisible audience listens, 
Not to the play, but to itself, expressed 
In an emotion as of two people, as of two 
Emotions becoming one. The actor is 
A metaphysician in the dark, twanging 
An instrument, twanging a wiry string that gives 
Sounds passing through sudden rightnesses, wholly 
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Containing the mind, below which it cannot descend, 
Beyond which it has no will to rise.72 
 
We will analyse Stevens’ ‘modern poetry’ in more detail in due course. For now it is 
enough to note that it must 'construct a new stage' and act out a ‘play’, speaking 
words and sounding notes that ‘play’ ‘two’ together as ‘one’. The audience are 
included in that connection, fixed in the sounding of the ‘wiry string’ that 'plays' the 
fiction of poetry together with reality. Modern poetry, expressed as language, acting 
and music is considered to be a means of accessing a metaphysical 'oneness'. The 
'play' of art to which the audience listens connects them into that same ground of 
'oneness'. However, the audience listens not to the play, but to themselves, because 
what is being played is the unity of which they are already a part. The role of 
'modern poetry' for Stevens is to awaken people to that ontological unity by playing. 
The ‘metaphysician’ behind this performance is presented as playing a guitar 
to achieve the ‘oneness’. Music itself is one of the key elements of Stevens’ ‘play’ 
and its effect is seen to be a conscious effort to ontologically bind the subjective and 
the objective in ‘becoming one’. For Stevens, who played the guitar as a young man, 
the ‘blue guitar’, like the ‘banjo’ of ‘Banjo Boomer’, or the ‘oboe’ of ‘Asides on the 
Oboe’, is a means of connection. The power of Stevens’ ‘blue guitar’, the earliest of 
these three instruments, was to bring together opposites: Specifically, to fuse the 
imagination and reality. ‘Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz’, a poem collected in Ideas of 
Order (1936) that laments the death of Hoon’s music, had predicted the ‘blue guitar’ 
as a means of uniting opposites. Here, the will to find a uniting music is assertive: 
 Some harmonious skeptic soon in a skeptical music 
 
                                                          
72 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 219. 
 Will unite these figures of men and their shapes 
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 Will glisten again with motion, the music 
 Will be motion and full of shadows.73 
 
Stevens advocates that the familiar shape or notion of ‘men’ ‘Will’ (must) be merged 
in the unity of ‘music’ (art), and the question of what a human ‘is’ becomes opaque 
once again (‘full of shadows’). When ‘Blue Guitar’ opens, Stevens is bent over this 
instrument of the ‘imagination’ like a ‘shearsman of sorts’.74 His very first thought in 
the poem is to ‘patch’ ‘reality’ together into one thing and achieve the 'oneness' that 
the poet desires.75
  The image of the ‘blue guitar’ also fuses the art forms of music and painting. 
Bonnie Costello confirms that Stevens had quoted Picasso in the poem and appears 
to describe ‘Picasso’s early (pre-cubist) painting of The Old Guitarist (“I sing a 
hero’s head, large eye”)’.
 
76
In ‘It Must Change’ from ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ (1942), the 
references to music increase as the poet ‘plays’ of change, or the absence of change 
in moments of hiatus. In Gadamer’s sense of ‘play’, Stevens’ playing has the effect 
of gathering his audience into an ontological relationship with the constancy of the 
change under scrutiny. The poems of ‘It Must Change’ reference the ‘booming’ of 
‘bees’
 However, the ‘blue guitar’ is not just a symbol of music 
and painting, but also of the ‘imagination’, as a modern descendent of the Æolian 
harp and the Orphic lute. It is Stevens who ‘plays’ this ‘instrument’ in order to 
‘patch’ ‘reality’. 
77; ‘a deep echo in a horn’78
                                                          
73 Wallace Stevens, ‘Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 101. 
74 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 135. 
75 Ibid., p. 135. 
76 Bonnie Costello, ‘Stevens and Painting’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, p. 171. 
77 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 337. 
78 Ibid., p. 337. 
; ‘at the final funeral,/ The music halted and the 
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horse stood still’79; ‘Music falls on the silence like a sense’80; ‘In solitude the 
trumpets of solitude/ Are not of another solitude resounding’81; ‘A little string speaks 
for a crowd of voices’82; ‘Sighing that he should leave the banjo’s twang’83; ‘idiot 
minstrelsy in rain’ – ‘Bethou, bethou, bethou me’ – ‘It is/ A sound like any other’84; 
‘We have not the need of any seducing hymn’85; ‘Like a page of music’ - ‘The west 
wind was the music, the motion’.86
The playing of music is the conscious effort to play multiple beings into a 
single sense of being. 
 The sounding of these musical ‘Notes’ evokes 
the sense of ‘change’ that Stevens’ demands (‘Must Change’), but it is also the 
means of ‘playing’ the audience into that nature of ‘change’. 
Stevens had said of poem XI of ‘Blue Guitar’ that: ‘The chord 
destroys its elements by uniting them in the chord. They then cease to exist 
separately.’87 This theme would be posited as a ‘unifying’ force capable of 
eradicating racism in the very late poem, ‘The Sick Man’. Here the ‘Bands’ of ‘black 
men’ ‘seem to be drifting in the air’, ‘Playing mouth-organs in the night or, now, 
guitars.’88 The music has the effect of awakening 'the sick man' lying in bed to an 
ontological connection with the 'black men'. This echoes the kind of range of musical 
expression sought for in Hö
                                                          
79 Ibid., p. 338. 
80 Ibid., p. 339. 
81 Ibid., p. 339. 
82 Ibid., p. 339. 
83 Ibid., p. 340. 
84 Ibid., pp. 340 - 341. 
85 Ibid., p. 341. 
86 Ibid., p. 343. 
87 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 10th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 363. 
88 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Sick Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 455. 
lderlin’s Hyperion at climactic moments: ‘all that has 
being floated together in blissful union, like a chorus of a thousand inseparable 
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tones’.89 We will investigate the romantic origin of such a conception in relation to 
pre-Socratism in due course. 
The seemingly impossible feat of sounding ‘A million people on one string’ 
was achieved in ‘Blue Guitar’ by playing the chords of that instrument. In ‘It Must 
Change’, Stevens recalls this precise moment with: ‘A little string speaks for a crowd 
of voices’.90
One thing about life is that the mind of one man, if strong enough, can become the 
master of all the life in the world…Any really great poet, musician, etc. does this.
 The single string plays the audience into a state of oneness. Stevens 
suggested in a letter of 1940 that: 
91 
 
 Gadamer suggests that ‘we make every work of art, as it were, into a 
picture.’
It is the ‘poet’ and ‘musician’ who can ‘become the master of all the life in the 
world’. Stevens’ musician is a ‘metaphysician in the dark’ who ‘plays’ through a 
poetry of connection that includes the audience. 
92 In investigating the mode of being of a picture, Gadamer considers that 
‘Every picture is an increase of being and is essentially definable as representation, 
as coming-to-presentation.’93 Stevens paints his own pictures in poetry, not least 
through a systematised use of colour, with blue symbolising the imagination, red 
reality, green nature, and debatably, purple symbolising complete being, mixing the 
subjective blue with the objective red. What we do know is that when Stevens read 
from the ‘purple tabulae’, it produced: ‘The outlines of being and its expressings’.94
 Stevens’ engagement with painting through poetry is clear to see. On 
occasion he will write a poem inspired by a painting, as in the case of ‘Angel 
 
                                                          
89 Friedrich Hölderlin, Hyperion and Selected Poems, ed. by Eric L Santner (New York: The 
Continuum Publishing Company, 1990), p. 60. 
90 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 339. 
91 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 8th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 360. 
92 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 131. 
93 Ibid., p. 142. 
94 Wallace Stevens, ‘Large Red Man Reading’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 365. 
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Surrounded by Paysans’. This poem, collected in The Auroras of Autumn, celebrates 
what Bonnie Costello has called ‘the presence/absence dynamic’ of a Pierre Tal-Coat 
painting that Stevens had acquired.95 In earlier examples, Stevens would present 
poems in a sequence of vivid pictures, such as the stark black and white of the 
distinctly Oriental picture-poem from Harmonium (1923), ‘Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird’. At times Stevens will refer to artists directly, such as Pablo 
Picasso or Frans Hals, adopting their styles in his verse. On yet more occasions he 
will compose poetry by looking at the world much as the artist does, arranging forms 
upon a canvas to create the desired effect. For example when he recalls having 
‘recomposed the pines’ and having ‘Shifted the rocks’, ‘For the outlook that would 
be right’, in ‘The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain’, published in his 1954 
Collected Poems as one of the poems of The Rock.96 As an artist, Stevens is always 
projecting and it is through the ‘play’ of his projection of the picture in the process of 
being formed, that for Gadamer he plays his audience into an ontological 
‘understanding’ of the weave and fibres of that one canvas. 
 Stevens appreciated a wide variety of artists. Costello relates that: 
He liked the classicism of Claude Lorrain, the silvery atmosphere of Jean-Baptiste 
Camille Corot, the struggle for realization in Paul Cézanne, the decreative energy of 
Pablo Picasso, the comic-tragic disposition of Paul Klee, the virility of Pierre Tal-
Coat. Critics have found links between Stevens’ poetry and artistic movements such 
as impressionism, symbolism, Cubism, and even surrealism and abstract 
expressionism. But as Stevens writes: “The subject of modern relations [between 
poetry and painting] is best to be approached as a whole”.97 
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435. 
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This approach of taking the modern relations between poetry and painting ‘as a 
whole’ suggests that Stevens identifies his own poetic effort of realisation with that 
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of the painter, which itself suggests that poesis, or the act of making, is a reductive 
concept for Stevens. ‘It Must Be Abstract’ of ‘Notes’ shows that ‘Abstraction’ is 
Stevens’ method of ‘play’ here. Not surprisingly, in one of the poems we find an 
example of an artist in the act of making brush strokes: 
Not to be realized because not to 
Be seen, not to be loved nor hated because 
Not to be realized. Weather by Franz Hals, 
 
Brushed up by brushy winds in brushy clouds, 
Wetted by blue, colder for white.98
The paint is connecting with the elements of water and air and evoking something 
‘not to/ Be seen’, something like Stevens’ ‘foreign song’ from ‘Of Mere Being’.
 
 
99
The weather and the giant of the weather, 
Say the weather, the mere weather, the mere air: 
An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought.
 In 
this poem from ‘It Must Be Abstract’, Stevens provides a description of what his 
painting in poetry is drawing his audience into a relationship with: 
It must be visible or invisible, 
Invisible or visible or both: 
A seeing and unseeing in the eye. 
 
100
The ‘visible’ and the ‘invisible’ are blended in painting and poetry, as in sight and 
thought. The act of painting on a canvas is to take something from the 'invisible' 
whole and abstract it in colour. That the appearing of the physical paint is termed as 
'An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought', demonstrates Stevens' effort to show 
that mental representations and physical representations are connected in the 
'invisible' whole. The act of painting or making poetry involves us all in this 
‘oneness’, by enacting the ‘truth’ of an appearing out of the ‘invisible’ to which we 
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are purported to be connected. The canvas, the blank page and the mind become 
horizons for the revealing of being. Of Caravaggio’s The Death of the Virgin, 1605 - 
6, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy suggests that: 
We are there without leaving the threshold, on the threshold, neither inside nor 
outside – and perhaps we are, ourselves, the threshold, just as our eye conforms to 
the plane of the canvas and weaves itself into its fabric.101 
 
 Gadamer’s radicalisation of the hermeneutical project considers that 
‘language is the universal realm in which understanding occurs’, and that: 
We can now see that this activity of the thing itself, the coming into language of 
meaning, points to a universal ontological structure, namely to the basic nature of 
everything toward which understanding can be directed. Being that can be 
understood is language.102 
 
Not at the eye but at the joy of it. 
I play. But this is what I think.
As poet, Stevens’ primary mode of ‘play’ is language. For example, in poem XXIV 
of ‘The Man With The Blue Guitar’ (1937) Stevens writes: 
A poem like a missal found 
In the mud, a missal for that young man, 
 
That scholar hungriest for that book, 
The very book, or, less, a page 
 
Or, at the least, a phrase, that phrase, 
A hawk of life, that latined phrase: 
 
To know; a missal for brooding-sight. 
To meet that hawk’s eye and to flinch 
 
103 
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p. 57. 
102 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 469 - 470. 
103 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 145 - 146. 
‘I play. But this is what I think.’ The ‘play’, performed through language with 
reference to the ‘guitar’, is linked to the serious thought that poetry can replace the 
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religious text, relishing nature instead. There can be little doubt that Stevens’ 
language is self-consciously at ‘play’. From Harmonium it cries, it calls, it sings and 
it addresses: 
Chieftain Iffucan of Azcan in caftan 
Of tan with henna hackles, halt!104 
 
Stevens’ ‘play’ is universal in scope and it is through the ontological connection that 
he feels the poet or musician is able to ‘become the master of all the life in the 
world’, as here in poem XXV of ‘Blue Guitar’: 
He held the world upon his nose 
And this-a-way he gave a fling. 
 
His robes and symbols, ai-yi-yi— 
And that-a-way he twirled the thing.105 
 
At times the language can be more direct in trying to touch the senses through terms 
such as: ‘flick’106, ‘clipped’107, ‘nick’108 and ‘rattapallax’.109 At other times this 
effort to connect can become violent. It wants to ‘burn’, to ‘trace’ and press its 
‘character’ onto us. Poem III of ‘Blue Guitar’ says: 
To drive a dagger in his heart, 
 
To lay his brain upon the board 
And pick the acrid colors out, 
 
To nail his thought across the door, 
Its wings spread wide to rain and snow, 
 
To strike his living hi and ho, 
                                                          
104 Wallace Stevens, ‘Bantams in Pine-Woods’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 60. 
105 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 146. 
106 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 333. 
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Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 62. 
To tick it, tock it, turn it true, 
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To bang it from a savage blue, 
Jangling the metal of the strings...110 
 
The imagination is violently forged together with a reality that includes nature and 
the metal, mechanical world of modernity. It wants to ‘drive’, ‘lay’, ‘pick’, ‘nail’, 
‘spread’, ‘tick’ and ‘bang’ it into a single ‘reality’. Mind and world are nailed 
together and it is the ‘play’ of the language that grounds the work of art and us in an 
ontological connection for Gadamer. 
Equally, Stevens’ language can be classical, delighting in a knowing 
pomposity: ‘Begin, ephebe’111, ‘Ecce, Oxidia’112, ‘celestial ennui of apartments’113, 
‘lutanist of fleas’114, ‘Le Monocle de Mon Oncle’115. Yet the last thing it desires is 
language for its own sake. What it desires is ‘reality’, the reality of a ‘Pure rhetoric 
of a language without words’, the unveiling of being in language as ‘a shape of life 
described/ By another shape without a word’.116 It is desperate to include what 
cannot be said into what can be said, to ‘say the unsayable’, as that which connects 
all things.117 Rational language must make way for a revealing of reality: ‘there are 
words/ Better without an author, without a poet’.118 It echoes Gadamer’s suggestion 
that ‘being that can be understood is language.’119
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 Stevens will ‘play’ with different languages, seamlessly slipping into French 
and German: ‘C’était mon enfant, mon bijou, mon âme’, or ‘Ach, Mutter’.120 The 
effect of the ‘play’ is one of connecting the audience to the ‘whole’, which is the 
thrust of Stevens’ poetic project. Stevens had written in his Adagia that: ‘French and 
English constitute a single language’.121
An elixir, an excitation, a pure power. 
The poem, through candor, brings back a power again 
That gives a candid kind to everything.
 This could also be viewed as an example of 
the notion that modernism is international, though this would apply more to Stevens’ 
language and interest, rather than to his non-existent travel to other continents. 
 A poignant example of what Gadamer calls the ‘play’ of a work of art, of 
language reflecting a universal hermeneutic experience, is given in ‘It Must Be 
Abstract’ from ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. Here Stevens begins by giving 
the theory: 
The poem refreshes life so that we share, 
For a moment, the first idea . . . It satisfies 
Belief in an immaculate beginning  
 
And sends us, winged by an unconscious will, 
To an immaculate end. We move between these points: 
From that ever-early candor to its late plural  
 
And the candor of them is the strong exhilaration 
Of what we feel from what we think, of thought 
Beating in the heart, as if blood newly came, 
 
 122
The poem, as a new creation, ‘refreshes life’ and curiously brings poet and audience 
into a state where they ‘share’ the ‘first idea’. We will outline Stevens’ interpretation 
of the ‘first idea’ in due course. For now it is enough to see how this refreshing of 
life ‘Satisfies belief in an immaculate beginning’ from which all subsequent 
 
 
                                                          
120 Wallace Stevens, ‘Sea Surface Full of Clouds’ & ‘Explanation’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 83 
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122 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 330 - 331. 
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pluralities are intimated to arise. Stevens says that it is through the ‘ever-early’ 
‘candor’, the openness of the poem, that this ‘pure power’ is to be found. In origin, 
‘candor’ is a pure radiance or ‘whiteness’.123 I will argue that the fundamental 
ground that opens up for Stevens through the ‘candor’ of the poem, is one in which 
he can attempt to recreate (abstract) a broader sense of what it means to be human. 
The poem, as a new creation, creates this ‘power’ by bathing everything in the 
original unity of the ‘first idea’; it ‘gives a candid kind to everything’. Poetry 
refreshes life in its ‘pure radiance’, in what Gadamer, after Heidegger, calls its being, 
which is ‘ever-early’. The experience of the appearing of a new fiction, to use 
Stevens’ language from a late poem entitled ‘The Rock’, produces ‘The body 
quickened and the mind in root.’124
And still the grossest iridescence of ocean 
Howls hoo and rises and howls hoo and falls. 
Life’s nonsense pierces us with strange relation.
 From this universal re-grounding of reality in the 
equality of mere being the poet is free to abstract whatever he wants. Stevens 
continues in ‘Notes’ by presenting a proof for his theory: 
We say: At night an Arabian in my room, 
With his damned hoobla-hoobla-hobbla-how, 
Inscribes a primitive astronomy  
 
Across the unscrawled fores the future casts 
And throws his stars around the floor. By day 
The wood-dove used to chant his hoobla-hoo 
 
125 
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This mini-poem is an example of how poetry generates ‘candor’, through ‘play’, that 
draws the audience into a single ground opened by its ‘hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how’. 
In itself, in terms of rational ‘meaning’, it is only part of ‘Life’s nonsense’, yet the 
‘play’ of it ‘pierces us’ with the single bond of ‘strange relation’. Here, form 
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dominates meaning. It raises the ‘first idea’ by showing a new appearance, 
reminding the audience that everything is grounded in the ‘first idea’, and embracing 
them in that fundamental ground. Gadamer suggests that the ‘play’ of a work of art 
draws the audience into an ontological experience. Stevens had said that he liked his 
philosophy ‘smothered in beauty and not the other way around’.126 The nature of this 
outer beauty, what Stevens called the ‘essential gaudiness’ of poetry, is itself 
‘philosophical’ to Gadamer.127 
In terms of the philosophy that lies beneath this outer shell of beauty, 
Gadamer suggests the following of his own connections of language, object and 
thought: 
But must we not speak of the rightness of words – i.e., insist on the unity of word 
and thing? Did not the most profound of early thinkers, Heraclitus, discover the 
depth of meaning contained in the play on words?128 
 
In considering the being of beings, Greek metaphysics regarded it as a being that 
fulfilled itself in thought. This thought is the thought of nous, which is conceived as 
the highest and most perfect being, gathering within itself the being of all beings. 
The articulation of the logos brings the structure of being into language, and this 
coming into language is, for Greek thought, nothing other than the presencing of the 
being itself, its aletheia.
Further that: 
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The Greek conception of the ‘being of beings’, and what Gadamer refers to as ‘the 
Eliatic principle of the association of being and noein’ [mind/thought], belong to 
Parmenides.130
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 Indeed, Gadamer says that: ‘In that our hermeneutical theory seeks to 
show the interconnection of event and understanding, it sends us back to 
41 
 
Parmenides’.131 Gadamer’s reliance on Parmenides comes with the following 
proviso:  
We are simply following an internal necessity of the thing itself if we go beyond the 
idea of the object and the objectivity of understanding toward the idea that subject 
and object belong together...But we cannot simply follow the Greeks.132 
 
Rather, Gadamer says that he was drawn ‘toward the dialectic of the Greeks, because 
they did not conceive understanding as a methodic activity of the subject, but as 
something that the thing itself does and which thought suffers.’133 This recalls 
Stevens’ statement pertaining to ‘An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought.’134
 Gadamer’s return to the rhythms of the two pre-Socratics, Heraclitus and 
Parmenides, will now lead us through a chronological reading of each of Stevens’ 
collections. Here we will analyse how the language and form of Stevens’ poetry 
evokes what McMahon calls an ‘archai of unity’, to see if this accounts for the 
‘philosophy’ that Stevens has smothered with ‘beauty’, and also to consider whether 
it bears resemblance to Gadamer’s own reliance upon pre-Socratism.
 I 
would suggest that this is Parmenidean ‘thought’ in origin, but a proof of that is not 
essential for the case ahead. 
135
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 If so, this 
would have significant implications for critics’ constant reading of a Heideggerian 
philosophy into Stevens’ poetry, as Heidegger’s own philosophy owes much to pre-
Socratic thought. What Gadamer’s ontological sense of ‘play’ has demonstrated to 
this point, is the hermeneutic relationship of Stevens’ poetry and its reading 
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audience. We will now turn our attention to the ground with which Stevens appears 
to be connecting his audience. 
 
After Kant: Experiencing the ‘Thing-In-Itself’ through the Pre-Socratic 
Element in the Philosophy of Art 
 
Harmonium – A Poetry of Connection 
Critchley seems entirely correct to suggest that Stevens comes at poetry from 
a 'perceived failure of Kantianism, from what might be called a dejected 
transcendental idealism'.136 Similarly, Bloom appears accurate in suggesting that 
Stevens began as an 'involuntary and desperate Transcendentalist.'137
Having seen the pre-Socratic thought at the heart of Gadamer’s sense of how 
an audience ‘understands’ a work of art, we can now analyse the chronological 
development of Stevens’ use of language and form as it attempts to enact a sense of 
these ontological concepts. It is because art, mind and world are equally founded in 
being and becoming for Stevens, that these conceptions become the means of 
reconnecting with the ‘thing-in-itself’. This reconnection necessarily takes place in 
art for Stevens, because art refreshes the ontological connection and shows mind and 
world, or the imagination and reality, to be ‘one’. The result is to ascribe a truth-
telling function to the work of art, which is itself subject to being and becoming. 
 However, in 
what follows I will argue that Stevens’ poetry is in line with post-Kantian poets and 
philosophers of art, who, in certain instances, turned back to pre-Socratic thought in 
an effort to overcome Kant and reconnect with the ‘thing-in-itself’. 
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My 
contention is that such an effort to reconnect with the 'thing-in-itself' through art is 
43 
 
reminiscent of the objectives of pre-Socratic poetic ontology, and that it is the artistic 
act of opening a new poesis
Critchley argues that Stevens owes his sense ‘that “the two-in-oneness” of 
the world is phenomenologically disclosed or reflectively transfigured as a world not 
in philosophy but through a poetic act, that is to say, in an artwork’, to 
‘romanticism’.
 that is perceived as forming the point of connection.  
138 Stevens’ initial debt to romanticism in this specific regard seems 
highly likely. However, later poems will show that reductive pre-Socratic concepts, 
themselves originally expressed in poetry, closely parallel how Stevens progressed 
beyond romanticism. We may also say that it was the pre-Socratics to whom a 
romantic poet such as Hölderlin turned back, precisely in order to justify reducing 
two things to one thing. Stevens’ letters suggest that he was familiar with Hölderlin, 
who wrote several pieces in homage to Empedocles, admiring his ability to ‘confuse 
the subjective and objective in their appearance’.139
 If the question of art becomes the question of philosophy at the writing of the 
third Critique, as Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy suggest, then we 
may consider that without Kant we would not have had romanticism.
 What is significant is that 
Empedocles wrote his philosophy of connection in poetic form. 
140 This is not 
to say that romanticism is merely a ‘scheme derived from post-Kantian 
philosophy’.141 Rather, Kant becomes instrumental for creating the ground for a 
movement that modernism has perhaps not so much escaped, as rehashed.142
                                                          
138 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 30. 
139 Friedrich Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. and ed. by Thomas Pfau (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988), p. 61. 
140 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute, trans. by Philip Barnard 
and Cheryl Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 30. 
141 Ibid., p. 11. 
142 Ibid., p. 15. 
 In other 
words, part of the unconscious movement evident within modernism, to Lacoue-
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Labarthe and Nancy, is its various uses of romanticism as a ‘foil’ to modernism 
while not considering how it is reworking romanticism.143 This does not lead them to 
attempt to establish the ‘contemporary relevance of romanticism’, as a ‘suppression 
pure and simple of history’, but rather they consider that we still belong to the age it 
opened up.144
If it is true to suggest that ‘Philosophy, then, controls romanticism’, or in less 
provocative terms, ‘Kant opens up the possibility of romanticism’, then perhaps it is 
not surprising that elements of this post-Kantian poetry should consume pre-Socratic 
poetic thought for its ability to collapse the subjective and objective divide.
 
145
Heraclitean Reverberations 
 What 
certain post-Kantian philosophers and poets seem to have wanted from pre-Socratic 
poetic ontology, is its claim to reconnect with the 'thing-in-itself'. As we shall see 
later, one of the interesting developments with modernism is how not just the 
audience, but also the poet and poetry itself stand in relation to these reductive pre-
Socratic concerns. 
 
 
Arguably, Stevens' earliest poems did not immediately approach an evocation 
of the ontological centre at the heart of their 'play'. Rather, they found their way to a 
breakthrough into a sense of 'pure being' (that I will argue was attempted fully in 
'The Snow Man') by viewing an individual poem to be a 'thing-in-itself'. For 
example, Stevens said of 'The Curtains in the House of the Metaphysician', first 
published in 1919 and collected in Harmonium, that it was written ‘at a time when I 
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felt strongly that poems were things in themselves’.146 Though Critchley considers 
that Stevens is interested in the thing itself, this considerably weakens his claim for 
Stevens that ‘the poet gives us ideas about the thing, not the thing itself.’147
That poems were ‘things in themselves’ for Stevens, at the time when he was 
composing the pieces for Harmonium, can be read as a parallel with the poetic 
philosophy of the pre-Socratics. Müller had suggested that ‘the philosophers of old’ 
preferred a language of phusei over a language of thesei, thus creating their own 
natural/physical language.
 
148 This could be seen as a parallel of Stevens' 'Earthy 
Anecdote', the poem that opens Harmonium. John Miles, following Joan Richardson 
in highlighting the importance of the pre-Socratics for Stevens, suggests that ‘Earthy 
Anecdote’ ‘is a poem with which the Presocratics might feel at home.’149 As Eleanor 
Cook has noted, in its original Greek form the word ‘anecdote’ (anékdota) means ‘a 
secret or private, hitherto unpublished narrative’.150 The language of Stevens’ poem 
is itself presented as part of the earth, an ‘unpublished’ language of phusei. Müller 
records that Heraclitus 'was reported to have said, that to use any words except those 
supplied by nature for each thing, was not to speak, but only to make a noise.'151 Bart 
Eeckhout maintains that Stevens would have realized the similarities between his 
own world view and that of Heraclitus.152
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 Such modes of thought lend a palpable 
sense to language, placing it on equal terms with natural reality, such as in the 
Harmonium poem, 'To the Roaring Wind': 
 What syllable are you seeking, 
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 Vocalissimus, 
 In the distances of sleep? 
 Speak it.153
 Of a windy night as it is
 
 
Certainly the idea of poetry being a 'thing-in-itself' remained in Stevens and 
is still evident in the long poem, ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, collected in 
The Auroras of Autumn: 
 The poem is the cry of its occasion, 
 Part of the res itself and not about it. 
 The poet speaks the poem as it is, 
 
 Not as it was: part of the reverberation 
154
Stevens’ poems as ‘things in themselves’ in Harmonium, can be presented as 
reduced to a fundamental becoming to which everything is subject. For example, in 
the Heraclitean sounding 'Life is Motion', ‘Bonnie and Josie’ dance around a stump 
and cry out in celebration of the ‘marriage/ Of flesh and air’.
 
 
Poetry is not ‘about’ things, it is part of ‘the res’, part of the ‘thing-in-itself’, because 
poetry and reality both share in Stevens’ repetition of the mere ‘it is’. The above 
lines from ‘An Ordinary Evening’ are an example of the aforementioned significant 
development of individual poems as ‘things in themselves’, as seen in Harmonium, 
to the point where poems are considered by Stevens to be part of a universal ‘res 
itself’, which is the ‘rock’. 
155
Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn together and what is 
drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, 
and all things issue from the one.
 The model parallels 
a fragment of Heraclitus who had said that: 
156
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‘Bonnie and Josie’ can be read as objects in flux, moving around the centre as a 
model for ‘the harmonious’, to which the poem itself as an object is also attuned. As 
such, becoming is both a mode of ‘play’ in Stevens and a ground into which he plays 
us. 
Heraclitus’ universal philosophy of ‘the harmonious’, presents a parallel for 
what Stevens seems to imply in naming his first collection Harmonium. What 
Stevens may have done is to combine the sense of a fundamental harmoniē of 
ontological connection with a specifically American musical art, the humble native 
instrument of that name. Art becomes the means of expression for a reductive 
philosophy, as Stevens ‘plays’ his audience into the single ground of becoming. 
However there are a number of philosophical sources from which Stevens could 
have derived the title of this collection. For example, the post-Kantian Schelling 
speaks of ‘The ultimate ground of all harmony between subjective and objective’, 
rendered ‘by means of the work of art’.157 What seems more definitive is that 
Schelling, and other post-Kantian philosophers of art, found in the philosophy ‘born 
and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge’, a sense ‘that art is the only 
true and eternal organ and document of philosophy’.158
The language and form of Stevens' poetry is a means by which he evokes the 
harmony of fundamental becoming, to which reality and the poem are equally bound. 
 Regardless of a definitive 
source for the title of Stevens’ first collection, it certainly presents its own ‘art’ as 
something similar to an ‘eternal organ’ (harmonium) grounded in a fundamental 
philosophy that I would argue is ‘nourished’ by Pre-Socratic concerns. 
                                                          
157 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, trans. by Peter Heath (Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 2001), p. 232. 
158 Ibid., p. 232. 
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'The Curtains in the House of the Metaphysician', written in the belief that 'poems 
were things in themselves', evokes a sense of universal becoming: 
It comes about that the drifting of these curtains 
 Is full of long motions; as the ponderous 
 Deflations of distance; or as clouds 
 Inseparable from their afternoons159
The sense of a reduction to becoming is enhanced by the language and form of the 
poem as it unfolds, by using words that sound the same (either through a direct 
rhyme or the use of assonance) and creating a single extended sound in the sustained 
alliteration of ‘curtains’, ‘deflations’ and ‘motions’. The individual words are 
collapsed into the oneness of the same sound. It is this alliterative sense of oneness 
in the endings of the words that makes the sentence itself sound ‘long’, ‘ponderous’ 
and, combined with the rhythm, even ‘Inseparable’. This is reminiscent of what 
‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’ will call ‘the inescapable rhythms’, 
which is how the binding oneness of the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ is aurally 
achieved.
 
 
160
Through the form of the poem the curtains drift up in ‘long motions’ until 
they hit the semi-colon, resulting in a ‘ponderous’ moment, from which they appear 
to deflate into the next line. The opening phrase of the poem, ‘It comes about’, 
implies that becoming is beyond rational perception, beyond the subjective self as a 
fundamental cause to which the poem is itself connected. ‘It comes about’ is a 
statement of becoming to which all things (including the poem) are subject, and that 
is precisely how the poem unfolds. The curtains drift as clouds drift, linking them to 
the natural objects of clouds, which are ‘Inseparable from their afternoons’. 
  
                                                          
159 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Curtains in the House of the Metaphysician’, Collected Poetry and Prose, 
p. 49. 
160 Wallace Stevens, ‘Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 75. 
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Language, the curtains, the days and the clouds are all linked in the oneness of 
becoming, the universal harmony. 
If we search for a parallel for Stevens' sense of universal becoming, then the 
Heraclitean archê ('first beginning') of flux presents itself. However, for Heraclitus, 
flux was itself driven by a fundamental 'fire'. He had written that:  
This world, which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was 
ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and 
measures going out.161
In Stevens’ 'Earthy Anecdote', 'Every time' the 'firecat'  bristles in the way, the 
'bucks' move in a 'swift circular line' to the 'right' and 'left'. 
 
 
162 The sense of 
movement is enhanced by the undulating syllables of 'Over Oklahoma' and the 
'firecat' that 'bristled', goes 'leaping', as flames leap.163 Miles has said that there is no 
such animal as a ‘firecat’, which we might suggest portends its metaphysical nature 
as a metaphysical fire.164 This firecat could be a model for Zarathustra's 'fire dog' as 
B.J. Leggett suggests, but the universality of its 'law' seems to suggest a more 
fundamental archê, to which the ‘measures’ of the poem are also bound, in a mode 
reminiscent of the pre-Socratics.165 Hillis Miller’s reading certainly seems to sense 
something closer to the Heraclitean reduction: ‘Earth and mind are reduced to these 
elements, and motion on one side is possible only so long as there is life on the 
other.’166
The concept of a universal becoming founded in a fundamental fire is equally 
evident in 'Domination of Black': 
 
                                                          
161 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 134. 
162 Wallace Stevens, ‘Earthy Anecdote’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 3. 
163 Ibid., p. 3. 
164 John Miles, ‘An Encounter with the Firecat: Wallace Stevens’ “Earthy Anecdote”’, The Wallace 
Stevens Journal, Vol. 22 No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 116 – 132. 
165 B.J. Leggett, Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), pp. 
210 - 212. 
166 J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality, p. 235. 
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Turning in the wind, 
 Turning as the flames 
 Turned in the fire167
 Turning in the wind.
 
 
This nature of perpetual ‘Turning’ is extended to the cosmos, showing that 
everything, be it a leaf or a planet is subject to this ‘law’ for Stevens, as the terms are 
again universalized: 
 Out of the window, 
 I saw how the planets gathered 
 Like the leaves themselves 
 168
The ‘planets’ are ‘gathered’ and are ‘Like’ ‘leaves’, bound to the single ‘law’ of 
motion. Hillis Miller has considered of the poem that: ‘it is like the universe of 
Heraclitus.’
 
 
169 This is true, but importantly, it is like the universe of Heraclitus 
realized through a poetic act. Stevens’ poetic acts appear to remember Heraclitus’ 
poetic use of harmoniē, the image of the bow and the lyre and the ‘measures’ of fiery 
flux. Through musical ‘play’ both poetry and reality, as ‘things in themselves’, are 
reduced to the universal ‘truth’ of becoming. This raises the possibility that it is in 
Heraclitus’ ‘play on words’, that insists upon ‘the unity of word and thing’, that 
Stevens and Gadamer meet in their dealings with art and ontology.170
 Critchley suggests that there is a move in Stevens that may be compared to 
the move from ‘metaphysica specialis, special metaphysics concerned with God, 
freedom and immortality, to metaphysica generalis, or the general metaphysics of 
Kant’s transcendental idealism’.
 
171
                                                          
167 Wallace Stevens, ‘Domination of Black’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 7. 
168 Ibid., p. 7. 
169 J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality, p. 227. 
170 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 406. 
171 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 36. 
 Critchley’s argument suggests that if Kant 
decisively shows that ‘the issues of the nature of God and soul are simply beyond 
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our ken and are thus cognitively meaningless’, then that does not exclude the 
possibility of a philosophy that may be able to investigate what we do know.172 This, 
Critchley says, is the ‘transcendental turn in philosophy’ which means that the 
question of ‘the relation of thought to things or mind to world can no longer be 
conceived in terms of some myth of the given, whether material or immaterial 
substance, but rather has to be conceived as radically subject dependent, i.e. that 
which is is only for the subject to whom it appears, even if what appears is real for 
us.’173
Certainly we can agree with Critchley in saying that Stevens presents a 
departure from ‘some myth of the given’, as the elemental becoming of ‘Ploughing 
on Sunday’ is presumably embraced in favour of the church-tolling bell.
 
174 However, 
I would argue that Stevens’ move is from something that looks like metaphysica 
specialis to a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ that collapses transcendental idealism, 
much as Heidegger had in his critique of Kant.175 For this thought, rather than ‘what 
is’ being ‘only for the subject for whom it appears’, the poet arguably uses poetic 
language to establish ‘the connection between subject and object’, as Hölderlin says, 
in order to know the ‘thing-in-itself’.176
                                                          
172 Ibid., pp. 36 - 37. 
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174 Wallace Stevens, ‘Ploughing on Sunday’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 16. 
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 As we proceed I will argue that this 
connection for Stevens (as for Heidegger), has a close affinity with the poetic 
ontology of the pre-Socratics. 
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Parmenidean Visions 
The sense of a universal 'law' of becoming never departed from Stevens' 
poetry. For Heraclitus, as we have outlined, we may say that the archê ('first 
beginnings') of the universe was fire and becoming. However, for Parmenides, the 
founder of what has come to be called ontology, the archê of the universe was the ‘it 
is’, being.177
Someone here wrote to me and wanted to know what I meant by a thinker of the first 
idea. If you take the varnish and dirt of generations off a picture, you see it in its first 
idea. If you think about the world without its varnish and dirt, you are a thinker of 
the first idea.
 This archê stands in contrast to Heraclitus' conception of becoming in 
that being is seemingly static, a paradox which Stevens’ verse exploits. Stevens 
explained his own conception of the 'first idea' in a letter to Henry Church in 1942, 
as follows: 
178
Harold Bloom, after considering the quote from Stevens’ letter above, suggests that: 
‘The only relevant philosophical notion would seem to be C. S. Peirce’s Idea of 
Firstness. In a letter of 1944, Stevens said he long had been curious about Peirce but 
implied that other interests had kept him from reading the philosopher.’
 
 
179
From Stevens’ explanation of the ‘first idea’ and his use of the term within 
his poetry, I would interpret it as a concept akin to the pre-Socratic sense of being as 
an archê (‘first beginnings’) that underlies all reality. Stevens’ explanation starts by 
describing a way of seeing the world. I interpret this as meaning that the ‘first idea’ 
always originates in the world, rather than as a rational thought within our own 
minds. This would interpret ‘idea’ as an eidos, a direct sense image which has to be 
seen. The ‘first idea’ is buried beneath the ‘varnish and dirt’, which I interpret to be 
 
                                                          
177 Julian Marias, History of Philosophy, pp. 21 - 22. 
178 A Letter to Henry Church, October 28th, 1942. Letters of Wallace Stevens, pp. 426 - 427. 
179 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate (Ithaca & London: Cornell University 
Press, 1977), p. 49. 
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all of the names and rational ideas that humanity has attributed to the world through 
the mind. In opposition to this, Stevens seems to be advocating that there is an ‘idea’ 
that is not our own in origin, and that both mind and world arise from ‘it’. 
 The difficulty with Stevens’ statement is that he proceeds to talk about a 
‘thinker’ of the ‘first idea’, which appears to imply a rational thought. However, it is 
not a rational thought that begins in the mind, rather it is the opposite. The seeing of 
the ‘first idea’ in the world has to take place first. To think the ‘first idea’ is to think 
the ‘nothing’ of being from which mind, all thoughts and the world itself arise in the 
equality of mere being as the ‘it is’. When you think about the ‘first idea’, you are 
allowing your own mind to be utterly reduced in the thought of mere being, which is 
always ‘first’ in terms of priority, and no matter how many millions of thoughts and 
things proceed from ‘it’, ‘it’ always remains ‘first’ as the archê, being. To be a 
‘thinker of the first idea’ is to reduce thought to being so that mind is what being 
unveils, not the other way around, as we shall see. 
However, the particular object which Stevens uses as an example for how to 
see the ‘first idea’ is a picture, a work of art. According to Stevens one must look for 
the ‘first idea’ in the ‘world’ as one would look for it in a ‘picture’, demonstrating 
that for Stevens both art and world (which includes the mind) are equally grounded 
in the single ‘first idea’. ‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’, a poem about a painting, 
collected in The Auroras of Autumn, suggests that ‘in my sight, you see the earth 
again’.180
                                                          
180 Wallace Stevens, ‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 423. 
 The role of the poet is to reveal the single ground that underlies art, mind 
and world (without the ‘varnish and dirt’), thus applying a truth-telling function to 
poetry. Such poetry does not view itself as a work of art, rather it is a mode of 
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unveiling a connection between art, mind and the world, and as such it claims to be 
the ground of an enlarged reality of ‘truth’. 
A new work of art provides a connection to the ‘first idea’ because it is the 
appearing of something new, in the ‘candor’ of its being, giving ‘a candid kind to 
everything’ that sends us back to an ‘immaculate beginning’, which sounds very 
much like the archê (‘first beginnings’) that a pre-Socratic like Parmenides 
attempted to ‘reach’ through a poetic act.181 In ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ 
Stevens says that ‘The first idea was not our own’, ‘Adam/ In Eden was the father of 
Descartes.’182 It was not ‘our own’ because it doesn’t come from the human mind, 
but is what mind and world are proposed to arise from. The inference suggests that in 
naming the animals Adam covered the ‘first idea’ of the thing itself (thus making it 
‘our own’) with a web of language and meaning. It is from this nexus that the poet 
must extricate all things and allow them to be seen in the unity of the ‘first idea’ of 
mere being, that lies beneath the ‘varnish and dirt’.183
It is from the thing itself that Stevens is suggesting we should allow the 
original ‘idea’ of being to step forth, as a reversal of the rationalist terms, just as 
Parmenides’ poesis had done through the concept of aletheia (‘unveiling’). For 
Gadamer this was something that ‘thought suffers’ from ‘the thing itself’
 
184, just as 
for Stevens it was like ‘An abstraction blooded, as a man by thought.’185
                                                          
181 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 330 - 331. 
182 Ibid., p. 331. 
183 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Mere Being’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 476. 
184 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 469. 
185 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 333. 
 The terms 
of the Kantian mind that orders the world are collapsed as mind and world are 
connected in the ‘first idea’, opened by the ‘candor’ of the poem appearing out of 
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being. Stevens' perspective of the underlying ‘first idea’ of the ‘it is’ is aligned with 
Parmenides' sense that: 
Wherefore all these things are but names which mortals have given, believing them 
to be true—coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of 
place and alteration of bright colour.186
For this thinking it is folly to name objects as individually distinct from the totality 
of being, which is the ‘first idea’ that underlies all things. Stevens would record in 
his Adagia the concept of: ‘The World Reduced to One Thing.’
 
 
187 Rajeev Patke has 
surmised that the ‘first idea’ in Stevens is ‘probably Atomic or Parmenidean in 
origin. Whatever its ancestry, Stevens’s fascination with it is obvious.’188
In very early poems such as 'In The Carolinas', first published in the January 
1917 issue of The Soil: A Magazine of Art, as part of a group of poems collectively 
titled Primordia, Stevens can be seen mining his earthy language itself for the 
'honey' of a universal ground of unity. In his collected essays entitled The Necessary 
Angel (1951), Stevens says that: ‘Poetry is a revelation in words by means of 
words.’
 
189 Stevens, like Heidegger, appears to consider that ‘language is an object’ 
to be mined for the universal ground in which all nature stands connected in 
being.190 ‘In the Carolinas’ presents all things as subject to an archê that incorporates 
the 'aspic nipples' of nature that vent honey.191
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 Eleanor Cook considers that Stevens’ 
evocation of nature’s ‘aspic nipples’ suggests both ‘a nourishing meat-jelly and a 
sense of death’, meaning ‘the deadly asp or aspic that Cleopatra laid on her 
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breasts’.192  This demonstrates the fusion of the 'deadly' and the 'nourishing' in a 
single ground (‘honey’) that underlies all nature.193 The opening of poetry reveals 
the single ground in which life, death and language all have their root for Stevens. It 
is here Stevens who is ‘for once’ suckling on the sweet being of nature, as part of it, 
in contradistinction to the becoming of the Heraclitean looking river and days of 
‘Frogs Eat Butterflies’, that ‘seemed to suckle’ on the ‘arid being’ of the planter.194
‘In the Carolinas’ may be a remembrance of Keats’ ‘A Song of Opposites’, 
which references ‘Cleopatra’ ‘With the aspic at her breast’ and the ‘sweetness of the 
pain’ in context of uniting ‘joy’ and ‘sorrow’.
 
195 Stevens’ rewriting of Keats’ 
principle seems to be to ground physical reality in it as well, at the exclusion of the 
‘Muses’ and ‘gods’ (as mere ‘names which mortals have given’), while 
universalising the concept of connection to include the poet as well.196
The pine-tree sweetens my body. 
The white iris beautifies me.
 
Future echoes of 'The Snow Man' are arguably to be found in the close of 'In 
the Carolinas'. Nature and the speaker appear to have become 'one' in the poesis, 
with the italics identifying the otherness of the universal voice of a cosmically 
connected whole. Here, the universal 'honey' and sweetness (depicted in the 
sweetness of the ‘white’ iris) can be read as prophesying the ‘white’ ‘candor’ of the 
'snow' and 'ice' that will perform a similar function in 'The Snow Man': 
197
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Stevens is opening the ground that in 'Credences of Summer', collected in Transport 
to Summer (1947), will include 'The physical pine' and 'the metaphysical pine' in his 
enlarged vision of a reality of connection.198
If the initial glimpse of the 'first idea' had been seen in the language of 'In the 
Carolinas', then a complete breakthrough is enacted in the 'The Snow Man'. Here 
Stevens’ demonstrates what sort of mind it takes to be a ‘thinker of the first idea’
 ‘The Curtains in the House of the 
Metaphysician’ had viewed the poem as a ‘thing-in-itself’, subject with all things to 
an archê of becoming. Poems such as ‘In the Carolinas’ demonstrate that from his 
first collection, Stevens was attempting to mine poems as ‘things in themselves’ in 
order to find an ultimate archê of cosmological connection that lies beneath. The 
archê is not created by the poet; ‘it’ is evoked as already ‘there’. Poetry for Stevens, 
as for Parmenides, Heidegger and Gadamer, is a means of opening the archê of 
‘oneness’ as a ground for a complete ‘reality’ that includes both the imagination and 
reality. 
199
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: 
One must have a mind of winter  
To regard the frost and the boughs  
Of the pine-trees crusted with snow; 
 
And have been cold a long time  
To behold the junipers shagged with ice,  
The spruces rough in the distant glitter  
 
Of the January sun; and not to think  
Of any misery in the sound of the wind,  
In the sound of a few leaves,  
 
Which is the sound of the land  
Full of the same wind  
That is blowing in the same bare place  
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For the listener, who listens in the snow,  
And, nothing himself, beholds  
Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is.200
The command is ‘not to think’, not to reason, because reasoning divides the 
connection. If we don’t think, empathetically or romantically, of a sense of ‘misery’ 
in the wind, then we will become as cold as the glittering sun of ‘January’, as nature 
shagged with ice, and as the snow. ‘Misery’ is reduced to just ‘sound’ collapsed into 
 
 
Only the mind that is part of ‘reality’ will be free of applying the ‘varnish and dirt’ 
of the intellect, because thinking the ‘first idea’ is not to think yourself, but to think 
‘nothing’ of which everything is comprised in mere being. Through the event of 
opening poetic language Stevens reduces mind and world down to the ‘first idea’ 
itself, which after all is not something seen, but only a way of seeing. Again it is the 
‘pine-trees’ that are enveloped in the connection, perhaps evoking a sense of 
Stevens’ yearning for the ‘evergreen’ nature of being as underlying total reality.  
‘One’ is the first word and it sets the tone for a landscape extinguished in a 
blanket of white snow, a ‘candor’ free from the ‘varnish and dirt’. There is no 
Heraclitean ‘fire’ of becoming here and static being is identified with the cold 
opposites of ‘ice’ and ‘snow’. ‘One’ must make the ‘mind’ a revealing of ‘winter’ in 
order to ‘behold’ ‘real reality’, gilded in the oneness of ice. ‘Behold’ sounds the 
sense of ‘be’ and ‘hold’ in terms of a connection of thought and world in being. The 
earlier use of ‘regard’ as a passive viewing collapses the two of Latinate and 
Germanic language into ‘one’ meaning, when used alongside ‘behold’. The natural 
world is ‘in’ the ‘distant glitter’ of the cold ‘January sun’, which serves to collapse 
the distance while making the sun ‘glitter’ like the ice on the natural objects, again 
engendering ‘oneness’. 
                                                          
200 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Snow Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 8. 
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the ‘sound of the land’ which itself seems to blow away with the ‘same wind’, with 
which it is ‘Full’, in what is now ‘the same bare place’. This ‘bare place’ is ‘For the 
listener’ who does not act, but ‘listens’, not to ‘misery’ or to ‘sound’, which have 
been collapsed into the ‘same bare place’, but to ‘nothing’. Mental attribution has 
vanished because what is being ‘looked at’ is the ‘nothing’ of the ‘first idea’ ‘itself’, 
as that which lies beneath mind and world. 
Of ‘The Snow Man’, George S. Lensing has suggested that: ‘I can think of 
few poets, the Christian mystics of the dark night of the soul being a possible 
exception, who more ruthlessly and radically restrain the ego’.201
let me therefore aspire to see, reason and judge in no specific or finite manner – that 
is, not to see, reason or judge at all. So I shall be like the Infinite, nay I shall become 
one with the Infinite and (marvellous thought!) one with the One.
 In restraining the 
ego so ‘radically’, Stevens could be seen as correcting what he had inferred was 
Adam’s rationalist mistake in Eden. George Santayana, a philosopher concerned 
with art who Stevens knew personally, says: 
202
Within these remarks that Stevens has read, in a work which Lentricchia says moved 
Stevens ‘to a lifetime of meditation’, Santayana has described the restraint of the ego 
that allows him to become ‘one with the One’. By advocating an unveiling (aletheia) 
as something that ‘thought suffers’, through the total restraint of judgement, 
Santayana’s comments connect with Parmenides’ concept of the ‘One’.
 
 
203
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 The ‘One’ 
for Parmenides is the totality of the ‘it is’, which in Stevens might be compared to 
the vision of ‘Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is’. Santayana has also 
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advocated a complete, total and utter alignment with Parmenides’ concept of the 
‘One’, calling it a ‘marvellous thought!’204
As Lensing had intuited (and as I have suggested) it seems likely that 
Stevens’ use of the ‘One’ in the opening line, ‘One must have a mind of winter’, is 
not used in the sense of the singular, rational ‘I’, but to imply a sense of all things 
reduced to ‘One’. Krzystof Ziarek considers that in the concept of ‘nothing’ 
‘Heidegger and Stevens meet again’, which they do, but perhaps Parmenides 
provides the ground of origin in which Stevens and Heidegger meet?
 
205
In the primary stages, of course, mysticism does not venture to abolish all our ideas, 
or to renounce all our categories of thought. Thus many Christian mystics have still 
clung, out of respect for authority, to traditional theology, and many philosophical 
mystics have made some room for life and science in the postscripts which they, like 
Parmenides, have appended to the blank monism of their systems. But such 
concessions or hesitations are inconsistent with the mystical spirit which will never 
be satisfied, if fully developed and fearless, with anything short of Absolute 
Nothing.
 On the same 
page Santayana proceeds to say: 
206
Santayana views the sections of Parmenides’ poem that pertain more to ‘life’ and to 
‘science’, as ‘postscripts’ to his ‘blank monism’. However, though Santayana 
advocates that the mystic goes beyond Parmenides’ ‘concessions’, Stevens has 
followed something that looks similar to Parmenides’ rendering of the ‘One’, 
allowing for ‘Nothing that is not there’ and the ‘nothing that is’, in a similar way as 
Parmenides had contrasted the  ‘it is not’ with the ‘it is’ of being in a poem.
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 The 
pre-Socratic ontological poetry is useful for the post-Kantian philosopher of art, or 
poet, in approaching a reconnection of mind and world at the base of reality, beneath 
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the ‘varnish and dirt’. What gives weight to this conception in Stevens’ poetry is that 
it is certain that he encountered this kind of thinking. The process of reduction to the 
‘nothing’ of being also has the interesting side-effect of cleansing reality of all 
romantic intoning for Stevens. Here we see an example of how modernism’s 
metaphysical consciousness re-grounds the post-Kantian project on new universal 
terms. 
Though this ‘reality’ grounded in ‘nothing’ could appear empty, an early 
reading by Hillis Miller had considered the ‘nothing’ to be being, the fully reduced 
state of mind, nature and poet. He says: 
the nothing is not nothing. It is. It is being. Being is a pervasive power, visible 
nowhere in itself and yet present and visible in all things…Being is not a thing like 
other things and therefore can only appear to man as nothing, but it is what all things 
must participate in if they are to exist at all.208
However, Bloom suggests that the interpretation of the ‘nothing’ as being, works for 
the later poetry, but not quite so much for ‘The Snow Man’.
  
 
209
The listener, reduced to nothing, remains human because he beholds something 
shagged and rough, barely figurative, yet still a figuration rather than a bareness. 
This “nothing” is the most minimal of abstracted fictions, and yet still it is a 
fiction.
 Bloom argues that the 
‘listener’ is not made inhuman by a reduction to amorphous being: 
210
Certainly Bloom has a point as the evocation of being would always seem to 
be made through yet another word or metaphor, never finally revealed as being 
‘itself’. However, this does not see the poem as a process of unveiling (aletheia) that 
leads to the nakedness of that final line. In Adagia Stevens would write that: ‘The 
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thing seen becomes the thing unseen’.211 By the time the speaker is ‘reduced to 
nothing’ he has passed through the revealing of the branches disclosed in the single 
bond of ‘ice’, to mere ‘revealing’ ‘itself’. He has created a sense of a bond of 
‘oneness’ from which he brings us to its nature as a ‘nothing’. He no longer sees 
ontic reality, rather, he ‘beholds’ the ‘nothing’ of ontological ‘reality’, he beholds 
‘nothing’. In context of the poem the ‘nothing’ of himself is no different from the 
‘nothing that is’. As Santayana says, he has become ‘one with the One.’212 That this 
sense of being is communicated through language is of little concern to a post-
Kantian philosopher such as Gadamer, who we saw concluding earlier that: ‘Being 
that can be understood is language.’213
If naming is an act of unveiling as it is for Heidegger and Gadamer, then the 
form of the poem discloses being, just as an appearance in reality does. In reading 
the long sentence that constitutes the poem the reader must look to the next 
successive line to complete the next unveiling of phusis (that includes the naturalised 
mind that is ‘of winter’). It is only the last line that unveils ‘Nothing that is not there 
and the nothing that is’ which Hillis Miller’s early appraisal had suggested was 
being. In the satisfaction of completing the sentence Stevens has reduced language 
(as a ‘thing-in-itself’) to the unveiling of mere revealing itself. Through its use of 
language, the poem takes its reader to the threshold of the ‘thing’, to the thought of 
the ‘nothing’ of being in which all things are grounded. It is in the thought of nothing 
 What Bloom's argument does not allow for is 
that it was a pre-Socratic such as Parmenides who had achieved his own connection 
with the 'One' through the creation of a new poesis. Poetic language unveils the 
‘nothing’ of being that lies beneath the ‘varnish and dirt’ for this thought.  
                                                          
211 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 906. 
212 George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 14. 
213 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 470. 
63 
 
that mind is reduced to opening that opens nothing, the vanishing of the ground of 
the subjective self, or the radical, ruthless restraint of the ego. The poem resists 
rationalist and transcendental idealist terms, in a radical effort to connect in the 
universal ground of the ‘thing-in-itself’, which for Stevens includes both poetry and 
reality. 
 
Ideas of Order – The Way in Which Order Appears 
 
Stevens’ reduction to the ‘nothing’ of being in ‘The Snow Man’, could be 
linked to the horror and revulsion of the earliest of the poems collected in Ideas of 
Order (1936), ‘The Sun This March’ (1930).  The painful poem of poetic 
reawakening after six years of what Bloom calls ‘almost total silence’, states that214: 
‘Cold is our element and winter’s air’ seems to revive a sense of the ‘mind of winter’ 
that immediately: ‘Brings voices as of lions coming down.’215 The apparent terror 
this induces manifests itself in a desperate cry: ‘Oh! Rabbi, rabbi, fend my soul for 
me/ And true savant of this dark nature be.’216
                                                          
214 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 88. 
215 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Sun this March’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 109. 
216 Ibid., p. 109. 
 This ‘rabbi’ may be offered in an 
ironic tone, but the ‘fend my soul’ and reference to ‘this dark nature’, seems entirely 
serious. The ‘turning spirit in an earlier self’ and the ‘dark nature’ seem to recall the 
reduction to becoming observed in the Harmonium poem, ‘Domination of Black’. 
Equally, the references to the ‘cold’ ‘element’ and ‘winters air’ evoke the reduction 
to what Hillis Miller had called being in ‘The Snow Man’. The terror seems to stem 
from the mind and world being subject to the same universal fate, which is utterly 
dispassionate. 
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By 1936 the thought of ‘winter’s air’ in ‘The Sun This March’ is passed over 
in favour of the lines from the poem eventually chosen to open Ideas of Order, 
‘Farewell to Florida’, which begins with: 'Go on, high ship'.217 The poem of 
departure is seen to reject both ‘The leaves in which the wind kept up its sound’ of 
‘The Snow Man’, and ‘the ever-freshened Keys’ of ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ 
(1934).218 Stevens is seen to attempt to reject the preceding conceptions of the ‘first 
idea’ as both a ‘nothing’ (in its Northern male form) and the ‘inhuman’ 
singer/artificer (in its Southern female form), saying: 'Her mind had bound me 
round'.219 In ‘The Snow Man’ Stevens had found ‘her’ totality through his own 
mind. In ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ he would himself be a part of ‘her’ mind. 
In ‘Farewell to Florida’ however, she is gone, having left her ‘skin upon the 
floor’.220
Although ‘Farewell to Florida’ opens Ideas of Order, in both chronology and 
intent, it really points to the more socially engaging poetry that Stevens would 
attempt to write through the later 1930’s and early 1940’s, and in which the ‘first 
idea’ would once again be re-imagined to incorporate social existence. The pointed 
effort to reject ‘Ananke’ that ‘Farewell to Florida’ announces would itself ultimately 
 I would argue that the ‘skin upon the floor’ is a literal reference to the 
language of ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’, which as we shall see, surrounds the 
‘first idea’ as the metaphysical ‘beyond’ of the singing ‘she’. The serpentine ‘her’ 
who had left ‘her’ skin is Ananke (‘Necessity’), who’s ‘aspic nipples’ had previously 
vented ‘honey’, and ‘she’ and her ‘aspic’ nature will be discussed in a later chapter 
with reference to parallels concerning Parmenides’ sense of being.  
                                                          
217 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Sun this March’ & ‘Farewell to Florida’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 
109 & 97. 
218 Wallace Stevens, ‘Farewell to Florida’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 97. 
219 Ibid., p. 97. 
220 Ibid., p. 97. 
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fail, although to advantageous dramatic effect for the poet, as poems from Stevens’ 
later period such as ‘The Auroras of Autumn’ will show. The essential development 
of this period of Stevens’ poetry is in line with Bloom’s broad assessment of 
Stevens, which suggests that: ‘The three stages in him are called: Reduction to the 
First Idea → Being unable to Live with the First Idea alone → Re-imagining the 
First Idea…’221
is not the familiar modern meaning of “idea” but a reactivation of the word’s original 
meaning in ancient Greek, from before the days of Plato. Originally, idea referred to 
the realm of the visible; deriving from the verb idein (to see), it meant as much as 
“look, semblance.”
 
 ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’, written before ‘Farewell to Florida’, 
attempts to ‘Re-imagine the First Idea’ in a way which shows a nuanced 
development from the reduction to the ‘nothing’ of ‘The Snow Man’. In a sense the 
poem also performs a ‘Reduction to the First Idea’, but here it is physical reality seen 
as grounded in the ‘first idea’, not reality consumed by the ‘nothing’ of the ‘first 
idea’ alone. What is most fully realised in ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ is a 
turning, a looking out from the ‘first idea’ as a principle of ‘order’, rather than a 
reduction of the mind to the pure ‘nothing’. In this regard the importance of the 
poem to Stevens’ future direction cannot be underestimated. 
Echoing Hillis Miller, Eeckhout confirms that in Stevens the word ‘idea’: 
222
As we saw earlier with Stevens’ account of the ‘first idea’, it is how a thing appears 
from itself (once cleared of its ‘varnish and dirt’) that is important, not what ‘I’ think 
about it. What ‘I’ think about it is only what is added to the ‘thing’, what is covering 
it over. The ‘mind of winter’ had entreated us ‘not to think’. In the case ahead 
concerning the Key West poem, I will argue that what the universe ‘shows’ for 
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Stevens, as its eidos, parallels an inherent technê (art or skill) which it is the poet’s 
task to read out from phusis. Further, I want to show how this development 
illuminates structures that subsequently appear in important poems that followed, 
such as ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ (1937) and ‘Of Modern Poetry’ (1940). 
What I am calling technê is presented in the Key West poem as the inherent ‘order’ 
which naturally runs from the ontological ground, on through nature, and into the 
language and form of the poem as its antipodes.  Poesis here is the result of the 
‘expressings’ of ‘being’ seen in the ‘order’ of things, it is not a poetry that attempts a 
reduction of things to the ‘nothing’ of being, as has been suggested of ‘The Snow 
Man’. 
Certainly ‘The Idea of Order’ can be read as a subjective ‘idea’, as Bloom 
has read it. Yet here we depart from Bloom by suggesting that Stevens’ ‘Re-
imagining of the First Idea’ is an alignment of the poem with what resembles a 
universal eidos of technê, the ‘idea of order’. Critchley outlines the issue: 
For Bloom, like Riddel, the poem is entirely an act of the mind without reference to 
reality, a view that he ingeniously, but somewhat obsessively, traces back to 
Emerson, Whitman and the tradition of American transcendentalism.223
However, Robert Rehder seems more convincing in suggesting that: ‘The poet’s 
function in this poem is to listen rather than create’.
 
 
224
                                                          
223 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 27. 
224 Harold Bloom, ed., ‘Robert Rehder on Metaphor’, Wallace Stevens - Bloom’s Major Poets, p. 63. 
 This approach is reminiscent 
of Stevens’ ‘listener, who listens’ in ‘The Snow Man’ in order to allow an 
‘unveiling’. Yet this is not the unveiling of a ‘nothing’ to which everything is 
reduced, but the unveiling of an inherent order in which everything stands. The poet 
must allow the eidos to step forth. In this sense a poesis is an appearing, an eidos. 
This method suggests a post-Kantian stance that denies the ordering power of the 
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mind and allows the order at hand to reveal itself. This appraisal is conducive with 
Stevens’ own assessment in ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’: 
  But to impose is not 
 To discover. To discover an order as of 
A season, to discover summer and know it, 
 
 To discover winter and know it well, to find, 
 Not to impose, not to have reasoned at all225
This finding that does not ‘impose’ is contrary to Critchley’s suggestion that: ‘We 
find an order in things. This is not an order that is given, but one that we give it.’
 
 
226
phusis gets narrowed down by contrast with technē - which means neither art nor 
technology but a kind of knowledge, the knowing disposal over the free planning and 
arranging and controlling of arrangements. Technē is generating, building, as a 
knowing pro-ducing.
 
The ‘song’ of ‘order’ is already there, it is not what the poet is injecting into reality, 
it is what the poet is trying to hear and align his art with. 
Heidegger, mining the pre-Socratic ground of phusis and technê, provides a 
parallel for Stevens’ sense of the word ‘order’, which I am suggesting resembles an 
inherent technê (what Stevens calls ‘Arranging’, ‘ordering’) at Key West: 
227
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This inherent ‘knowledge’ of technê narrows down phusis for Heidegger and in 
Stevens’ poem it is evident as a sound (‘key’) that is heard in nature, not as 
something that originates with the poet. Just as phusis (‘nature’) was a consuming 
force in Harmonium poems such as ‘Sunday Morning’, ‘Frogs Eat Butterflies’ and 
‘Anatomy of Monotony’, so at Key West chaotic nature rears up, threatening to 
destroy: 
 The meaningless plungings of water and the wind, 
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 Theatrical distances, bronze shadows heaped 
 On high horizons, mountainous atmospheres 
 Of sky and sea.228
 More even than her voice, and ours...
 
 
Yet Stevens senses that there is something more inherent than the sublime theatre of 
chaotic nature, more even than the appearing, the eidos of things, there is an inherent 
technê that orders the semblance of nature, of which he appears to see the human 
mind as an extension: 
If it was only the dark voice of the sea 
 That rose, or even colored by many waves; 
 If it was only the outer voice of sky 
 And cloud, of the sunken coral water-walled, 
 However clear, it would have been deep air, 
 The heaving speech of air, a summer sound 
 Repeated in a summer without end 
 And sound alone. But it was more than that, 
229
Alongside the theatrical confines of chaotic nature and the ‘speech of air’ (the 
underlying ‘nothing’), there is something that is ‘more than that’: An inner order that 
appears, like the order of the seasons that are ‘Repeated’, not like the endless 
repetition of a ‘summer sound’, which is reminiscent of the ‘sound alone’ of ‘The 
Snow Man’. Stevens has embraced the universal nature of the ‘nothing’ of being, but 
has recast it as an appearing of technê which underlies all things. In a sense, Stevens 
could be seen to be uncovering the technical ground for the universal 'stage' that will 
appear in ‘Of Modern Poetry’, and which connects the imagination and reality in the 
'more than that' (
 
 
technê) of his universal art.230
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Again, it is Heidegger, who through the pre-Socratic thought can provide a 
language for this ‘more than that’, in its pressing back against the overwhelming, and 
also for the role of art in aligning with that containment, or taming, of phusis: 
technē characterizes the deinon, the violence-doing, in its decisive basic trait; for to 
do violence is to need to use violence against the over-whelming: the knowing 
struggle to set Being, which was formerly closed off, into what appears as beings.231
Technê, as the fundamental semblance of nature, is in Heidegger’s terms entirely 
aligned with the nature of the poem, which is itself a technê that allows for the 
appearing of beings in their being. In other words, on Stevens' universal 'stage' his art 
can connect the technê inherent in the ‘lion locked in stone’ (reality/nature), with the 
technê of the ‘lion in the lute’ (imagination/poetry). This is a playing together that 
Stevens will enact in ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, although only once he has re-
imagined the ‘first idea’ again as we shall see.
 
 
232
The change at ‘Key West’, as compared with ‘The Snow Man’, is that the 
poem no longer reduces to the ‘first idea’, but rather expresses the ‘first idea’ 
through the poem as technê, which can interface with the technê in nature. This 
allows nature to be connected to poetry through the unity of ‘order’, an ‘order’ that 
the poet (who attempts to stand apart) can control, thus equally controlling the 
chaotic aspects of nature (tuche). Language is still a ‘thing-in-itself’ for Stevens, 
but poetry aligned with the universal 
 
eidos of technê has become a means of showing 
that the imagination and reality are a single totality, from which the poet can begin to 
create new forms from the enlarged ground. The creation of this 'new stage' opens 
the temptation to manipulate technê 
                                                          
231 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 170 - 171. 
232 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
as the single ground of all existence, connected 
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to Stevens' own imagination as he starts to become what in ‘Of Modern Poetry’ he 
will express as the 'metaphysician in the dark'.233
The terms of the poem as connected to a universal technê indicate how it can 
be read. Schleiermacher had referred to hermeneutics as an ‘art’ of 
‘understanding’.
 
234 He uses the term ‘art’ (Kunst), partly in the Greek sense of 
technê (by which he means ability, capacity) and partly in Kant’s sense, ‘that 
something cannot be understood as art merely via the rules of the particular form of 
articulation.’235 Alternatively, Gadamer states that ‘understanding belongs to the 
being of that which is understood.’236
For we find action governed by knowledge in an exemplary form where the Greeks 
speak of technê. This is the skill, the knowledge of the craftsman who knows how to 
make some specific thing. The question is whether moral knowledge is knowledge of 
this kind. This would mean that it was knowledge of how to make oneself. Does man 
learn to make himself what he ought to be, in the same way that the craftsman learns 
to make things according to his plan and will? Does man project himself on an eidos 
of himself in the same way that the craftsman carries within himself an eidos of what 
he is trying to make and embody in his material? We know that Socrates and Plato 
did apply the concept of techne to the concept of man’s being, and it is undeniable 
that they did discover something true here.
 Gadamer considers the Platonic and Socratic 
conception of technê as follows: 
237
With this in mind we can see why in ‘The Man With The Blue Guitar’ Stevens will 
say that ‘From this I shall evolve a man’.
 
 
238
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235 Ibid., p. 3. 
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237 Ibid., pp. 312 - 313. 
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 For Stevens at Key West, he is not 
yet ready to ‘evolve a man’, literally to control the eidos of ‘man’. Rather, here he 
is suggesting that a technê is not a subjective projection, but something to which we 
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belong. Stevens would begin the late poem, ‘In a Bad Time’, collected in The 
Auroras of Autumn with: 
How mad would you have to be to say, “He beheld 
 An order and thereafter he belonged 
 To it”? He beheld the order of the northern sky.239
However, although this kind of reading may illustrate the ontological ground 
of Stevens’ reversal of Kant’s ‘Copernican Revolution’ (the return of the ‘idea’ to 
the ‘thing-in-itself’ as its eidos) it provides no explanation of why Stevens’ ‘vatic 
lines’ speak through references to art.
 
 
The remembrance is of the ‘northern sky’ of ‘The Auroras of Autumn’, but its 
context of beholding an ‘order’ runs back to ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’. ‘Mad’ 
or not it is certainly what the poem proposes. ‘Order’ is the reductive, unifying force 
here and it is only in ‘Blue Guitar’ that Stevens will attempt to manipulate that new 
and enlarged ground to construct a ‘man’. 
240 Stevens’ modernism is highlighted by the 
poem refusing to acknowledge its own status as ‘a work of art’, rather, by aligning 
itself with an ontological ground and expressing that ground through art, the poem 
(as a form) becomes the place where art, mind and world are united. In other words it 
avoids the ‘jarring’ of the isolated jar of technê that stands against ‘slovenly’ nature, 
regardless of whether that jar is indicative of mass produced kitchenware or Keats’ 
‘Sylvan historian’.241
If we step back from the Key West poem, what it shows is a woman singing, 
a woman wandering through ‘theatrical distances’, a woman described by Stevens as 
an ‘artificer’ of the world, its ‘maker’. This woman, who at one level is the 
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personification of the fundamental conception of the appearance of order, who sings 
‘beyond the genius of the sea’ (the word ‘beyond’ signifying the ontological ‘depth’) 
is expressing ‘her’ fundamental ground through artistic forms, through song, 
revealing ‘keener sounds’.242
In 'Domination of Black' it was 'the color of the heavy hemlocks' that 'Came 
striding' out of the black sublime.
 ‘She’ serves as that ontological ground and its 
appearing as phusis, through the theatre of appearance, which includes the human 
world. Her ‘striding’ and ‘singing’ are the constancy of the eidos of technê, of the 
appearing of order. It would be a mistake to read this woman singing as a subjective 
‘she’, as simply an object of the poem. ‘She’ is not subjective but cosmological and 
‘her’ ‘singing’ is from the ‘beyond’ of the ontological that lies outside reality, 
outside of poetry, but to which all things are deemed to be ‘connected’.  
243 When Stevens says 'we beheld her striding there 
alone', he means that 'we' can 'behold' the ontological unity of the appearance of 
order in a similar way to which he beheld the 'Nothing that is not there' and 'the 
nothing that is' from 'The Snow Man'.244
For music, for whisperings from the reefs.
 The difference is that here Stevens is not 
reducing everything to the 'first idea', rather he is watching and listening to the 
unveiling of an ontological order, in which everything is deemed to be grounded. 
'Farewell to Florida' speaks of a transition from 'my' subjective 'North of cold', to: 
Her South of pine and coral and coraline sea, 
Her home, not mine, in the ever-freshened Keys, 
Her days, her oceanic nights, calling 
245
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73 
 
'Her' 'calling' and 'music' that come from the 'oceanic nights' and 'reefs' is the eidos of 
objective reality, that Stevens has combined with his own subjective imagination, in 
the freshened 'Key' of 'Key West'. 
Stevens had written in Adagia that: 'Poetry is often a revelation of the 
elements of appearance.'246 Stevens’ own art in this period is the closing of the 
imagination and reality into a oneness that attempts to connect with technê, as the 
fundamental ground of existence that underlies everything. Stevens says: ‘Art, 
broadly, is the form of life or the sound or color of life. Considered as form (in the 
abstract) it is often indistinguishable from life itself.’247 Further that: ‘poetry is a part 
of the structure of reality...poetry and the structure of reality are one’.248
If aesthetic intuition is merely transcendental intuition become objective, it is self-
evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and document of 
philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what philosophy 
cannot depict in external form, namely the unconscious element in acting and 
producing, and its original identity with the conscious. Art is paramount to the 
philosopher, precisely because it opens to him, as it were, the holy of holies, where 
burns in eternal and original unity, as if in a single flame, that which in nature and 
history is rent asunder, and in life and action, no less than in thought, must forever 
fly apart.
 In other 
words poems are ‘things in themselves’, subject to technê as all things are. What 
reality needs according to Stevens’ point of view, is a poetic maker to help create an 
enlarged sense of ‘human’ at the axis of the imagination and reality, an axis of 
technê. 
Schelling can provide words to help express this galvanising of mind and 
world: 
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Stevens had quoted the following from Ernst Cassirer’s Essay on Man in The 
Necessary Angel: 
Schelling declared in his System of Transcendental Idealism that art is the 
consummation of philosophy...The true poem is not the work of the individual artist; 
it is the universe itself, the one work of art which is forever perfecting itself.250
Philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the infancy of knowledge, and with 
it all those sciences it has guided toward perfection; we may thus expect them, on 
completion to flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of 
poetry from which they took their source. Nor is it in general difficult to say what the 
medium for this return of science to poetry will be; for in mythology such a medium 
existed, before the occurrence of a breach now seemingly beyond repair.
 
 
What is fascinating for our study here is that Schelling turns back to the pre-
Socratics for the origin of this process of bringing the ‘external form’ of philosophy 
into presence: 
251
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As Schelling infers, there is an older mythological origin for this thought that is 
contained in its talk of art and philosophy. We will address the terms of this 
mythological ground in a later chapter. 
The inherent order unveiled in the Key West poem is united with the order of 
human culture through the order of a new poesis. Phusis (nature) and nomos 
(culture) are united in the technê to which the poem is also connected. The act of 
making poetry opens the single ground of a fundamental technê in which the cosmos 
is founded for Stevens, and it is now that he can turn towards social existence and 
include it in the universal ground of a remaking out of the ‘nothing’: 
Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know, 
 Why, when the singing ended and we turned 
 Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights, 
 The lights in the fishing boats at anchor there, 
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 As the night descended, tilting in the air, 
 Mastered the night and portioned out the sea, 
 Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles, 
 Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.252
Once the song that unites all polarities has ended, culture (nomos) has been 
transformed in the ‘enchanting night’ and is now part of the one universal order that 
incorporates both the imagination and reality. For Stevens’ Darwinian thinking, 
humanity, as a part of phusis, is composite to the ‘intelligence’ of phusis, part of the 
eidos of technê.
 
 
253 ‘Our nature is her nature’ as he says in ‘Anatomy of 
Monotony’.254 The conclusion he has reached from this is that we and our nomos 
(culture) are an extension of ‘her’ nature. It suggests that we have constructed the 
‘order’ of our world, meaning the very Euclidean sounding geometry of our world as 
the ‘glassy lights’ of the town, and the ‘lights in the fishing boats’, as an extension 
out of the order of the ‘fiery poles’ and ‘emblazoned zones’ in the night sky. The 
manmade, ‘glassy lights’, reflect the order of the ‘fiery poles’. Both are part of 
nature. In his Adagia Stevens notes that: ‘All of our ideas come from the natural 
world: Trees = umbrellas.’255
 Through a poetic act the night descends and merges with the human nomos. 
This merging is shown to be complete by the night seeming to tilt, which is the 
‘tilting’ of the boats and their masts on the water, connecting the natural night sky 
and the manmade. Such an effort of connection through art points to ‘Blue Guitar’ 
which will symbolize this artistic attempt to ‘patch’ reality together.
 Humanity is seen as an extension of the technê in 
phusis, literally born out of the universe. 
256
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 The ‘glassy 
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lights’ of the town and in the fishing boats master the night and portion out the sea 
precisely because they are now equal points of order to the ‘emblazoned zones’ and 
‘fiery poles’. Technê in nature is one thing for Stevens and includes the poem 
because language is a ‘thing-in-itself’ like any other. Wielding the universal 
imagination, as part of reality, the poet can press back and manipulate the technê in 
nature and the manmade as one ‘thing’. The ‘deepening’ of the night highlights the 
new link between humanity and nature. This is the ‘order’ stepping forth as a poesis 
that the poem has captured. The inherent technê points to the ‘ghostlier 
demarcations’ and ‘keener sounds’ of ‘our origins’ for Stevens, as he places mind 
and world in a single universal ground which the poem claims to unveil.257
The beautiful does not lie in form, but only because the forma once took its light 
from Being as the isness of what is. Being at that time made its advent as eidos. The 
idea fits itself into the morphe. The sunolon, the unitary whole of morphe and hule, 
namely the ergon, is in the manner of energeia. This mode of presence becomes the 
actualitas of the ens actu. The actualitas becomes reality. Reality becomes 
objectivity. Objectivity becomes experience. In the way in which, for the world 
determined by the West, that which is, is as the real, there is concealed a peculiar 
confluence of beauty with truth.
 The 
poem’s chronology of capture shows a similarity to Heidegger’s ontological 
chronology for how beauty appears as ‘truth’: 
258
 It is appropriate to say that Stevens’ art has ‘captured’ the underlying 
‘metaphysics’ and reduced the imagination and reality to one ‘thing’. Stevens’ poem 
has become the place where the apparent ‘opposition’ of art and nature and culture 
and nature could be ‘made whole’. Stevens’ art has captured the single eidos to 
which it has forcefully (deinon) reduced all appearing. In Adagia Stevens says: ‘The 
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aesthetic order includes all other orders but is not limited to them.’259
The allowing of the first five stanzas of this poem to unveil themselves in the 
tidal rhythm is an enforced naiveté that again subordinates the rational ‘I’. An ‘idea’ 
becomes an eidos of the ‘thing-in-itself’ rather than an intellectual idea. ‘Ignorance is 
one of the sources of poetry’ says Stevens in Adagia, and in order to ‘see the sun’ 
‘clearly in the idea of it’, one must ‘see the sun again with an ignorant eye’.
 Art and 
philosophy have become one, just as they had been at the birth of philosophy, as 
Schelling had suggested. 
260 
Kingsley notes that: ‘Ignorance for Parmenides is only what’s ignorance in terms of 
ordinary human experience, with all its narrowness and limitations.’261 The terms of 
such ‘ignorance’ echoes the collapse of the ego into the ‘mind of winter’. Stevens’ 
reversal of idealism could be judged to withhold the terms of a full reduction, like 
that experienced in ‘the mind of winter’, at the point at which he acknowledges the 
‘Other’, ‘Ramon Fernandez’ (for the singing woman is part of the ontological 
unveiling). Like Stevens and his companion in ‘How To Live. What To Do’ (also 
collected in Ideas of Order) they appear to stand above, on ‘solid’ ground. The 
question remains however as to how real Ramon Fernandez really is for Stevens, 
who denied he was thinking of the critic and minor philosopher of that name when 
he fashioned him into his fiction?262
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 The ‘godlike’ modern artist (reminiscent of 
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Parmenides’ references to ‘mortals’) is certainly standing apart from the totality 
which he has seen, and will increasingly attempt to manipulate that ground in 
constructing the eidos of ‘man’. It was only ‘thereafter’, as ‘In A Bad Time’ 
suggests, that Stevens realised that he had in fact reduced himself to this totalizing 
order, that he ‘belonged’ to it.263
‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ and Parts of a World – The ‘Struggle’ to 
Answer One’s Critics 
 What ‘man’ needs, at this stage in Stevens’ 
development, is to be ‘created’ anew from the universal ground to which humanity is 
unwittingly attached. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the longer, more meditative 
forms of poem that Stevens would write for the rest of his life emerge in this period, 
in an attempt to tackle that ambitious objective. Stevens’ effort to reject ‘Ananke’ or 
any other Muse in ‘Farewell to Florida’ appears to have been a flight from the ‘first 
idea’ presenting ‘itself’ as anything resembling the romantic imagination, in favour 
of a social engagement (on ontological terms) with the pressing realities of the 
modern world. However, in order to achieve that objective the terms of the ‘first 
idea’ would need to be re-imagined once again. 
 
 
 If Stevens’ poetry is concerned to write out of a ground of the meeting of the 
imagination and reality, then it is not surprising that that art has been accused of 
being socially detached. Lentricchia has made the case that: 
How much more responsible (and guilty) can you get than, on the one hand, writing 
the rarefied lyric that Stevens wrote, and, on the other, asserting that poets help 
people live their lives?264
Following Stanley Burnshaw’s review of Ideas of Order Stevens attempted a more 
consciously public poetry. This was signified through the working title of a new 
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poem entitled ‘Aphorisms on Society’, a title which the publisher, given the choice, 
changed to ‘Owl’s Clover’ (1936).265 Stevens acknowledged that the original title 
was ‘pretentious’, but felt that it brought out ‘for the reader the element that is 
common to all the poems.’266
The attempt was not necessarily a critical success. Ben Belitt’s review of 
Ideas of Order and Owl’s Clover in The Nation, suggested that Stevens’ ‘problem’ 
was that he had ‘moved to formal discourse in the quest for order and certitude’, but 
that ‘his art has not up to the present permitted him to pursue such discourse or his 
temperament to accept it.’
 
267 Stevens realised that Belitt was suggesting that ‘Owl’s 
Clover’ was ‘a lot of Easter Eggs’ and that the reviewer had identified ‘a difficulty 
that I have long been conscious of and with which I am constantly struggling.’268
A few months after his exchanges with Belitt, Stevens was writing to his 
publisher to announce his efforts to compose ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ (1937), 
a series of short poems that he suggests ‘deal with the relation or balance between 
imagined things and real things’.
 
269 This looks like a hasty retreat to familiar ground, 
where Stevens can engage his demanding audience (‘you must’, ‘Do not speak to us 
of the greatness of poetry’) on his own terms.270
The maker of a thing yet to be made
 Here Stevens paints himself as 
having withdrawn: 
And I am merely a shadow hunched 
 
Above the arrowy, still strings, 
271
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The poet it seems is the ‘shearsman of sorts’ who through the imaginative 
qualities of the ‘blue guitar’, namely the imagination represented through art, can 
make the world whole. What I want to highlight here is that Stevens has withdrawn, 
but in the foreground of his poetry, he begins to present some references to a 
universalized reality that might be described as a ‘horde of destructions’.272
 The initial means of presenting this ‘horde of destructions’ is through art, 
namely through a sense of Pablo Picasso’s art. As we have noted, Costello confirms 
that in ‘Blue Guitar’ Stevens appears to describe ‘Picasso’s early (pre-cubist) 
painting of The Old Guitarist (“I sing a hero’s head, large eye”)’.
 In what 
follows I will argue that the threat and outbreak of world war resulted in Stevens 
substituting his sense of a universal order (technê) for a sense of universal conflict. 
The imagination and reality remain connected, but not through an inherent technê, 
rather through an inherent state of struggle. 
273 Stevens himself 
appears to deny the connection with this specific Picasso painting, but in context of 
what the poem is seeking to achieve, a connection with Picasso is definite:274
Now, an image of our society?
 
Is this picture of Picasso’s, this “hoard 
Of destructions”, a picture of ourselves, 
 
275
Stevens had referred to Picasso’s ‘hoard of destructions’ in The Necessary Angel 
with: ‘Does not the saying of Picasso that a picture is a horde of destructions also say 
that a poem is a horde of destructions?’
 
 
276
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 Stevens had also suggested of the poems 
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of ‘Blue Guitar’ that: ‘Perhaps it would be better to say that what they really deal 
with is the painter’s problem of realization’.277 Picasso’s ‘hoard of destructions’ 
forms ‘an image of our society’ because it is a technê that is smashed to pieces, for 
the sole reason that the society it reflects is becoming increasingly fractured. Stevens 
is announcing that his poetry will follow suit. The question here then, in face of 
Lentricchia’s critique, is in what way does Stevens believe that poets ‘help people 
live their lives’?278
Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn together and what is 
drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, 
and all things issue from the one.
 
 To draw a crude philosophical parallel with Picasso’s ‘horde of destructions’, 
we will need to revisit a particular fragment of Heraclitus’ that we have already 
encountered: 
279
Burnet suggests that: ‘The truth Herakleitos proclaimed was that the world is at once 
one and many, and that it is just the “opposite tension” of the opposites that 
constitutes the unity of the One.’
 
 
280
The chord destroys its elements by uniting them in the chord. They then cease to 
exist separately. On the other hand, discord exaggerates the separation between 
elements. These propositions are stated in a variety of terms: ivy on stone, people in 
cities, men in masses.
 Of poem XI and other sections of ‘Blue Guitar’, 
Stevens had said: 
281
If Stevens had embraced a principle of this kind from Heraclitus, then it may have 
provided a means for connecting society, the poem and the world in a single 
ontological ground which Stevens as guitarist/metaphysician could manipulate. He 
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could literally ‘play’ the ground between harmony and discord in Gadamer’s sense. 
Towards the end of ‘Blue Guitar’, poem XXXI appears to exemplify this approach: 
How long and late the pheasant sleeps...  
 The employer and employee contend, 
  
 Combat, compose their droll affair.  
 The bubbling sun will bubble up,  
 
 Spring sparkle and the cock-bird shriek.  
 The employer and employee will hear  
 
 And continue their affair. The shriek  
 Will rack the thickets. There is no place, 
 
Here, for the lark fixed in the mind, 
In the museum of the sky. The cock 
 
Will claw sleep. Morning is not sun, 
It is this posture of the nerves, 
 
As if a blunted player clutched 
The nuances of the blue guitar. 
 
It must be this rhapsody or none, 
The rhapsody of things as they are.282
The peace of the sleeping pheasant is about to be disturbed. As Heidegger suggests, 
‘The dots tell what is kept silent’....
 
 
283
Heraclitus had also said that: ‘Men do not know how what is at variance 
agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and 
 'Blue Guitar' was published in 1937 when the 
Spanish Civil War was underway and the build-up to World War II was in motion. 
Again it is through language that Stevens appears to merge society, the poem and the 
world through a single ontological concept. The humans ‘contend’, ‘combat’ and 
‘compose’. Yet ‘compose’, though it alliterates, seems out of place, unless Stevens 
means to link the idea of poetic and artistic composition with this human struggle? 
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the lyre.’284 As we noted earlier, Heraclitus’ word for ‘attunement’ is harmoniē. He 
had said that: ‘Homer was wrong in saying: “Would that strife might perish from 
among gods and men!” He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the 
universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away.’285
This poem shows itself to be about something more fundamental than just 
war, it is about universal ‘law’, a law that looks very similar to statements made by 
Heraclitus such as ‘war is the father of all and the king of all’.
 In Heraclitus 
the struggle of opposites amounts to ‘attunement’. Within the poem, this harmonious 
struggle has left no place for the ‘lark fixed in the mind,/ In the museum of the sky’. 
It is tempting to conclude that unlike Keats’ nightingale, the bird that ‘Will claw 
sleep’ and ‘Will rack the thickets’ is the bird engaged in struggle to which Stevens’ 
poem is connected, rather than to the ‘lark’ ‘fixed’ in the ‘mind’ of Kant’s 
transcendental idealism, detached from the ‘thing-in-itself’ and relegated to the 
museum of the past. 
286 Heraclitus’ word 
for ‘war’ is polemos, which we earlier defined as ‘strife’ or ‘struggle’.287
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 The poem 
certainly extends polemos to ‘all’ by demonstrating that the humans, like the 
wildlife, are contending, though the humans fail to see the connection. This is the 
harmoniē of the tension between the ‘bow and the lyre’, and it is now that we can 
think back to the antithetical forces of the poem that opened Stevens’ Harmonium, 
‘Earthy Anecdote’. We can think of that instrument, and the more precise instrument 
of Stevens’ guitar, twanging a wiry string, connecting world and art in the unity of 
the fundamental ground. This is the ‘rhapsody’ of ‘things as they are’ which 
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connects with the posture of the nerves. It is poetic language that opens up the 
connection in the ontological ground, as the word ‘guitar’ echoes the ontological 
sense of ‘are’ in the repetition of ‘things as they are’. The harmoniē of a universal 
polemos has replaced the musical ‘key’ of the order of technê found at Key West, as 
the universal point of connection between the imagination and reality. Patke notes 
that Picasso had considered that ‘Cubist painting was an anticipation of the 
camouflaged war machines he saw passing through the streets of Paris in 1914.’288
Opposition is necessary to the cosmos, for without it, the bow is unstrung; things 
united in the hidden harmony of conflict lose their very definition when that strife 
ceases.
 
 In what way does Stevens believe that the poet’s ‘role is to help people live 
their lives’? The first step it seems is to uncover a more fundamental connection of 
poetry, society and world, subject to war as the nature of all things. Gregory Fried, in 
his work entitled Heidegger’s Polemos – From Being to Politics (2000), suggests 
that for Heraclitus: 
289
Fried states further that the word ‘all’ in Heraclitus’ ‘war is the father of all and the 
king of all’, is at once a ‘social’ and an ‘ontological’ term.
 
 
290 He says that: ‘I have 
argued that both levels of meaning can be present in the fragment without the one 
excluding the other.’291
If this marks Stevens’ response to his critics for how he can trump socially 
conscious poets, by suggesting that society itself is reduced to an ontological 
struggle, then it would render him very close indeed to Heidegger’s use of Hölderlin, 
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who Heidegger believed was ‘deeply wedded in spirit to Heraclitus’.292
as Robert Dostal has cogently argued, Heidegger turns to Hölderlin because of 
Heidegger’s very particular understanding of what it takes to forge a Volk, that is a 
genuine, historically rooted community, rather than the inauthentic, shallow “public” 
of liberal civil society.
 Fried notes 
that: 
293
If Stevens really is entertaining the idea that he can ‘help people live their lives’ by 
aligning them with a fundamental ontology of struggle, as a higher law than those 
governed by society, then perhaps this is the ground that Lentricchia’s critique fails 
to conceive of as a universal ontology. Lentricchia makes mention of Stevens’ sense 
of ‘reality’ as possessing ‘some ultimate ontological portent’, but does not pursue 
that ontology in the complete sense in which Stevens’ poems present it.
 
 
294
Heidegger emphasizes that the fragment is not simply a sociological observation and 
stresses that polemos describes the ontological manner in which beings form a 
world.
 Fried 
notes with reference to fragment 53 (‘war is the father of all and the king of all’) 
that: 
295
 For the post-Kantian philosopher of art, or poet, pre-Socratic poetic ontology 
can provide the unity required to ‘patch’ ‘a man’ through a universal connection in 
 
 
Stevens, in no sense, went as far as Martin Heidegger in what is tempting to say is 
the logical conclusion of a thinking that politicises pre-Socratic thought of this kind. 
He did, however, present an ontological alignment of art, society and world, and 
retreated into the shadows, almost as if to allow it to speak for itself: a law of reality 
with which to answer his critics. 
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polemos. In poem XIX of ‘Blue Guitar’, it is in the single ground of polemos that the 
two warring poles of the ‘lion in the lute’ (imagination) and the ‘lion locked in stone’ 
(nature/reality) are connected, and then reduced to himself.296 For Stevens the ‘horde 
of destructions’ and the sense that ‘war is the father of all’ were part of  reality, but 
this just meant that the ‘first idea’ of polemos was what all things had in common, 
including poetry as a ‘thing-in-itself’. Stevens’ ‘committed writing’ is an effort to 
point to warring humanity’s ‘oneness’, in the universal polemos which connects 
every element in the ‘horde of destructions’. It is because poetry is part of the 
polemos that Stevens feels he can use it to connect with the polemos inherent in 
reality, and ‘reduce’ that reality to the imagination of ‘himself’. As such Stevens 
feels he can become the ‘intelligence’ of the warring elements who can re-direct the 
totality of that violence through art.297
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In view of the apparent ontological ground beneath Stevens’ interpretation of 
Picasso’s ‘horde of destructions’, the title of Stevens’ next collection, Parts of a 
World (1942), is perhaps fitting.  It is a collection of some of the poems Stevens had 
written between 1936 and 1941. By the time of its release in 1942, World War II was 
well under way.  Just as Picasso’s Cubism was a ‘horde of destructions’ reminiscent 
of Heraclitus, so Stevens, the modern poet, seems to be looking back to similar 
Greek ideas to render his own art, precisely as T.S. Eliot was doing in this period 
with his ‘Four Quartets’ (1943). 
 Through its language and form 'The Latest Freed Man' enacts the freedom 
felt when aligned with the polemos in nature: 
   And so the freed man said.  
     It was how the sun came shinning into his room: 
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     To be without a description of to be, 
     For a moment on rising, at the edge of the bed, to be, 
     To have the ant of the self changed to an ox 
     With its organic boomings, to be changed 
     From a doctor into an ox, before standing up, 
     To know that the change and that the ox-like struggle 
     Come from the strength that is the strength of the sun, 
     Whether it comes directly or from the sun. 
    It was how he was free. It was how his freedom came. 
   It was being without description, being an ox.298
The ‘freed man’ is here shown to be reduced to 'the ox-like struggle', which does not 
appear to refer to his subjective ‘animal nature’, but rather seems to be symbolic of 
the polemos of all beings struggling within the ‘One’. Burnet had said of Heraclitus 
that ‘the “opposite tension” of the opposites’ was that which ‘constitutes the unity of 
the One.’
 
  
299
Bloom suggests that Stevens is here ‘granted a Nietzschean vision of the sun, 
not as a strong man, but as a strong man might be.’
 Through the opening of poetic language ‘the man’ is ‘freed’ into an 
awareness of the unity of being as struggle, that includes the struggle of the sun in its 
rising. The struggle of the sun is reminiscent of what Stevens referred to in poem 
XXXI of ‘Blue Guitar’, as ‘the bubbling sun will bubble up’. By simply ‘rising’ ‘the 
freed man’ is aligned with the polemos of the sun’s own struggle, transforming him 
from an ‘ant’ to the larger ontological alignment, which makes him vast in the 
‘organic boomings’ of nature expressed ‘without’ rational ‘description’. Poetry 
becomes an experiential event of being. That he is ‘the latest freed man’ implies that 
Stevens will attempt to usher more people across the threshold, thus helping them to 
‘live their lives’ according to an intrinsic ‘truth’, free of ‘doctrine’. 
300
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 Certainly Nietzsche was 
familiar with the concept of polemos and one could easily imagine Zarathustra 
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speaking ‘thus’ to the sun. However, regardless of where Stevens picked up this pre-
Socratic concept, this particular thought seems concerned with an alignment rather 
than with a ‘vision’. It is a ‘connection’, because Stevens’ poem and the sun are all 
one in the ‘struggle’ of polemos. Stevens has become a part of the discordant 
harmony, part of the polemos, which is like freedom, strength and change. It could 
be freedom from some of the ‘dandyism’ of Harmonium, as the discordant dirge of 
polemos evokes the world at war. 
Certainly Stevens’ sense of liberty is freedom from the doctors who propose 
a ‘doctrine to this landscape’, like William Carlos Williams perhaps. Jacqueline 
Vaught-Brogan notes that Stevens had referred to Williams in a letter of 1935 as ‘old 
Dr Williams’.301
It is then the silence of all painting, of all music, the silence of the form, of this form 
that neither signifies nor flatters but that shows: the rhythm or the schema, the line or 
the cadence. Neither is it therefore the silence that holds back and keeps in reserve, 
but the silence that lets the strangeness of being occur: its immediate contiguity, right 
at the wall. The silence does nothing: it exposes everything.
 It is the ‘doctors’ as representative of the human sphere who cover 
the ‘first idea’ in ‘varnish and dirt’, instead of allowing it to present itself from itself. 
For Stevens people are unwittingly part of the polemos of the sun in just rising from 
their beds, their place of comfort in their doctrine, and a threshold of the meeting of 
dreams and reality. For Nancy, the silence of what I would suggest is akin to ‘being 
without description’ is of a specific kind: 
302
The ‘being’ that Stevens ‘lets’ ‘occur’ discloses itself as a universal harmony of 
struggle shared by all things, including poetry. As such, it is no surprise that the 
collection includes a poem entitled ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’, which violently 
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reduces the poet and his art in the oneness of the universal polemos.303 In ‘The Noble 
Rider and the Sound of Words’ (1940), which Longenbach notes was written a few 
months before the attack on Pearl Harbor304, Stevens defined the ‘pressure of reality’ 
as ‘spiritually violent, it may be said, for everyone alive’.305 This spiritual violence 
underpinned both the absence of physical violence and the presence of physical 
violence for Stevens, and amounted to the essential ground in which friend and 
enemy meet.306
Qui fait fi des joliesses banales, the chairs.
 
The point of connection between the poem and the world that Stevens seems 
to have located in polemos allows him to connect all things in a poetic language that 
is presented as part of the ontological ‘truth’ it describes. ‘The Latest Freed Man’ 
continues with: 
It was the importance of the trees outdoors, 
 The freshness of the oak-leaves, not so much 
That they were oak-leaves as the way they looked. 
 It was everything being more real, himself 
 At the centre of reality, seeing it. 
 It was everything bulging and blazing and big in itself, 
 The blue of the rug, the portrait of Vidal, 
307
Stevens’ ‘being without description’, his sense of allowing the ‘first idea’ ‘to be’, 
extends to the ‘trees outdoors’, connecting with the world at hand. His use of 
language and form is enacting what it is describing, which ironically is ‘being 
without description’ as the poem becomes an expression of the ‘first idea’. The 
‘freshness of the oak-leaves’ implies renewal, change, flux and a fresh way of seeing 
them in the unity of the ‘first idea’ that the new poesis has achieved by reconnecting 
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them in their being. It is notable that the way they look is more important than their 
actual form, as oak-leaves, in a poem collected with another poem entitled ‘Oak 
Leaves Are Hands’. Perhaps here they look like two things connected in ‘one’. 
Stevens’ ‘being without description’ is an aletheia (an unveiling), and it is in this 
sense that it was ‘everything being more real’, with himself at the axis of being, ‘At 
the centre of reality, seeing it.’ Reality literally swells around him through the 
alliteration of ‘bulging and blazing and big in itself’. This is not a reduction to the 
‘first idea’ ‘itself’, as in ‘The Snow Man’, but rather is a way of ‘seeing’ physical 
objects as connected in the ‘centre’ of the ‘first idea’, through poetry. 
In the final two lines the linguistic collapse is completed as we move from 
the ‘blue of the rug’ at high speed, through a rhyme of ‘the portrait of Vidal’ 
(Stevens’ Paris-based art dealer) with ‘Qui fait fi des joliesses banales’, as the rug 
and portrait seem to be literally swallowed up in the music of that line, before 
crashing into ‘the chairs’. This leaves us uncertain of the separate nature of the ‘rug’ 
that started the process, the artwork showing the image of Vidal and the ‘chairs’. Art 
and world are fused in the collapse. Of course, switching into French, which Stevens 
believed to be the other half of the English language, collapses the two languages 
into oneness. Vidal is here remembered for despising banal prettiness. Heraclitus had 
expressed ‘delight in the mire’, and Stevens may be recalling such a conception as a 
means of including dirty reality in complete being.308 Such a Heraclitean notion 
would be in keeping with Stevens question in the same collection of poems, as to 
whether it is ‘a philosopher’s honeymoon’ that one finds ‘on the dump’.309
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 It is 
through the opening of a new poesis that Stevens experiences a ‘bulging’ universe, 
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connected in the ‘struggle’ that initially gave way to this crescendo. The evocation of 
being is expressed through constant references to art, which is consciously 
performed in order to attach art to the single underlying principle of ‘truth’. The 
effect is to blur the lines of fiction and reality and of subjective and objective, 
consuming the social sphere into a single ontological ground, of which the ‘freed’ 
Stevens is a gatekeeper. 
 In 'The Glass of Water', also collected in Parts, Stevens overtly addresses 
‘the metaphysical’: 
 That the glass would melt in heat, 
 That the water would freeze in cold, 
 Shows that this object is merely a state, 
 One of many, between two poles. So, 
 In the metaphysical, there are these poles.310
At first glance, poetically, this seems rather a blank statement, with the assonance of 
‘heat’ and ‘state’ and ‘cold’ and ‘poles’. However, Stevens’ double use of ‘would’ 
could stretch to ‘wood’, and this type of enlargement of the principle is borne out by 
‘state’ equally serving as a U.S. State, and ‘poles’ for the North and South poles. The 
language selected has the effect of universalizing the seemingly localized principle. 
Within this enlargement, ontologically speaking, multiplicity is also ‘merely a state’ 
in the sense of a way of being. We recall that Heraclitus had written: ‘The one is 
made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.'
 
 
311 He had also written that: 
‘Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of 
opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre.’312
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312 Ibid., p. 136. 
 The ‘poles’ of the 
‘metaphysical’ are the source of the polemos, but what Stevens has done is to begin 
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with an arbitrary object to demonstrate its universal nature as what he will now 
suggest applies equally to the ‘social’ and political sphere. 
 Just as with Heraclitus’ fragment 53, Stevens applies the precise metaphysics 
to the 'indigènes' (the social level). As such the context is extended and shown to be 
a part of fundamental nature (the ontological level) that erupts in the masculine 
conception of war: 
 But in the centre of our lives, this time, this day, 
 It is a state, this spring among the politicians 
 Playing cards. In a village of the indigenes, 
 One would have still to discover.313
The ‘politicians’ who trivially play ‘cards’, together with the earlier reference to the 
‘poles’ in ‘the metaphysical’, would  suggest that Stevens understands ‘politics’ to 
be a form of polemos, ‘in the centre of our lives’. Stevens’ recorded in his Adagia 
that: ‘Politics is the struggle for existence.’
 
 
314
A large number of ‘indigènes’ (Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccan 
‘Goumiers’) were enrolled in the French First Army of the Free French Forces, 
formed to liberate France after the Nazi occupation. The army had been recruited in 
Africa in French colonies outside the control of the Vichy regime.
 
315
                                                          
313 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Glass of Water’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 182. 
314 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 902. 
315 Marshal de Lattre de Tassigny, The History of the French First Army, trans. by, Malcolm Barnes 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1952), p. 28. 
 Of the 200,000 
men conscripted, 130,000 were ‘indigènes’ (natives). For Stevens, the ‘indigènes’ 
‘have still to discover’ because they, as ‘parts’ are about to be absorbed into the 
‘oneness’ of another nation, France. The law of polemos is the same for them as it is 
for the glass of water, or the imaginative conception of light that descends as ‘a lion’ 
(symbolic of the polemos between the ‘imagination’ and ‘reality’), and so they, like 
the glass are reduced to the single ontological principle, which is inferred to be their 
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point of unity. The connection between World War II, ‘politics’, an imagined lion 
and a glass of water is found in the oneness of polemos. Poetry claims the right to a 
truth-telling function by virtue of its connection to the ontological sense of 'things as 
they are'. 
Beverly Maeder seems somewhat hasty to pitch her statement that 'In order to 
be interesting "modernist" writing needs to situate itself in opposition to the 
dominant understanding of language as a picture of mind-world', specifically as a 
departure from concepts that are originally philosophical.316 By considering 
that Stevens' statements of equivalence serve 'to join facts that are different in nature' 
as a means of not delimiting characteristics (as by the reduction of two things to the 
concept of being), Maeder negates Heraclitus' concept of the One and the 
many struggling in the same moment.317
                                                          
316 Beverly Maeder, Wallace Stevens’ Experimental Language: The Lion in the Lute (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 93. 
317 Ibid., pp. 93 – 94. 
 The result is to take Heraclitean concepts 
and attribute them to modernist language. The effort does not escape ontology, it 
merely moves from a Parmenidean philosophy of oneness, to a Heraclitean ontology 
of difference ('the one is made up of all things' etc). 
 The series of experiments, of theories, that Stevens has been embarking upon 
as a means of validating the role of the poet in his duty of ontological connection, to 
carve a Volk that know what ‘they’ are, in the sense in which Fried suggests 
Heidegger had used Hölderlin, would seem to be realised in ‘Of Modern Poetry’. It 
reads as Stevens’ full sense of the appropriate action of the poet standing in a world 
defined by polemos: 
The poem of the mind in the act of finding 
What will suffice. It has not always had 
To find: the scene was set; it repeated what 
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Was in the script. 
           Then the theatre was changed 
To something else. Its past was a souvenir. 
 
It has to be living, to learn the speech of the place. 
It has to face the men of the time and to meet 
The women of the time. It has to think about war 
And it has to find what will suffice. It has 
To construct a new stage. It has to be on that stage 
And, like an insatiable actor, slowly and 
With meditation, speak words that in the ear, 
In the delicatest ear of the mind, repeat, 
Exactly, that which it wants to hear, at the sound 
Of which, an invisible audience listens, 
Not to the play, but to itself, expressed 
In an emotion as of two people, as of two 
Emotions becoming one. The actor is 
A metaphysician in the dark, twanging 
An instrument, twanging a wiry string that gives 
Sounds passing through sudden rightnesses, wholly 
Containing the mind, below which it cannot descend, 
Beyond which it has no will to rise. 
             It must 
Be the finding of a satisfaction, and may 
Be of a man skating, a woman dancing, a woman 
Combing. The poem of the act of the mind.318
 This is Stevens’ poem of what ‘modern poetry’ is. It is ‘The poem of the 
mind’ (aligned with the ‘first idea’) in the (theatrical/artistic) ‘act’ of ‘finding’ 
satisfaction for all minds as being part of violent reality. Through the ‘act’ of ‘play’ 
Stevens can content all minds that they are parts of the reality of polemos, at which 
point they will become one. This finding of ‘What will suffice’ was not necessary for 
the romantics who had ‘repeated’ what was ‘in the script’, presumably a script 
inherited from Classicism. However for Stevens’ modern era the theatre changed to a 
 
 
                                                          
318 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 218 - 219. 
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‘theatre of war’ as Helen Vought-Brogan has observed.319
It is a violence from within that protects us from a violence without. It is the 
imagination pressing back against the pressure of reality. It seems, in the last 
 Stevens’ ‘theatre of war’ 
is universal, ‘spiritual’, incorporating both mind and world. It is on this stage that the 
poem must be a part of reality (‘It has to be living’) walking among the people, much 
like a reinvented form of Stevens’ singer from ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’, 
wandering among the ‘theatrical distances’ as the personified ‘first idea’ at the axis 
of mind and world. This poetry is trying to be consciously ‘social’ in the sense that it 
has to ‘face’ ‘the men of the time’ and ‘meet’ ‘The women of the time’. This ‘poem 
of the mind’ has to ‘think about war’, about polemos, and find ‘what will suffice’ in 
order to awaken all minds to the fact that they are all part of a single violent reality. 
 The poem has to ‘construct a new stage’, which will be the ‘place’ where the 
imagination and reality are welded together through the use of an ontologically 
grounded art that uses ‘play’ to achieve a connection. The new poems themselves 
must ‘be on that stage’, ‘like an actor’ containing the ‘first idea’, consciously 
‘playing’ a role in society. This ‘actor’ is ‘insatiable’ for the contentment of the 
mind, of the minds of the audience, but not with a fulfilment of peace and ‘order’, 
rather with an acceptance that they are parts of the reality of ‘war’. The poem must 
speak with meditation as ‘The Idea of Order’ had spoken in performing its own 
marriage of the imagination and reality in technê. Stevens’ ‘modern poetry’ has to 
speak the unity of the imagination and reality in polemos to the ‘delicatest ear of the 
mind’. 
In The Necessary Angel Stevens explains how ‘the poem of the mind’ as an 
expression of this ‘violence’, helps ‘people to live their lives’: 
                                                          
319 Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, The Violence Within The Violence Without - Wallace Stevens and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Poetics, p. 31. 
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analysis, to have something to do with our self-preservation; and that, no doubt, is 
why the expression of it, the sound of its words, helps us to live our lives.320
Stevens’ words of polemos allow the ‘invisible audience’ to hear themselves, 
to listen to their own nature of polemos, importantly ‘expressed’ through Stevens’ 
use of ‘play’ (in the musical and ontological sense) in an ‘emotion’, a mutual 
empathy of ‘becoming one’. The inference suggests that people and things are 
fundamentally united, if only in mutual polemos. This is the ‘reality’ Stevens wants 
us to accept that we are part of, just as the reality of world war is part of it. Stevens 
had said in The Necessary Angel that: ‘The defeat or triumph of Hitler are parts of a 
war-like whole’.
 
 
‘Of Modern Poetry’ is the ‘sound’ and ‘expression’ of the imagination and reality 
connected in a universal polemos (‘violence from within’/‘violence without’), and it 
is a mind embedded in that connection that can press back against the ‘pressure’ 
associated with the violent fact of war. Stevens’ expression of polemos attempts to 
allow the inner ear to accept that humanity is part of a single ‘spiritually violent’ 
‘reality’, and like Gerard Manley-Hopkins, it must ‘repeat’ exactly what the equally 
insatiable audience ‘wants to hear’, which is a change of focus from repeating ‘what 
was in the script’. It is only the recognition that the polemos in the imagination is the 
same polemos found in reality, which allows people to press back against the 
external pressure. It is through the act of making poetry grounded in the ‘first idea’ 
that the poet demonstrates this connection and can fulfil his sense of helping us ‘to 
live our lives’. 
321
                                                          
320 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words’, The Necessary Angel, Collected 
Poetry and Prose, p. 665. 
321 Ibid., p. 656. 
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Stevens appears to have been working out this reconciliation of the self with 
reality in renewed ‘social’ terms from ‘Owl’s Clover’ and ‘Blue Guitar’. As with 
fragment 53, the ‘modern poetry’ Stevens proposes is at once ‘social’ and 
‘ontological’, though as with the eidos its proposal is offered as an unveiling of what 
is merely intrinsic. Stevens remains withdrawn in the shadows still and it is ‘the 
poem of the mind’ that is presented as ‘the actor’, controlled by ‘the metaphysician 
in the dark’ who ‘plays’ the audience into that ‘reality’. Heraclitus was widely 
known to have been called ‘Heraclitus the Dark’ (due to his obscure statements) and 
we can see that it is the idea of a sense of detachment that this allows that might 
appeal to Stevens, precisely as Steven Dedalus describes it322
The artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above 
his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his 
fingernails.
: 
323 
 
In view of the metaphysical twang of this wiry string Heraclitus had said: ‘The 
hidden attunement is better than the open.’324
What is key is that the ‘metaphysician’ plays the ‘blue guitar’, ‘twanging a 
wiry string’ which denotes the precision of this instrument over the harmonium of 
his earlier work. The twang of the string ‘gives’ to this audience ‘Sounds passing 
through sudden rightnesses’, metaphysical ‘sounds’ that ‘wholly’ contain ‘the mind’ 
 Stevens is acutely conscious of the 
relationship of the ‘poet’ with his audience where here he is not present, but is 
allowing the metaphysics of the poem to speak themselves as an unveiling devoid of 
a conscious poet. Stevens remains above, manipulating the strings with care to 
‘create’ the right sounds. 
                                                          
322 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Volume I – The Earlier Presocratics and the 
Pythagoreans (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 405. 
323 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 233. 
324 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 136. 
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in a total collapse of the ‘Copernican Revolution’, from which the mind ‘cannot 
descend’ into a mythical underworld and from which it has ‘no will to rise’, to seek 
for heaven or perhaps the transcendental idealist perspective. Stevens has apparently 
found a meeting point of mind and world in polemos. This ‘meeting point’ suggests 
in what way the pre-Socratics are useful to post-Kantian philosopher’s of art, and to 
poets themselves, in reconnecting the mind with the violent nature of the ‘thing-in-
itself’. For Stevens, a thought that looks similar to Heraclitus’ philosophy may have 
provided a means of creating an answer for his socially minded critics, and reveals 
how Stevens felt a poet could ‘help people to live their lives’. 
As Fried had suggested, fragment 53 operates a ‘social’ and an ‘ontological’ 
ground at once. Where would such a pre-Socratic reduction of people and nature as 
one in ‘war’ lead politically? It is easy to reference anecdotal evidence, such as when 
Heidegger praised ‘Nazi martyr’ Albert Schlageter for his ‘hardness of will and 
clarity of heart’, attributing the latter to ‘the Alemannic countryside’ and ‘the autumn 
sun of the Black Forest.’325
 
 I would argue in closing that ‘Of Modern Poetry’ is 
suggesting that the ‘modern poetry’ (having totally confronted the nature of 
polemos) should play out the reality of polemos in the ‘everyday’ as an act of 
neutralizing it. Through an enactment of the becoming of everyday beings, ‘skating’, 
‘dancing’ and ‘Combing’, acts performed by men and women as Stevens says, the 
poet can ‘play’ out polemos in art in a way that may be considered as a socially 
engaging act of the poet which neutralizes the need for masculine warfare, if not the 
reality of violence. The problem, as we shall see in a later chapter, is that this still 
has the effect of violently reducing individuals to oneness. 
                                                          
325 Jeff Collins, Heidegger and the Nazis (Cambridge: Totem Books, 2000), pp. 24 - 25. 
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A Pre-Socratic Sense of Being as the Universal ‘Thing-in-Itself’ 
 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ – A Fiction to Neutralize Polemos 
 
In ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, published in context of America’s 
entry into the second world war, Stevens returns to the ‘fat girl’ who first appeared in 
‘Anatomy of Monotony’. We will deal with the earlier sections of the ‘Notes’ in due 
course, but here, at the end, we find a reappraisal of the ‘fat girl’ ‘who’ is earth for 
Stevens. Poem X of ‘It Must Give Pleasure’ says: 
Fat girl, terrestrial, my summer, my night, 
 How is it I find you in difference, see you there 
 In a moving contour, a change not quite completed? 
 
 You are familiar yet an aberration. 
 Civil, madam, I am, but underneath 
 A tree, this unprovoked sensation requires 
 
 That I should name you flatly, waste no words, 
 Check your evasions, hold you to yourself. 
 Even so when I think of you as strong or tired, 
 
 Bent over work, anxious, content, alone, 
 You remain the more than natural figure. You 
 Become the soft-footed phantom, the irrational 
 
 Distortion, however fragrant, however dear. 
 That’s it: the more than rational distortion, 
 The fiction that results from feeling. Yes, that. 
 
 They will get it straight one day at the Sorbonne. 
 We shall return at twilight from the lecture 
 Pleased that the irrational is rational, 
 
 Until flicked by feeling, in a gildered street, 
 I call you by name, my green, my fluent mundo. 
 You will have stopped revolving except in crystal.326
In the period in which Stevens was composing the ‘Notes’ he wrote to Hi Simons 
that: ‘It is simply a question of whether poetry is a thing in itself, or whether it is not. 
 
 
                                                          
326 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 351. 
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I think it is.’327
 “... like the moon, so life surely has a side that is constantly turned away from 
us, and that is not its opposite but its completion to perfection, to plenitude, to the 
real, whole, and full sphere and globe of being.”
 If the poet is to help to neutralize polemos, then he ‘must’ achieve an 
art that can connect totality in a oneness devoid of the disparate parts that cause the 
struggle. He wants to ‘Check your evasions, hold you to yourself’. However the 
earth is always revolving, always in a state of becoming and what Stevens actually 
has is an aberration, a world that is always found ‘in’ the ‘difference’ that causes the 
polemos. He has not yet achieved the stasis and unity of the ‘rock’ that will be fully 
unveiled in ‘Credences of Summer’. 
 In context of speaking of Parmenides’ spherical conception of being, 
Heidegger proceeds to elucidate a position comparable to one taken by Rilke: 
Yet Rilke himself, on one occasion, speaks of the “globe of being,” and does so in a 
context which touches directly on the interpretation of the statement about the widest 
orbit. In a letter of January 6, 1923, Rilke writes: 
328 
 
Rilke's conception of a 'full sphere and globe of being' that includes everything is 
reminiscent of Parmenides' spherical plenum that includes seeming as well as 
truth.329 For Stevens it is the imagination that rises from reality and reveals the 
fullness of complete being, exactly as he had depicted it in poem XVIII of ‘Blue 
Guitar’. 330
For Stevens, earth automatically becomes a ‘soft-footed phantom’ and shows 
that part of the character of the earth is the ‘irrational distortion’, ‘the fiction that 
results from feeling’.
 In just thinking about the earth ‘it’ automatically becomes a ‘figure’ with 
human characteristics of being ‘strong’, ‘tired’, ‘anxious’, ‘content’, ‘alone’. 
331
                                                          
327 A Letter to Hi Simons, February 18th, 1942. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 403. 
328 Martin Heidegger, ‘What Are Poets For?’, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 121. 
329 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 182. 
330 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
331 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 351. 
 This reveals the imagination as rising up and out of the sea 
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of ‘ex’, as the unseen half of ‘real reality’.332 The imagination is depicted as rising 
out of reality for Stevens, because the mind is part of ‘reality’. ‘That’s it: the more 
than rational distortion,/ The fiction that results from feeling. Yes, that.’333
A single empirical judgement, as for example, the judgement of one who perceives a 
moveable drop of water in a rock-crystal, rightly looks to everyone finding the fact 
 The 
‘Sorbonne’ will realize that the ‘irrational is rational’ only when they, like 
Parmenides’ poesis, realize that ‘the more than rational distortion’ is a part of the 
oneness of ‘real reality’, something that must be included in truly naming the earth. 
As will become critical for Stevens’ later vision of the ‘rock’, it is through a 
poesis that this enlarged sense of reality is reduced to one thing. The process 
confirms that the irrational must first become ‘rational’ (at ‘twilight’, the threshold 
between dreams and reality), which results in pleasure, from which universal ground 
it is predicted that we will finally be ‘flicked by feeling’. Arguably, to be ‘flicked’ by 
the ‘feeling’ of the enlarged ground of the imagination and the reality foretells of the 
ecstatic ‘transport’ of the ‘rock’ of ‘Credences’. The earth can only truly be named 
when we allow the complete reality of the metaphysical and the physical 
(imagination and reality) to flick us with feeling, rather than determining what it is 
with our own (detached) subjective minds, that look at the earth and automatically 
attribute a ‘soft footed phantom’ to it. In other words the ‘soft footed phantom’ must 
be re-compounded into a sense of ‘reality’ as a single unit. 
 The effect of this completion of what will become the ‘rock’ is to produce a 
fullness that stops the earth ‘revolving’, ‘except in crystal’. This line raises a section 
from the Critique of Judgement as follows:  
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as stated, since the judgement has been formed according to the universal conditions 
of the determinant judgement under the laws of a possible experience generally.334
In contradistinction to Kant’s ‘radical subjectivization of the aesthetic’, Stevens 
seems to be suggesting that a ‘singular judgement’ for everyone is possible, in 
‘reality’, if we accept that the ‘irrational distortion’ is itself part of the enlarged 
reality, that allows that the work of art has a truth-telling function.
 
 
335 In this regard 
Kant’s sensus communis can be curiously verbalised: ‘I call you by name, my green, 
my fluent mundo./ You will have stopped revolving except in crystal.’336
The earth can be named, fluently, as part of Stevens’ earthly language of the 
‘mundo’. It will stop evading the mind, unified in a sense that neutralizes polemos. It 
will only revolve in the beauty of poetry, in ‘rock-crystal’ that has become a ‘stanza 
my stone’.
 
337
 Patches the moon together in his room 
 ‘Everyone else’ will find it the same because the universal connection 
of being will be complete. Only then will the polemos between individual beings be 
swallowed up in the ontological oneness of the language of the ‘rock’. Poetic 
language has become the ‘place’ where the universal ‘thing-in-itself’ comes to 
fulfilment, where it can be felt, seen and heard. Only a poetic language that is 
fulfilled by both the physical and the metaphysical can qualify as the language of the 
‘rock’. 
 The final poem of the ‘Notes’ further reiterates the constant need for the 
unification of mind and world for the mollifying of the polemos: 
Soldier, there is a war between the mind 
 And sky, between thought and day and night. It is 
 For that the poet is always in the sun, 
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 To his Virgilian cadences, up down, 
 Up down. It is a war that never ends.338
It is through the act of making poetry, to the rhythm of his ‘Virgilian cadences’, that 
the poet places the imagination into the light to demonstrate that it is part of reality 
and as such refreshes reality as a whole. Threading the mind and sky, thought and 
day, day and night, sun and moon is the act of the poet continually in connecting the 
whole in a way that neutralizes the poles of the polemos and connects the audience 
with the universal ‘thing-in-itself’. Stevens’ images are of a poet tirelessly forging 
the imagination and reality together and his language is at ‘play’ with the ‘up down,/ 
Up down’ acting to blur the lines of the subjective and the objective, while at once 
denoting the ‘Virgilian cadences’ of the act of writing poetry. His ‘play’ binds the 
audience into the oneness and his words echo the reductive philosophy of Heraclitus: 
‘The way up and the way down is one and the same.’
 
 
339
Transport to Summer - An ‘Accord’ with ‘Reality’ 
 
 
 
‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ was later added to Transport to Summer 
(1947). The collection itself marks the beginning of a new poetic vision that pursues 
the conclusions reached at the end of the ‘Notes’. In a letter of 1951 Stevens called 
this vision ‘the necessity of a final accord with reality’.340
The first thing that the Copernican Revolution teaches us is that it is we who are 
giving the orders. There is here an inversion of the ancient conception of Wisdom: 
the sage was defined partly by his own submission, partly by his ‘final’ accord with 
 The harmonious music of 
this ‘accord’ will be the artistic ground where the universal ‘rock’ as a ‘thing-in-
itself’ can come to presence. The French philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, in his 
innovative work on Kant’s critical philosophy, states that: 
                                                          
338 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 351. 
339 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 138.  
340 A Letter to Charles Tomlinson, June 19th, 1951. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 719. 
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Nature. Kant sets up the crucial image in opposition to wisdom: we are the 
legislators of Nature.341
                                                          
341 Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 14. 
 
 
Stevens’ ‘final accord’ is not an accord that takes place in the subjective self as 
legislator, rather it is an embracing of the ancient sage-like, poetic ‘Wisdom’ of a 
connection in being that precedes what is arguably Kant’s romantic turn in the 
Critique of Judgement. 
What I have previously referred to as Stevens’ engagement with polemos, as 
that which characterized his poetry written in context of the rise of fascism and 
World War II, can now be absorbed in the language of the ‘rock’. Stevens’ ‘new’ 
vision is not concerned with the one and the many, but with the equally acute axis of 
the point where ‘The physical pine’ and ‘the metaphysical pine’ meet in the oneness 
of a new poesis. This vision constitutes a complete ‘reality’ that fulfils the mind by 
seeing the visible and the invisible as part of one ‘reality’. The development in 
Stevens’ poetry, from at least the period following the ‘Notes’, is to no longer see 
individual poems as ‘things in themselves’, but to view poetry as part of a universal 
‘thing-in-itself’. This cosmic ‘thing-in-itself’ includes the imagination and reality, 
the metaphysical and the physical and it is freed of all Kantian dislocation or ‘dis-
cord’. As we have seen since ‘The Snow Man’, the vision is manifest as a particular 
way of seeing. What Stevens will finally reveal in ‘Credences of Summer’ is a work 
of art that itself reveals a language of physical and metaphysical ‘reality’, reduced to 
a single unity. This revelation through poetic unveiling is completed synonymously 
with the fulfilment of summer, in contradistinction to the bare principle of winter 
associated with ‘The Snow Man’. 
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‘Transport’, in the sense of carrying from one place to another, is a mode of 
becoming, in the sense of moving towards summer. Yet Stevens also uses the 
word ‘transport’ in its other sense of ‘overwhelmingly strong emotions’.342 In his 
Adagia Stevens had written that: ‘we never arrive intellectually. But emotionally we 
arrive constantly (as in poetry, happiness, high mountains, vistas).’343
In 'Repetitions of a Young Captain' Stevens appears to elect the mode of the 
future ‘rock of summer' that will complete the ‘accord with reality’:
 This kind of 
‘transport’ is not that of physical movement, but is an emotional fulfilment that will 
be completed in the static peak of summer, as the poet is ‘flicked by feeling’. To be 
‘flicked’ by the ‘feeling’ of the physical and the metaphysical combined, produces 
the language of the ‘rock’ through ‘transport’. 
344
 My orator.
 
 The choice is made. Green is the orator 
 Of our passionate height. He wears a tufted green, 
 And tosses green for those for whom green speaks. 
 
 Secrete us in reality. It is there 
345
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‘Green’ is the ‘orator’ of the ‘speech we do not speak’, of ‘our passionate height’, 
the ecstatic ‘transport’. The language of physical nature is spoken to those ‘whom 
green speaks’, which suggests that language, nature and humanity are one thing for 
Stevens. ‘Secrete us in reality’, literally, invest us in the same stuff as the earth. 
‘Credences of Summer’ has been presaged throughout this canto and now its 
objective is outlined: 
   Discover 
 A civil nakedness in which to be, 
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In which to bear with the exactest force 
The precisions of fate, nothing fobbed off, nor changed 
In a beau language without a drop of blood.346
The lines foresee an encounter with ‘reality’ in which the attempt to hold on to the 
static mode of this ‘to be’, will be attempted. Let it reveal (‘Dis-cover’) ‘nothing 
fobbed off’, nothing ‘changed’ and let it do so in a beautiful language.
 
 
347
 Physical if the eye is quick enough
 Yet 
underlying the sense of ‘Green’ as the ‘orator’ is the metaphysical, which the 
appearing of ‘Green’ ‘speaks’. 
In ‘Chocorua to its Neighbor’, also collected in Transport, Stevens appears to 
confirm that the ‘snow’ of ‘The Snow Man’ was a ‘metaphor’ for the underlying 
metaphysical unity of the ‘nothing’ of being: 
   metaphysical metaphor, 
 But resting on me, thinking in my snow, 
348
If one looks at the ‘nothing’ of being as Stevens did in ‘The Snow Man’, then ‘it’ 
can be physical ‘if the eye is quick enough’. The ‘meta-phor’ of ‘snow’ stood for the 
‘meta-physical’ and it is in that sense that the metaphysical can be physical, because 
when Stevens wrote ‘The Snow Man’ language and poetry were ‘things in 
themselves’ that Stevens had reduced to the ‘nothing that is’. The development with 
‘Credences’ is not to reduce the physical, but to envision the physical arising out of 
the metaphysical, as two halves of the whole of being, and to uncover this whole in 
the language of the ‘rock’ as a universal ‘thing-in-itself’. The language of the ‘rock’ 
will not cover the ‘first idea’ with metaphor, but will be physical reality unveiled as 
that which is grounded in the metaphysical. In other words the physical is the solid 
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edge of being, the ‘nothing that is’ as the axis of the ‘Nothing that is not there’, 
devoid of metaphor and wholly one.  
 Bloom suggests that Stevens’ desire for ‘a final accord with reality’ is ‘a 
curious hope for the theorist of It Must Change.’349
Pliny the younger wrote to Lucretius - “Pass through life unnoticed”; - “do not wish 
to be known even while living.” That seems worth noting. How one wishes one 
could pass through life unnoticed - unnoticed by Necessity - by Nature, itself!
 There is nothing odd or curious 
about this wish for an ‘accord with reality’ against the theory of change or becoming.  
In a journal entry of 1907 Stevens noted that: 
350
The consuming nature of the ‘law’ of becoming for Stevens had been embodied from 
the beginning in the suckling rivers of 'Frogs Eat Butterflies' and as the 'monotony' 
of 'Anatomy of Monotony', which was later added to Harmonium.
 
 
351
What Stevens had discovered in the Harmonium poem, 'The Bird with the 
Coppery, Keen Claws' and developed further in 'How To Live. What To Do' from 
Ideas of Order, was the hard implacable 'rock'. In these poems the 'rock' is a symbol 
that is acceptable to Stevens. It is a solid ground that is fundamentally ‘true’ in his 
terms, and which won't consume him (‘away from the muck of the land’).
 The aging 
Stevens seems keen to ‘Dis-cover’ a way to stand in nature and ‘bear’ the ‘precisions 
of fate’, knowing that he cannot accept the consuming sway of the ‘first idea’ that he 
had unveiled in 'The Snow Man'. 
352 On the 
‘rock’, Stevens is 'Joyous and jubilant and sure'.353
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 In ‘Credences of Summer’ 
Stevens will seek to reduce ‘the physical’ and ‘the metaphysical’ to a single ‘reality’ 
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that absorbs becoming. The opening of a new poesis produces the ‘candor’ of this 
ground of the universal ‘rock’. 
 The 'rock' is no longer Stevens' earlier conception of a literal rock (though it 
retains its status as a symbol of implacable surety); rather it is reality as a whole. As 
such Stevens can determine the physical and the metaphysical as a oneness: 'The 
physical pine’ becomes one with ‘the metaphysical pine.'354
 Burn everything not part of it to ash.
 This unity is achieved 
through a way of seeing, devoid of attribution and expressed as poetry: 
 Let’s see the very thing and nothing else. 
 Let’s see it with the hottest fire of sight. 
355
This artistic, purgatory way of seeing is reminiscent of how Müller had described the 
pre-Socratics in seeing the archê of phusis, which for Heraclitus was fire. Müller’s 
assessment was that: 'their eyes had not been dimmed by the dust raised in the wars 
of words that have been going on since their time for more than two thousand 
years.'
 
 
356 Just as Parmenides had brought his complete philosophic ‘reality’ of the ‘it 
is’ to stand in poetic language, so Stevens raises his ‘rock’ into the unity of a poesis. 
Poetic language is the ground for Stevens’ ‘rock’ to come to presence, to experience 
the ‘very thing’ in-itself. This explains how a ‘poem’ could take ‘the place of a 
mountain’ in Stevens.357
From this vantage the poet is able to see the physical sun in its 'first idea', in 
'the difficulty of what it is to be':
 
358
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 Trace the gold sun about the whitened sky 
 Without evasion by a single metaphor. 
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 Look at it in its essential barrenness 
 And say this, this is the center that I seek.359
What Charles Altieri calls ‘the order of metaphor’ is shown to be utterly 
compounded in the ‘essential barrenness’.
 
 
360
 Axis of everything, green’s apogee
 The ‘center’ that Stevens is seeking for 
is the axis of the metaphysical and the physical without the polemos or struggle of 
becoming, because the ‘rock’ is a single universal ‘thing-in-itself’, realised in poetry. 
In the structure of Stevens’ ‘rock’ the physical is viewed as that which stands above 
the metaphysical, as being that can be seen: 
 It is the natural tower of all the world, 
 The point of survey, green’s green apogee, 
 But a tower more precious than the view beyond, 
 A point of survey squatting like a throne, 
361
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The here and now of physical reality emerging out of the metaphysical is more 
precious ‘than the view beyond’, than mythological projections that really begin and 
end with the earth. It is an ‘accord with reality’, a huge sense of reality where visible 
nature is only half of reality. It is a point of ‘survey’, a perspective from which to see 
the invisible that is at one with it. ‘Green’, or physical nature is an ‘apogee’, a 
‘tower’, a ‘throne’ that squats as it is compressed with the metaphysical half, 
secreted into one ‘reality’.  As we have argued, this ‘rock’ is the ‘Axis of everything’ 
and we should not underestimate Stevens’ sincerity in meaning ‘everything’. ‘Time’, 
or becoming, perhaps in context of Stevens’ own advancing years, is now addressed 
with reference to this fixed state of the ‘apogee’ of summer: 
 It is the old man standing on the tower, 
 Who reads no book. His ruddy ancientness 
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 Abhors the ruddy summer and is appeased, 
 By an understanding that fulfils his age, 
 By a feeling capable of nothing more.362
Having arrived at the apex of summer, Stevens is determined to exchange ‘transport’ 
as becoming for the emotional ‘transport’ of ecstatic completion. It was as early as 
‘Blue Guitar’ that Stevens had suggested that: ‘time grows upon the rock’.
 
  
363 When 
Stevens wrote ‘Blue Guitar’ the ‘rock’ was still that literal, palpable, implacable part 
of nature, the solidity of planet earth. Here, Time in ‘His’ 'ruddy ancientness', is 
'appeased' by this stasis at the ‘Axis of everything’, which at the apex of Summer, is 
momentarily static. ‘There is nothing left of time’.364
 A land too ripe for enigmas, too serene.
 
The opening of the new poesis that absorbs physical reality and metaphysical 
‘reality’, ‘fulfils’, or fills full Time’s age. Stevens shares the identity of this ‘Father 
Time’ figure, ‘feeling capable of nothing more’ and seeking the moment of arrest 
from time. In other words he wants to resist the becoming towards death, to resist 
'The precisions of fate' and to slip past ‘Necessity’ unnoticed. Physical reality, again 
piled high, is the apex of metaphysical reality: 
 One of the limits of reality 
 Presents itself in Oley when the hay, 
 Baked through long days, is piled in mows. It is 
365
is perân; and it has very particular connotations. It happens to be related to another 
word we have encountered already - peirata, “bonds” or “limits” - and you can judge 
its sense accordingly.
 
 
In context of Stevens’ use of ‘transport’, Kingsley says that Parmenides’ word for 
‘travelling’: 
366
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365 Ibid., p. 323. 
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At the ‘limits of reality’ the land is ‘too ripe’ for any ‘enigmas’ for the mind. The 
‘limits of reality’, like aletheia, ‘Presents itself’ and fulfils the mind as the poet is 
‘flicked by feeling’. The bond of an ontologically grounded poesis has captured the 
two-in-oneness of the physical and the metaphysical. Parmenides had said of the 'it 
is' that: 'Since, then, it has a furthest limit, it is complete on every side, like the mass 
of a rounded sphere, equally poised from the centre in every direction.'367 In the 
letter of 1945 in which Stevens praises Parmenides, he had specifically noted 
Calliois' reference to Parmenides as ‘the supreme poet from the point of view of 
substance’.368
 As if twelve princes sat before a king.
 
The ‘rock’ is now revealed again and it includes both physical nature in 
totalis and its metaphysical underbelly. Physical reality is the showing out of the 
nothing of metaphysical reality: 
 The rock cannot be broken. It is the truth. 
 It rises from land and sea and covers them. 
 It is the mountain half way green and then, 
 The other immeasurable half, such rock 
 As placid air becomes. But it is not 
  
 A hermit's truth nor symbol in hermitage. 
 It is the visible rock, the audible, 
 The brilliant mercy of a sure repose, 
 On this present ground, the vividest repose, 
 Things certain sustaining us in certainty. 
  
 It is the rock of summer, the extreme, 
 A mountain luminous half-way in bloom 
 And then half way in the extremest light 
 Of sapphires flashing from the central sky, 
369
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Stevens’ opening line, ‘The rock cannot be broken. It is the truth’, is strongly 
reminiscent of Parmenides’ ‘it is’, which is described as the ‘truth’ that is ‘uncreated 
and indestructible’.370 This ‘rock’ rises out of sea and land as a literal rock. The 
‘rock’ is the mountain that is half way physical (‘the nothing that is’) and the other 
'immeasurable half', metaphysical, 'such rock/ As placid air becomes' (the 'Nothing 
that is not there').371 It is not a truth known only to the obscure hermit, or in obscure 
symbol, rather it is right before Stevens’ eyes, the ‘rock’, in its being, a ‘sure repose’. 
Symbol and metaphor are part of the greater ‘reality’ of the ‘rock’. The ‘rock of 
summer’ is the ‘extreme’ of reality, ‘mountainous’, yet equally one with the other 
half which is ‘in the extremest light’ (a ‘candor’), ‘flashing from the central sky’, 
which is the point at which the physical and the metaphysical meet. It is the ‘sounds’ 
of ‘midsummer’ singing in ‘choirs’, which itself remembers the ‘summer sound’ ‘in 
a summer without end’ from the Key West poem.372
As good. The utmost must be good and is
 It is the repetition of the sound 
of summer in favour of the repetition of the seasons wheeling past that produces a 
‘Pure rhetoric of a language without words’, as the poesis unveils this new ‘rock’ of 
stasis: 
 Things stop in that direction and since they stop 
 The direction stops and we accept what is 
373
To sum up. What is, is a finite, spherical, motionless corporeal plenum, and there is 
nothing beyond it. The appearances of multiplicity and motion, empty space and 
 
 
The poesis of the ‘rock’ expresses the physical and metaphysical in unison as 
Stevens experiences completion in the ‘thing-in-itself’, an ‘accord with reality’. 
Burnet, who Stevens had read by 1945, suggests of Parmenides' poem that: 
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time, are illusions. We see from this that the primary substance of which the early 
cosmologists were in search has now become a sort of "thing in itself." It never quite 
lost this character again. What appears later as the elements of Empedokles, the so-
called "homoeomeries" of Anaxagoras and the atoms of Leukippos and Demokritos, 
is just the Parmenidean "being." Parmenides is not, as some have said, the "father of 
idealism"; on the contrary, all materialism depends on his view of reality.374
Stevens wrote ‘Credences’ in 1946, a few months after reading Burnet’s assessment 
that the absolute fullness of Parmenidean ‘being’, as a ‘motionless corporeal 
plenum’, had ‘become a sort of “thing in itself”.’ That this ‘thing-in-itself’ is ‘finite’ 
and static against ‘motion’, as well as being achieved in a poesis, establishes the 
source as a possible line of influence, though we cannot categorically rely upon it. 
The point of interest is that the direction of Burnet’s interpretation of Parmenidean 
being leads out of ‘idealism’ and into ‘materialism’, in which the ‘metaphysical’ 
becomes ‘physical’, ‘if the eye is quick enough’.
 
 
375
 The development of Stevens’ poetry from Harmonium is perhaps best 
thought of in context of his development of the ‘rock’, which changes from an object 
of implacable surety to a universal ground of complete reality. It is with the 
emergence of Stevens’ universal ‘rock’ that he can begin to move toward the idea of 
‘The Whole of Harmonium’, a title that he considered for his 1954 Collected 
Poems.
 What had been folded up in the 
winter of ‘The Snow Man’ is here, in ‘midsummer’, unfolded again from that same 
‘center’. This direction of thought demonstrates very clearly how Pre-Socratic poetic 
philosophy, as the ‘Wisdom’ of a ‘final accord’ with Nature, was useful for post-
Kantian philosophers and poets in attempting to experience the ‘thing-in-itself’. 
376
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 As such, poems are no longer individual ‘things in themselves’, but are 
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increasingly seen as part of the universal ‘thing-in-itself’, which is the ‘rock’ of the 
physical and the metaphysical unveiled in poetic language as an ‘accord’. 
 
The Auroras of Autumn – A Crisis in ‘Accord’ and a Return to Art 
The unity of the physical and the metaphysical in the oneness of the opening 
of a new work of art, produced the 'candor' of ‘accord’ that brings Stevens into 
dialogue with post-Kantian philosophers of art, such as Heidegger and Gadamer, as 
we have seen. However, Stevens' jubilation in establishing the static nature of the 
'rock' is short lived in 'Credences of Summer'. The seed of doubt that this ecstatic 
stasis would last seems to come with: 'One day enriches a year', and then, 'Or do the 
other days enrich the one?/ And is the queen humble as she seems to be'.377 This is 
posited in the terms of the many and the one, of the ‘horde of destructions’ 
reanimated in the river of becoming, possibly in context of Heraclitus’ reductive 
statement that ‘One day is like any other.’378 This unseen 'queen', who appears to 
be 'Ananke', may not be serene and 'humble' and may yet determine to reverse the 
endless repetition of a ‘summer sound’ back to the repetition of the seasons in 
change.379
The dilemma of that irrepressible question 
 
concerning the dominance of 
either static being or becoming
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, which I have suggested is linked to Stevens' 
consciousness of his own advancing years, rolls into the title poem of The Auroras of 
Autumn (1950). Here the question emerges as an acute crisis that opens the 
collection. When Stevens wrote the poems of Auroras he was in his later sixties. The 
new universal sense of the ‘rock’ reveals itself not to be made of the hard implacable 
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'rock', but of a universal 'law' of becoming reminiscent of Heraclitus. 'Aurora' was 
the 'goddess' of dawn to the ancient Greeks and this is the dawning of autumn, or the 
dawning of death for Stevens. Leggett suggests that 'if "Credences" is about stasis, a 
moment "Beyond which there is nothing left of time," "Auroras" is about flux'.380 
Arguably, it is only with the ‘return to art’ in forms such as the ‘angel of reality’, that 
Stevens re-establishes static being as the ‘first idea’.381
Deeper within the belly's dark 
Of time, time grows upon the rock.
 The ‘angel of reality’ appears 
in the last poem collected in The Auroras of Autumn, which we will analyse in 
greater detail in due course. 
For now we can recall that 'Blue Guitar' had related that: 
382
The 'belly's dark' is reminiscent of the 'belly-sounds' of Stevens' river of becoming 
seen in 'Frogs Eat Butterflies'.
 
 
383
And the serpent body flashing without the skin.
 'The Auroras', meaning the 'Northern Lights', 
appear to be nothing other than a huge serpent, literally consuming the fabric of the 
'rock' as reality is given up to arbitrary change:  
This is form gulping after formlessness,  
Skin flashing to wished-for disappearances  
384
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The 'change' of forms is the aurora borialis as the 'rock' appears to be consumed 
within its own nature of becoming: 
This is his poison: that we should disbelieve  
Even that. His meditations in the ferns,  
When he moved so slightly to make sure of the sun,  
   
Made us no less sure. We saw in his head,  
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Black beaded on the rock, the flecked animal,  
The moving grass, the Indian in his glade.385
The 'poison' of this snake seems to be that it will make us 'disbelieve' that change 
will consume us as well, a theme espoused in earlier poems such as 'Anatomy of 
Monotony'. The difference here is that Stevens’ sense of becoming is not merely 
physical, it is the absolute base of all reality, it is ontological. As such the 'nest' of 
this snake is anywhere and it runs through reality ('The moving grass, the Indian in 
his glade'), even to the real/natural snake: 'Black beaded on the rock, the flecked 
animal', as Vendler has noted.
 
   
386
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 The constituents of this ‘nature’ are all ab-original 
and the ‘flecked’ camouflage of the snake (indicating the ‘one and the many’), 
makes it appear to be 'one' with the ‘rock'. In Stevens' lexicon, this would seem to 
indicate that change is consuming the very fabric of reality, a ground that would 
have to be re-established in the poems of The Rock (1954). 
The crisis of Stevens' concept of having been secreted into a universal reality 
of becoming, continues in ‘This Solitude of Cataracts’. Here a specifically 
Heraclitean sense of becoming is depicted as a destructive force:   
He never felt twice the same about the flecked river,  
Which kept flowing and never the same way twice, flowing  
   
Through many places, as if it stood still in one,  
Fixed like a lake on which the wild ducks fluttered,  
   
Ruffling its common reflections, thought-like Monadnocks.  
There seemed to be an apostrophe that was not spoken. 
 
There was so much that was real that was not real at all. 
He wanted to feel the same way over and over.  
   
He wanted the river to go on flowing the same way,  
To keep on flowing. He wanted to walk beside it,  
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Under the buttonwoods, beneath a moon nailed fast.  
He wanted his heart to stop beating and his mind to rest  
   
In a permanent realization, without any wild ducks  
Or mountains that were not mountains, just to know how it  
             Would be,  
   
Just to know how it would feel, released from destruction,  
To be a bronze man breathing under archaic lapis,  
   
Without the oscillations of planetary pass-pass,  
Breathing his bronzen breath at the azury centre of time.387
Change or becoming appears to stand still in 'one,/ Fixed like a lake'.
 
 
388 This is a 
close parallel with Heraclitus' statement that 'it rests by changing'.389 The fluttering 
of the ‘wild ducks’ indicates that nature is on the move again, and the effect is to 
ruffle the ‘common reflections’ of the ‘thought-like Monadnocks’. The ‘common 
reflections’ are Stevens’ words and the ‘thought-like Monadnocks’ (perhaps 
inverting the idealism of that ‘mountain-minded Hoon’) are indicative of his poems 
themselves (as poems ‘of the mind’), such as the mountainous ‘rock of summer’ 
from ‘Credences’, that is grounded in the fixed flowing of the ontological river.390
Heraclitus held that words exist naturally, but he did not confine himself to that 
technical phraseology. Words, he said, are like the shadows of things, like the 
pictures of trees and mountains reflected in the river, like our own images when we 
look into a mirror.
 
Stevens had read Müller’s account of Heraclitus on the subject of words in 
Lectures on the Science of Language, which reads as follows: 
391
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For this thinking, our words, like ourselves are part of nature and that nature is 
grounded in the river of becoming. Echoing Heraclitus precisely, Stevens had said in 
a letter of 1940 that: 
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a poem is like a man walking on the bank of a river, whose shadow is reflected in the 
water. If you explain a poem, you are quite likely to do it either in terms of the man 
or in terms of the shadow, but you have to explain it in terms of the whole.392
The ‘Monadnocks’ (reminiscent of Stevens’ ‘mountain’ from ‘Credences’) 
are grounded in the river of a universal becoming. The river, like the serpent of 
change from the 'Auroras' is 'flecked', showing their synonymous Heraclitean nature, 
as the one containing the many, or the 'horde of destructions'. Stevens’ own poems 
are swept into the past before his eyes, even the seemingly static ‘rock’ of 
‘Credences’. It is significant that Stevens would call his ‘thought-like’ mountains 
‘monadnocks’, an outcrop of incredibly hard rock that provides a metaphor for the 
solitude of these cataracts standing against the river of becoming. In Ralph Waldo 
Emerson’s long poem, Monadnock, it is the rock summit itself that foresees its own 
collapse despite its efforts to stand against ‘the hurts of time’.
 
 
The poet, his mind, his words and the mountains of his land are all one for Stevens, 
and all are subject to the oneness of Heraclitean becoming. The emphasis in Stevens’ 
poem certainly seems to be on the poet’s words (as part of the ‘thing-in-itself’) 
sailing down the river to oblivion, and it seems that we must read the poem by 
incorporating Stevens in that same flow. What he is presenting is the drama of his 
connection with the universal ‘thing-in-itself’ of the ‘rock’. It is clear from this 
drama that pre-Socratic thought raises ‘new’ difficulties, while proving useful to the 
poet for reanimating the project of modernism. 
393
For his own part, Stevens doesn't want the flow of change that leads toward 
death. He wants to 'walk beside’ the river, 'beneath a moon nailed fast'. He wants 
simply ‘to be’, to know how it ‘Would be’, just to abide in the eternal ontological 
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connection, which includes the ‘whole’ of the ‘man’ and his ‘shadow’. He is seeking 
a 'permanent realisation' in which his heart can 'stop beating' and his 'mind' can 'rest'. 
He wants to be 'released from destruction' (from the ‘cataracts’ of declining 
eyesight), 'To be a bronze man', still 'breathing' 'bronzen breath'. In ‘An Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven’, a poem from the same collection concerned to remedy the 
crisis of every successive poem amounting to ‘farewell to an idea’, it was ‘the man/ 
Of bronze whose mind was made up and who, therefore, died.’394
In 'Credences of Summer' Stevens had attempted to reverse the sense of 
'transport' as becoming to an ecstatic fulfilment that ‘fulfils’ time’s ‘age’.
 
Stevens is approaching seventy years of age in context of this collection. He 
has engaged wholly with his enlarged sense of ‘reality’, and now he is looking to 
realign the terms of this engagement that has pressed through Kantian synthesis. He 
desires the 'planetary pass-pass', reminiscent of the 'Turning' planets of 'Domination 
of Black', to cease their 'oscillations' and let him 'be' at the 'azury' centre of time. 
When Stevens wrote 'Domination of Black' it was the poem that enacted the 
becoming of the universe. Now his own historical poems are included in that truly 
universal becoming (because poems are part of the ‘thing-in-itself’ for Stevens), as is 
his own existence. 
395
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 'The 
Auroras' had destroyed that stasis. Stevens' efforts to shift the dynamic of 
fundamental becoming to one of a stasis, which he now overtly calls 'being', continue 
into 'Metaphor as Degeneration'. He appears to be seeking the implacable 'metaphor' 
that will not degenerate, like that which he had momentarily dis-covered in the 
‘rock’ of ‘Credences’. In doing so, Stevens could be read as showing an affiliation 
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with Heidegger’s sense of sein-zum-tod (being-towards-death) or Parmenides’ sense 
of the ‘truth’ of being lying in the ‘underworld’. If being is to be complete, it must 
include death:  
If there is a man white as marble  
Sits in a wood, in the greenest part,  
Brooding sounds of the images of death,  
   
So there is a man in black space  
Sits in nothing that we know,  
Brooding sounds of river noises;  
   
And these images, these reverberations,  
And others, make certain how being  
Includes death and the imagination.  
   
The marble man remains himself in space.  
The man in the black wood descends unchanged.  
It is certain that the river  
   
Is not Swatara. The swarthy water 
That flows round the earth and through the skies, 
Twisting among the universal spaces, 
 
 Is not Swatara. It is being.  
That is the flock-flecked river, the water,  
The blown sheen – or is it air?  
   
How, then, is metaphor degeneration,  
When Swatara becomes this undulant river  
And the river becomes the landless, waterless ocean?  
   
Here the black violets grow down to its banks  
And the memorial mosses hang their green  
Upon it, as it flows ahead.396
‘If’ is the key initial strain to be heard here. ‘If there is a man white as marble’ sitting 
in a wood, contemplating ‘the images of death’, so there is a man who has already 
died, ‘in black space’, ‘in nothing that we know’, ‘Brooding sounds of river noises’. 
The river is called 'being' and the man is dead. The living man, the ‘man white as 
marble’, frets about death, the dead man broods on being, as a part of it. If the living 
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man can imagine death then the dead man is in being, and here being is proposed as 
incorporating both death and the imagination: 
And these images, these reverberations,  
And others, make certain how being  
Includes death and the imagination.397
The reference to 'these images' is connected to 'these reverberations', in a mode of 
‘play’ similar to being ‘flicked by feeling’. In 'The Creations of Sound', collected in 
Transport, it was the sound of authentic poetry that was 'reverberating' and equally 
linked to making ‘the visible a little hard/ To see', by implying the invisible in the 
visible.
 
 
398
To prove the strength of the certainty that the dead man will be held, and 
certainty is what Stevens is searching for, he inverts their prospective positions. The 
man ‘white as marble’ is equally himself in space as he is in being, the same as the 
dead man, who now in the ‘black woods’, denoting death very clearly, ‘descends 
unchanged’. ‘Descends’ evokes a specifically Greek notion of being led into the 
underworld and we should make no mistake that it is the dead man that Stevens is 
extremely concerned about preserving in being. Indeed, the whole conception of the 
unity of life and death is reminiscent of Heraclitus’ saying that: ‘it is the same thing 
in us that is quick and dead, awake and asleep, young and old; the former are shifted 
 Through the artistic representation of image and sound, being comes to 
representation and it wholly connects mind, world and now death in a oneness for 
Stevens. However, as the river (which is still in the Heraclitean guise of being ‘flock-
flecked’) ‘flows ahead’, the inference is confirmed that only with the inclusion of 
‘death’ into the ‘rock’ will time stop and metaphor cease to be degeneration, as an 
equally valid part of the totality of the ‘it is’.  
                                                          
397 Ibid., p. 381. 
398 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Creations of Sound’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 274 - 275. 
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and become the latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former.’399
Is not Swatara. It is being.
 It 
appears to be within the context of a proposition of this kind that Stevens 
immediately clings to the ‘certainty’ of the ontological connection by saying, ‘it is 
certain that the river/ Is not Swatara.’ If ‘the river’ is not a real river, the river that 
runs through east central Pennsylvania, then what is this river that the dead man 
hears?  
The swarthy water  
That flows round the earth and through the skies,  
Twisting among the universal spaces,  
   
400
That art is the means of conceiving of the ‘expressings’ of ‘being’ 
demonstrates Stevens’ wish to elevate the status of art and ground the imagination in 
an ontological ‘truth’, reminiscent of Heidegger and Gadamer. Critchley had 
suggested that Stevens owes his sense ‘that “the two-in-oneness” of the world is 
phenomenologically disclosed or reflectively transfigured as a world not in 
philosophy but through a poetic act, that is to say, in an artwork’, to 
‘romanticism’.
 
   
Stevens’ questioning into the nature of being, which he clearly sees as the 
fundamental archê that underlies reality, is to ask why metaphor is degeneration 
when everything is connected to the ‘swarthy water’ of ‘being’? Such a question 
suggests an ontology of becoming that suits Stevens’ modernism, but which is at 
odds with his own existential encounter with death. 
401
                                                          
399 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 139. 
400 Wallace Stevens, ‘Metaphor as Degeneration’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 381. 
401 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 30. 
 However, the romantic connection should not be embraced at the 
expense of recalling what Stevens did in transforming what he saw as the limitations 
of the romantic imagination. Stevens says in The Necessary Angel: 
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before going on, we must somehow cleanse the imagination of the romantic. We 
feel, without being particularly intelligent about it, that the imagination as 
metaphysics will survive logical positivism unscathed. At the same time, we feel, 
and with the sharpest possible intelligence, that it is not worthy to survive if it is to 
be identified with the romantic. The imagination is one of the great human powers. 
The romantic belittles it. The imagination is the liberty of the mind. The romantic is 
the failure to make use of that liberty.402
                                                          
402 Wallace Stevens, ‘Imagination of Value’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 
727 - 728. 
 
 
I would suggest that the poetic philosophy of the pre-Socratics which had proved so 
useful to Hölderlin, provided post-Kantian poets and philosophers with a model for 
connecting the imagination and reality in the unity of the work of art. 
Having accommodated the crisis of the 'Auroras', Stevens returns to the 
theme of the appearing of art as the means of uniting the physical and the 
metaphysical in a way that defuses polemos, by establishing the unity of static being 
as the ‘first idea’. In the poem that closes the collection, entitled ‘Angel Surrounded 
by Paysans’, Stevens says: 
One of the countrymen:  
                                                There is  
            A welcome at the door to which no one comes? 
The angel:  
            I am the angel of reality,  
            Seen for a moment standing in the door.  
   
            I have neither ashen wing nor wear of ore  
            And live without a tepid aureole,  
   
Or stars that follow me, not to attend,  
            But, of my being and its knowing, part.  
   
            I am one of you and being one of you  
            Is being and knowing what I am and know.  
   
            Yet I am the necessary angel of earth,  
            Since, in my sight, you see the earth again,  
   
            Cleared of its stiff and stubborn, man-locked set,  
            And, in my hearing, you hear its tragic drone  
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            Rise liquidly in liquid lingerings,  
            Like watery words awash; like meanings said  
   
            By repetitions of half-meanings. Am I not,  
Myself, only half of a figure of a sort,  
   
A figure half seen, or seen for a moment, a man  
Of the mind, an apparition apparelled in  
   
Apparels of such lightest look that a turn  
Of my shoulder and quickly, too quickly, I am gone?403
The poem, through the mouth of ‘One of the Countrymen’, begins with a line 
containing the blank ontological statement, ‘There is’, which ‘is’ itself like a 
‘welcome’ at a ‘door to which no one comes?’ Or do they, because in the moment of 
putting being into question, ‘The angel’ appears. The language of the poem is 
predominantly expressed by the 'angel', who is an angel of reality, not a religious 
'angel'. The 'angel' is 'one of you', which in the next chapter I will suggest is a criteria 
for 'major man' aligned with the 'first idea', wherein 'being one of you/ Is being and 
knowing what I am and know'. This angel is 'necessary', performing a practical 
function for the 'social' (peasants) sphere, allowing people to see the 'first idea' again 
through an art that literally dresses the ‘first idea’ in the apparel of the imagination. 
Just as with the ‘song’ at Key West, it is from ‘beyond the genius of the sea’, 
through the hearing of this ‘angelic’ necessity, that you can hear the ‘tragic drone’ of 
‘watery words awash’, as the unfolding of ‘reality’ from that centre, dis-closes the 
centre in language. Adorno had critiqued such an annulment of the rational in the 
ontological thought associated with Heidegger, suggesting that Heidegger: 
‘discarded the rational moment which Husserl preserved’.
 
 
404
                                                          
403 Wallace Stevens, ‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 423. 
 
404 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by E.B. Ashton (New York: The Continuum 
International Publishing Group, Inc., 2007), p. 70. Much has been written on Stevens and Edmund 
Husserl, notably, Paul Kenneth Naylor. ‘“The Idea of It”: Wallace Stevens and Edmund Husserl’. The 
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 Heidegger would seem to bear out an ontological interpretation of this poem 
through an assessment of Rilke’s reference to the being called the ‘Angel’: 
This being, in Rilke’s Duino Elegies, is the Angel. This name is once again a basic 
word in Rilke’s poetry. Like “the Open,” “the draft,” “the parting,” “Nature,” it is a 
basic word because what is said in it thinks the whole of beings by way of Being. In 
his letter of November 13, 1925 Rilke writes: 
 “The Angel of the Elegies is that creature in whom the transmutation of the 
visible into the invisible, which we achieve, seems already accomplished. The Angel 
of the Elegies is that being who assures the recognition of a higher order of reality in 
the invisible.” 405
The poem was inspired by a Pierre Tal-Coat painting that Stevens had 
purchased and therefore is conceived as a poetic evocation of a work of art. Just as 
Stevens had advocated that we should look at the world as we would look at a 
‘picture’, cleared of its 'varnish and dirt' (‘man-locked set’), so this art work stands 
as a universal ontological principle which stretches the ground between reality and 
the imagination. The painting itself shows a Venetian glass bowl surrounded by 
several smaller terrines, glasses and bottles, as Riddel has noted.
 
 
This directly correlates with Stevens’ ‘angel’ and perhaps we would better say that it 
is in the ‘sight’ of being within art that we see Stevens, see the ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’. 
406
                                                                                                                                                                    
Wallace Stevens Journal 12.1 (Spring 1988): 44-45, Thomas J. Hines, The Later Poetry of Wallace 
Stevens - Phenomenological Parallels with Husserl and Heidegger (New Jersey & London: 
Associated University Presses, 1976) and Charles Altieri’s essay entitled ‘Stevens and the Crisis of 
European Philosophy’, Wallace Stevens Across the Atlantic, pp. 61 - 78. 
405 Martin Heidegger, ‘What Are Poets For?’, Poetry, Language, Thought, p. 131. 
406 Joseph N. Riddel, The Clairvoyant Eye: The Poetry and Poetics of Wallace Stevens, p. 234. 
 The smaller 
objects orbiting the larger is composite to the parallel of Picasso's 'horde of 
destructions', or the model of the 'flecked' objects as part of the pixilated whole. 
This parallel can be extended when we note a letter from Stevens to the art 
dealer Paule Vidal from 1949, on the subject of the Tal-Coat painting:  
126 
 
Now that I have had the new picture at home for a few days, it seems almost 
domesticated. Tal Coat is supposed to be a man of violence but one soon becomes 
accustomed to the present picture. I have even given it a title of my own: Angel 
Surrounded By Peasants. The angel is the Venetian glass bowl on the left with the 
little spray of leaves in it. The peasants are the terrines, bottles and the glasses that 
surround it. This title alone tames it as a lump of sugar might tame a lion.407
Art is the ground in which the ‘rock’ comes to appearance, just as for 
Parmenides it was through a poesis that the plenum of the ‘it is’ was fulfilled. In this 
model the 'angel' spans the ground between the physical ‘rock’ and the 'placid air' 
half of the 'rock', 'such rock/ As placid air becomes.'
   
 
This poem is set where the 'peasants' are and the peasants are entreated to see 
through the 'sight' of the 'necessary angel of earth'. This has the effect of taming the 
'violence' of the Tal-Coat painting, symbolised by Stevens' 'lion'. Just as Stevens was 
looking to play out polemos in 'a man skating' in 'Of Modern Poetry', or just as he 
would read 'Of the pans above the stove, the pots on the table, the / tulips among 
them' in 'Large Red Man Reading', also collected in The Auroras, so too here, he is 
defusing the polemos of the 'lion' by playing out the violence of fundamental reality 
at the root of 'social' existence, through a work of art that connects to the unity of 
being. 
408 Costello suggests that ‘Angel 
Surrounded by Paysans’ also ‘explores a presence/absence dynamic undoubtedly 
drawn from Tal Coat’s mixtures of solid and transparent surface.’409
 
 For the post-
Kantian philosopher of art or poet, the oneness of this conception that parallels pre-
Socratic notions, has the effect of nullifying polemos and it is through the work of art 
that this representation of the philosophical is most accurately rendered. Stevens is in 
complete accord with the dynamics of this 'perspective'. 
                                                          
407 A Letter to Paule Vidal, October 5th, 1949. Letters of Wallace Stevens, pp. 649 - 650. 
408 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 324. 
409 Bonnie Costello, ‘Stevens and Painting’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, p. 178. 
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The Rock and Final Lyrics - Recomposing out of the 'Rock'  
 
‘The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain’, collected in The 
Rock, arguably looks back on the mountain that appeared in ‘Credences’, as Bloom 
has noted410
Recognize his unique and solitary home.
: 
There it was, word for word,  
The poem that took the place of a mountain.  
   
He breathed its oxygen,  
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table. 
 
It reminded him how he had needed  
A place to go to in his own direction,  
   
How he had recomposed the pines,  
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds,  
   
For the outlook that would be right,  
Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion:  
   
The exact rock where his inexactness  
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had  
             edged,  
   
Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea,  
411
                                                          
410 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 249. 
411 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 
435. 
 
 
Stevens' secreting of the mind in 'reality' is complete and content with the advent of 
this poem. His 'final accord with reality' was successful and here he is seen to be re-
composing out of the universal 'rock' unveiled in the earlier poem, 'Credences of 
Summer'. His language of phusei is now the language of the 'rock', a reality from 
which Stevens can proceed to compose more realities that are still part of the 'rock'. 
However, if we look at the language of the poem we can see how that 'rock' (which 
includes the poem as part of the ‘thing-in-itself’), is realised through art. Stevens 
recalls how he had unveiled 'the rock of summer':  
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How he had recomposed the pines,  
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds,  
   
For the outlook that would be right412
He is operating here much as an artist operates and 
 
 
Costello associates the poem with 
the subject matter of Cézanne.413 The re-composition of the pines was the realisation 
of 'The physical pine' as connected to 'the metaphysical pine'.414 Stevens 'shifted the 
rocks' which rose above land and sea in canto VI of 'Credences'.415 He ‘picked his 
way among the clouds’ when he traced ‘the gold sun about the whitened sky’ in 
canto II.416 The outlook that would be right was achieved atop the tower, that was 
more important than its perspective and the unexplained completeness is the 
'transport' of the 'rock', fully realised.417
As the poem, 'Credences of Summer', 'took the place of a mountain' through 
its 'stanza my stone' or language of phusei, so 'The Planet on the Table' appears to be 
Stevens' collected works sitting on the table next to him, as Bloom has noted.
 Stevens is here painting a remembrance of 
his earlier composing of reality. 'The exact rock' is the 'axis' between the 
metaphysical and the physical that fulfils the 'inexactness' of his own mind, by dis-
covering the universal ground in which mind and world are one. It is a way of 
seeing, a 'view' toward which he had 'edged', much as he had been secreted in reality 
at the 'Axis of everything'. His connection with the ‘thing-in-itself’ is a 'gazing' 
where he can 'Re-cognize' his being at home in the universe.  
418
                                                          
412 Ibid., p. 435. 
413 Bonnie Costello, ‘Stevens and Painting’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, p. 170. 
414 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 322. 
415 Ibid., pp. 324 - 325. 
416 Ibid., p. 322. 
417 Ibid., p. 323. 
418 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 365. 
 
Stevens’ poems are a 'rhetoric of a language without words', they are a pure 
expression of the 'rock', with 'nothing fobbed off', with 'everything not part of it' 
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burnt 'to ash'. Stevens doesn't mind if the poems should survive or not, but it is 
important that they be capable of bearing: ‘Some lineament or character,/ Some 
affluence, if only half-perceived’, ‘Of the planet of which they were part’.419 
Heraclitus had said: ‘It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word and to confess 
that all things are one.’420
Were no less makings of the sun.
 The use of the word 'lineament' combines its geological 
sense with its sense of features, usually of a face. This is made more certain by the 
additional use of the word 'character', which combines the root word meaning to 
engrave and the sense of the printed letter or word, with the human sense of the 
character of a person. Stevens has ingeniously collapsed the earth, the poem and the 
sense of the human into the oneness of his 'rock', from which it is implied he can 
carve a new sense of ‘man’. Here the ‘unity’ is expressed as:  
His self and the sun were one  
And his poems, although makings of his self,  
421
In the poem called 'The Rock', Stevens would work through the implications 
of his 'final accord with reality'. Here the physical half of the 'rock' ('blooming and 
the musk') is grounded in 'being, that gross universe'.
 
 
The Kantian mind that orders the world has passed. Stevens is 'one' with the 
'sun'. The modern poet has completed the 'horde of destructions' and can paint a new 
reality from that palette, as 'makings of his self' that are also 'makings of the sun'. He 
is making it new, painting from a ground of the total connection of mind and world, 
which owes much to the pre-Socratic ontology. 
422
                                                          
419 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Planet on the Table’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 450. 
420 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 132. 
421 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Planet on the Table’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 450. 
422 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Rock’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 445. 
 A language of binding 
describes how the physical reality surrounds the ‘gross universe’ of 'being’. Physical 
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reality that includes language had always been presented as the ‘crust’423, the ‘shed’ 
snake ‘skin’424
Its copy of the sun, these cover the rock.
 that encircle the ‘first idea’ as the ‘centre’: 
The pearled chaplet of spring,  
The magnum wreath of summer, time's autumn snood,  
   
425
At B: The origin of the mango's rind.
  
 
The 'rock' collapses the distance of the 'Copernican Revolution' and 'point A' is 'near' 
point 'B':   
The rock is the habitation of the whole,  
Its strength and measure, that which is near, point A  
In a perspective that begins again 
 
426
Heraclitus had said that: ‘In the circumference of a circle the beginning and end are 
common.’
 
 
427 Phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard has said in a phrase reminiscent of 
Parmenides' spherical 'plenum' of being (in Heideggerian guise) that: 'Das Dasein ist 
rund. Being is round'.428
The step to the bleaker depths of his descents...
 Stevens says: 
 The rock is the gray particular of man’s life, 
The stone from which he rises, up-and-ho, 
429
Lee M. Jenkins has suggested that Stevens’ point of reference for these lines may be 
Heraclitus. Jenkins says that: ‘Stevens may have in mind the Heraclitean dictum that 
the way up is also the way down’.
 
 
430
                                                          
423 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 150. 
424 Wallace Stevens, ‘Farewell to Florida’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 97. 
425 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Rock’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 446. 
426 Ibid., p. 447. 
427 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 138. 
428 Gaston Bachelard, The Poetics of Space, trans. by Maria Jolas (Boston: Beacon Press, 1994), p. 
239. 
429 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Rock’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 447. 
430 Lee M. Jenkins, Wallace Stevens: rage for Order (Brighton & Portland: Sussex University Press, 
2000), p. 119. 
 The thinking, which mirrors pre-Socratic 
thought, is useful to the post-Kantian philosopher of art for secreting humanity in a 
reality of connection, realized through poetry.  
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The poem that closes The Rock is entitled 'Not Ideas About the Thing But the 
Thing Itself'. Stevens is clearly confident of his ability to present the ‘thing-in-itself’, 
having completely overcome Kant:  
At the earliest ending of winter,  
In March, a scrawny cry from outside  
Seemed like a sound in his mind.  
   
He knew that he heard it,  
A bird's cry, at daylight or before,  
In the early March wind.  
   
The sun was rising at six,  
No longer a battered panache above snow...  
It would have been outside.  
   
It was not from the vast ventriloquism  
Of sleep's faded papier-mâché...  
The sun was coming from outside.  
   
That scrawny cry - it was  
A chorister whose c preceded the choir.  
It was part of the colossal sun,  
   
Surrounded by its choral rings,  
Still far away. It was like  
A new knowledge of reality.431
The thing that can be thought and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the 
same; for you cannot find thought without something that is, as to which it is 
uttered.
 
 
The language of the poem serves to collapse the distance of 'point A' from 'B'. The 
separation between objective and subjective is collapsed as the 'bird's cry' is neither 
'in the mind' or 'outside'. Parmenides had said that: 
432
                                                          
431 Wallace Stevens, ‘Not Ideas About the Thing But the Thing Itself’, Collected Poetry and Prose, 
pp. 451 - 452. 
432 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 176. 
 
 
Kingsley observes of Parmenides' statement that: 
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reality consists of nothing apart from existence and what thinks or perceives it, there 
is no longer any question of inner or outer. Whatever we consider outside us is really 
inside, and anything we view as internal is right out there.433
In the Auroras poem, ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, Stevens had said that a 
philosopher seeks ‘an interior made exterior’ and a poet ‘the same exterior made/ 
Interior’.
 
 
434
In like manner, past and future are collapsed into an eternal ‘now’. It is 'at 
daylight', 'or before'. It is 'the earliest ending of winter'. 'The sun was rising at six'. 
The language is indecisive and the moment is displaced in the single unity of the 
‘rock’. Every seemingly different premise is really just a single expression of the 
homogenous 'rock' that has no past and no future. The separation between all 
individual objects is also collapsed in oneness as the bird’s cry is equally 'part of the 
colossal sun'. 'Battered panache' is a phrase like 'early ending' that seeks to marry 
contrasting extremes in oneness. 'Panache' can also mean a 'plume of feathers' worn 
in a helmet or cap.
 For Parmenides and Stevens, a poesis is the single ground in which 
‘outside’ and ‘inside’ meet. 
435
However, Stevens’ collapse of all individual things into oneness is being 
painted out of the 'rock', which includes the de-creations of his 'Planet on the Table'. 
The sun and the bird have become fused together in the language of the poem 
(‘battered panache’), which raises the 'panache upon panache' of the 'parakeet of 
parakeets' from the Harmonium poem, 'The Bird with the Coppery, Keen Claws'.
 Thus the earlier 'battered panache' of the sun also links the 
'scrawny cry' of the bird to the sun.  
436
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In that early poem the bird exists 'in the sun pallor of his rock'.437 Stevens’ total 
reduction includes the collapse of his ‘early’ poetry into his ‘later’ poetry. For 
Stevens it seems, as for Parmenides, there is only the eternal 'now' of the 'it is'.438 
Equally, the phrase 'choral rings' serves to conflate sound, future echoes, matter and 
the fire of the 'colossal sun', in a spherical sense that we have already seen identified 
with Parmenides’ conception of reality as bound within a single plenum. The ‘choral 
rings’ represent the ontological ‘song’ that comes from ‘beyond the genius of the 
sea’439, as a remembrance of  the ‘coral and coraline sea’, ‘in the ever-freshened 
Keys’ heard at Key West.440
 Itself, until, at last, the cry concerns no one at all.
 The 'c preceded the choir' is a textual link to 'The 
Comedian as the Letter C', a letter of the alphabet that Stevens had always found 
amusing for its sound, which abundantly repeated here, adds another connection to 
‘sea’. The term ‘preceded’ also suggests that the earlier poem ‘seeded’ the later in 
advance, just as a poesis is ‘seeded’ from being. The poem is a re-composition of the 
fabric of the 'rock', in an effort to destroy the ground between the ‘ideas about the 
thing’ and ‘the thing itself’, through total immanence. 
The ‘bird’s cry’ is not part of a false dream, rendered through the constructed 
falsehoods of ‘ventriloquism’ and ‘papier-mâché’. Rather it is the stark, utterly 
impersonal ‘thing-in-itself’ of complete ‘reality’, crying of ‘itself’ at the same time 
as listening to ‘itself’, as Stevens’ late lyrics such as ‘The Course of a Particular’ will 
depict it: 
 In the absence of fantasia, without meaning more 
 Than they are in the final finding of the ear, in the thing 
441
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Stevens is capable of listening to the universal ‘thing-in-itself’ as ‘it is’, as part of it, 
without the ‘varnish and dirt’ of any human attribution. The bird that cries and the 
poet who listens are no different. They are the ‘thing-in-itself’ come full circle (with 
everything) into one ‘thing’, having purged the rational human concepts of ‘truth’, 
which themselves simply become more ‘rock’. In ‘Not Ideas About the Thing’, the 
cry of the totalized ‘thing-in-itself’ comes ‘from outside’, yet, ‘Seemed like a sound 
in his mind’. The same conception of the cry and the hearer of the cry being equal 
‘parts’ in the one ‘rock’ is evident in this universal ‘thing-in-itself’, just as Burnet 
had said of Parmenides’ sense of being. 
The bird’s cry is equally ‘part of the colossal sun’, a sun which is ‘Still far 
away’. Here we may offer the parallel with the Parmenidean collapse of distance. 
Parmenides had said: ‘Look steadfastly with thy mind at things though afar as if they 
were at hand. Thou canst not cut off what is from holding fast to what is’.442
                                                          
442 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 173. 
 The 
‘new knowledge of reality’ is very like the Parmenidean poetic collapse of this 
distance through being, a collapse that brings Stevens’ ‘earlier’ poetry into his 
‘later’. However, we cannot say this is definitively a Parmenidean philosophical 
position. It could equally be linked to non-perspectival painting. The relationship of 
‘near’ and ‘far’ is of course a key aspect of modernism and the connection of subject 
and object is a central theme of romanticism. What I have attempted to demonstrate 
is how the pre-Socratics accommodate the dynamics of this kind of thought, often in 
a sense that demonstrates that they were direct sources of influence, as with 
Heidegger, Gadamer, Schelling and Hölderlin. It would seem, however, that what 
post-Kantian philosophers and poets wanted from pre-Socratism was primarily the 
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power of its language of reconnection and perpetual renewal, in a context of poetry 
as ‘truth’. 
The last poem collected together in Stevens’ late lyrics is simply called 'Of 
Mere Being'. Stevens had used the phrase 'mere being’ in a letter of 1943 that 
described Miami beach at a time when it was still ‘an isolated spot'.443
The palm at the end of the mind, 
Beyond the last thought, rises 
In the bronze decor,  
 
A gold-feathered bird 
Sings in the palm, without human meaning, 
Without human feeling, a foreign song.  
 
You know then that it is not the reason 
That makes us happy or unhappy. 
The bird sings. Its feathers shine. 
 
The palm stands on the edge of space. 
The wind moves slowly in the branches. 
The bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down.
 Florida, much 
like Matthew Arnold's Dover, seems to denote a threshold for Stevens at the 
periphery of certainty. The 'palm' that rises into view would appear to be at a cross 
roads, at an axis:  
444
At 'the end of the mind' and 'Beyond the last thought' does not signal transcendence, 
but rather death. The 'distance' is 'bronze' because bronze in the lexicon of ‘An 
Ordinary Evening’ signalled the dead man held by 'being'.
 
 
445 This is why Bloom 
calls 'Of Mere Being' 'the great death poem'446
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446 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 343. 
, which would be the end of it if 
Stevens had not already told us that 'being' includes both ‘death and the 
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imagination'.447
In this analogy, the palm signifies physical reality and the bird in it is the 
metaphysical 'reality'. However, in Stevens’ terms it is not a symbol or a metaphor 
that can degenerate, because death and destruction are already part of ‘it’, and the 
language of which it is composed is part of the universal ‘thing-in-itself’ 
compounded with the ‘first idea’. This precious bird parallels the bird seen in 'The 
Bird With the Coppery, Keen Claws', as Bloom has said.
 Stevens’ palm is here the completed ‘rock’, the 'rock' that includes 
all things, even death.  
448 It is a 'gold feathered 
bird' here just as in the earlier poem it was expressed as a bird 'Of his gold ether, 
golden alguazil.'449
'The bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down' and appear to look exactly the 
same as the branches of the palm. 'The physical pine' is one with the 'metaphysical 
pine'.
 The temporal proximity of the ‘earlier’ poem again forms part of 
Stevens' ‘rock’ and a collapse of time is certainly a trait of modern literature. This 
'reality' of connection is expressed through 'song', and the bird sings a 'foreign song' 
that is 'Without human feeling', 'without human meaning'. It is the expressing of 
‘being’, like the Parmenidean sense of being that is a universal ‘thing-in-itself’, the 
‘rock’. The intimation is that there is no 'reason', in the sense of cause, and in the 
sense of ratiocination. These two things are not the cause of happiness or misery, 
which here are two in one.  
450
                                                          
447 Wallace Stevens, ‘Metaphor as Degeneration’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 381. 
448 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 343. 
449 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Bird with the Coppery, Keen Claws’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 65. 
450 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 322. 
 The poem’s blank statements of ‘is’ take us right back to the ‘pine’ of ‘In 
the Carolinas’ where the connection of physical and metaphysical seems to have first 
been unveiled in a poesis. The difference here, at the end, is that Stevens has 
universalised the form, a total inclusiveness that has incorporated an acceptance of 
137 
 
the poet’s own impending death. Leggett questions: 'If pure being is beyond the last 
thought...then how is it possible to depict it, to provide an image for it, as the poem 
attempts to do?'451 As we have seen, one answer to Leggett's not unreasonable 
question is that thought has become the 'rock'. These images are not just symbols or 
metaphors, but are part of the 'syllables' of the ‘rock’, as a language of phusei. Ziarek 
notes that: ‘the title phrase never occurs in the poem itself, as though it were 
intended to be articulated aside from the words of the poem.’452 Visible and invisible 
are two in one, not 'pure being' in the sense of just a 'nothing', but 'mere being' in the 
sense of everything as the totality of 'it is'. As Stevens declares in his ‘Note on 
Moonlight’ (perhaps remembering Burnet’s interpretation of Parmenides rather than 
Bishop Berkeley): ‘It is as if being was to be observed’.453
This rather Yeatsean bird has 'fire-fangled feathers' perhaps because, as 
Eleanor Cook has observed, it is envisioned as a phoenix.
 
454 In 'The Bird With the 
Coppery, Keen Claws', it would 'flare' 'in the sun-pallor of his rock.'455 It holds 
similarities with Heraclitus' sense that the world was animated by an ever-living fire 
with measures perpetually igniting and going out.456
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453 Wallace Stevens, ‘Note on Moonlight’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 449. 
454 Eleanor Cook, Poetry, Word-Play, and Word-War in Wallace Stevens (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), p. 312. 
455 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Bird with the Coppery, Keen Claws’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 65. 
456 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 134. 
 The idea may be to keep the fire 
of being burning in one’s poems, even when dead. The palm after all is another 
evergreen, like the pine. In 1926 Rilke, two weeks before he died, recorded in his 
notebook a final poem entitled ‘Death’: 
 as I in my spirit burned, see, I now burn in thee: 
 the wood that long resisted the advancing flames 
 which thou kept flaring, I now am nourishing 
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 and burn in thee. 
 
 My gentle and mild being through thy ruthless fury 
 has turned into raging hell that is not from here.457
The implicit pun is on the word “phoenix,” which is what this fiery bird is. The 
Greek word for this fabulous bird is also used for a date-palm. The bird “sings in the 
palm” and through a pun is the palm. So also the poem is contained in its words or 
its leaves, and vice versa; it also is its words or leaves. So also space is contained in 
the mind, and vice versa; it also is in the mind.
 
 
Stevens’ connection of the metaphysical bird of flame with the physical palm 
is deepened in a further observation by Cook:  
458
Altieri seems correct to suggest that Stevens’ poems ‘concentrate attention 
upon the basic ontological property of the as’, such as with Stevens’ constant use of 
the phrase, ‘as if’, that appears to expand the perceptual experience of a thing 
through ever flowering metaphor.
 
 
Stevens' pun would seem to imply that physical and metaphysical reality are one, 
and that this reality includes the mind as we have already evidenced with reference 
to Parmenides. 
459 However, Stevens’ intense perceptions that 
produce ‘the order of metaphor’ are not simply a technical, modernist means of 
expanding the ‘rock’, as Altieri has also argued.460 Stevens says that ‘one does not 
progress through metaphor’, and that ‘reality is the indispensible element of each 
metaphor’.461
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 In Stevens’ later period the multiplicity of metaphor only establishes 
the ‘oneness’ of the ‘rock’, according to the extant concept that directs his art in 
uncovering a totality that he already believes in. The ‘act’ of making poetry does not 
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construct the ‘rock’, but rather uncovers, unveils, and rubs the ‘varnish and dirt’ off 
of art and reality in order to see the totality of the static ‘first idea’ (that was already 
there), as clearly as possible.462 In other words, multiple metaphors are not an ‘act’ 
of creating ‘a thing’ or ‘a poem’. Rather, they are the illusory movements (‘up 
down/Up down’) in the surface of the ‘rock’ that confirm its extant oneness, the clear 
view of which satisfies belief.463 As Stevens says in ‘The Rock’, the appearing of 
things real or imagined is ‘like a blindness cleaned’ through the ‘candor’ (‘bright 
sight’) of ‘a birth of sight’.464
The development in ‘Of Mere Being’ from 'The Bird With the Coppery, 
Keen Claws' has been to come to see the conflation of the bird and the rock, and to 
allow this universalized vision to ‘flick’ the reduced poet with ‘feeling’, and produce 
the language of the ‘rock’ from the ‘transport’ of the ‘rock’. So complete is Stevens’ 
vision of the ‘rock’, that the ‘earlier’ poetry is ‘one’ with the ‘later’. If the circus 
animals have gone then Stevens is still artistically rendering out of the immediacy of 
his ‘earlier’ poetry, as if his entire output were one poem, as part of the one ‘rock’. 
Parmenides had written of the ‘it is’ that: ‘Thus is becoming extinguished and 
passing away not to be heard of’.
 
465 Kingsley suggests that here Parmenides 
establishes the cosmic order ‘at the only possible moment it ever can be: right 
now.’466
                                                          
462 A Letter to Henry Church, October 28th, 1942. Letters of Wallace Stevens, pp. 426 - 427. 
463 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 351. 
464 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Rock’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 445. 
465 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 175. 
466 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 168. 
 Stevens’ encounter with his early poetry is not a looking back, rather it is a 
confirmation that he, like everything, has not moved at all. He is still composing out 
of the ‘first idea’ that is (and always was) a universal ‘thing-in-itself’. The rest, in 
terms of multiplicity and movement, is all illusion. 
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As a death poem engaging the 'bronze distance', 'Of Mere Being' is 
reminiscent of an 'underworld' encounter, at the crossroads between the earth and 
death. Kingsley argues that Parmenides' sense of the 'underworld', where the 'truth' 
(aletheia) was revealed to him through a poesis, was 'the supreme place of paradox 
where all the opposites meet.'467 Life and death, reality and the imagination, physical 
and metaphysical, all meet in this ‘place’ of final accord. Stevens is conceptually at 
the cross roads. Parmenides' 'journey' which went nowhere except to the heart of a 
realisation of a single, united reality, was not about dying, it was about dying before 
you die. It was about realising that death is a part of complete reality. As such 
Parmenides in his mythical poem was received 'kindly' in the 'underworld', which 
denotes he was not there to die, but to return, like a phoenix or an evergreen.468
The mythical journey mirrors that of other Greek fables concerning 'heroes' 
who, in the stories, journeyed into the 'underworld' and returned, such as Heracles 
and Orpheus. Yet Stevens' model is closer to Parmenides' philosophical rendering 
that finds the 'truth' of being in Tartarus: 'To die before you die, no longer to live on 
the surface of yourself: this is what Parmenides is pointing to'.
 
469 It is the ‘place’ of 
the 'extremest light/ Of sapphires flashing from the central sky'.470 For the ancient 
Greeks the stars in the night sky reflected the fires of the 'underworld', because it was 
the place where all oppositions and multiplicities were unified. 
For the post-Kantian philosopher or poet, such pre-Socratic poetry provides a 
sense of the unveiling of a full connection with physical and metaphysical ‘reality’, 
What is key is that 
Parmenides attempted that connection through poetic language and in that sense 
Stevens has a very close affinity with such a figure.  
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which the 'Copernican Revolution' had arguably drained from experience. For 
Stevens the expression of poetry unites the physical and the metaphysical in a 
single bond by bathing all things in the renewed ‘candor’ of the ‘first idea’. Art 
becomes 'truth' for this thinking because it suggests that everything is a fiction made 
'true' by its founding in being, because being is the only truth. Rajeev Patke believes 
with regard to Stevens that: 
It does not seem then a question of the Ding an sich as beyond human reach; rather, 
the Ding an sich itself seems a fiction, a conscious and necessary fabrication which 
we believe in provisionally and for a purpose.471
 Unreal, as if nothing had been changed at all.
 
 
For the late Stevens, individual things in themselves are fictions, including language, 
poems and metaphor. What remains is the static ‘oneness’ of the ‘rock’ of being that, 
according to Burnet’s interpretation of Parmenides’ sense of being, is the universal 
‘thing-in-itself’ in which all change is illusory, unreal. In a very late poem written 
near the end of his life, Stevens describes himself as ‘a disbeliever in reality’ who is 
leaving: 
 With something I could touch, touch every way. 
 
 And yet nothing has been changed except what is 
472
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What is ‘true’ is the eternal ‘it is’, the ‘rock’ of being, and what has had meaning for 
Stevens is the renewal of the ‘oneness’ of the ‘rock’ through the creation of endless 
fictions.  
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Chapter Two 
 
 
To review our progress to this point, we began by demonstrating how 
Gadamer suggests an audience experiences and understands a work of art, through 
an analysis of the ‘play’ of art. In this analysis we saw how Stevens, at ‘play’, was 
able to draw his audience into the ontological ground of his poetry, at least in 
Gadamer’s terms. It was through this analysis that we could demonstrate how 
Stevens could be read, particularly in view of the comparable nature of pre-Socratic 
thought with Gadamer’s hermeneutical ‘experience’. We have subsequently pursued 
a chronological approach to reading the experience of the ‘thing-in-itself’ in Stevens’ 
poetry, having demonstrated why the pre-Socratic philosophy is useful for the post-
Kantian philosopher of art, or poet. 
This analysis has led us through romantic points of connection with pre-
Socratic thought, as well as via modern examples, demonstrating how Stevens has 
affiliation with both the romantic and the modern projects, or at least with the epoch 
which opened up after Kant. In this affiliation, we can perceive a sense of an 
indebted departure from romanticism, while still utilizing art as the medium of 
‘truth’, toward the re-creative energies and post-theological possibilities of what is 
called modernism. It is this latter, ‘modern’ approach that accounts for the detached 
role of the poet, the consciousness of the poetry concerning the reader reading, the 
determination of the poetry to enact what it is advocating, the emphasis on 
metaphysical conceptions, and the refusal to acknowledge the poetry itself as a 
‘work of art’.  
‘Major Man’ and the ‘Supreme Fiction’: The Transvaluation of 
Religion with Poetry 
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Beauty, artistic reference, symbol and a precise use of metaphor may be what 
one first encounters in reading Stevens. However, the full relevance of this is only 
grasped in context of the ontological concept that lies beneath, a concept that makes 
the outer beauty itself ‘philosophical’ in Gadamer’s terms. It is the conceptual 
presence of this central ground in advance of all ‘meaning’ that drives the shape of 
Stevens’ poetry. Stevens likes his philosophy ‘smothered in beauty’, but there was 
an uncompromising agenda of connection behind the innocence of that ‘play’ from 
the beginning. Throughout the analysis, the theme of ‘destruction’ and recreation by 
manipulating the perceived ontological base of reality has been evident.473
Modern Poetry and Religion 
 We have 
seen how Stevens’ efforts to balance ‘reality’ moved from the physical to the 
metaphysical; from the metaphysical to the physical; and finally into the ‘accord’ of 
the union of the two in the ‘it is’ of the ‘rock’. 
In view of this background we will move into an analysis of the relationship 
of (what might be called) Stevens’ poetry of being with religious forms. Having 
pursued a chronological analysis in chapter one, chapter two will move into a 
thematic analysis. This analysis will remain conscious of chronological development 
wherever possible, but will be led by a cross-reading according to themes, in order to 
ensure that a complete picture of this aspect of Stevens’ poetry comes into view. 
 
‘That hugest banality of literary modernism’ is how Lentricchia refers to the 
idea that poetry is a substitute for religion.474
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 If an important characteristic of 
Modernity is what Bowie calls ‘the growing divorce of individuals’ subjective 
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experience of the world from the way the objective world is explained in science’, 
then arguably that ‘divorce’ is also comparable to a general sense of detachment 
from the communal religious forms of the preceding age.475 If this statement is 
considered to be in any way accurate, then there is a dual implication in it for the role 
of art in a post-theological world. Firstly, as Bowie suggests, there is a problem of 
engagement: ‘How could the individuality of a non-theologically based art ever gain 
collective public significance?’476
The holy, he argues, is constituted at the level of the community, not in the 
individual: ‘A nation which has nothing holy...cannot have true tragedy’, thereby 
establishing the terms of the debate over the possibility of tragedy in the modern 
world. The problem for modern art is that the collectively binding status of Greek 
tragedy as a norm for the community could not be achieved by an individual artist.
 Schelling had considered the precise problem: 
477
What, then, does the artist who sees his or her task in terms of the need for a new 
mythology do in the meanwhile, in a society which seems to be moving further and 
further away from the integration sought in that mythology? This was precisely 
Hölderlin’s problem, which suggests how intense the problem can become for the 
modern artist.
 
 
If the hallmark of modern society is an increasing individualism that defies the 
necessary community required for the creation of an art of public significance, then 
how is the individual artist to achieve a work that is ‘collectively binding’?: 
478
In his Adagia Stevens remarks on the project of replacing religion with aesthetics as 
follows: ‘Its present state is the result of the difficulty of establishing it except in the 
individual mind.’
 
 
479
Secondly there is the problem of fulfilling the same intrinsic needs that the 
religious forms had in some sense fulfilled. How could art, specifically poetry, fill 
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the hole left by the collapse of religious belief on its own? This problem has been felt 
by thinkers and poets who have come after Schelling. Bowie suggests: 
Interestingly, many subsequent thinkers, like Heidegger and Adorno, come back, in 
the light of the decline in theology, to the idea that art is the locus of kinds of self-
understanding which are not accessible to the sciences. In this respect one of the vital 
aspects of modern thought is precisely the way in which needs previously catered for 
by theology can be catered for by forms like the aesthetic.480
This, as Critchley says, is also characteristic of poetry written ‘in the wake of 
romanticism’, ‘animated by the belief that poetry should take on to itself the 
existential burden of religious belief without the guarantee of religious belief.’
 
 
481
In our first chapter we outlined Gadamer’s efforts to assign an intrinsic truth-
telling function to the work of art. If art has the power to unveil the ‘truth’ of being, 
from itself, the world at hand and in its audience, then perhaps that unifying ‘truth’ 
would be an attractive substitute for the ‘truth’ of religion? In a move away from the 
transcendental function that Kant had ascribed to aesthetics, Gadamer had suggested 
that: ‘Must we not also acknowledge that the work of art possesses truth?’
 
482
One of the dangers in the traditions leading from Hegel to Heidegger and Adorno has 
been a tendency to over-essentialise accounts of art and philosophy. This is 
particularly the case if a strong, exclusive connection is made between art and truth, 
so that, as in Heidegger, only art which is inseparable from its grounding context 
discloses being in an essential way’.
 From 
what we have evidenced in chapter one, such a position would seem reminiscent of 
Stevens’ efforts to allow a poesis to be a revealing of ‘being’ and ‘mere being’ to be 
final ‘truth’. However, Bowie remains sceptical as to the extent that art can reveal 
‘truth’: 
483
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If there is a ‘tendency to over-essetialise accounts of art and philosophy’, particularly 
in Heidegger, then Stevens increasingly appears to be a part of that tradition. 
Stevens’ theological environment in the poetry of Harmonium looks 
distinctly post-Nietzschean, as a world drained of a theology of the transcendent: 
‘Not as a god, but as a god might be’.484 B.J. Leggett, who has written extensively on 
Stevens with regard to Nietzsche, references an unpublished letter of 1943 that 
suggests that Stevens had read Thus Spake Zarathustra, The Genealogy of Morals, 
The Case of Wagner and The Dawn of Day when he was ‘a young man’.485 Stevens’ 
reading of Nietzsche, by his own account, began again in 1943 and by 1944 he could 
say in correspondence to Henry Church, that he had ‘found a complete set of 
Nietzsche at the [Hartford] Theological Seminary’.486
Critics such as David R. Jarraway have observed that the poetry of 
Harmonium attempts to resolve the conflict between immanence and transcendence, 
and that ‘Sunday Morning’ demonstrates ‘that a too-worldly poetry might have its 
shortcomings too’.
 
487 For the early Stevens, art, an art that rises out of life, is the 
appropriate consolation in a world where ‘Death is the mother of beauty’.488 In his 
undated Adagia Stevens says: ‘It is possible to establish aesthetics in the individual 
mind as immeasurably a greater thing than religion.’489
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 From this perspective, 
aesthetics becomes a saving power in face of an apparent nihilism. Jarraway 
highlights that in a journal entry of 1902, Stevens recorded the following: ‘the true 
religious force in the world is not the church but the world itself: the mysterious 
147 
 
callings of Nature and our responses’.490 ‘The quail’ of ‘Sunday Morning’ ‘Whistle 
about us their spontaneous cries’.491 The ‘boisterous’ chanting of the ring of men 
resounds in the ‘echoing hills’ ‘returning to the sky’.492 The ‘casual flocks of 
pigeons’ had made ‘ambiguous undulations’ as they sank ‘Downward to darkness, 
on extended wings’.493 It is tempting to conclude that ‘the mysterious callings of 
Nature’ correlates with the ‘ambiguous undulations’ of these birds that are going 
down to death, ‘unsponsored’.494
But most important the being of the work of art is connected with the medial sense 
of play (Spiel: also, game and drama). Inasmuch as nature is without purpose and 
intention, just as it is without exertion, it is a constantly self-renewing play, and can 
therefore appear as a model for art. Thus Friedrich Schlegel writes, “All the sacred 
games of art are only remote imitations of the infinite play of the world, the eternally 
self-creating work of art.”
 This would suggest that the power circuitry of 
‘flux’ is approximate to Stevens’ sense of ‘the world itself’ being ‘the true religious 
force’. 
Gadamer, thinking of Friedrich Schlegel, suggests how the power circuitry of 
‘self-renewing’ can be separated from what he views as nature ‘without purpose and 
intention’. ‘Play’ is the key concept for Gadamer because he believes it reconstructs 
our being anew, which obviously appeals to modernism while perhaps also 
absorbing the ‘death’ element in nature: 
495
The romantic connection is important, as Gadamer and Heidegger’s sense of ‘truth’ 
embedded in the work of art has strong romantic, as well as pre-Socratic overtones, 
though ‘the eternally self-creating work of art’ would appeal to what is called 
modernism. Stevens’ sense of immanence contains the ontological unity that 
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attempts to reconnect individuals to ‘the true religious force’ in nature’s undulations. 
Hillis Miller has suggested that the interface between subject and object is central to 
Stevens, and that this interchange could lead to a “mystical marriage”.496
As we saw in the preceding chapter, Stevens’ ‘belief’ is in a constant 
inconstancy that was only finally ‘fulfilled’ at the point of death. Jarraway notes that 
Stevens had suggested of ‘Notes’ that: “the essence of poetry is change,” and the 
essence of change is not that it provides stable truths but rather “that it gives 
pleasure”.
 This is 
poetry in its most universal and inclusive form. According to this thinking, humanity 
and poetry are part of Nature’s ‘mysterious callings’. 
497 It is this pleasure, as Jarraway unravels, that can answer the 
dissatisfaction found in a purely physical reality that only ends in death: ‘And shall 
the earth/ Seem all of paradise that we shall know?’ 498
Nihilism for Nietzsche, in contrast, is inextricably linked to the history of philosophy 
since Plato: ‘The need for a metaphysical world is the consequence of being unable 
to derive any meaning any what for? from the world at hand. “Consequently”, it was 
decided, “this world can only be apparent”’. ‘Psychological nihilism’ is a result of 
three factors in modernity. The first is the failure to find any teleological meaning in 
existence, such as a movement towards a moral world order, so that ‘becoming’ 
ceases to have a goal and is just arbitrary change; the second is the realisation that 
there is no unity in the multiplicity of existence which would enable one to believe in 
one’s own value as part of something greater; the third is the loss of the belief in a 
supersensuous world, which is accompanied by the realisation that one cannot bear 
this world without that other world. Nihilism is therefore a result of metaphysical 
beliefs which have turned out to be illusory.
 Bowie provides an account of 
how Nietzsche’s sense of nihilism arguably arises: 
499
There is no world beyond the here and now of ‘reality’ for Stevens. The physical and 
the metaphysical are reduced in the ‘candor’ of a new poesis, as in the days before 
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Plato. The poem provides an opening in which the unity of the imagination and 
reality is purported to be ‘seen’. 
For Stevens, ‘arbitrary change’ or becoming that is linked to aesthetics can 
give an ‘order’ to existence which results in pleasure rather than nihilism. In a poem 
entitled ‘The Pleasures of Merely Circulating’, collected in Ideas of Order, it is the 
‘angel’ that is reduced to becoming, as a ‘religious’ icon: 
 The garden flew round with the angel, 
 The angel flew round with the clouds, 
 And the clouds flew round and the clouds flew round 
 And the clouds flew round with the clouds.500
No doubt a religion of art always risks fastening a sacred respect on the “work” there 
where one should only look to (look at) its operation, which is to say also  its 
technique. The technicity of art dislodges art from its “poetic” assurance, if one 
understands by that the production of a revelation, or art conceived as a phusis 
unveiled in its truth.
 
 
Nancy, a philosopher concerned with art and ontological thought, suggests that: 
501
It is thus interesting to speculate that the programme that Stevens sets out for himself 
in his second volume, Ideas of Order, was one of immanent transcendence, a 
synthesis of both physical and metaphysical experience.
 
 
A ‘reduction of metaphysics’ approximate with the ‘thing-in-itself’, expressed in 
poetry, is what Stevens seems to consider a suitable replacement for the religious. 
Jarraway seems entirely correct to argue that: 
502
 The effort seems to be directed at restoring an apparent ‘supersensuous world’, 
which, if only another fiction, withholds nihilism and promotes pleasure. This would 
appear to be an example of a move from what Critchley refers to as the move from 
metaphysica specialis to metaphysica generalis, or the ‘transcendental turn in 
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philosophy’.503 However, as we have already seen, the turn away from metaphysica 
specialis plays out in Stevens as a turn toward a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to being 
and becoming as forces of a ‘natural’ religious sense. Adorno suggests that: 
‘Heidegger’s transcendence is an absolutized immanence, obdurate against its own 
immanent character’.504
It should be admitted that, say, an ancient image of the gods that was not displayed 
in a temple as a work of art in order to give aesthetic, reflective pleasure, and is now 
on show in a museum, retains, even as it stands before us today, the world of 
religious experience from which it came; the important consequence is that its world 
still belongs to ours. What embraces both is the hermeneutic universe.
 The ‘angel’, the ‘garden’ and the ‘clouds’ are all subject to 
‘merely circulating’, as all things for Stevens, real or imagined, are subject to ‘mere 
being’. Stevens’ poetry enacts this reduction on the grounds of a fundamental 
reductive ‘truth’ expressed through the aesthetic. 
In changing the ‘ground’ of ‘truth’ from divine revelation to being at hand, 
Stevens is only left with the drained religious forms of the past. Gadamer suggests 
that: 
505
It is an ontologically grounded art that forms Stevens’ alternative order to the 
order of religion, a ‘necessary angel of earth’.
 
 
It is in a similar sense that Stevens’ reduction of the religious form of the angel to 
becoming is embraced as a modern form. It is embraced in a sense of oneness that 
has dialogue with the universality of Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutic universe’. 
506
                                                          
503 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, pp. 36 - 37. 
504 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 106 - 107. 
505 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. xxviii. 
506 Wallace Stevens, ‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 423. 
 Seeing the invisible in the visible 
would appear to be one sense in how Stevens proposes to ‘fill’ the hole where 
religion once stood. Gadamer considers that: ‘The inseparability of visible 
appearance and invisible significance, this “coincidence” of two spheres, underlies 
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all forms of religious worship. It is easy to see how the term came to be extended to 
the aesthetic sphere.’507 It is because the ‘angel’ that appears among the peasants in 
‘Angel Surrounded by Paysans’ is curiously, ‘one of you’, that it aspires to fulfil the 
additional criteria of how the increasingly individualist members of a modern society 
could form the community that can experience the communal myth through art.508
In every vision of something, the vision first of all sees itself as pure vision, seeing 
nothing, seeing nothing there – and yet, it is already “vision,” and as such is ahead of 
itself or outside itself, not a figure and the figure of nothing – this surprising figure 
without figure that the event of Being traces in a flash.
 
Nancy suggests that: 
509
‘A turn/ Of my shoulder and quickly, too quickly, I am gone?’
 
 
510 This ‘man/ Of the 
mind’, this ‘apparition apparelled’ is as Nancy suggests, ‘the event of Being’ for 
Stevens – ‘of my being and its knowing, part’.511
 Looking back it would seem clear that Stevens was in some sense standing in 
Nietzsche’s post-theological world in the poems of Harmonium, but that the 
progressive development of his work sought aesthetic forms that could fulfil the need 
left by the absence of religion. It was from the minutiae of Stevens’ first collection 
that the project of a ‘supreme fiction’ was announced, but not fully pursued. 
Nietzsche’s thought is undoubtedly useful for outlining the post-theological 
environment in which Stevens finds himself in his early poetry. However, in tracing 
Stevens’ development of ‘major man’ and the ‘supreme fiction’ as alternative 
fictions to religion, Nietzsche’s thought seems unable to take us much further. In a 
letter of 1942 Stevens says: ‘About Nietzsche: I haven’t read him since I was a 
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young man. My interest in the hero, major man, the giant, has nothing to do with the 
Biermensch’.512 In a letter to the same correspondent written later in the same year, 
Stevens relates that: ‘The incessant job is to get into focus, not out of focus. 
Nietzsche is as perfect a means of getting out of focus as a little bit too much to 
drink.’513
In what follows I intend to use the pre-Socratics and their thought as models 
for Stevens’ own approach to a poetry that could replace religion, and to do that in 
the light of Jarraway’s sense of the use of ‘immanence’ in Stevens.
 Contrary to Leggett’s analysis, I would argue that although Stevens is 
certainly operating in a post-Nietzschean arena, it is his affinities with concepts 
resembling the pre-Socratics that characterizes his response to Nietzsche and the 
post-theological world in which he finds himself. 
514
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513 A Letter to Henry Church, December 8th, 1942. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 432. 
514 David R. Jarraway, ‘Stevens and Belief’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, p. 195. 
 This analysis 
will remain indifferent to a source-based proof and is as open to Stevens’ encounters 
with pre-Socratic conceptions found within more contemporary poets and 
philosophers as to those found within the pre-Socratics themselves. As we progress, 
the analysis should also demonstrate the central importance of the specifically poetic 
language of the pre-Socratics, in considering why thinkers such as Heidegger and 
Gadamer should apply a truth-telling function to art and poetry. Further, in context 
of the pre-Socratics, I intend to analyze the truth-telling function of poetry in 
conjunction with the role of the artist, conceived as the protagonist who can bring the 
saving power of art to a world detached from theological order. Finally, we shall also 
demonstrate that in Stevens the idea of replacing religion with poetry is not, as 
Lentricchia says, ‘banality’, but rather that it is absolutely critical for understanding 
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how Stevens attempted to go beyond a mere religion of art, and fundamentally 
reconstruct the ground of religion on the terms of an ontological poetry. 
 
The Xenophanean Account of the Religious Imagination 
 The pre-Socratic philosopher, Xenophanes of Colophon, had stated that: 
Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and 
produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like 
horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several 
kinds.515
In his reading of Müller Stevens would potentially have had access to the quote 
above from Müller’s Lectures on the Science of Language, and certainly encountered 
it again in Burnet’s Early Greek Philosophy in 1945.
 
 
516 Burnet, like Müller, also 
records that Xenophanes had written that517
The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have 
blue eyes and red hair.
: 
518
The conception forms a strong parallel with an entry in Stevens’ Adagia: ‘Only a 
noble people evolve a noble God.’
 
 
519 Further that: ‘The mind that in heaven created 
the earth and the mind that on earth created heaven were, as it happened, one.’520
                                                          
515 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 119. 
516 Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, pp. 423 - 424. 
517 Ibid., pp. 423 - 424. 
518 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 119. 
519 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 912. 
520 Ibid., p. 913. 
 In 
a lecture entitled ‘Two or Three Ideas’, presented at Mount Holyoke College in 
1951, Stevens intimates that he knows that: ‘the gods of China are always Chinese; 
that the gods of Greece are always Greeks and that all gods are created in the images 
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of their creators’.521
 Ennobled as in a mirror to sanctity.
 Again, in ‘Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery’, collected in 
Ideas of Order, Stevens wrote: 
 God of the sausage-makers, sacred guild, 
 Or possibly, the merest patron saint 
522
Vendler refers to this stanza as ‘the most ironic passage of all’, suggesting that 
Stevens’ conceives of the fifty stanzas in ‘Like Decorations’, as ‘so many sausage 
links, presided over by the “god of the sausages”’.
 
 
523 However, although this may 
allude to Stevens’ fifty ‘sausages’, Stevens confirmed in a letter of 1940 to Hi 
Simons, that this precise stanza could be paraphrased as: ‘An anthropomorphic god 
is simply a projection of itself by a race of egoists, which it is natural for them to 
treat as sacred.’524 This parallels the root of Xenophanean philosophy. What is 
interesting is that in the same letter, Stevens had also said: ‘I ought to say that it is a 
habit of mind with me to be thinking of some substitute for religion.’525
 The gods grow out of the people.
 From this we 
can legitimately suppose that a strong parallel with Xenophanean philosophy 
amounts to part of Stevens’ strategy for finding a ‘substitute for religion.’ 
 In ‘Loneliness in Jersey City’, collected in Parts, Stevens considers that the 
people and their religious imaginations are an extension of nature: 
 The deer and the dachshund are one. 
 Well, the gods grow out of the weather. 
 The people grow out of the weather; 
526
Nature, the people and the religious imagination are conceived as ‘one’ thing. All are 
reduced in the single, self perpetuating growth. The concept mirrors the reductive 
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sense of the Greek notion of phusis. Stevens would adapt the notion to the Christian 
religion in ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, suggesting that in Eden: 
 Eve made air the mirror of herself, 
 Of her sons and of her daughters. They found themselves 
 In heaven as in a glass; a second earth527
Stevens uses the same conception of a vain reflection of self, whether attempting to 
discredit the Christian religion or the pagan religions. What Bloom refers to as the 
‘primal narcissism’ here, forms a parallel with Xenophanes’ inadvertent reversal of 
the Biblical account that says that God created mankind in His own image.
 
 
528
 We know that Xenophanes had said that if oxen had hands, then they would 
paint their gods to resemble themselves.
 
Stevens is suggesting that ‘air’ is the ground for anthropomorphic deities that are a 
product of the imagination. 
529
 Oxidia is Olympia.
 Stevens provides a textual link to this 
‘ox’ in conceiving of 'Oxidia' in poem XXX of 'Blue Guitar'. The intention, as with 
‘Loneliness in Jersey City’, seems to be to demonstrate that a mythology is an 
extension of the people, who are themselves an extension of their place: 
 Through Oxidia, banal suburb, 
 One-half of all its installments paid. 
 
 Dew-dapper clapper-traps, blazing 
 From the crusty stacks above machines. 
 
 Ecce, Oxidia is the seed 
 Dropped out of this amber-ember pod, 
 
 Oxidia is the soot of fire, 
530
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Stevens wrote of this poem in 1953 that: 
  
if Oxidia is the only possible Olympia, in any real sense, then Oxidia is that from 
which Olympia must come. Oxidia is both the seed and the amber-ember pod from 
which the seed of Olympia drops. The dingier the life, the more lustrous the 
paradise. But if the only paradise must be here and now, Oxidia is Olympia.531
The lines are an example of modernist literature’s tendency to express 
modern life with ambivalence. This ‘banal suburb’ with its ‘Dew-dapper clapper-
traps, blazing/ From crusty stacks above machines’, is contrasted with the use of 
‘Ecce’ and ‘Olympia’, which evoke the golden ages of the past, in this instance, 
mirroring the thought of ancient Greece. It is the projection of the religious ideal 
from the reality near at hand that forges an association with Xenophanes. For 
Stevens, ‘heaven’ is close at hand, in immanence. This Xenophanean style of 
presentation could fulfil the modernist concept that suggests ‘that art is properly art – 
 
  
Stevens could be seen to be playing with a notion that parallels Xenophanes and 
showing that our ‘oxide’ stained reality has led humanity to conceive of an oxide 
stained heaven, ‘Olympia’ ('Oxidia'), that is at hand. The pun on the ‘ox’ appears to 
have a textual relationship to Xenophanes, working equally well as ‘oxide’, or 
perhaps ox-hide. The language attempts to drag ‘Olympia’ down to earth, into the 
‘crusty stacks’ of ‘banal’ mechanised reality, an earthly ‘seed’ of ‘soot’. It reinvests 
the religious imagination with the dirty reality that produced it. It is the moment of 
the opening of poetry that provides the single ground for this new equation. This is 
extended with the heavy use of hyphens that suggests two connected as one, ‘one-
half’, where ‘amber-ember pod’ and ‘seed’ are one, the ‘Oxidia’ of the here and 
now. 
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and arts – only when it is withdrawn from the sole service of divine presentation, 
and when it presents itself as such.’532
The Unveiling of ‘Major Man’ 
 
 
 Stevens’ use of the trope, ‘major man’, could sound as if he were seeking the 
ultimate human, the supreme anthropomorphic ‘man’. However, if we seek for the 
origin of ‘major man’, one may perhaps choose to look at Hoon connected to the 
amorphous limits of his own imagination, in ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’ from 
Stevens’ first collection: 
Not less because in purple I descended 
 The western day through what you called 
 The loneliest air, not less was I myself. 
 
 What was the ointment sprinkled on my beard? 
 What were the hymns that buzzed beside my ears? 
 What was the sea whose tide swept through me there? 
 
 Out of my mind the golden ointment rained, 
 And my ears made the blowing hymns they heard. 
 I was myself the compass of that sea: 
 
 I was the world in which I walked, and what I saw 
 Or heard or felt came not but from myself; 
 And there I found myself more truly and more strange.533
Clearly Hoon is connected to something larger than a subjective self extant in the 
world; rather he is aligned with the possibilities of his own imagination. Everything 
seen, heard or felt comes from ‘myself’. ‘I’ is reduced to ‘world’ as Stevens in the 
mask of Hoon evidences signs of the 'involuntary and desperate Transcendentalist' 
that he would soon reject.
 
 
534
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533 Wallace Stevens, ‘Tea at the Palaz of Hoon’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 51. 
534 Harold Bloom, A Map of Misreading, p. 25. 
 However, just because Stevens imagines himself 
descending ‘the western day’ dressed ‘in purple’, does not mean that this imagined 
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self is not still a part of ‘himself’. The scope and limits of what constitutes a ‘self’ 
are being broadened (‘not less was I myself’) through the imagination. What this 
doesn’t include is everyone else, or the objective world that lies outside of his own 
imagination. It is also notable that in accordance with the Xenophanean philosophy, 
Hoon’s projection of his world includes the religious as a product of the mind, as it is 
his ‘ears’ that ‘made’ the ‘hymns they heard’. 
Stevens’ model for a self enlarged through the imagination bears some 
resemblance to elements of the persona of the pre-Socratic philosopher, Empedocles, 
who like Parmenides, had also written his philosophy in verse. In legend, 
Empedocles was thought to have thrown himself into a volcano (Etna) that he may 
become a ‘god’.535 He had written that: ‘I go among you an immortal god’.536 Hillis 
Miller considers that Hoon ‘enjoys a sense of kinglike power and, godlike, disposes 
things freely, by legislative fiat’.537 The model of a ‘destruction’ of anthropomorphic 
form in favour of a rebirth to ‘godlike’ status through poetry, may have appealed to 
Stevens, just as the same subject matter had appealed to Hölderlin and Arnold before 
him. In context of his ‘godlike’ status, Empedocles had also vaunted himself in an 
iconic purple robe, which resonates with Hoon who is also ‘dressed in purple’. 
Accounts of Empedocles show that: ‘He went about in a purple robe with a golden 
girdle, in shoes of bronze, and [with] a Delphic laurel wreath on his head.’538 W.K.C. 
Guthrie notes that he was ‘something of a poseur in externals, and had a lively 
appreciation for sacerdotal pomp and impressiveness.’539
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 Further that ‘he had both a 
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knowledge of the real Orphic beliefs and an inward feeling for their truth, and was 
capable of a high degree of mystical experience.’540
Arguably, the concept of ‘major man’ was fully universalized through ‘The 
Idea of Order at Key West’, which depicts an encounter with a real sea. Here the 
‘enchanting night’ ‘descended’ (rather than Hoon who ‘descended’ ‘The loneliest 
air’ of ‘The western day’) and was ‘Mastered’, a process which literally enacted a 
marriage of heaven and earth that included the ‘self’.
 Hoon’s own ‘purple’ attire could 
certainly be read in other terms, for example as arbitrary flamboyance or self-
lampooning dandyism. However, the notions of destroying anthropomorphic form, 
wielding ‘godlike’ status, and the expression of ‘inward’ ‘mystical experience’ 
within poetry, are clearly evident within the poem itself. What subsequent poems 
will show is an increasingly strong link with Empedocles as a means of destroying 
anthropomorphic form. The same poems will also demonstrate that Hoon himself is 
a false start for ‘major man’, because the ‘world’ with which he is one in the poem is 
only his imagined world, locked out of an inclusion of objective ‘reality’ that 
includes other people. The ‘sea whose tide swept through’ Hoon is only the sea of 
his imagination. 
541 Importantly, this new 
reduction only comes after Stevens had destroyed Hoon in ‘Sad Strains of a Gay 
Waltz’, from Ideas of Order, seemingly because of his detachment from reality in his 
‘mountain-minded’ ‘order’ of ‘solitude’.542
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 However, this mode of destruction could 
be seen as a further parallel with the model of Empedocles leaping into the volcano 
(Etna) to be reborn as a ‘god’. In the poem entitled ‘A Postcard from the Volcano’ 
(which advocates a very Empedoclean sounding philosophy) also collected in Ideas 
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of Order, a ‘spirit’ is ‘left behind’ by ‘he that lived there’ in the ‘mansion-house’, 
‘storming in blank walls’.543 This might be read as Hoon’s spirit from the ‘Palaz of 
Hoon’, with the ‘postcard’ arguably coming from Hoon himself in the volcano. It 
could be that Hoon, like Empedocles, is awaiting a rebirth into complete being that 
includes the imagination, but also the ‘dirty’ and ‘gutted’ ‘reality’ that the poem 
refers to.544 The gesture for Stevens, as with much of Ideas of Order, appears to be 
one of poetic rebirth. In fact, according to Kingsley, ‘by leaping into Etna 
Empedocles jumps into fire. For the Greeks the function of fire was above all 
purificatory, particularly in relation to the underworld and the dead.’545
Just as Stevens seems to collapse anthropomorphism in favour of an enlarged 
existence through the Empedoclean model, so he also appears to establish ‘major 
man’ through the Xenophanean model. Arguably, ‘major man’ is further unveiled in 
‘Blue Guitar’, because here Stevens combines ‘the lion in the lute’ (imagination) and 
the ‘lion locked in stone’ (reality) in oneness, and reduces this oneness to 
himself ('That I may reduce the monster to/ Myself').
 Arguably, 
Stevens is ritually de-creating Hoon within a similar pattern of myth in order to 
reassemble him as ‘major man’, aligned with complete being. 
546 According to the 
Xenophanean model, the imagined ‘lion’ deity seems to be collapsed back to the self 
in the event of opening the total connection of being through a poesis. This was not 
the first time that Stevens had attempted this, as a remembrance of ‘the mind of 
winter’ in ‘The Sun This March’ also resulted in ‘lions coming down’.547
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 The 
development plotted through Ideas of Order to ‘Blue Guitar’ is an enlargement of 
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Hoon’s subjective imagination to the inclusion of the universal imagination 
(religious or otherwise) and ‘reality’, as the enlarged ground for a new vision of 
‘self’. Hoon’s ‘mountain-minded’ order of ‘solitude’ is replaced by the ‘thought-like 
Monadnocks’.548
By accepting the total reality of ‘immanence’, Stevens denies that God is a 
reality and chooses instead to believe in ‘immanence’. It is the opening of poetic 
language that causes the collapse of mankind and imagined ‘deity’ to one ‘thing’. 
‘Oxidia’ had ‘dropped’ from the ‘amber-ember pod’, just as in ‘Notes’ ‘Phoebus’ 
would ‘slumber and die in autumn umber’, with the ‘autumn umber’ echoing the 
‘amber-ember’.
 Self, reality, imagination and the ‘gods’ of the imagination, are all 
placed in total ‘immanence’ through a poesis. Xenophanes had said that lions and 
oxen would paint their gods as lions and oxen, suggesting that deities are an 
extension of self. Stevens’ remedy, however, appears to have been to reverse the 
process, to collapse the concept of the imagined deity back to himself and, enlarged 
through it, collapse himself back to nature to become what he calls ‘major man’, the 
single immanent ground from which to perpetually paint what ‘man’ is, or could be. 
549
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 The act of opening poetry collapses all ideas, high or low, to the 
single equality of the one work in its opening. This is the one ground from which 
Stevens paints, or abstracts. Xenophanes, like Parmenides and Empedocles had 
written his philosophy in verse. According to Heidegger and Gadamer poetic 
opening induces a connection with being, a transformation, a ‘candor’, that connects 
the universal to ‘Myself’ and reconstitutes the ground of human being. Such a 
reconstitution includes the religious imagination in the equality of ‘mere being’. 
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In ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ Stevens clearly expresses the general 
principle of collapsing the imagined ‘deity’ and the self back to reality, in the 
oneness of phusis: 
 A substitute for all the gods:  
 This self, not that gold self aloft,  
 
 Alone, one's shadow magnified,  
 Lord of the body, looking down,  
 
 As now and called most high,  
 The shadow of Chocorua  
 
 In an immenser heaven, aloft,  
 Alone, lord of the land and lord  
 
 Of the men that live in the land, high lord.  
 One's self and the mountains of one's land,  
 
 Without shadows, without magnificence,  
 The flesh, the bone, the dirt, the stone.550
The language of the poem demonstrates what it is arguing, namely that this 
‘reality’ is ‘one’. It is the totality of an ‘immenser heaven’ that Stevens is enacting 
through the opening of poetic language. Thus the ‘shadow of Chocorua’ is part of 
  
 
Stevens' reduction of self and the imagined deity is back to phusis, back to 'The 
flesh, the bone, the dirt, the stone.' The self ‘magnified’, enlarged in the ‘shadow’ of 
the mountain ‘Chocorua’, expresses the collapse of the imagined ‘gold self aloft’ 
into the mountains of one’s land. Metaphysica specialis is becoming a pre-Socratic 
inspired ‘reduction of metaphysics’ of which poetry is the engine. It bears the 
characteristics of a modern recreation of the romantic connection of ‘god’ 
corresponding to man through art, though for Stevens as for Xenophanes, the 
conception was always immanent in the human imagination, always grounded in 
‘reality’. 
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‘one’s shadow magnified’ with the existential abandonment of being ‘Alone’. It is 
‘one’s self’ and the reduced mountains of ‘one’s land’ where this amorphous ‘lord’ 
stands, ready to erupt into new fictions as the seasons of ‘himself’ roll on. The 
repetition of ‘one’ drags high heaven down to the earth, investing ‘This self’ with 
heaven’s height as a possibility of the imagination. Pre-Socratic conceptions provide 
the post-Nietzschean philosopher or poet with a means of connecting humanity to the 
‘substance’ of a region and to the ‘mythology’ of that region. The effect, as with the 
earlier ‘change’ and ‘freshness’, is to be made anew, to be ‘freshened’. This making 
is a painting out of the ‘horde of destructions’, in the substance of the ‘rock’ that 
attempts to reconnect man to universal being. It is through the perpetual painting of 
new forms out of this single ground that demonstrates one aspect of Stevens’ relation 
to modernism. Adorno shows Stevens to be connected to a ‘reprise’ of ancient 
thinking of the ‘Absolute’, when he says of the Heidegger of Being and Time that: ‘It 
was a second reprise of the old philosophies of the Absolute, their first reprise 
having been post-Kantian idealism.’551
The act of bringing the 'lion in the lute' ‘Before’ the 'lion locked in stone', 
through poetry, seems to have opened the complete archê in which Stevens could 
collapse the lion’s envisioned lion deity, back to a oneness that included himself.
 
552
                                                          
551 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 62. 
552 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
 
The ‘lion’ has a strong textual link to that imagined Xenophanean lion, but now 
reduced to a oneness with humanity. This connection is what makes 'major man' a 
giant at the centre of reality. It seems to be why in the next collection (Parts) Stevens 
could say: 
    himself 
 At the centre of reality, seeing it. 
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 It was everything bulging and blazing and big in itself553
The ‘self’ at the ‘centre’ of ‘reality’ is enlarged and ‘reality’ itself is ‘blazing’, 
precisely as it was for Empedocles in the fiery ‘underworld’, where all polarities 
were united. ‘Blazing’ was a word that Stevens had used to describe the imagined 
heaven of ‘Oxidia’ in poem XXX from ‘Blue Guitar’, which he had begun by 
saying: ‘From this I shall evolve a man’.
 
 
554 The moment of the opening of poetry 
aligns ‘self’ and ‘world’, prior to the dissection of the world in language derived 
from the intellect. This is arguably why it is a 'large' 'man' who is reading of being in 
‘Large Red Man Reading’.555
 Lions and oxen appear repeatedly in Stevens’ canon, often together. Bloom 
makes the casual observation that there are ‘plenty of lions in Stevens’, which he 
says are ‘emblems of the poetic Will-to-Power, stemming perhaps from Nietzsche’s 
Zarathustra.’
 For Stevens the act produces an enlargement, a 
connection to being. 
556 Just as the ‘firecat’ may be a Heraclitean conception, equally as it 
could be, as Leggett suggested, “modeled upon Zarathustra’s ‘fire-dog’”, so too, 
Stevens’ use of lions may be Xenophanean and not necessarily Nietzschean.557
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Bloom and Leggett favour a Nietzschean context for Stevens’ ‘emblems’ of power. 
The point here is that the pre-Socratics show themselves to be useful to post-
Nietzschean philosophers, and poets, for constructing alternatives to the religious 
imagination. This is not to deny a sense of Nietzschean thinking in Stevens at all, nor 
to forget how entrenched in specifically Heraclitean thought certain elements of 
Nietzsche’s writings were, but to suggest that pre-Socratism offered artists and 
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thinkers a means of building out of post-theological nihilism; perhaps because their 
philosophy predated Plato and in some sense formed an ‘original’ poetic ground. 
 Parts of a World develops the inversion of Stevens’ parallel of the 
Xenophanean model further, but in accordance with the concerns of that collection 
the reduction is characterised by polemos: 
 That’s what misery is, 
 Nothing to have at heart. 
 It is to have or nothing. 
 
 It is a thing to have, 
 A lion, an ox in his breast, 
 To feel it breathing there. 
 
 Corazon, stout dog, 
 Young ox, bow-legged bear, 
 He tastes its blood, not spit. 
 
 He is like a man 
 In the body of a violent beast. 
 Its muscles are his own… 
 
 The lion sleeps in the sun. 
 Its nose is on its paws. 
 It can kill a man.558
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‘Misery’ appears to be the nihilism of theological detachment, ‘Nothing to have at 
heart’. ‘Possession’, in the sense of ‘to have’, is a lion or ox in your breast, which is 
like the imagined Xenophanean lion or ox reduced with the self to a single ground. 
‘To have or nothing’ creates the presence/absence dynamic and it is the ‘nothing’ of 
the imagined animals that will become presence, ‘to feel’. It is this moment of poetic 
opening that is the enlargement of ‘major man’. 
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The lion and the ox, again used together, are comparable to the lion and ox 
used by Xenophanes. This is Stevens directly after poem XIX of ‘Blue Guitar’. The 
reduction of the human, nature and the religious imagination are all in his breast like 
the sleeping volcano, Corazon of Ecuador. It is in his breast because ‘corazon’ is the 
Spanish word for heart. However, as we have seen, for the ancient Greeks volcanoes 
are also entrances to the mythical ‘underworld’ (the ‘heart’ of the world), the place 
where all paradoxes of difference were purported to meet in ‘oneness’. With regard 
to Stevens’ Transport poem, ‘Esthétique du Mal’, Patke astutely observes Kant’s 
references in the Critique of Judgement to the insignificance of our resistance in the 
face of the violence of volcanoes, and identifies Arnold’s ‘Empedocles’ as sharing ‘a 
number of interesting affinities’ with Stevens.559
In ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’, the reduction is achieved by a palpable 
breathing in him and the bodily presence of muscle and blood without form. It enacts 
the collapse of the old projections of the imagination back into the muscular, earthly 
self. In tasting its blood, not his spit, Stevens has replaced the Eucharist with the 
equation of what resembles Xenophanes’ lion deity and the self in nature. Stevens’ 
‘Communion’ appears to be with phusis, meaning all nature as one thing, including 
the imagination. The ‘violent beast’ is at once inside of him, like his heart, and 
outside of him as ‘He’ is ‘In the body of a violent beast’. The forging of this single 
‘immanence’ is achieved through the ‘candor’ of the opening of poetic language. 
The model is precisely the same in ‘The Glass of Water’, another poem collected in 
Parts, where an evocation of being as polemos at the ‘centre of our lives’ also results 
in ‘the lion that comes down’.
 
560
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 ‘The Latest Freed Man’ seems to continue this equation of poet (as human) 
and the imagined 'deity’ in the massiveness of nature in being, again as a violent 
struggle (polemos). In this case it is the ‘freed man’ who is collapsed into the ‘ox’, at 
one with all things: 
   And so the freed man said. 
 It was how the sun came shinning into his room: 
 To be without a description of to be, 
 For a moment on rising, at the edge of the bed, to be, 
 To have the ant of the self changed to an ox 
 With its organic boomings, to be changed 
 From a doctor into an ox, before standing up, 
 To know that the change and that the ox-like struggle 
 Come from the strength that is the strength of the sun, 
 Whether it comes directly or from the sun. 
 It was how he was free. It was how his freedom came. 
 It was being without description, being an ox.561
 Leggett notes that ‘Oxen are strangely anachronistic animals for twentieth-
century texts’, which we can agree they are.
 
 
The transformation (‘change’) has occurred (‘To have the ant of the self changed to 
an ox’). The ox is not the poet’s animal nature, but it is phusis in totalis (which 
includes the imagination) and it is the opening of a new poesis that evokes the 
‘change’. It appears to be the fusing of what looks like Xenophanes’ ox to its 
envisioned ox deity, connected in the self as the only kind of ‘god’ that exists for 
Stevens, 'major man'. The mode is again one of polemos: ‘The ox-like struggle/ 
Come from the strength that is the strength of the sun.’ Poetic opening equates high 
and low and makes them one with the ease of pure opening. ‘Major man’ remains an 
amorphous figure that ‘himself’ includes all forms, all religion, as a ‘saviour’ of 
connection in the ‘one’ that purportedly nullifies polemos. 
562
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 However, in favouring a Nietzschean 
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connection Leggett argues that this ‘ox’, in its linkage to the rejection of truth, is ‘a 
direct experience of the world without the intervention of truth, of metaphysics or 
doctrine.’563 Though Stevens’ poem certainly celebrates the freedom derived from 
the connection to the ‘ox’, I would argue that this relationship is only achieved 
through a connection in a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to being and becoming. The 
terms ‘be’ or ‘being’ are used six times in those twelve lines, and the freedom results 
in a reduction to being that is itself ‘being without description’. Stevens’ poetic 
consciousness inhabits the moment of the opening of poetic language, the ‘candor’ 
that ‘gives a candid kind to everything’.564
 In Lectures on the Science of Language Müller had recorded that 
Xenophanes 'himself declares, in the most unhesitating manner - and this nearly 600 
years before our era - that "God is one, the greatest among gods and men, neither in 
form nor in thought like unto men”.
 It is what Stevens defined as the ‘first 
idea’ which is of course no rational ‘idea’; it is the opening of being. Such reductive 
thinking changes the meaning of a poem to ontological opening in primacy as the 
poet performs himself what Clark had suggested was a weakness in a Heideggerian 
reading of a poem. The standing of being is set against the becoming of ‘rising’, 
‘changed’ and ‘change’ which together are the connection that results in the 
elevation of self through the ‘reduction of metaphysics’. It is through a language of 
‘immanence’ that Stevens collapses what looks like Xenophanes’ ‘ox’ back to the 
self as an elevation of this ‘high lord’. 
565
                                                                                                                                                                    
562 B.J. Leggett, Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext, p. 245. 
563 Ibid., p. 245. 
564 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 331. 
565 Max Müller, Lectures on the Science of Language, pp. 423 - 424. 
 From Burnet, Stevens would have seen that 
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Aristotle says that: ‘Xenophanes, “referring to the whole world, said the One was 
god.”’566
 Who in a million diamonds sums us up.
 In ‘Asides on the Oboe’, collected in Parts, Stevens had referred to: 
 The man who has had the time to think enough, 
 The central man, the human globe, responsive 
 As a mirror with a voice, the man of glass, 
567
‘I was the world in which I walked’ says Hoon.
 
 
568 Bloom suggests that this ‘human 
globe’ is ‘of Emersonian tradition’ and certainly there are passages in Emerson that 
are reminiscent of how Stevens paints ‘him’.569
The essence of all this, quite apart from its hieratic and religious significance, is of 
the greatest interest in connection with the poetic side of humanism.
 Yet in denying the ontological 
connection in Stevens’ poetry, Bloom, like Lentricchia, fails to grasp the 
fundamental depth of recalibration that Stevens is seeking between religion and 
poetry. Stevens’ conception of ‘major man’ could equally be seen as expressing a 
sense of Xenophanes’ amorphous ‘god’, which is ‘one’, a collapse into immanence. 
When Stevens recalls his reading of Müller, when he was 'young', he reminisces that: 
570
'Major man' may not be a type of Nietzschean ‘Biermensch’ as Stevens says, though 
the concept does bear a strong resemblance to the compounding of Xenophanean 
philosophy to a connection of the self at the centre of the deified ‘one’.
 
 
571
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 In this 
philosophical sense the self inhabits the ‘deity’, which is a sphere without 
anthropomorphic form for Stevens, as for Xenophanes. ‘Inside’ and ‘outside’ in 
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context of this ‘deity’ become connected as Stevens constructs this ‘impossible 
possible philosophers’ man’.572
The reason Xenophanes might appeal to Stevens could be wholly bound up 
with Stevens’ sense of the importance of art. Gadamer suggests that: ‘Only in the 
representation of the human form does the whole content of the work speak to us, at 
the same time, as an expression of its object.’
 
573
The hum of thoughts evaded in the mind, 
Hidden from other thoughts
 It is this blend of subject and object 
that redefines human limitations, incorporating the limits of the imagination into the 
potential ‘form’ of the whole. It is therefore a fluctuating, inhuman ‘form’ that befits 
a modern spin on romanticism, in that it allows for a perpetual change that includes 
the immanent religious imagination along with everything (‘a million diamonds’) 
and everyone (‘sums us up’), through the work of art. Xenophanes provides an 
image of this ‘figure’ for the modern artist, laughing at the ‘gods’ as he conceives of 
it. 
In ‘Notes’ Stevens would name ‘major man’ overtly for the first time. Here 
Stevens appears to outline a connection with being that comes from not thinking, at 
least not thinking rationally. This connection results in ‘major man’: 
The romantic intoning, the declaimed clairvoyance 
Are parts of apotheosis, appropriate 
And of its nature, the idiom thereof. 
 
They differ from reason’s click-clack, its applied 
Enflashings. But apotheosis is not 
The origin of the major man. He comes, 
 
Compact in invincible foils, from reason, 
Lighted at midnight by the studious eye, 
Swaddled in revery, the object of 
 
574
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David La Guardia appears to be correct to suggest that ‘major man’, ‘swaddled in 
revery’, ‘is about to be canonized a replacement saviour’.575
Yet look not at his colored eyes. Give him 
No names. Dismiss him from your images. 
The hot of him is purest in the heart.
 For Stevens, it is the 
avoidance of the rational and the acceptance of ‘the more than rational distortion’ 
that arises in its place that is the origin of ‘major man’, not apotheosis: 
576
In Auroras there is evidence to suggest that Stevens’ ‘purpose’ for ‘major 
man’ is for him to act as a ‘saviour’, capable of reconnecting people’s lives to a 
complete reality that has been drained of the religious. In Lectures on the Science of 
Religion Müller had suggested that if we could only descend ourselves into ‘the dark 
catacombs of ancient thought’, we should feel ourselves to be in the presence of men 
who ‘would be looked upon as giants’.
 
 
It is ‘being without description’ evoked in the ‘look not’ and the ‘Dismiss him’ that 
is the ‘hot’ of ‘him’ felt in the ‘heart’, like the volcanic heart of ‘Corazon’ found at 
the centre. The lines enact the ‘candor’ of a connection to being, without 
anthropomorphic form, as the renewal of art sets it to work. 
577
Empedocles is a son of his heaven and his time, of his fatherland, a son of 
tremendous oppositions of nature and art in which the world appeared before his 
eyes. A man within whom those oppositions are united so intimately that they 
become one within him.
 Müller was speaking of the pre-Socratics 
(while alluding to the ‘dark catacombs’ of the ‘underworld’) and it is intriguing to 
find that it is a ‘large’ red man that Stevens envisions as reading from the ‘great’ 
tabulae. Hölderlin relates that: 
578
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Though the Empedoclean model is certainly not the only reading that can be offered, 
its consistent emergence forms a strong parallel with Stevens’ concept of ‘major 
man’, as the means of connecting people to the world in a way that religion had 
previously fulfilled: 
There were ghosts that returned to earth to hear his 
phrases, 
As he sat there reading, aloud, the great blue tabulae. 
They were those from the wilderness of stars that had 
expected more. 
 
There were those that returned to hear him read from the 
poem of life, 
Of the pans above the stove, the pots on the table, the 
tulips among them. 
They were those that would have wept to step barefoot into 
reality, 
 
That would have wept and been happy, have shivered in the 
frost 
And cried out to feel it again, have run fingers over leaves 
And against the most coiled thorn, have seized on what was 
ugly 
 
And laughed, as he sat there reading, from out of the purple 
tabulae, 
The outlines of being and its expressings, the syllables of its 
law: 
Poesis, poesis, the literal characters, the vatic lines, 
 
Which in those ears and in those thin, those spended hearts, 
Took on color, took on shape and the size of things as they 
are 
And spoke the feeling for them, which was what they had 
lacked.579
Empedocles had written: ‘Thou shalt bring back from Hades the life of a dead 
man.’
 
 
580
                                                          
579 Wallace Stevens, ‘Large Red Man Reading’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 365. 
580 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 221. 
 This mirrors the sense of why these ghosts return to hear these phrases, 
because they are spoken in a way that resembles the Empedoclean sense, that being 
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is one and that nothing that is in being, regardless of the dissemination of parts, can 
cease to ‘be’.581
Thus mysticism, although a principle of dissolution, carries with it the safeguard that 
it can never be consistently applied. We reach it only in exceptional moments of 
intuition, from which we descend to our pots and pans with habits and instincts 
virtually unimpaired. Life goes on; virtues and affections endure, none the worse, the 
mystic feels, for that slight film of unreality which envelops them in a mind not 
unacquainted with ecstasy.
 The ‘large’ ‘red man’ is arguably ‘large’ because he is connected to 
(and occupies) Stevens’ sense of complete reality, which includes death. Life-forces 
return to earth in the poem because the ‘large’ red man is reading aloud, evoking: 
‘The outlines of being and its expressings, the syllables of its/ Law’. ‘He’ has 
become one with the ground of being. For Stevens it is a poesis that puts being to 
work, raising new life into the here and now in a sense identical to Gadamer’s notion 
of ‘play’, as a connection to being. Under this thinking a poem is ‘the literal 
characters’ and ‘the vatic lines’ that unveil the oneness of being. Speaking it 
connects the seemingly dead to Stevens’ sense of the wholeness of life. The poetic 
language of the pre-Socratics provides a perfect archetype for this mode of opening 
being, as well as for the enlargement of ‘major man’. 
 Stevens’ depiction of fetching back the ghosts here is one of connecting 
people to the being of ‘reality’, a reality that includes death. Santayana’s 
Interpretations of Poetry and Religion (1900) offers a possible source for speculating 
on how Stevens may have attempted to use pre-Socratic thought to connect people to 
‘reality’. Arguably the connection was designed to fulfil the desire for the ‘religious’ 
through a connection with the concept of the ‘One’. Santayana writes: 
582
Santayana advocates that the mystic should, on behalf of others, awaken them to the 
‘slight film of unreality’, rising from the sea of ‘ex’, which connects them to the 
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ecstasy of the mystic, which in turn connects them once again to the ‘pots and pans’ 
and ‘habits and instincts’.583 This is a direct textual and conceptual link to Stevens’ 
poem in connecting these ‘ghosts’ to ‘the pans above the stove, the pots on the 
table’. The poem suggests that it is only by connecting the imagination to reality that 
moderately indulged in and duly inhabited by a residuum of conventional sanity, it 
serves to give a touch of strangeness and elevation to the character and to suggest 
superhuman gifts. It is not, however, in the least superhuman. It is hardly even 
abnormal, being only an exaggeration of a rational interest in the highest 
abstractions.
the mystic at their centre can connect people to the ‘One’. Santayana continues: 
584
The word ‘residuum’, the giving of ‘a touch’ and the suggestion of ‘superhuman 
gifts’ that are not ‘abnormal’, but only a ‘rational interest in the highest abstractions’, 
connects Santayana’s comments very closely to Stevens’ poem. Santayana defines 
his conception of this ‘rational interest in the highest abstractions’, having just been 
speaking of Parmenides, with: ‘The divine, the universal, the absolute, even the One, 
are legitimate conceptions.’
 
 
585 It is Empedocles in his philosophical ‘poetry’, who 
gave account of his use of the ‘One’ (being) to raise the dead.586 Whereas 
Parmenides had actually envisioned a flight into the ‘underworld’, Empedocles had 
‘incarnated the teaching in himself’ as a ‘more-than-human teacher’ who ‘discovered 
the immortal at the heart of the mortal, the divine in the middle of the human.’587 
Hölderlin had considered of Empedocles that: ‘Such a human being can only grow 
out of the highest opposition of nature and art.’588
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 Stevens’ ontological poetry drops 
the image of anthropomorphic ‘man’ into a single pool of being, where it is 
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presented as occupying the totality of that pool, amorphous, waiting to be made 
anew. 
For post-Nietzschean philosophers and poets, the pre-Socratics, at the axis of 
the mystical and the philosophical, provided poetic models of a form of mysticism 
without the need for belief. An inconstant ‘belief’ which as Santayana says, ‘can 
never be consistently applied.’ The descent into the ‘underworld’ and the return with 
‘complete reality’ embodied in the self, allowed thinkers and poets to express this 
‘mysticism’ through art without the dogma of organised religion, while attempting to 
fulfil a sense of connection that had been drained from human experience. For 
Hölderlin, Empedocles provided an embodiment of that ‘connection’: 
In the way that with Empedocles art and nature are reunited at the extreme of their 
opposition, that the active principle becomes excessively objective and that the lost 
subjectivity is replaced by the profound effect of the object.589
Stevens’ particular ‘resurrection’ resembles a ‘resurrection’ of what 
Parmenides called ‘two-faced’ people to a sense of being in the everyday.
 
 
The modern amendment would appear to be the emphasis, not only on art as the 
mode of connection with the otherness of the universe, but in following that 
otherness as a constant process of destruction and rebirth. In other words, belief is in 
an inconstancy and religion is an alignment of ‘self’ with that inconstancy. 
590 The 
everyday aspect (‘pots’ and ‘pans’) ties in with Santayana’s assertion that  it is not 
‘superhuman’, but presents itself as ‘the hardly even abnormal’ ‘highest 
abstractions’, derived from ‘the One’, a Parmenidean conception which is apparently 
demystified through its connection to ‘philosophy’.591
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 The inference could be seen to 
be that without it people are as good as dead, disconnected from ‘reality’ that 
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arguably includes death and the ‘ugly’ for Stevens. In his Materia Poetica, Stevens 
had written that: 
The poet is the intermediary between people and the world in which they live and, 
also, between people as between themselves; but not between people and some other 
world.592
tulips among them.
 
 
Poetry is the ground of connection for Stevens through his ontologically grounded 
‘imagination’. The limit of what it means to be human is found in the limits of being 
for this thinking. 
‘Large Red Man Reading’ could also be drawing upon the persona and 
stories surrounding Heraclitus. Stevens’ effort in the poem was to connect people to 
their ‘pots’ and ‘pans’ in the kitchen, to the universal ‘One’ as Santayana had 
suggested, which is the enlargement of ‘major man’: 
There were those that returned to hear him read from the 
poem of life, 
Of the pans above the stove, the pots on the table, the 
593
some callers, seeing him warming himself at the kitchen stove, hesitated to enter his 
house, but he told them not to be afraid, ‘for there were gods there too’.
 
 
In fulfilling his determination in Adagia to connect people to their world, free of the 
transcendental religious imagination, Stevens, like Santayana, appears to recall a 
story told of Heraclitus as Guthrie relates: 
594
“The man,” I resumed, “who has not at least once in his life felt full, pure beauty in 
himself, when the powers of his being merged like the colors in the rainbow, who 
has never felt the profound harmony that arises among all things only in hours of 
exaltation.
 
 
Hölderlin, in context of Heraclitus had said the following in Hyperion: 
595
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This connection of ‘his being merged like colors in the rainbow’ through ‘harmony’ 
and ‘exaltation’ forms an extremely close parallel with Stevens’ poem. The red and 
blue tabulae merged as what becomes the purple tabulae, which in Stevens’ sense is 
part of this ‘major man’, part of complete being that includes reality and the 
imagination. To read from the ‘purple tabulae’ is to be ‘flicked by feeling’, to 
pronounce the syllables of the ‘blue’ imagination and the ‘red’ reality combined. 
Hölderlin continues, confirming the connection with Heraclitus as follows: 
The great saying, the ϵν διαφϵρον ϵαυτω (the one differentiated in itself) of 
Heraclitus, could be found only by a Greek, for it is the very being of Beauty, and 
before that was found there was no philosophy.596
A sense of the Xenophanean philosophy would explain why Leggett 
considers that Stevens himself in the late poem, ‘Final Soliloquy of the Interior 
Paramour’, collected in The Rock, is an ‘inhabitant’ of ‘a larger imagination’, a 
“central mind.”’
 
 
Through the pre-Socratics directly and through the subsequent poets and 
philosophers who had adopted elements of their conceptions, Stevens would not only 
have had access to a philosophy of this kind to inspire his poetry, but also the 
personas of mystical, poet, healer magicians, the ‘saviours’ through which he could 
attempt to connect people to the pre-Socratic concept of the ‘One’, in the guise of 
‘major man’. The emphasis can be read as finding an alternative to what Stevens saw 
as transcendental religious concepts, themselves ridiculed by Xenophanes. 
597
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 Like the Xenophanean philosophy, this thinking conflates the 
‘deity’ with the central man at the centre of the central mind, a oneness with the 
human globe, similar to that which Xenophanes had envisioned: 
 We say God and the imagination are one… 
 How high that highest candle lights the dark. 
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 Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
 We make a dwelling in the evening air, 
 In which being there together is enough.598
Hence, moving beyond the binary opposition of classical mimesis (man 
corresponding to God) and the romantic poesis (God corresponding to man), we 
conceivably find a poet motivated by the dismantling of generic forms of godlike 
correspondences. More and more, he becomes inspired by a metaphysics having to 
do with the rhetorical production of such correspondences, a rhetorical (or semiotic) 
generation of modernist forms that comes gradually to replace their classic and 
romantic counterparts.
 
 
Yet this seems to be a more complex case than that of God corresponding with man 
in the romantic sense. Jarraway insightfully states that: 
599
It is also in this sense that it might be said that the creation of the world is the 
thought of God. [We could say this] if from now on – given that the unconditioned is 
no longer subjected to the condition of the supreme being – it were not also 
necessary for us to think this without “God” and without a “creator”.
 
 
Certainly I would agree Stevens’ move beyond the romantic poesis is ‘inspired by a 
metaphysics’, but I would argue that this manifests itself as a ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’ to being. This sense of being finds its closest parallel in the pre-
Socratic poetic philosophy of the ‘it is’, where all polarities (including the religious 
imagination) are grounded in the immanence of the ‘central mind’ of the 
‘underworld’. Such thought appears to form Stevens’ ground for moving out in new 
and ‘modern’ directions of re-creation. Nancy suggests that:  
600
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What is critical is that the conception of this thought, ‘We say God and the 
imagination are one’, is used to allow thought this power of ‘creation’. It conceives 
of thinking/imagination as the opening of being, the very painting ‘Out of’ religious 
forms as concepts the imagination is saturated in: 
179 
 
It never stops happening – and surprising. Thinking never stops catching itself in the 
act [se surprendre á] of seeing it coming, its open look turned upon the transparency 
of nothing. A thought is an event: what it thinks happens to it there, where it is not. 
An event is a thought: the tension and leap into the nothing of Being. It is in this 
sense that “Being and thinking are the same” and that their sameness takes place 
according to the incisive ex-tension of ek-sistence.601
[Since Hegel] at the very least – it might be necessary to pay some renewed attention 
to the work of Parmenides himself, particularly to how ontological truth is inscribed 
there in the recitation of an event. After all, the poem immediately opens onto the 
present with “the horses which carry me,” where nothing indicates a stopping point 
in any formal way. In fact, the speaker’s chariot enters the domain of the goddess, 
but this domain is only presented as the road opened wide by the gaping opening that 
Diké agreed to open. He, the “young man,” the one who “knows” or “sees” his road 
“pass through all the cities,” does not come down from his chariot. He is instructed 
by the goddess along the way, without stopping, instructed not about Being but about 
the “it is.” Passing through the opening, he sees that there is; that is all that happens 
to him, and nothing else ever happens – when something happens.
 
 
Nancy continues his discourse on the creation of the world as the thought of 
God: 
602
The ‘immanence’ of the ‘it is’ is characteristic of the ontological ‘value’ or nature of 
poetry. It is ‘the poem’ that ‘immediately opens onto the present’, without stopping. 
Its constant movement in opening the ground of poetry allows for the arising of 
infinite forms that ‘pass through’ ‘the road opened wide’, a connection well able to 
fuel modernism in its thirst to continually make it new. At the periphery of this 
modern reinterpretation of what resembles Parmenidean thought lies the machinery 
of religion and mysticism, but without the belief. The Parmenidean charioteer is the 
‘charioteer’ held by the ‘transport’ of the ‘it is’, of the poetic imagination grounded 
in being, which of course includes physical reality. This provides a stark contrast to 
Stevens’ critique of Plato’s imagined charioteer of the flight of the soul, in ‘The 
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Noble Rider and the Sound of Words’.603 For Stevens, romantic flights of the 
imagination are useless. Only with an imagination connected to the ‘central mind’ of 
being (through ‘the sound of words’) can ‘unreal things have a reality of their own’, 
in the ‘transport’ of the ‘it is’.604
The Birth of a ‘Supreme Fiction’ - The Order of Religion and the Order of 
Poetry 
 ‘Major man’ is ‘he’ who ‘knows’, he who ‘sees’ 
immanence, the ‘it is’, as part of it. ‘He’ is the one who claims to be able to 
reconnect humanity to the ‘one’ and neutralize the polemos as a form of ‘saviour’. 
But what would be the ‘extension’ of this ‘major man’? What would ‘major man’, 
connected to the totality of ‘being there’, to immanence, which is ‘enough’, imagine 
for himself as his own mythology? 
 
The early Stevens wanted, needed, the central position that religion once 
filled, but could not believe in traditional religious forms. It is interesting to note that 
after encouraging Elsie to join the local church in 1907, saying that he was ‘not in 
the least religious’, but still ‘very, very glad to know that you are now on the road’, 
Stevens declared that: ‘I say my prayers every night - not that I need them now, or 
that they are anything more than a habit, half-unconscious.’605
                                                          
603 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words’, The Necessary Angel, Collected 
Poetry and Prose, p. 643. 
604 Ibid., p. 644. 
605 A Letter to Elsie Moll, March 10th, 1907. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 96. 
 The effort of much of 
Stevens’ poetry would seem to be engaged with substituting the old religious forms 
with the fiction of poetry, while attempting to fulfil his very real need to ‘believe’, 
even though he knows he only believes a ‘fiction’. The oft quoted entry from his 
Adagia confirms that: ‘The final belief is to believe in a fiction, which you know to 
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be a fiction, there being nothing else. The exquisite truth is to know that it is a fiction 
and that you believe in it willingly.’606
 Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame.  
 Take the moral law and make a nave of it  
 And from the nave build haunted heaven. Thus,  
 The conscience is converted into palms,  
 Like windy citherns hankering for hymns.  
 We agree in principle. That's clear. But take  
 The opposing law and make a peristyle,  
 And from the peristyle project a masque  
 Beyond the planets. Thus, our bawdiness,  
 Unpurged by epitaph, indulged at last,  
 Is equally converted into palms,  
 Squiggling like saxophones. And palm for palm,  
 Madame, we are where we began.
 
 When ‘major man’ is first mentioned by name in the ‘Notes’ his entrance can 
seem somewhat enigmatic, unless we trace ‘his’ origin from Stevens’ first collection. 
The same could also be said of the ‘supreme fiction’. From Harmonium there is 
evidence to suggest that Stevens was seeking to replace religion with poetry, as 'A 
High-Toned Old Christian Woman' makes clear: 
607
The conception that 'Oxidia' was born from the minds of humans is again apparent - 
'Take the moral law and make a nave of it/ And from the nave build haunted heaven.' 
So too is the idea of projecting ‘a masque/ Beyond the planets’, which echoes 
Xenophanes, suggesting that the excesses of the ‘gods’ described by the poets arose 
from human minds. The artistic conception is to re-conceive, to ‘make’ and to 
‘project’ from the old religious forms. Everything, including the paraphernalia of 
religion is eligible for remaking because it was only imagined in the first place. This 
includes the ‘peristyle’ of the ‘opposing law’ which reads as a substitution for the 
 
 
                                                          
606 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 903. 
607 Wallace Stevens, ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 47. 
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old temple at Jerusalem with something closer to revelry and debauchery. To 
Stevens it simply doesn’t matter, it all came from the imagination and as such it is 
poetry that is the ‘supreme fiction’. 
 Milton J. Bates, in an essay entitled ‘Stevens and the Supreme Fiction’, 
argues that: ‘“A High-Toned Old Christian Woman” dramatizes the central insight in 
George Santayana’s Interpretations of Poetry and Religion (1900), published while 
Stevens was a student at Harvard and spent time in Santayana’s company.’608 
Lentricchia makes the point that ‘the tendency of Interpretations of Poetry and 
Religion is to argue from isolate sensibility to community, from poems as aids to 
perception to poems as aids to connection’.609
Beginning, however, with that zealous Protestant, the old Xenophanes, the austerer 
minds, moralists, naturalists, and wits, united in decrying the fanciful polytheism of 
the poets.
 In this work of Santayana’s, Stevens 
would have read: 
610
Although Santayana suggests that Xenophanes’ scepticism may seem ‘unjust’, or as 
‘hard denials’ to ‘our mind’, he also says
 
 
611
But in their day the revolt of the sceptics had its relative justification. The 
imagination had dried up, and what had once been a natural interpretation of facts 
now seemed an artificial addition to them. An elaborate and irrelevant world of 
fiction seemed to have been imposed on human credulity. Mythology was, in fact, 
already largely irrelevant; the experience poetised by it had been forgotten and the 
symbol, in its significance, could not be honestly or usefully retained.
: 
612
In Stevens’ view the Christian tradition had also ‘dried up’ as a product of the 
imagination. In fact, in a letter of 1953 Stevens describes himself as ‘a dried-up 
 
 
                                                          
608 Milton J. Bates, ‘Stevens and the Supreme Fiction’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace 
Stevens, p. 49. 
609 Frank Lentricchia, Modernist Quartet, p. 6. 
610 George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 39. 
611 Ibid., 39. 
612 Ibid., 39. 
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Presbyterian’, using Santayana’s precise terminology for describing Xenophanes’ 
dilemma.613
We observe to-day a process exactly analogous to that by which the natural divinities 
of Greece were reduced again to the physical or social forces from which poetry had 
originally evoked their forms.
 Santayana had said that: 
614
Judging other minds and other ages by our own, we are tempted to ask if there ever 
was any fundamental difference between religion and poetry.
 
  
It seems certain that Santayana was well positioned to contribute to Stevens’ sense of 
philosophical ‘poetry’ as a substitute for religion with statements such as: 
615
Or rhyming almost perfectly with Stevens: ‘Our religion is the poetry in which we 
believe.’
 
 
616 However, although Santayana may have contributed the impetus to 
perform the transvaluation of poetry for religion, its model is reminiscent of that 
‘zealous Protestant’, ‘old Xenophanes’.617
 Having once announced that ‘poetry is the supreme fiction’ in ‘A High-
Toned Old Christian Woman’, 
 For the post-Nietzschean poet or 
philosopher, Xenophanes’ ridicule of the polytheism of his age provided a means of 
substituting the religious imagination with the poetic. 
Stevens does not overtly name the 'supreme fiction' 
again until the title of the 'Notes'. However, the idea of substituting the order of 
religion with the order of poetry is very much at work in the interim period. For 
example, the 
                                                          
613 A Letter to Bernard Heringman, July 21st, 1953. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 792. 
614 George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 42. 
615 Ibid., 19. 
616 Ibid., 20. 
617 Ibid., 39. 
concept of replacing religion with poetry continued to be evident in 
Ideas of Order. I argued earlier that in ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ Stevens had 
appeared to view the order of poetry as extending from an inherent technê, 
personified as the singing ‘she’. The act of writing a poem opened a connection to 
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that fundamental ‘order’ that disclosed being. What becomes clear is that Stevens 
offered the order of poetry as a replacement for religion. In a letter to Ronald Lane 
Latimer in 1935, Stevens said that: 
If poetry introduces order, and every competent poem introduces order, and if order 
means peace, even though that particular peace is an illusion, is it any less an illusion 
than a good many other things that everyone high and low now-a-days concedes to 
be no longer of any account?618
As Stevens had just been speaking of the poet as a ‘metropolitan Rabbi’, we can 
assume that the ‘illusion’ no longer of ‘any account’ is the old religious order that 
brings ‘peace’. Poetry, connected to the inherent order can reconfigure reality. The 
order of poetry is no less an ‘illusion’ than the religious order for Stevens, but he 
sees the act of replacing the religious order as ‘a freshening of life’, ‘a thing of 
consequence’, a process that would ‘change the status of the poet’.
 
 
619
 In a letter of April 9
 
th 1907 to Elsie, Stevens recounts having been reading the 
“Note Books” of Matthew Arnold and ‘a volume of lectures on Greek subjects’ at 
the same time.620
Christian virtue consists in order; that is, in letting every duty have its proper place 
and concern. To engage in other business before we acquit ourselves of this is to go 
against order; and all other virtues are useless.
 This letter was written nine days before deciding to throw his Bible 
away. One of the quotes that Stevens would have read in the Notebooks reads as 
follows, from the 1902 edition: 
621
Certainly the language of a poem like ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ implies a 
transvaluation of the established order. The phrase ‘Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if 
you know’, echoes God questioning Job in this context by saying: ‘Tell Me, if you 
 
 
                                                          
618 A Letter to Ronald Lane Latimer, November 5th, 1935. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 293. 
619 Ibid., p. 293. 
620 A Letter to Elsie Moll, April 9th, 1907. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 101. 
621 Matthew Arnold, Matthew Arnold’s Notebooks (London: Smith, Elder, & Co., 1902), p. 61. 
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know all this’,622 or, ‘declare, if thou hast understanding’.623
The Old King James version of the Bible renders from Job as follows: ‘Canst 
thou bind the sweet influences of Pleiades’.
 This questioning of Job 
was in the context of God asking Job where he was when God created all things. For 
Stevens, the ‘Blessed rage for order’ may be parodying what he perceives as God’s 
‘rage’ (‘The maker’s rage’) for order, in asking Job approximately ninety questions 
out of the violence of the whirlwind, with respect to His creative (ordering) 
omnipotence over Job. 
624 The ‘sweet influences of Pleiades’ 
would appear to have become the ‘fragrant portals’ of the night sky for Stevens, 
from which he intimates that we literally had our birth. The cosmos is now ‘dimly-
starred’ and provides only ‘ghostlier demarcations’, because the ‘truth’ of the 
Darwinian inflected ‘origins’ (that he believes he has uncovered) is here a synthesis 
of the physical and the metaphysical. Jarraway seems accurate in suggesting that: 
‘Ideas of Order focuses more on the substitution of God as a means of ultimately 
terminating metaphorical play.’625 The phrases, ‘voice of sky’ and ‘water-walled’, 
appear to try and reduce images of the ancient Israelites at Mount Sinai and the 
exodus through the Red Sea to physical nature at hand.626 The woman’s song of 
technê at Key West is ‘uttered word by word’627 and seems to be offered as Stevens’ 
replacement for ‘The Word’ (Logos) of God through Whom ‘all things were 
made’.628
                                                          
622 The Holy Bible - New King James Version (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1998) Job 
38:18, p. 469. 
623 The Holy Bible (Glasgow: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1954) Job 38:4, p. 499. 
624 Ibid., Job 38:31, p. 499. 
625 David R. Jarraway, ‘Stevens and Belief’, The Cambridge Companion To Wallace Stevens, p. 195. 
626 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 105. 
627 Ibid., p. 105. 
628 The Holy Bible (Glasgow: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1954) John 1:3, p. 90. 
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For Stevens the universal order of technê includes the religious order, not the 
other way around. Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach’ had announced the receding belief in 
God. The Key West poem not only proposes an alternative to ‘The Word’ that 
sustains the universe in the form of the woman’s song of technê from ‘beyond’ 
physical nature, but it also claims to be a poesis that is grounded in that new ‘song’. I 
would argue that this is Stevens’ ‘supreme fiction’ in embryo. The supremacy of the 
‘supreme fiction’ is based upon grounding the new poesis in the woman’s ‘song’, 
which had united both the imagination and reality. This is superior for the 
Xenophanean Stevens, because he believes religion is only a product of the 
imagination, derived from the physical. As subsequent poems will show, it is a 
fiction that launches (is ‘flicked’) from the ground of the imagination and reality as a 
‘oneness’ that constitutes Stevens’ conception of the ‘supreme fiction’. 
 
‘Notes Toward’ the ‘Supreme Fiction’ 
 The idea of poetry as a 'supreme fiction' that could replace religion had been 
evident since Harmonium. The concept itself would seem to have taken a trial run in 
'The Idea of Order at Key West'. Here it was the idea of poetry being written out of a 
‘song’ that united the imagination and reality, or a fiction derived from ‘real reality’, 
that could conceptually negate God as the ground for an extant ‘creation’. In his 
definition of the cosmic scope of phusis Heidegger had included ‘the gods who 
themselves stand under destiny.’629
                                                          
629 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 16. 
 I argued earlier that the singer at Key West was 
‘Ananke’ (‘Necesity’) who incorporated the ‘more than that’ in phusis (technê) that 
ordered the seasons. It is from this totalizing song of everything subject to the 
fictional figure of ‘destiny’ that Stevens can build the ‘supreme fiction’ as a ground 
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that includes the imagination (religious or otherwise) and reality. With the advent of 
'Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction', Stevens takes a significant step in developing the 
'supreme fiction', hence it is not that fiction fully realised, rather it is 'toward' it, as 
something like the enactment of the pure Necessity of belief, derived from the unity 
of the imagination and reality. What I want to pursue here is the development of the 
idea of producing a fiction out of a fiction, which has already united the imagination 
and reality, as the criteria for the ‘supreme fiction’ that could consume the religious 
imagination. 
Close analysis of the ‘Notes’ allows for an argument that suggests that 
significant portions of the three main sections of 'It Must be Abstract', 'It Must 
Change' and 'It Must Give Pleasure', can be interpreted as a renewal of a previously 
written poem. Each conscious renewal can be read as a ‘meta-poetry’, attempting to 
produce the 'supreme fiction' that would replace what I have called the Xenophanean 
interpretation of religion. Essentially, the prospective idea of a ‘supreme fiction’ 
could now begin to walk about upon the stage constructed in ‘Of Modern Poetry’, 
which is the single stage of the imagination and reality played together as one 
‘stage’, that includes the audience. By the term ‘meta-poetry’ I mean a poetry 
consciously written out of existing poetry, in a way that views the original poem as 
able to provide a ground of origin unique to poetry and distinct from the extant 
world at hand, which is precisely what his essay entitled ‘Imagination as Value’ 
implies.630
                                                          
630 Wallace Stevens, ‘Imagination as Value’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 
724. 
 Instead of a lion imagining a lion ‘deity’, Stevens could be read here as 
imagining a poem out of an existing poem (that has already played the imagination 
and reality together) in an effort to radically displace the ground of religion, the 
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ground of a pre-given creation. The replacement is a ground of mythos that suggests 
that all appearances, be they real or fictive, are ‘true’ by virtue of their status of ‘in 
being’. I am not suggesting that a conscious presentation of these mechanics 
amounts to a fully fledged ‘system’ for Stevens. In view of that consideration I will 
restrain my remarks to an interesting parallel with a view to analyzing the language 
of a select few, key poems, to demonstrate the mechanics of a possible ‘supreme 
fiction’ and to comment on what it may imply. 
We can begin by noting poem III of 
Beating in the heart, as if blood newly came, 
An elixir, an excitation, a pure power.
‘It Must be Abstract’, which speaks of 
the poem refreshing life, of thought:  
631
This may be compared to lines from ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’ that speak of ‘A 
lion, an ox in his breast’… ‘He tastes its blood’….‘In the body of a violent beast’.
 
 
632 
Poem VII of ‘It Must be Abstract’ notes that: 
We more than awaken, sit on the edge of sleep, 
As on an elevation, and behold.633 
  
This can be read as a reworking of earlier lines from ‘The Latest Freed Man’: 
For a moment on rising, at the edge of the bed, to be, 
To have the ant of the self changed to an ox.634 
  
Poem II from ‘It Must Change’ carries the lines: 
                                              does 
The body lift its heavy wing, take up, 
  
Again, an inexhaustible being, rise 
Over the loftiest antagonist 
To drone the green phrases of its juvenal?635
                                                          
631 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 331. 
632 Wallace Stevens, ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 178. 
633 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 334. 
634 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Latest Freed Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 187. 
635 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 337. 
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It also speaks of 'barefoot servants' who 'adjust/ The curtains to a metaphysical t'636 
which together are reminiscent of ‘The Curtains in the House of the Metaphysician’ 
which had referred to: 'the drifting of these curtains/ Is full of long motions’ and ‘the 
firmament,/ Up-rising and down-falling, bares/ The last largeness, bold to see.’637 
Poem IX of ‘It Must Change’ may be seen as self referential of the process 
Stevens seems to be enacting:   
The poem goes from the poet’s gibberish to 
The gibberish of the vulgate and back again.638 
  
It could also be read as a reworking of ‘Blue Guitar’ poem XXII:  
Poetry is the subject of the poem, 
From this the poem issues and 
 
To this returns.639 
   
From ‘It Must Give Pleasure’ we could point to the following from poem IX: 
round and round, the merely going round, 
Until merely going round is a final good.640 
  
This would appear to be a reworking of ‘The Pleasures of Merely Circulating’: 
The garden flew round with the angel, 
The angel flew round with the clouds641 
  
Further, poem X as a reworking of ‘Anatomy of Monotony’: ‘Fat girl, terrestrial, my 
summer, my night’…. ‘Bent over work, anxious, content, alone’642, which compares 
to the earlier poem with: ‘She walks an autumn ampler than the wind’…. ‘over the 
bare spaces of our skies/ She sees a barer sky that does not bend.’643
                                                          
636 Ibid., 337. 
637 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Curtains in the House of the Metaphysician’, Collected Poetry and Prose, 
p. 49. 
638 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 342. 
639 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 144. 
640 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 350. 
641 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Pleasures of Merely Circulating’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 120. 
642 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 351. 
643 Wallace Stevens, ‘Anatomy of Monotony’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 90. 
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When I say it 'compares' I don't mean it simply mimics or pays homage to the 
earlier poem, as Robert Lowell may be said to imitate Elisabeth Bishop in 'Skunk 
Hour'. Rather, I am suggesting that Stevens is using the original poem in which the 
‘imagination’ and ‘reality’ had been forged together as a fundamental ground of 
mythos, as the fiction of a ‘whole’, from which to establish new fictions that attempt 
to free themselves from the pre-existent, created ground that implies a creator God. 
If we had to point to a model that Stevens is mimicking, I would suggest the New 
Testament’s prolific use of Old Testament scriptures, in the sense of building upon a 
solid foundation of truth. This would be in line with Stevens’ conscious effort to 
debunk religion as just another poetry in his Xenophanean mode. The point is that 
the ‘Notes’ can be read as a meta-poetry, by which I mean a poetry consciously 
grounded in existing poetry and propelled by the ontological urgency of the ‘it must’ 
(‘It Must Be Abstract’ etc).644 In Heidegger and Gadamer’s sense, as well as in the 
sense that Nancy attributes to Parmenides’ ontological poetry, this is an opening of 
being grounded in an opening of being. Poetry, as opening becomes an endless 
opening of fiction, particularly if we give extended license to ‘fiction’ and say with 
Stevens that: ‘What we see in the mind is as real to us as what we see by the eye.’645 
As in ‘Of Modern Poetry’, which itself re-enacts the terms of ‘Blue Guitar’, ‘all the 
world’s a stage’, and it is upon that ‘stage’ that the ‘supreme fiction’ seems to be 
founded.646
 Indeed, not only is the entire idea for 'Notes' as ‘toward’ a ‘supreme fiction’ 
rooted in the Harmonium poem ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’, but we 
 If this approach warrants a more contemporary label, that label is surely 
‘modernism’ as a part of the epoch opened after Kant. 
                                                          
644 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 329. 
645 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 903. 
646 William Shakespeare, As You Like It, The Dramatic Works of William Shakespeare, p. 205. Act II, 
Scene II. 
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should recall that at one stage Stevens intended calling Harmonium - The Grand 
Poem: Preliminary Minutiae. ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’ pays homage to 
that rejected title. With reference to Stevens’ dissatisfaction with the poems of his 
early period, Lentricchia interprets that: 
the aborted purposes of his “horrid cocoons” (his metaphor for his earlier poems) 
might somehow still be redeemed, the miscarried insects reimplanted in the 
nourishing environment of a longer meditative form, so that their potential might 
finally emerge.647
Lentricchia seems correct to consider this reimplanting as connected to the dramatic 
transformation of Stevens’ earlier ‘trifling poesies’ to a ‘missal’, but completely 
incorrect in not considering that the idea for ‘poetry’ as ‘the supreme fiction’ began 
with Harmonium, and that Stevens never stopped renewing poetry as his re-
composition of ‘Credences’ through ‘The Poem that Took the Place of a Mountain’ 
shows.
 
 
648
Whereas Lentricchia is correct to maintain that: ‘Stevens was one of those 
writers who find their old things just old’, he comes unstuck by trying to suggest that 
Stevens also found his earlier poems ‘psychically unprofitable to reencounter.’
 On the contrary, reimplanting and re-composition are the refreshing of the 
‘first idea’, as the ontological ground of a fiction derived from the unity of the 
imagination and reality for Stevens. Lentricchia’s disconnect occurs in viewing 
Stevens’ in cultural terms, failing to see that ontological thought claims to have no 
cultural ground. 
649 
Rather, Stevens, the modern artist standing in ‘the metaphysical streets’ says650
                                                          
647 Frank Lentricchia, Modernist Quartet, p. 159. 
648 Wallace Stevens, ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 47. 
649 Frank Lentricchia, Modernist Quartet, p. 148. 
650 Wallace Stevens, ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 403. 
: 
  To re-create, to use 
 
 The cold and earliness and bright origin 
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 Is to search.651
‘To recreate’ and ‘to use’ is to reencounter. Stevens consistently maintained artistic 
integrity in the process of literally rearranging earlier poems. The ‘Notes’ had 
declared that: ‘The poem refreshes life’, it ‘sends us’ back to the ‘immaculate 
beginning’.
 
 
652 As a recreation of the earlier poetry, ‘Notes’ could equally send us 
back to the ‘bright origin’, the ‘candor’ of the ‘first idea’, which is an ontological 
ground opened by those original poems.653 The project was proposed from the 
beginning and what becomes old is still always part of the ‘rock’, only in need of 
recomposing to awaken the ‘first idea’. Renewal and refreshing make poetry a 
continually living thing. Patke draws attention to a statement by Marianne Moore 
from The Harvard Advocate centennial Anthology of 1940 where she says of 
Stevens that: ‘The interacting veins of life between his early and later poems are an 
ever-continuing marvel to me.’654
The blend of ontology, poetry and mythology found in the pre-Socratics, 
offered post-Nietzschean philosophers and poets a conceptual archê from which a 
new fiction could be perpetually renewed. For Stevens as a modern poet, there is no 
 The term ‘early’ is relative, because Stevens 
renewed poems of his middle and later period as well, so does not signify a desire to 
just renew his initial efforts. This is not about a glutinous lust to consume things for 
the sake of collecting them rather it is an ontological desire (‘it must’) for the 
refreshing of the ‘first idea’, for the completion of the mind. It is entirely detached 
from the possession of a ‘thing’, which is merely symptomatic of a metaphysical 
desire which runs deeper than all modes of physical completion through possession. 
                                                          
651 Ibid., p. 411. 
652 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 330 - 331. 
653 Ibid., pp. 330 - 331. 
654 Rajeev S. Patke, The Long Poems of Wallace Stevens – An Interpretive Study, p. 233. 
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ultimate ‘Truth’, no ‘The the’.655
The Meta-Poetry of the ‘Rock’ as the ‘Supreme Fiction’ 
 There is only being at hand compelled by the ‘it 
must’ as it establishes the ‘it is’ of the new fiction. What the pre-Socratics offered 
was a ground that made ‘belief’ and ‘truth’ perpetual inconstancies in need of being 
made anew. In this sense the poems of ‘Notes’ enact the abstraction and change of 
their own poetically constructed ‘reality’, that is justified merely by coming into 
being, and which results in ‘pleasure’. They are what they are speaking of in a sense 
that universalises poetry to something like Gadamer’s ‘universal hermeneutics’. For 
modernism to retain its label it has to continually fashion new fictions, and the 
‘Notes’ can be read as an effort to extend that possibility infinitely. What we will 
observe in Stevens as we progress in this analysis, is that the sense of the total 
connection between old and new poems gradually becomes one universalising poem, 
that is conscious of all poetry, all fictions, issuing from a single ground of the 
opening of being. 
 
 We noted earlier that Stevens had written that ‘a poem in which the poet has 
chosen for his subject a philosophic theme should result in the poem of poems. That 
the wing of poetry should also be the rushing wing of meaning seems to be an 
extreme aesthetic good’.656
None but a book-student could ever imagine that a creation of the brain, woven of 
poetry and philosophy, can take the place of real religion.
 In looking back, ‘Notes’ can be read as the achievement 
of that ‘extreme aesthetic good’, with the ‘philosophic theme’ resulting in ‘the poem 
of poems’. Arnold's Notebooks record a quote from Strauss as follows: 
657
                                                          
655 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man on the Dump’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 186. 
656 Wallace Stevens, ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 854. 
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194 
 
Though such a comment is only indicative of the attitude that Stevens was looking to 
repost, I would argue that the ‘Notes’ can be read as Stevens’ answer to such a 
challenge to replace religion. 
When Stevens fully realised his conception of the ‘rock’ in 'Credences of 
Summer', we can argue that he had found his ground for attempting to replace God. 
‘The Rock’ is a title of Christ and by using that title Stevens could be read as 
attempting to replace Christ The Rock, as ‘The Word’ through Whom all things were 
created, with his fusion of the physical and the metaphysical as ‘immanent’ ‘reality’. 
In terms of the Christian religion we may think of Peter (petros - ‘stone’/‘rock’) in 
this context, but ‘The Rock’ is a title of Christ and Stevens, who as a child would fall 
asleep to the sound of his mother reading the Bible, is attempting a more 
fundamental subversion of religion than just the replacement of a man: 
 Behold, I lay in Zion a 
 stumbling stone and rock of 
 offense, 
 and whosoever believes on Him 
 will not be put to shame.658
The same characteristics are applied to The Lord spoken of in the Psalms, which 
Stevens recalls reading in a letter of 1909
 
 
659
 Fortress.
: 
 For you are my rock and my 
660
This section of scripture has the title, ‘God the Rock of Salvation’ and I would argue 
that it is this title of God’s that Stevens attempts to reconstruct on his own terms. 
 
 
This becomes certain when we note that Stevens refers to his 'rock' in section III of 
‘Credences of Summer’, as a 'natural tower' and a 'refuge'661
                                                          
658 The Holy Bible - New King James Version, Romans 9:33, p. 996. 
659 A Letter to Elsie Moll, May 3rd, 1909. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 141. 
660 The Holy Bible - New King James Version, Psalm 71:3, p. 509. 
661 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 323. 
, which echoes the 
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Psalmist frequently referring to God as ‘a strong tower’ and ‘my refuge’, in context 
of ‘the rock of my strength’.662 There seems to be little doubt that when Stevens 
initially climbed upon the ‘rock’, for its status of being ‘away from the much of the 
land’663, he was consciously inverting King David’s request to God to lift him ‘out 
of the miry clay, and set my feet upon a rock’.664
The ‘transport’ of Transport to Summer ultimately seemed to be the 
‘transport’ of ‘overwhelmingly strong emotions’.
 
665 This kind of ‘transport’ as a 
euphoric experience of the ‘rock’ has the characteristics of a replacement of 
‘religious’ emotion in ‘Credences of Summer’. ‘Credences’ is a word usually taken 
at face value, literally as creeds of summer. Vendler relates that: ‘Credences of 
Summer, as its title betrays, is the creed of the believer’.666 This is indeed one 
meaning, but its more obscure meaning is that of ‘credence’: ‘A small side table, 
shelf, or niche in a church for holding the elements of the Eucharist before they are 
consecrated.’667 The act of taking nature to his body in ‘Poetry is a Destructive 
Force’ produced blood in Stevens’ mouth, literally a Communion with nature. 
‘Notes’, in what I am calling its Xenophanean looking transvaluation of the religious 
imagination with poetry, had done its work. ‘Credences’ is a euphoric experience of 
the immanence of the ‘rock’ of the physical and the metaphysical in its being at 
hand. In ‘An Ordinary Evening in New Haven’, collected in Auroras, Stevens states 
that: ‘We seek/ Nothing beyond reality. Within it,/ Everything’.668
                                                          
662 The Holy Bible (Glasgow: Collins Clear-Type Press, 1958) Psalms 61:3 & 62:7, p. 519. 
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 Through the 
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protagonist, ‘Professor Eucalyptus’, Stevens implies the level of import attached to 
this seeking: ‘“The search for reality is as momentous as/ The search for God.”’669
 The ‘without a drop of blood’ that came at the end of ‘Repetitions of a Young 
Captain’ signalled the ‘credences’, or small tables, that would hold up the bread and 
wine of ‘reality’ in a sense that resembles Hölderlin.
 
670
 This is the refuge that the end creates.
 The height of the ‘tower’, the 
‘apogee’ of ‘green’, the ‘limits of reality’, the ‘hay’, ‘piled in mows’ and the ‘rock’, 
are all indications of this raised platform, offering up the ‘holy’ bread and wine of 
‘reality’ itself. The point is that Stevens has transvalued these religious icons with 
the physical and the metaphysical of the ‘rock’, bound in the poesis, which is 
reminiscent of Parmenides’ configuration of ‘reality’ as the ‘it is’: 
 And happiest folk-land, mostly marriage-hymns. 
 It is the mountain on which the tower stands, 
 It is the final mountain. Here the sun, 
 Sleepless, inhales his proper air, and rests. 
671
What meaning, then? The meaning that makes it the case that “there is”; that which 
destines or provokes Being into happening; that which sends Being on its way into 
happening – into happening/arriving/leaving. What is this? This cannot be 
represented as an axiom, or as a fact. It will be said that it is an “it must.”
 
 
The sun ‘rests’ and ‘inhales his proper air’ because it was to the ‘underworld’ that 
the Greeks believed the sun went each night and where all polarities were unified. 
The repetition of ‘It is’ echoes Parmenides and in context of Parmenides Nancy says: 
672
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The urgency of the ‘it must’ is comparable to a poesis and is strongly evident in 
Stevens’ ‘transport’ of the ‘refuge’ that ‘the end creates’: 
     It must 
Be the finding of a satisfaction, and may 
Be of a man skating, a woman dancing, a woman 
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Combing.673
For Gadamer in his essay entitled ‘On the contribution of poetry to the search 
for truth’, it is the term ‘nearness’ that closely resembles such ‘immanence’.
 
 
‘It must’ says Stevens. ‘It Must be Abstract’, ‘It Must Change’, ‘It Must Give 
Pleasure’. In the case of ‘Of Modern Poetry’, the ‘it must’ is an ‘immanence’ that 
immediately opens onto what I earlier said were modes of becoming. 
674 Its 
connective power in the opening of the poem allows for what Gadamer, like 
Heidegger, and ultimately Parmenides, called aletheia, which Gadamer defines as 
“openness”.675
This standing and this nearness find permanence in the language of literature and, 
most perfectly, in the poem. This is not a romantic theory, but a straightforward 
description of the fact that language gives all of us our access to a world in which 
certain special forms of human experience arise: the religious tidings that proclaim 
salvation, the legal judgement that tells us what is right and what is wrong in our 
society, the poetic world that by being there bears witness to our own being.
 It is this power of poetic language to open this ‘truth’ that leads 
Gadamer to see ‘nearness’ as a reductive force, being: 
676
 For Gadamer, this process is like a mirror held up to ‘this nearness or familiarity 
itself in which we stand’.
 
 
677
The truth of poetry consists in creating a “hold upon nearness.” What this hold upon 
nearness means becomes clear if we consider a counterexample. Wherever we feel 
something lacking in a poem, then it is because it is not a structure that hangs 
together. It jars because it contains something merely conventional or stale. A 
 
Stevens’ poetic language establishes a ‘final mountain’ founded upon 
‘nothing’. Together, this presence/absence dynamic is the ground of being, the 
‘transport’ of the movement from the ‘it must’ to the ‘it is’. Gadamer suggests that: 
                                                          
673 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 219. 
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genuine poem, on the other hand, allows us to experience “nearness” in such a way 
that this nearness is held in and through the linguistic form of the poem.678
Stevens was obviously aware of how a ‘jar’ could inhibit ‘nearness’ to nature.
 
 
679
As good. The utmost must be good and is
 
Here however, the result of such ‘nearness’ to the ‘rock’ is that: 
Things stop in that direction and since they stop 
The direction stops and we accept what is 
680
the poem does not fade, for the poetic word brings the transience of time to a 
standstill. It too “stands written, not as a promise, nor as a pledge, but as a saying 
where its own presence is in play. Perhaps it is connected with the power of the 
poetic word that the poet feels a challenge to bring to language that which seems 
most closed to the realm of words.
 
 
Gadamer suggests that: 
 
681
Stevens’ language of the ‘rock’, his collected poems described as a ‘planet on the 
table’, all point to an absolute ‘hold upon nearness’, that here is experienced as 
‘transport’.
 
 
682
 Pure rhetoric of a language without words.
 
 And the secondary senses of the ear 
 Swarm, not with secondary sounds, but choirs, 
 Not evocations but last choirs, last sounds 
 With nothing else compounded, carried full, 
683 
 
This ‘Pure rhetoric’, that is ‘without words’ is what ‘seems most closed to the realm 
of words’. It is a sense of being. The ear is swarming, not with 'secondary sounds', 
but with another replacement for 'holiness' or ‘worship’, 'choirs', the 'choirs' of ‘real 
reality’, evoked as 'holy', the mere being
                                                          
678 Ibid., pp. 113 - 114. 
679 Wallace Stevens, ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 60 - 61. 
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 of 'Creations of Sound', that here too is a 
constant rhetoric 'without words'.  
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The ‘rock’ and the poem are ‘compounded’, the senses of the rational self are 
‘secondary’ and as with the ‘end’, these are ‘last’ choirs, ‘last sounds’ on the edge of 
‘nothing’. Stevens’ language is collapsing into a ‘Pure rhetoric’, a rhapsody of ‘it is’, 
aligned with the poesis. For Stevens, the ‘rock’ comprises both summer and the 
poesis, reduced to one thing in the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to the ‘it is’: 
 The rock cannot be broken. It is the truth. 
 It rises from land and sea and covers them. 
 It is a mountain half way green and then, 
 The other immeasurable half, such rock 
 As placid air becomes. But it is not 
  
 A hermit's truth nor symbol in hermitage. 
 It is the visible rock, the audible, 
 The brilliant mercy of a sure repose, 
 On this present ground, the vividest repose, 
 Things certain sustaining us in certainty. 
  
 It is the rock of summer, the extreme, 
 A mountain luminous half-way in bloom 
 And then half way in the extremest light 
 Of sapphires flashing from the central sky, 
 As if twelve princes sat before a king.684
The language and form of this canto can be read as wholly enacting the unity of the 
visible and the invisible that it is describing. The strength of the assonance of 'the 
rock cannot be broken' in binding the separate words into each other, aurally 
establish a sense of the fullness of this rock of summer, the ripeness of a natural and 
creative fulfilment as Gadamer had described. Its status as 'truth' demonstrates 
Stevens’ belief in its worthiness as a reality that can replace religious 'truth'. This 
much is obvious from the open terms of the poem and the ground that establishes 
this unity is not realized as mere alliteration. Rather, the oneness is performed by the 
act of opening a poetry that is conscious of establishing itself as connected to the 
ontological. The fullness of this physical ‘rock’ is expressed because it includes the 
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invisible, its 'other immeasurable half' that is 'such rock as placid air becomes'. The 
invisible half of the ‘rock’ is becoming 'the visible rock' in Stevens' poesis of the 'is', 
an underlying 'is' evoking a sense of 'Things certain sustaining us in certainty'. This 
would sound like religious language in its talk of a merciful sustainer, but it is 
merely religious language applied to the visible and the invisible at hand, in an effort 
to transvalue the religious as a facet of the imagination. 
The word 'repose' that Stevens repeats is key for the 'supreme fiction', as it 
can mean to 'pose again', to move, or 'repose' in the sense of staying still, or resting. 
It is the paradoxical static movement of the 'it must' of being. 'Truth' in Stevens' 
terms is the visible containing the invisible, as a totality. The lens of art is depicted 
as being able to bring us into that view, that perspective, by an enframing of both 
imagined and real things. Art in this sense is not passive; it is an action, the ‘play’ of 
which is re-awoken for a fresh opening of being every time it encounters its audience 
that completes it. Just as it is an 'end', just as it is a 'limit', just as it is 'last', so here 
too it is 'the extreme', the limit of reality, the edge of the fullness of summer, of all 
things. Kingsley says of the fullness of Parmenides’ conception of the ‘it is’ that: 
‘That limit, so elusive, is the rock of our existence.’685
Again the language creates the presence/absence dynamic by establishing a 
'mountain' that is partly intangible, 'luminous' and 'flashing', containing the 'fires' 
sounded by the use of 'sapphires' (just as the ‘hay’ in ‘Oley’ was ‘Baked’ at the same 
‘center’).
 
686
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 This 'half-way' is located in the 'central sky' where presence and absence 
meet in the work of art. The imagery takes us back to the ‘underworld’, inside the 
volcano where the fires of the night sky burned as all paradoxes met in absolute 
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‘oneness’. To ‘Trace the gold sun about the whitened sky’ is really to ‘Trace’ the 
‘oneness’ of this central ground.687 It remembers the moment at ‘Key West’ when 
the ‘lights in the fishing boats’ fused with the ‘fiery poles’ of the night sky as it 
‘descended’, according to precisely the same ‘underworld’ ‘logic’.688
 
 This meeting 
of presence and absence in ‘Credences’ is akin to a royal audience for Stevens, with 
twelve princes sitting before a king, perhaps an image of the twelve Apostles judging 
the twelve tribes of Israel in the presence of God. The effort of Stevens' language 
appears to be engaged with grounding the physical and the metaphysical in the 
oneness of a poesis. Such a reduction includes religious images, from which new 
universal and totalized ground Stevens can construct new fictions infinitely, on the 
basis of that re-composition through art. 
 In the poems that comprise The Rock (1954) and the late poems, Stevens puts 
the ‘rock’ of the physical and the metaphysical to work. Its objective would appear 
to have been to replace the Biblical sense of 'The Rock' as ‘The Word’ through 
whom all things were created, and continue the programme set out in 'A High-Toned 
Old Christian Woman'. In this sense 'The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain' 
can be read as an example of the 'supreme fiction' fully realised. As a remembrance 
of ‘Credences’, ‘The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain’ is a poem written out 
of earlier poetry, and in Stevens’ sense, it is wholly comprised of the ‘rock’, which 
together constitutes Stevens’ replacement for religion, the ‘supreme fiction’: 
There it was, word for word, 
The poem that took the place of a mountain. 
 
He breathed its oxygen, 
Even when the book lay turned in the dust of his table. 
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It reminded him how he had needed 
A place to go to in his own direction, 
 
How he had recomposed the pines, 
Shifted the rocks and picked his way among clouds, 
 
For the outlook that would be right, 
Where he would be complete in an unexplained completion: 
 
The exact rock where his inexactness 
Would discover, at last, the view toward which they had 
  edged, 
 
Where he could lie and, gazing down at the sea, 
Recognize his unique and solitary home.689
‘Word for word’ implies a substitution of God with the poesis of the ‘rock’. ‘The 
Word’ is a title of Christ, and Stevens is certainly aware of a departure from religion 
to a move in ‘his own direction’, perhaps towards the Heraclitean ‘Word’ or Logos 
of fundamental ‘flux’.
 
 
690
 The creation of poetry out of poetry in the form of the ‘rock’, could be seen 
to explain the Xenophanian textual play on ‘oxygen’, the mere mention of which 
switches Stevens’ into the mode of transvaluing traditional religious belief with his 
own poetry bound to ontology. The ‘ox’ can be read as the compounding of the 
oneness of nature, including the projected Xenophanean looking deity. We will 
recall that Xenephones had referred to oxen painting their ‘deities’ in their own 
 It is an artistry, a re-composition (in Gadamer’s sense of 
‘play’) that is purportedly ‘curing’, recalibrating the ground of ‘truth’ in the 
‘immanence’ in which the poet is completely consumed. For Stevens, this is ‘exact’ 
‘completion’ that cures his ‘inexactness’. It is where he could ‘lie’, which could 
imply comfortably resting in a fiction, on the supposition that all appearing is fiction. 
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image and also that Costello had said the poem was reminiscent of Cézanne. Echoing 
Xenophanes, Stevens had said in an early draft of ‘Owl’s Clover’ that ‘It was a 
mistake to paint the gods.’691
Of the ground, a cure beyond forgetfulness.
 Even when the poem, ‘Credences of Summer’, 
recorded in a book (Transport to Summer) is turned in the dust of his table, the 
memory of the experience lives on, providing inspiration for this poem as its renewal 
– the universalizing, reductive sway of this ‘supreme fiction’. ‘The Poem that Took 
the Place of a Mountain’ seems to be a complete example of the ‘supreme fiction’ 
because it creates and renews a poetry out of poetry as the ‘rock’, a model signalled 
with the intoning of what strongly resembles the Xenophanean ‘ox’. 
 The poem called ‘The Rock’ is of course another survey of Stevens’ ‘rock’, 
with which I would argue he is proposing to replace Christ The Rock. It appears to 
be another example of the ‘supreme fiction’ because it is actively written out from 
the ground of the ‘rock’ of the physical and the metaphysical, forged in the earlier 
poem, ‘Credences’. In the second poem, Stevens returns to the theme of 
transplanting religion with his sense of the ‘rock’: 
                       The Poem as Icon 
 
It is not enough to cover the rock with leaves. 
We must be cured of it by a cure of the ground 
Or a cure of ourselves, that is equal to a cure 
  
692
‘A cure beyond forgetfulness’ only comes for Stevens when poetry is a ‘planet on 
the table’, of which we are ‘part’.
 
 
693
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 The title suggests that the poem is an ‘icon’, 
with the word icon carrying the sense of an image as well as the sense of a religious 
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icon that literally grows out of nature in Xenophanes’ sense. The suggestion appears 
to be that a poetic image and a religious image are both products of the imagination. 
It is not enough to cover the ‘rock’ with a fiction derived from nature in the form of 
leaves, not enough to make ‘rubbings of reality’ as Stevens had suggested Carlos 
Williams was prone to doing.694
 Is equally converted into palms
 Such a relation to the ‘rock’ does not go deep 
enough for Stevens. A deeper transvaluation at the ontological level is required. 
The leaves that are at once the poetic and the religious imagination recall the 
palms from ‘A High-Toned Old Christian Woman’: 
Thus, our bawdiness,  
Unpurged by epitaph, indulged at last, 
695
The ‘unpurged’ ‘bawdiness’ of the poem becomes a palm which is suggested to be 
equal to the religious image of the palm, which itself needs to be purged. Stevens 
continues by implying that we need to be cured of religious fictions by a cure of the 
ground or ourselves. The cure of ourselves is proposed as ‘equal’ to the cure of the 
ground, which is suggestive of humanity being ‘equal’ to the ‘ground’ in a reductive 
sense. The word ‘ground’ carries a sense of archê or ‘first beginning’ as well. For 
Stevens, in a way that mirrors Gadamer’s sense of ‘play’, it would seem that poetry 
is the means of opening this cure, this connecting of mind and world in the ‘candor’ 
of the poem. In his Adagia Stevens had said that: ‘Poetry is a cure of the mind.’
 
 
696
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The ‘play’ of poetry recalibrates our being for Gadamer as a post-Kantian. 
 Stevens continues with: 
And yet the leaves, if they broke into bud, 
If they broke into bloom, if they bore fruit, 
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And if we ate the incipient colorings 
Of their fresh culls might be a cure of the ground.697
This would seem to advocate the production of new fictions out of existing fictions, 
be they religious, romantic or poetic. I would argue that ‘Notes’ was the budding of 
Stevens’ earlier poetry in an effort to displace the ground of what looked like the 
Xenophanean religious imagination. This is itself a form reminiscent of religion if 
one recalls the budding of Aaron’s rod, the budding of a dead stick that yielded ripe 
almonds.
 
 
698
For Stevens, it would seem, remaking a poem out of an existing poem may 
‘be a cure of the ground’, may cure us of the religious imagination, or any imagined 
thing we allow to be ‘The the’, by letting humanity create its own fictitious ‘ground’ 
from which to build new fictions. It won’t imagine gods out of the physical ‘leaves’ 
(nature), but instead will make new fictions out of the ‘oneness’ of the physical and 
the metaphysical combined in mere being. Its palette for painting these new fictions 
includes the earth, the man and the imagination as one palette of a totalized 
‘immanence’ from which to paint, its possibilities being ‘a thousand things’.
 The inference appears to be that if we eat of these poems made anew, 
constructed in new colours, freshly picked, they might cure the ground of our being 
from what Stevens sees as strictures. Stevens appears to be blending the artistic sense 
of picking and selecting new colours (‘fresh culls’) for a work of art, with the idea of 
eating of forbidden fruit. The word ‘culls’ evokes the Biblical record of the ‘tree of 
the knowledge of good and evil’ where God warns mankind not to eat of its fruit, 
because in the day that they do, they will surely die. 
699
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 I 
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would argue that the poem itself, with its arising out of the ‘rock’ of ‘Credences’ is 
another example of the ‘supreme fiction’ fully realized. 
According to Kingsley, Parmenides was called a physikos, which is the origin 
of the word ‘physicist’.700 Kingsley argues that when applied to Parmenides the term 
physikos means both: “someone who’s interested in the beginnings and the nature of 
the universe. But it’s also the origin of the English ‘physician’: it could be a way of 
referring to doctors or healers, as well.”701 Parmenides’ mode of ‘healing’ was 
bringing the ‘knowledge’ of being back to the world in a poetry of connection. 
Empedocles, that other poetic philosopher of the ‘one’ who legend reported had 
returned from the fiery volcano, had written: ‘Friends, that inhabit the great town 
looking down on the yellow rock of Akragas…I go about among you an immortal 
god’.702 Further, he had decreed that they ‘beg to hear from me the word of 
healing.’703 Bloom notes that Hillis Miller believes that Stevens’ sense of ‘cure’ was 
as ‘a caring for the ground, a securing of it, making it solid, as one cures a fiberglass 
hull by drying it carefully.’704 This provides an interesting image of Stevens 
meticulously drying out ‘damp’ romanticism with its anthropomorphic presentation 
of a litany of deities. Bloom says that: ‘A cure of the rock is a cure of one’s own 
reductiveness and, with it, freedom to have a larger idea of what it is to be wholly 
human.’705
I would consider the concept of ‘cure’ as forming a strong parallel with 
Empedocles, as the model of philosopher, poet, healer and ‘saviour’, returning from 
the purgatory fires of the ‘underworld’ having internalized the knowledge that all 
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things are conceptually ‘one’. When Stevens first unveiled his complete ‘rock’ in 
‘Credences’, his vision was to ‘see it with the hottest fire of sight’ and to ‘Burn 
everything not part of it to ash’, perhaps remembering the Empedoclean notion of 
‘cure’, by which he seems to mean a fiery ‘cure’ of fantasia of every description that 
is not seen to be grounded in complete ‘reality’, located at the ‘centre’.706 When 
Stevens first climbed his ‘rock’, he describes it as situated in a ‘world unpurged’, 
presumably of religious concepts.707
 By the time Stevens wrote the very late poem, 'Of Mere Being', the physical 
and the metaphysical as the ‘rock’ had long since become the archê, which for 
Stevens, consumed religion. We suggested earlier that the phoenix in the palm could 
be read as representing the metaphysical, and the leaves of the palm tree that 
resembled the dangling feathers, represented the physical. This seems to be the 
composition of the ‘rock’ for Stevens, and I would argue that the poem is another 
example of the 'supreme fiction' fully realized. The ‘rock’ as the physical and the 
metaphysical is envisioned as a phoenix in a palm tree here. Palms live for many 
years, grow very tall and are evergreen. Stevens can be read as using the ‘palm’ 
because it is a symbol of perpetual return (as is the ‘phoenix’) that is connected to 
religious imagery, much like his use of the word ‘rock’. Both are the physical and 
the metaphysical reduced to the oneness of a poesis. Arguably this palm tree has a 
textual link to Harmonium and the palms referenced in 'A High-Toned Old Christian 
Woman', which are like the ‘cloudy palm/ Remote on heaven’s hill’, from ‘Sunday 
 The Empedoclean allusions may be being 
filtered through the common local practice of ‘fire-curing’ tobacco used in 
Connecticut. 
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Morning’.708
 Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame.  
 Take the moral law and make a nave of it  
 And from the nave build haunted heaven. Thus,  
 The conscience is converted into palms,  
 Like windy citherns hankering for hymns.  
 We agree in principle. That's clear. But take  
 The opposing law and make a peristyle,  
 And from the peristyle project a masque  
 Beyond the planets. Thus, our bawdiness,  
 Unpurged by epitaph, indulged at last,  
 Is equally converted into palms,  
 Squiggling like saxophones. And palm for palm,  
 Madame, we are where we began.
 I would argue that 'Of Mere Being' is a 'supreme fiction' because it 
seems to be written out of 'A High-Toned Old Christian Woman', and also because it 
realizes Stevens’ ‘rock’: 
709
A comparison of the two poems would allow us to suggest that 'The 
conscience is converted into palms' becomes, 'The palm at the end of the mind,/ 
Beyond the last thought'.
 
  
710 'Beyond' denotes the ontological proximity for Stevens 
and we will recall that for the Greeks, the ‘underworld’ was where being and death 
meet in oneness, hence it is 'Beyond the last thought' and realized in 'bronze decor', 
which is a textual signifier of the mythical ‘underworld’.711 In this context, the 
'windy citherns' could have become 'The wind moves slowly in the branches'.712 
'Beyond the planets' has become 'The palm stands on the edge of space'713; 
'hankering for hymns' has become 'a foreign song' of complete being, 'without human 
meaning,/ Without human feeling'.714
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 From this Stevens says that: 'You know then 
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that it is not the reason/ That makes us happy or unhappy'.715 Here he appears to be 
intimating that 'happiness' is not derived from the proscriptive meaning of the order 
of religion, the poetry of the ‘rock’ can stand as a comparable order for Stevens. 'The 
bird's fire-fangled feathers dangle down', perhaps because the ‘underworld’ of 
Tartarus, ‘where’ being and death purportedly meet and ‘where’ Stevens hopes being 
is greater than death, is ‘where’ he believes he is conceptually ‘going’, not to 
'haunted heaven'.716
This word used to mean a great deal to ancient Greeks. For them, a palm was not just 
the hollow of a hand. It also meant the unshakable power that gets and keeps the 
upper hand even in the most difficult situations, the steadiness that calmly manages 
to master instead of being mastered. And at the same time it was the part of the body 
used by artists or craftsmen to manipulate, shape, perfect; was what allowed them to 
transform their raw material into a work of art by making the subtlest of adjustments 
from moment to moment….in the Greek language of Empedocles’ time, “palm” 
happened to be the standard word for an ingenious device; a trick; a cunning 
scheme.
 Stevens has supplanted the religious ‘palm’ from ‘A High-
Toned Old Christian Woman’ and replaced it with the secular, philosophical ‘palm’ 
of the physical and the metaphysical, with the meta-poetry of the ‘rock’: 'And palm 
for palm,/ Madame, we are where we began.’ 
Kingsley says of Empedocles’ use of the word ‘palm’ that: 
717
Can we see how ‘palm for palm,/ Madame’, Stevens could appear to be back ‘where 
we began’ in ‘Of Mere Being’, by transvaluing the Christian use of the ‘palm’ (tree) 
for the pre-Socratic ‘palm’ (trick), with all that the pre-Socratic philosophical poetry 
implies?
 
 
718
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 It is clear now why 'The palms were hot/ As if I lived in ashen ground' 
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when Stevens reshaped his art in ‘Farewell to Florida’, having emerged from the 
‘central sky’ at the heart of the volcano (‘ashen ground’).719
Indeed this is certainly not the first time that Stevens had utilized such a 
technique. In ‘This Solitude of Cataracts’ Stevens had attempted to substitute ‘the 
oscillations of planetary pass-pass’ for the ‘fixed’ state of mere being. Eleanor Cook 
suggests that Stevens’ use of ‘pass-pass’ is a play on the French passe-passe 
(‘sleight-of-hand’).
 
720 Stevens’ ‘palm’ is a form of the ‘rock’ in the sense of the 
physical and the metaphysical considered as a unified whole. Here he has ‘palmed’ 
the Christian sense and replaced it with his ‘philosophical’ sense ‘by making the 
subtlest of adjustments’.721 It is his own ‘Oxidia’ of the here and now toward which 
his ‘inexactnesses’ had ‘edged’, as the satisfaction of belief.722
In this exchange between earlier and later poetry Stevens demonstrates why 
his poetry has proved so inviting to New Critical readings, and yet also how his 
sense of being attempts to be inclusive beyond the reach of metaphor or the text. 
Once he has universalized all things as constituting ‘poetry’ in a sense reminiscent of 
Gadamer’s universal hermeneutics, it is not just the texts of old and new poems that 
 The Harmonium 
poem uses the word ‘converted’ twice, perhaps implying that religion has been 
converted to poetry. This would further suggest that Stevens prefers to convert to his 
own sense of a living ‘reality’, which is ‘unpurged’ by religion. Finally, the 
‘hullabaloo’ of his poem (much like the ‘hoobla-hoobla-hoobla-how’ from poem III 
of ‘It Must Be Abstract’) has refreshed complete reality in the unity of the ‘first 
idea’, thus purging (or curing) religious fantasia by accessing the ‘centre’. 
                                                          
719 Wallace Stevens, ‘Farewell to Florida’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 97. 
720 Eleanor Cook, A Reader’s Guide to Wallace Stevens, p. 245. 
721 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Poem That Took the Place of a Mountain’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 
435. 
722 Ibid., p. 435. 
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are forged together, but all things as appearances. Stevens’ modernism is revealed in 
that he then creates new fictions out of this one ‘rock’, forced on by the ‘it must’, by 
the ever changing seasons. Collapsing poems together is one example of the 
universal oneness induced by the conceptual ‘rock’. 
Any sense of ‘going’ to ‘the edge of space’ in this death poem (‘Of Mere 
Being’) is of course no ‘going’. It is the ‘transport’ of the ‘rock’ that the ‘limits’, ‘the 
end’ and the ‘last’ creates. It is the ecstatic experience of the ‘rock’ that was unveiled 
in ‘Credences’. Such movement that is no movement is considered by Nancy in 
context of Parmenides as follows: 
Written beneath the title of the last movement of Beethoven’s Quartet, op. 135 – “the 
decision made with difficulty” – he added this well known note: “Muss es sein? Es 
muss sein.” (This could be interpreted in the following way: “Must it (be)? It must 
(be)? [“Le faut-il (être)? Il le faut (être)”]). If Being simply were, nothing would ever 
happen, and there would not be any thinking. In addition, the “it must” is not the 
expression of a simple, immanent necessity (of a nature or destiny). Necessity itself 
can only be the decided response of thinking to the suspense of Being wherein it is 
surprised: Muss es sein?723
The question arises, if the ‘supreme fiction’ holds open the way of the 
imagination to the ‘reality’ of being, then how ‘real’ or ‘true’ is the Parmenidean (or 
any other conceptual) account of being? What is the ground of being when it is 
treated as a philosophical concept derived from Parmenides? We will begin to 
 
 
If ‘The Snow Man’ equates to ‘nothing had happened because nothing had changed’, 
then Stevens’ ‘supreme fiction’ equates to the ‘it must’ as a poesis that ‘surprises’ 
being by putting the ground of complete being into question, ‘must it be?’ Standing 
in the ground of an imagined totality of the physical and the metaphysical, Stevens’ 
‘supreme fiction’ attempts to conceptually free itself from ‘The the’ of religious 
tradition, and allow the imagination infinite scope in a realization of modernism. 
                                                          
723 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, p. 176. 
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address this theme in the next chapter, for now I would conclude that the poems of 
the ‘supreme fiction’ fully realized are not seeking a form of expression for 
themselves, and they do not view themselves as individual poems. The ‘supreme 
fiction’ is the perpetual realization of its own manifesto, expressing itself as one 
thing, collapsing all poems to pure poetry, or in Gadamer’s terms, a universal 
hermeneutics. Gadamer questions: ‘How can a whole be formed out of 
configurations of sound and fragments of meaning? This question leads to the 
hermetic character of “pure poetry”.’724
 In Stevens’ hands as modern poet, ‘faith’, ‘truth’ and ‘belief’ are constant 
inconstancies, ‘squiggling like saxophones’, as flux and art are welded together in 
the ever freshened ‘play’ of a new poesis, indistinguishable from the seasons. For the 
post-Nietzschean philosopher or poet, the pre-Socratics, embodied perhaps in 
Santayana’s sense of ‘old Xenophanes’, provided a general critique of the religious 
imagination, though it is notable that the ‘supreme fiction’ is happy to swallow the 
old religious forms whole and even to inhabit their costumes. This in itself recalls the 
accusation levelled at Stephen Dedalus – ‘your mind is supersaturated with the 
religion in which you say you disbelieve.’
 
725
                                                          
724 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays, p. 135. 
725 James Joyce, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, p. 261. 
 Further, the pre-Socratics allowed for 
the critique of the claim of the religious imagination to be the true archê (first 
beginning) and offered an apparently philosophical archê as an alternative, often 
expressed through poetry. The ‘supreme fiction’ seeks to establish an archê of 
precisely this kind and to ‘grow’ there in infinitely changing forms as the totalizing 
expression of itself. Thus it universalizes to the point where individual poems are 
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collapsed into the ground of its own nature. ‘It is’, ‘it must’. It is a constructed 
framework that allows the term modernism to appear to sustain itself. 
In failing to identify the ontological connection, Lentricchia perhaps seems 
hasty in suggesting that the substitution of religion with poetry is merely a ‘banality’ 
in literary modernism, just as Bloom limits his critical ground by closing his analysis 
to the ontological in Stevens. In the next chapter we will address the violent 
implications of Stevens’ ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to ontological terms. From there 
the final chapter will analyze this ‘violence’ in context of the mythological origin of 
the pre-Socratic conception of being as a ‘oneness’. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 In the first chapter we saw how a post-Kantian conception of poetry as an 
opening of the ‘truth’ of being, has strong lines of connection with pre-Socratic 
poetic philosophy. Such a connection in being was seen as useful for experiencing 
the ‘thing-in-itself’. It was the act of opening a poesis that reduced all things to the 
single ‘truth’ of being, a ‘candor’, from which they could be infinitely recreated. 
Such a reduction to the ‘truth’ of the opening of being was seen as a suitable 
replacement for the religious imagination, which was itself considered to be another 
form of poetry. The poetic structures of ‘major man’ and the ‘supreme fiction’ 
attempted to surpass this model of reflecting what is close at hand into heaven, by re-
grounding imaginative projections in the immanent imagination. This amounted to 
the creation of a ‘meta-poetry’ that could hold open the doors ‘onto the present’ for 
the perennial poesis, and thus the perennial opening of being, a continual collapse of 
meaning in favour of a totalizing re-creation, ad infinitum. 
The Violence of a Reduction of Metaphysics in Wallace Stevens’ 
Poetry 
In the introduction we followed Derrida and Levinas in defining a ‘reduction 
of metaphysics’ to mean a reduction to being, in a way that conceptually destroys the 
pre-given state of the existent 'Other'.726 As we have noted, the subject of being as a 
branch of metaphysics is more properly called ‘ontology’.727
                                                          
726 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 81. 
727 Simon Blackburn, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996), p. 269. 
 If we are to definitively 
analyse Stevens’ poetry as an ontological poetry, then we need to test certain 
‘symptoms’ that will disclose it as ontological in primacy. To do this I propose to 
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turn to Derrida’s critical essay on the work of Emmanuel Levinas, ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics’, collected in Writing and Difference (1978). From this vantage the 
intention is to bring to bear an understanding of the symptoms of what Derrida, in an 
essay concerned with Levinas, refers to as ‘ontological violence’.728
 As we progress I will address some of the particular symptoms that Derrida 
and Levinas highlight in critiquing ontology. In the context of ‘Violence and 
Metaphysics’, these ‘symptoms’ deal specifically with Levinas’s critique of what 
Derrida allows himself to call the ‘ontology’ of Martin Heidegger.
 From here it 
will also be possible to keep Levinas’s essay on exteriority, Totality and Infinity 
(1969) in view, to further test the fundamental grounding of Stevens’ poetics. 
729 This is 
immaterial for the purposes of this exercise when we consider that Parmenides 
conceived of what would come to be termed ‘ontology’, and that one of the primary 
aims for Heidegger was to resurrect the fullness of the Parmenidean conception of 
being, believing that the question of the meaning of being was covered over from 
Plato.730 Indeed, Derrida mentions that Levinas’ departure toward a pluralism 
constitutes a ‘break with Parmenides’.731
The analysis will not follow a strict chronological order on the basis that it 
will follow a thematic structure that will identify themes from poems most pertinent 
to the subject in question. As I continue to increasingly read Stevens’ poetry as 
having affinity with the Parmenidean mode of poetic opening, I will also be 
questioning the validity of a post-Kantian tradition of philosophy and poetry that 
equates poetic opening to ‘truth’. This will particularly focus on Heidegger and 
 
                                                          
728 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 134. 
729 Ibid., p. 81. 
730 Ibid., p. 81. 
731 Ibid., pp. 89 & 108. 
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Gadamer where Parmenides may be considered a source of philosophical influence 
as a poetic ontologist. This analysis will move away from reading through the 
structure and form of Stevens’ poetry, and attempt to open up the poems by 
excavating the roots of the thought that we have shown to animate them. 
 
The Reduction of the ‘Other’ to Being 
How is the conception of ‘someone’ treated in Stevens’ most reductive 
poetry? How can the ‘Other’ step forth under the annihilating sway? Stevens had 
written: ‘Suppose the poet discovered and had the power thereafter at will and by 
intelligence to reconstruct us by his transformations. He would also have the power 
to destroy us. If there was, or if we believed that there was, a center, it would be 
absurd to fear or to avoid its discovery.’732
“To affirm the priority of Being over the existent is to decide the essence of 
philosophy; it is to subordinate the relation with someone, who is an existent, (the 
ethical relation) to a relation with the Being of the existent, which, impersonal, 
permits the apprehension, the domination of the existent (a relationship of knowing), 
subordinates justice to freedom”. This ontology would be valid for every existent, 
“except for the Other.”
 From Derrida’s reference to Levinas’ 
Totality and Infinity we read: 
733
 Is equal to the right to be.
 
 
For Stevens in the late poem, ‘Presence of an External Master of Knowledge’, the 
‘relationship of knowing’ is composite with the truth of being: 
  knowing 
 And being are one - the right to know 
734
                                                          
732 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, p. 670. 
733 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 135. 
734 Wallace Stevens, ‘Presence of an External Master of Knowledge’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 
468. 
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For Adorno: 
The toil and trouble of the metaphysics of Antiquity – from Parmenides, who has to 
split thinking and Being so that he might identify them, down to Aristotle – consisted 
in forcing the division. Demythologization is division; the myth is the deceptive 
unity of the undivided.735
Parmenides had said that: ‘For what exists for thinking, and being, are one and the 
same’, maintaining their unity through a poesis.
 
 
736
In ‘Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz’, the solipsistic ‘Hoon’ is reflected upon as 
one ‘Who found all form and order in solitude,/ For whom the shapes were never the 
figures of men.’
 In Stevens, the ‘Other’ is reduced 
precisely because being is allowed to dominate the liberty of thinking, in the moment 
of a new poesis. 
737
if the Parmenidean tradition – we know now what this means for Levinas – 
disregards the irreducible solitude of the “existent,” by the same token it disregards 
the relationship to the other. It does not think solitude, it does not appear to itself to 
be solitude, because it is the solitude of totality and opacity.
 However, when Stevens did eventually turn his mind toward 
other people, he tended to ‘relate’ to them through a reduction in being that utterly 
negated the existent. For example, ‘Sailing After Lunch’ raises the epithet ‘To 
expunge all people and be a pupil’, which itself can be read as a reminiscence of a 
reduction to ‘the mind of winter’: 
738
                                                          
735 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 118. 
736 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 70. 
737 Wallace Stevens, ‘Sad Strains of a Gay Waltz’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 100. 
738 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 91. 
 
 
It is ‘the solitude of totality and opacity’ that is the cosmic mind of ‘major man’, of 
Stevens as a poet of the opening of ontological primacy. 
Derrida, reflecting upon Levinas’s “except for the Other”, infers the 
following from the violence of a reduction to being: 
218 
 
Levinas’s phrase overwhelms “ontology”: not only would the thought of the Being 
of the existent have the impoverished logic of the truism, but it escapes this poverty 
only in order to seize and to murder the Other. It is a laughably self-evident but 
criminal truism, which places ethics under the heel of ontology.739
From ‘Blue Guitar’, Stevens wanted to ‘reduce the monster to/ Myself’ in a sense 
which I suggested echoed Xenophanes’ poetic collapse of deities into a spherical, 
amorphous ‘self’.
 
 
740 No existent people, no ‘Other’ can stand in this reduction to 
oneness of ‘the two together as one’, not even Stevens himself who reflects741: ‘Or 
better not of myself at all’, a disappearance of self which was evident in ‘Waving 
Adieu, Adieu, Adieu’.742
 Without human feeling, a foreign song.
 We can know that being is recognized as ‘otherness’ that 
evaporates the ‘Other’ for Stevens, because that is how he himself describes being in 
the late poem, ‘Of Mere Being’: 
  without human meaning, 
743
Considering Stevens and Heidegger jointly allows us to explore two key, interrelated 
aspects of what I am calling here the foreignness of poetry. First, the notion that the 
sense of ‘mere being’ remains not only without human meaning but without meaning 
as such. Within this perspective, the task of poetry for both Stevens and Heidegger is 
to open language to this foreign, non-human sense of being. What this endeavour 
involves...is a radical critique and, in fact, a transformation of the notion of ‘man’.
 
In an essay on Heidegger and Stevens, Ziarek relates that: 
744
For Levinas and Derrida such thought stands in the ‘Parmenidean tradition’ and 
‘transformation’ is a form of ‘ontological violence’.
 
 
745
                                                          
739 Ibid., p. 135. 
740 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
741 Ibid., p. 143. 
742 Ibid., p. 143. 
743 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Mere Being’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 476. 
744 Krzystof Ziarek, ‘Stevens, Heidegger and the Foreignness of Poetry’, Wallace Stevens Across the 
Atlantic, p. 80. 
745 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 91. 
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In ‘Credences of Summer’ ‘the metaphysical pine’ and ‘The physical pine’ 
were allowed to be ‘one’ and that oneness was presented as the totality of the ‘rock’ 
of being. Such a reduction was achieved through the opening of a work of art and the 
poetic act of forging the physical and the metaphysical together produces a language 
of violence against the ‘Other’. Joseph Adamson in his Wounded Fiction – Modern 
Poetry and Deconstruction (1988) provides an indication of this: 
A series of violent imperatives govern the syntax of canto II: “postpone,” “Let’s 
see,” “Burn,” “Burn,” “Trace,” “Look,” “And say,” “Fix,” “And fill,” “Exile”….The 
command to “see the very thing and nothing else” sets off a crescendo of violent 
images intensifying those of branding and incision…So as to declare at last without 
qualification: “this is the centre that I seek.”746
The price that is paid for ‘the centre that I seek’ is that of the rational ‘Other’. The 
centre that was located is where the axis of ‘the physical’ and ‘the metaphysical’ 
meet as one in being as a new poesis opens up.
 
 
747 We have just noted that Stevens 
had said that: ‘If there was, or if we believed that there was, a center, it would be 
absurd to fear or to avoid its discovery.’748 Further that the poet: ‘would also have 
the power to destroy us.’749 Prior to realising that ‘discovery’, Stevens had declared 
‘all fools slaughtered’, which allowed him to break into that centre.750 Bloom 
suggests that this reference to ‘all fools slaughtered’ would include Stevens’ earlier 
self ‘as it had been on All Fools’ Day, at the start of April’s green.’751
                                                          
746 Joseph Adamson, Wounded Fiction – Modern Poetry and Deconstruction (New York & London: 
Garland Publishing Inc., 1988), p. 133. 
747 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 322. 
748 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, p. 670. 
749 Ibid., p. 670. 
750 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 322. 
751 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 245 
 Spring is dead. 
Summer now ‘is’ and it is the overpowering ‘it is’ of summer that Stevens has 
violently captured and will desperately try to retain. The ‘Other’ is intentionally 
220 
 
destroyed in Stevens in an effort to achieve an ontological primacy. From this 
primacy, the poet feels he is able to begin painting a renewed sense of ‘human’ out 
of the ‘rock’ of which he feels we are part. 
 Stevens was very well aware of what it meant to reduce to ‘the very thing and 
nothing else’, aware also of what it would do to the human being.752
 The human that has no cousin in the moon.
 In ‘Less and 
Less Human, O Savage Spirit’, collected in Transport, he writes: 
 It is the human that is the alien, 
753
Precisely for this reason it is the rational human that Stevens’ verse seeks to 
annihilate, by enlarging the meaning of ‘human’ to include a reduction of all things 
to a oneness that would incorporate the moon. It is in this sense that speaking of the 
moon is to ‘speak humanly from the height or from the depth/ Of human things’, 
because humanity has been enlarged through the unifying sway of being.
 
 
754
We therefore are also radically opposed to Heidegger who subordinates the relation 
with the Other to ontology….rather than seeing in justice and injustice a primordial 
access to the Other beyond all ontology.
 Levinas 
strongly objects to such a conception: 
755
For Gadamer’s Truth and Method and Gianni Vattimo’s work entitled Art’s 
Claim to Truth (2008), the truth-telling function of the work of art relies on the 
Heideggerian (and I would also argue the pre-Socratic) sense of being amounting to 
‘truth’. Stevens does not stand in the tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer, except to 
the extent that he had read and valued pre-Socratic philosophy. He may, therefore, 
fall into Vattimo’s conception that ‘the need for an ontological foundation of art 
 
 
                                                          
752 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 322. 
753 Wallace Stevens, ‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 288. 
754 Wallace Stevens, ‘Chocorua to its Neighbor’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 267. 
755 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 89. 
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grew up not only in philosophy but also in the concrete experiences of the artists.’756 
Such ‘truth’, according to Levinas and Derrida only produces a violent reduction of 
the human. In Stevens such violence manifests itself through the painting of the 
renewed possibilities of humanity out of all things, in the model of ‘major man’. For 
Vattimo, like Stevens, desire for this appears to be driven by a sense that the 
‘ontological foundation of art’ ‘transcends consciousness and the human being, 
whose possibility it authentically grounds.’757
The Logos of No One and the Language of Nothing 
 As we proceed, a contemporary, ‘post-
modern’ philosopher like Vattimo, as an authority on Heidegger, Gadamer and 
Nietzsche, will prove useful for illuminating the implications of the pre-Socratic 
elements of their thought, particularly as it pertains to art. 
 
 A further ‘symptom’ of ontology and its violence against the existent, that 
Levinas in particular draws attention to, is that of the annihilation of language, 
speech and of the name: 
To recognize the Other is therefore to come to him across the world of possessed 
things, but at the same time to establish, by gift, community and universality. 
Language is universal because it is the very passage from the individual to the 
general, because it offers things that are mine to the Other. To speak is to make the 
world common, to create commonplaces. Language does not refer to the generality 
of concepts, but lays the foundations for a possession in common.758
In contrast to the above, Heidegger had maintained – ‘“But if man must one day 
arrive in the neighbourhood of Being, he must first learn to exist in that which has no 
name”.’
 
 
759
                                                          
756 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, ed. by Santiago Zabala, trans. by Luca D’Isanto (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 94. 
757 Ibid., p. 94. 
758 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 76. 
759 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 137. 
 But Stevens is a ‘poet’, surely it is his very vocation to ‘give’ language to 
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the ‘Other’? In his Moody Lecture entitled ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, given at the 
University of Chicago in 1951, Stevens maintained that human beings are not ‘part’, 
but are of ‘a whole’ for which 'we have as yet no language'.760 Such concepts accord 
with Parmenides who also said that the 'it is' has no name.761 Kingsley notes that 'it 
had no name for the very simple reason that it had not yet been named.'762
In ‘The Creations of Sound’, collected in Transport, Stevens had promoted 
silence above the language of the intellect. For Stevens this became a reason for 
triumphing over T.S. Eliot by judging that: ‘He lacks this venerable complication.’
 Stevens’ 
efforts to pronounce that name come after the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ as the poet 
is ‘flicked by feeling’. 
763 
‘Tell X that speech is not dirty silence/ Clarified. It is silence made still dirtier.’764 
To Stevens, a ‘human’ contribution to the silence of mere being makes it ‘dirty’, that 
is, it covers over the ‘first idea’ with rational ‘varnish and dirt’.765
                                                          
760 Wallace Stevens, ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 856. 
761 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 176. 
762 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 196. 
763 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Creations of Sound’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 275. 
764 Ibid., p. 275. 
765 A Letter to Henry Church, October 28th, 1942. Letters of Wallace Stevens, pp. 426 - 427. 
 Stevens’ 
Language does not constitute the giving of ‘things that are mine to the Other’, 
because this act is precisely what sullies the purity of poetry in Stevens’ view. 
Rather, Stevens’ language is often produced by listening to the unveiling of the 
‘song’ of the ‘whole’, in which the ‘Other’ is already utterly reduced. 
 For Levinas who is pulling away from this fully Parmenidean reduction, 
language is a means of giving community and universality, not enforcing the 
totalizing oneness of the silence of being: 
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The world in discourse is no longer what it is in separation, in the being at home 
with oneself where everything is given to me; it is what I give: the communicable, 
the thought, the universal.766
 Better without an author, without a poet
 
 
If the clean silence that Stevens yearns for is merely ‘everything is given to me’, then 
what does this do to the ‘Other’? 
 X is an obstruction, a man 
 Too exactly himself, and that there are words 
767
Thus the silent world would be an-archic. Knowing could not commence in it. But 
already as an-archic, at the limit of non-sense, its presence to consciousness lies in its 
expectation for a world that does not come.
 
 
Not unsurprisingly, X, the man, the poet, Eliot, is viewed as an obstruction: 
768
 ‘Description Without Place’ can be read as a natural conclusion of a world reduced 
to being, which is perhaps not surprising when we consider that that specific poem 
was written in context of reading Parmenides.
 
 
769
 In ‘The Latest Freed Man’ Stevens had defined the nature of his renewal of 
alignment through poetry as: ‘To be without a description of to be’.
 It is no surprise to discover that the 
an-archic conclusion of a world without language, where the poet is entertaining the 
thought of being in primacy, should result in the ‘world that does not come’ 
(‘without place’), the total destruction of the plane of the existent in favour of the 
oneness of the plane of the totality of being. 
770
                                                          
766 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 76. 
767 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Creations of Sound’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 274. 
768 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 93. 
769 A Letter to Henry Church, April 4th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 494. 
& A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
770 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Latest Freed Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 187. 
 The shape of 
much of Stevens’ poetry does not come by intellectually writing a poem, it comes 
through what I am calling the opening of being as aletheia, without the mediation of 
the poet’s rational intellect: 
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 It is a shape of life described 
 By another shape without a word.771 
 
Perhaps echoing Mendelssohn's Songs Without Words, Stevens' attempt is
 The vital music formulates the words.
 to locate a 
‘Pure rhetoric of a language without words’, the unifying ‘song’ of being: 
  to pierce the heart’s residuum 
 And there to find music for a single line, 
 Equal to memory, one line in which 
772
It is true, as Altieri has argued, that such abstraction produces Stevens’ ‘lyric force’, 
particularly in what I would describe as the poetry of the ‘rock’.
 
 
773 However, 
perhaps we need to be more cautious in using the ‘Must’ for this abstraction when 
‘abstraction’ is only ever used to conceptually refresh the ‘oneness’ of being in a 
way that Levinas suggests annihilates the ‘Other’.774
Metaphysical Desire 
 
 
 For Levinas, underlying the annihilating impulse of a ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’, is the notion of ‘Desire’. ‘The metaphysical desire does not rest upon 
any prior kinship. It is a desire that can not be satisfied.’775 The father of Western 
metaphysics, Parmenides, was concerned to travel ‘as far as longing can reach’ in his 
search for the ‘it is’.776
                                                          
771 Wallace Stevens, ‘Banjo Boomer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 475. 
772 Wallace Stevens, ‘Extracts From Addresses to the Academy of Fine Ideas’, Collected Poetry and 
Prose, p. 234. 
773 Charles Altieri, The Art of Twentieth-Century American Poetry: Modernism and After (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), p. 137. 
774 Charles Altieri, ‘Why Stevens Must be Abstract’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, p. 
86. 
775 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 34. 
776 Peter Kingsley, In The Dark Places of Wisdom, p. 53. 
 That use of ‘longing’, which in the Greek, thumos, means 
‘the energy of passion, appetite, yearning, longing’, can be read as a close parallel to 
Stevens’ sense of ‘beyond’ ‘the genius of the sea’, or alternatively to his use of the 
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word ‘transport’.777 What is desired is not somewhere at an empirical distance, it is 
the ‘desired’ singing, so close that for Stevens it constitutes what speaks things in the 
way that they are. For the poet this closeness is experienced as an ‘immanence’, 
which is how ‘a scrawny cry from outside’ could equally be ‘a sound in his mind’.778 
This ‘new knowledge of reality’ is really achieved by considering all appearances to 
be connected in the ‘centre’ of being, which allows for the founding of ‘new’ worlds, 
created in the moment of the opening of a work of art.779
the work brings into the foreground “that” there be world inasmuch as, by refusing to 
situate itself in the world as it is, it opens a new world and shows it to us in the 
moment of its disclosure.
 
Vatimo, in a line of thought extending from Heidegger and Gadamer 
suggests that: 
780
 In ‘The Well Dressed Man with a Beard’ Stevens shows us what kind of 
hunger exists in the mind, what kind of Desire consumes thought. The oft quoted, ‘It 
can never be satisfied, the mind, never’, serves to reveal Stevens’ own awareness 
that the mind desires satisfaction.
 
 
Creation is not something that happened long ago for Stevens, it is something that 
happens every time he creates, or every time something happens. If Stevens harbours 
something as extreme as a ‘Desire’ for the fullness of the ontological ‘candor’ of 
poetry, then Levinas’ break with Parmenides speaks against the ontological intent of 
Stevens’ poetic ‘transport’. 
781
                                                          
777 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 27. 
778 Wallace Stevens, ‘Not Ideas About the Thing But The Thing Itself’, Collected Poetry and Prose, 
p. 451. 
779 Ibid., p. 452. 
780 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, p. 69. 
781 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Well Dressed Man with a Beard’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 224. 
 However, the mind cannot be satisfied by an 
intellectual fulfilment for Stevens. It would seem that only an alignment of the mind 
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with a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ satiates Desire for the poet, as two become one. 
Stevens’ ‘modern poetry’ was considered to be: ‘The poem of the mind in the act of 
finding/ What will suffice.’782
In ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, Stevens would write of the poet’s 
power as proceeding ‘to those violences which are the maturity of his desires.’
 ‘What will suffice’ is the unity of being that is reached 
in the opening of a new poesis. For Stevens, this power connects the mind and the 
world, the imagination and reality, the subjective and the objective. 
783
The metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything that can 
simply complete it.
 
Levinas points to the acute nature of the problem: 
784
Stevens seems to have been driven to satiate the Desire for the fullness of ‘real 
reality’ that is ontologically grounded. It was Santayana, in context of ‘the One’ of 
Parmenides’ ‘blank monism’ who had said that it is ‘the mystical spirit which will 
never be satisfied, if fully developed and fearless, with anything short of the 
Absolute Nothing.’
 
 
785 In context of Parmenides, this ‘Nothing’ is being, what 
Stevens refers to as ‘the thin stuff of being’.786 Adorno suggests of the ‘ontological 
need’ that it cannot be ‘quenched by the transcendental system’, which thirst clearly 
saw Stevens pushing towards ontological ground in an effort to experience what he 
refers to as: ‘the veritable ding an sich, at last’.787
 In ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’ the ‘ox’, ‘lion’ and ‘bear’ were not the 
poet’s animal nature, but were the ‘immanence’ of a totalized ‘otherness’ created by 
  
                                                          
782 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 218. 
783 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, p. 683. 
784 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 34. 
785 George Santayana, Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, p. 14. 
786 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Snow Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 8. & Wallace Stevens, ‘Piano 
Practice at the Academy of the Holy Angels’, Opus Posthumous, p. 42. 
787 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 63. & Wallace Stevens, Opus Posthumous, p. 48. 
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the poet through the violence of a new poesis. They were the collapsing of what I 
have suggested was the Xenophanean conception of a projected deity, back into the 
possibilities of the apparent ‘self’. The Desire for this connection replaced the Desire 
for religion in Stevens, and it is the opening of being as a poesis that attempts to 
fulfil that Desire. ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’ begins with: ‘That’s what misery 
is,/ Nothing to have at heart./ It is to have or nothing.’788 If one doesn’t have the 
‘otherness’ of a connection to all things, beating like a volcanic heart in the breast, 
then one has nothing, is what the poem appears to be suggesting. It is the absolute 
Desire for the invisible connection that gives birth to this volcano of destructive 
potential: ‘Desire is absolute if the desiring being is mortal and the Desired 
invisible.’789 For Levinas, the reason that it destroys the ‘human’ would appear to be 
that: ‘Desire is desire for the absolutely other.’790
 The merging with the ‘bear’ the ‘ox’ and the ‘lion’ is the merging of the 
‘human’ with this ‘absolutely other’ in immanence. For Stevens this is to ‘speak 
humanly from the height or from the depth/ Of human things’ in his enlarged sense 
of ‘human’.
 
791
                                                          
788 Wallace Stevens, ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 178. 
789 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 34. 
790 Ibid., p. 34. 
791 Wallace Stevens, ‘Chocorua to its Neighbor’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 267. 
 It avoids Kantian transcendence, which he denies, collapses the 
anthropomorphic conception of the ‘gods’ and again enlarges the sense of ‘human’ 
by destroying the rational ‘human’, which is perceived as a limitation. As we have 
seen, it is the language and form of Stevens’ poetry that creates this sense of a 
collapse to oneness. ‘Desire’ for a connection would seem to be driving that process. 
Stevens is certainly not ignorant of the presence of this Desire, rather, he is fully 
conscious of it, engaging with it, working with it to produce poetry. In poem II from 
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‘It Must be Abstract’ Stevens considers the nature of Desire as connected to the 
possession of ‘what is not’: 
 But the priest desires. The philosopher desires. 
 
 And not to have is the beginning of desire. 
 To have what is not is its ancient cycle.792
 Arguably, a momentary fulfilment of the Desire for the ‘what is not’ in 
primacy, took place in ‘Credences of Summer’, where Stevens was briefly able to 
fuse ‘The physical pine’ and ‘the metaphysical pine’ in poetry, into a oneness that 
nourished Desire for a complete ‘reality’.
 
 
793 As such in this poem Stevens could say: 
‘Exile desire/ For what is not.’794 ‘The trumpet cries/ This is the successor of the 
invisible.’ ‘It is the visible announced’.795
The shock produced by the work is linked to law: in the work a world is encountered 
as it is being born. While with respect to things belonging to the world nothing is 
more normal than the fact “that the entity be,” the fact that in the work there is entity 
at all becomes strange and is encountered in all its radical underivability. We are 
accustomed to considering the world as always already given: we are interested in 
what stands inside the world, but we miss it because we take it for granted that there 
be world.
 Vattimo provides a sense of how the work 
of art brought ‘reality’ to stand within itself in ‘Credences’, something that for him is 
linked to art’s claim to ‘truth’: 
796
As we have suggested, the process of galvanising the physical and the metaphysical 
still annihilated the ground of the ‘Other’ to be able to stand, but it also embraced 
 
 
                                                          
792 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 330. 
793 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 322. 
794 Ibid., p. 323. 
795 Ibid., p. 325. 
796 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, p. 69. 
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nature as the apex of being in oneness. It was this momentary fusion in the poesis of 
a new work of art that fulfilled the Desire for the ontological in primacy.797
Violence Against the Face 
 
 
 In the guise of ‘major man’ Stevens envisages no anthropomorphic form, he 
is something amorphous, a ‘human globe’.798 For Levinas it is another mode of 
ontological violence that the reduction to being destroys the possibility of the 
existent human body, and most importantly for Levinas, the face. In Totality and 
Infinity it is the conception of the face that represents the ‘Most-High’, what he calls 
‘the height in which God is revealed’.799
The face brings a notion of truth which, in contradistinction to contemporary 
ontology, is not the disclosure of an impersonal Neuter, but expression: the existent 
breaks through all the envelopings and generalities of Being to spread out in its 
“form” the totality of its “content,” finally abolishing the distinction between form 
and content. This is not achieved by some sort of modification of the knowledge that 
thematizes, but precisely by “thematization” turning into conversation.
 The form of the face speaks of God for 
Levinas. 
 In Totality and Infinity Levinas suggests that the face overwhelms ontology 
and releases from the tyranny of totality: 
800
It signifies the philosophical priority of the existent over Being, an exteriority that 
does not call for power or possession, an exteriority that is not reducible.
 
 
In Levinas, the face is not just another sign that signifies something else, but it is 
itself signification which is already spoken, prior to ontology: 
801
                                                          
797 There is also a parallel realisation and subsequent melancholy in ‘Credences of Summer’ which we 
will address in the following chapter. 
798 Wallace Stevens, ‘Asides on the Oboe’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 227. 
799 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 79. 
800 Ibid., p. 51. 
801 Ibid., p. 51. 
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For Levinas: ‘The manifestation of the face is already discourse.’802
 The trees do not.
 Stevens had 
casually pondered the appropriation of the face that is ‘given’ in advance, as early as 
1917, in an uncollected section of the poem, ‘Primordia’. In this instance it is a 
pondering on the facial features of horses, but perhaps the questioning into the 
origins of ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ is enough to show conscious thought on the subject: 
 The horses are hollow, 
 The trunks of the trees are hollow. 
 Why do the horses have eyes and ears? 
803
In ‘The Snow Man’ it was not Stevens who regarded and who beheld, it was 
‘the mind of winter’. The ‘mind of winter’ was placed in primacy to the face and the 
apparent beholding and regarding was, as we argued, merely an unveiling of being 
through poetry, prior to the face. Adorno suggests that: ‘As Being, which the mind 
transmits, is ceded to receptive vision, philosophy converges with a flatly 
irrationalist view of life.’
 
As Stevens abandoned the religious faith he had been exposed to within his family as 
a child, the question of the origin of the face became opaque again. In time, it was 
the ‘whole’ of being that would be placed in advance of the face in his poetic 
thought. 
804 This notion destroys the possibility of the face (except 
that the poet create it out of being) which according to Levinas is spoken prior to 
ontology – ‘The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse.’805
 As we have said, the notions of beholding and regarding are certainly present 
in Stevens, but these do not allow the face in primacy. Rather they are of a reduction 
of the mind (mind of winter) and in this instance deny the ‘light’ which is prior to the 
 
                                                          
802 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 66. 
803 Wallace Stevens, ‘Primordia’, Opus Posthumous, p. 26. 
804 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 85. 
805 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 66. 
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mind, which allows it to ‘see’. I would argue that in Stevens, to ‘regard’ is a passive 
state that allows the enacting of what I have referred to as aletheia. This is in 
contradistinction to ‘seeing’, which is linked to rational ‘understanding’, to an action 
of the rational ‘self’ that begins with the human mind and ends at the object in view. 
To ‘see’ would suggest a sense of the self-conscious viewing of an object, while to 
‘regard’ or ‘behold’ would seem to render the human as the ‘site’ at which the object 
discloses itself, where a cognitive response would destroy mere ‘appearing’ and re-
establish the ‘I’ of the ego in primacy. The reduction of the mind to the unveiling of 
being destroys the possibility of the face, in what we have shown to be a move 
against transcendental idealism reminiscent of Heidegger. 
 The mind ‘Destroys romantic tenements/ Of rose and ice’, because the mind 
is allowed primacy over the face of the ‘Other’, because it reduces the ‘Other’ to 
being: 
As speech and glance the face is not in the world, since it opens and exceeds the 
totality. This is why it marks the limit of all power, of all violence, and the origin of 
the ethical. In a sense, murder is always directed against the face, but thereby always 
misses it.806
As we have evidenced, Stevens seems absolutely determined to remove that which is 
‘human’ at large, in an effort to usher in a broader sense of what it means to be 
‘human’. In the ‘The Auroras of Autumn’ Stevens would write: ‘The mother’s face,/ 
The purpose of the poem, fills the room.’
 
 
807 This would sound like a founding of the 
‘face’ in primacy, even as the purpose of the poem, but it is soon annihilated with: 
‘And yet she too is dissolved, she is destroyed’, if only in the roll of time.808
                                                          
806 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 104. 
807 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Auroras of Autumn’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 356. 
808 Ibid., p. 357. 
 The 
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face in ‘The Emperor of Ice-Cream’ is dead and covered with a sheet.809 In ‘United 
Dames of America’ Stevens laments that ‘There are not leaves/ Enough to hide away 
the face of the man’.810
The Role of the Metaphysician 
 The existing conception of the face is destroyed in Stevens, 
because what matters to him is the recreation of the face according to the limits of 
‘reality’. Levinas has argued that the ‘face’ is always in advance of the thought of 
being. That the face is annihilated in Stevens is evidence of the reductive thought of 
being in primacy. 
 
 In ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ Stevens had adopted the role of a kind of 
‘Prospero’, a ‘major man’ as the ‘intelligence’ of all things. This status of the poet as 
the ‘intelligence’ in nature was arguably a means of guarding Stevens against a total 
reduction, like that of ‘The Snow Man’. Levinas, in a totally unrelated analysis of the 
violence of the thought of being, yet which so closely pursues Stevens here, suggests 
that: ‘the metaphysician and the other can not be totalized. The metaphysician is 
absolutely separated.’811 In what sense could Stevens be said to maintain himself as 
‘separated’ from the total reduction? In poem XIX of ‘Blue Guitar’ Stevens had 
wished to ‘reduce the monster to/ Myself, and then may be myself/ In face of the 
monster’.812 The monster is nature, but the struggle, as through Ideas of Order, was 
for the retention of some sense of ‘self’, or ‘better not of myself at all,/ But of that as 
its intelligence’.813
                                                          
809 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Emperor of Ice-Cream’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 50. 
810 Wallace Stevens, ‘United Dames of America’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 188. 
811 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 35. 
812 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
813 Ibid., p. 143. 
 This inhuman figure, without a face, is Stevens as the 
‘intelligence’ of nature: ‘Being the lion in the lute/ Before the lion locked in 
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stone.’814
 This position allows Stevens to reduce to ‘Two things, the two together as 
one,/ And play of the monster and of myself’.
 It is the opening of poetry that causes this sense of connection in being, 
though the poet’s ‘intelligence’ is held apart so that he can ‘play’ of things as he 
would have them be. 
815 Levinas says: ‘But the 
metaphysician’s separation from the metaphysical, which is maintained within the 
relationship by being produced as an egoism, is not the simple observe of that 
relationship.’816
 An instrument, twanging a wiry string
 How else can we express this metaphysician of the ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’ who is weirdly conjoined, yet separate? He emerges again in ‘Of 
Modern Poetry’, still playing the blue guitar: 
 In an emotion as of two people, as of two 
 Emotions becoming one. The actor is 
 A metaphysician in the dark, twanging 
817
 The model of the poet as mystical metaphysician, corresponds with the 
practice of Heraclitus, Parmenides and Empedocles. Kingsley has argued that 
Empedocles has strong affinities with ‘the familiar figure in the ancient Near East 
and Mediterranean of the poet-magician, but also to what has been described as the 
“cosmic poetry”’.
 
 
This separated figure (‘in the dark’) who paradoxically is still a part of the ‘one’, is 
the ‘metaphysican’ of reduction that Levinas is inadvertently critiquing. 
818 Stevens had praised the poetic value of the ‘cosmic poetry’ that 
this kind of philosophy spoke of in ‘A Collect of Philosophy’.819
                                                          
814 Ibid., p. 143. 
815 Ibid., p. 143. 
816 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 38. 
817 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 219. 
818 Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic - Empedocles and Pythagorian Tradition, 
p. 296. 
819 Wallace Stevens, ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 856. 
 Kingsley suggests 
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that the evidence shows that Parmenides was a ‘shaman’ who believed himself to be 
‘allied to mysterious Iatromantis figures who were experts in the use of incantatory 
poetry’.820
the belief that the world constitutes a divine whole, with its parts bound one to 
another by a kind of sympathy. All that is needed to succeed in any enterprise is to 
manipulate this influence with care.
  This mode of poetry, attributed to Empedocles and Parmenides 
expresses: 
821
One thing about life is that the mind of one man, if strong enough, can become the 
master of all the life in the world…Any really great poet, musician, etc. does this.
 
 
Stevens had said: 
 
822
What becomes clear is that the claim by Heidegger, Gadamer and Vattimo 
for art to be an event of truth-telling, the opening of a new ‘historical epoch’ for 
Vattimo, negates the fact that the ‘newness’ of this opening is unalterably connected 
to the mysticism of the pre-Socratics.
 
 
823 What philosophers from the ‘Frankfurt 
School’ such as Adorno have been able to show, in works such as Negative 
Dialectics (1966) and more particularly in his work co-written with Max 
Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), is the way in which history is free 
from Heidegger’s suppression of time as the horizon of his own conception of 
being.824
                                                          
820 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 40. 
821 Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic - Empedocles and Pythagorian Tradition,  
p. 296. 
822 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 8th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 360. 
823 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, p. 70. 
824 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. by John Cumming 
(London & New York: Verso, 1997), p. ix. 
 The metaphysician who presumes to manipulate the ground of being, 
attempts to remain separate from the totality that is itself historically grounded in 
myth. 
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The parallel between pre-Socratic poetic philosophy and Stevens’ poetic 
objective is itself total and the reason for that, and for the theory that we have been 
unravelling since the beginning here, is that something close to the pre-Socratic 
locution dominates Stevens’ poetics, and for that reason, Stevens’ poetics, at times, 
dominate the ‘Other’ in totality. ‘Major man’ is this ‘egoism’ that remains at the 
heart of all things, all possibilities, yet where ‘major man’ is no one else can ‘exist’ 
and this is why it opens itself up as a kind of tyranny. Riddel notes that Stevens 
refers to this state as “indirect egotism”, and that through this ‘we discover not only 
one man’s mind but mind itself.’825
The relation of truth thus involves a dimension of interiority, a psychism, in which 
the metaphysician, while being in relation with the Metaphysical, maintains himself 
apart.
 Levinas states further: 
826
 In a sense reminiscent of Gadamer’s conception of ‘play’, it is into this 
liminal non-Site that the reader is invited to join the ‘metaphysician in the dark’, 
‘twanging a wiry string’ that enacts the ‘sudden rightness’ that will merge the 
‘Other’ with this oneness, ‘wholly/ Containing the mind, below which it cannot 
descend,/ Beyond which it has no will to rise’.
 
 
827
 In playing of ‘two/ Emotions becoming one’ in ‘Of Modern Poetry’, as the 
metaphysician of the blue guitar, Stevens was still strangely separate, operating as 
 The individuality of the ‘Other’ is 
bound and consumed by the ‘will of one man’, by one man’s conception of being. 
From Stevens’ perspective, this is an awakening of a oneness that mollifies polemos 
in the model of Heraclitus or Orpheus. From the perspective of Derrida and Levinas 
the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ is tyranny. 
                                                          
825 Joseph H. Riddel, The Clairvoyant Eye: The Poetry and Poetics of Wallace Stevens, p. 11. 
826 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 64. 
827 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 219. 
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the ‘intelligence’ of nature as he had said.828
The figure of the poet is essential to Stevens’s poetry, as the voice of the poet 
establishes the meditative, intimate structure of relationship with the reader that 
constitutes the playfulness and trust necessary for, or perhaps indicative of, the 
establishment of the irenic world of the poem. In the persistent emergence of 
questions about reality and knowledge, the reader is invited in, to share in the 
thoughtfulness and playfulness of that world. Like the figures of the shepherds in 
Arcady, the figure of the poet becomes integral to the scene - both as the story teller 
and as represented images of the poet - and contemplation of the liminal site of the 
represented world calls for consideration of the poem as both moment and 
metaphor.
 Howard Pearce in his essay on Poiesis 
and the Withdrawal: The Garden-Motive in Henry James, Wallace Stevens and 
David Mamet, has insightfully perceived the important position that the role of the 
poet occupies in Stevens: 
829
The Pastoral Site and the Garden 
 
 
It would appear that the persona that Stevens presents as himself (through voice and 
image) form an integral part of the ‘playfulness’ that establishes the ‘intimate 
structure’ with the ‘reader’, which for Gadamer closes up the fourth wall of complete 
being. For Levinas, this model of the standing apart of the metaphysician who is also 
curiously intimate to the scene, only indicates that a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ is 
operating in primacy. 
 
 So far in this chapter we have been analysing particular aspects of the 
critique of ontology mounted by Derrida and Levinas and have questioned to see if 
the same ‘symptoms’ exist in Stevens’ poetry, with a view to ultimately establishing 
the historical nature of these ‘symptoms’. As we have seen both Derrida and Levinas 
                                                          
828 Ibid., p. 219. 
829 Howard Pearce, ‘Poiesis and the Withdrawal: The Garden-Motive in Henry James, Wallace 
Stevens and David Mamet’, Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. LXXV, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 
263. 
237 
 
understand that when they critique Heideggerean ‘ontology’ for its violence, they are 
also critiquing the fundamental pre-Socratic ground from which it sprang. 
On the subject of the ‘pastoral site’, which is our next mode of enquiry in 
following Levinas and Derrida, Derrida has this to say: 
The Site, therefore, is not an empirical Here but always an Illic: for Heidegger, as for 
the Jew and the Poet. The proximity of the site is always held in reserve, says 
Hölderlin as commented on by Heidegger. The thinking of Being thus is not a pagan 
cult of the Site, because the Site is never a given proximity but a promised one.830
When we think of the pastoral scene or the garden in Stevens, is it ‘held in reserve’? 
This holding in reserve of the Site for Derrida would only amount to a ‘thinking of 
Being.’ In ‘Description Without Place’ the Site had been withheld. Stevens, 
considering ‘the supremacy of a figure like Parmenides’, who he had been reading at 
the time of writing ‘Description Without Place’, could be interpreted as having found 
precisely what Heidegger found in the Pre-Socratics, as Levinas makes clear
 
 
831
Heidegger finds in Presocratism thought as obedient to the truth of Being. This 
obedience would be accomplished in existing as builder and cultivator, effecting the 
unity of the site which sustains space.
: 
832
 Between us and the place in which we stood.
 
 
In ‘Wild Ducks, People and Distances’, collected in Transport, Stevens shows in 
what sense building and cultivating effects ‘the unity of the site which sustains 
space’, and in doing so shows his own affinity with what appears to continually led 
back to ‘Presocratism’: 
  It was that they were there 
 That held the distances off: the villages 
 Held off the final, fatal distances, 
833
                                                          
830 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 145. 
831 A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
832 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 46. 
833 Wallace Stevens, ‘Wild Ducks, People and Distances’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 289. 
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 Derrida had said that where the thought of being is in primacy the Site will be 
‘held in reserve’, never quite coming to presence. It is only on the terms of the 
‘builder and cultivator’ who paradoxically stands between being in primacy and the 
Site, that the Site is allowed to come forth out of being. Certainly, in earlier Stevens 
references to gardens and pastoral scenes, things are in a state of inconstancy, always 
on the move, never quite fixed. In the much anthologised ‘Domination of Black’ the 
remembrance of the garden, of the leaves, ‘Turned in the room,/ Like the leaves 
themselves/ Turning in the wind.’834
 In ‘The Pleasures of Merely Circulating’ the garden is again flying around 
and around like the turning leaves of ‘Domination of Black’, but this time with the 
‘angel’. The same Heraclitean ‘law’ is produced through the language of the poem. 
We know that Stevens will later lament that ‘Adam/ In Eden was the father of 
Descartes/ And Eve made air the mirror of herself’.
 The colours of the heavy hemlocks come 
‘striding’ and the colours in the tails of the peacocks turn like the leaves in the wind. 
This remembrance of the garden is never allowed to come fully to presence, never 
gathered fully into the ‘now’, but is always withheld. Just as Parmenides’ opening of 
a poesis is already on the way, already travelling, so Stevens’ poetry at times 
evidences the opening of a space in which the empirical ‘here’ is withheld.  
835
                                                          
834 Wallace Stevens, ‘Domination of Black’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 7. 
835 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 331. 
 Some fundamental, rationalist 
mistake began in ‘Eden’ for Stevens, and perhaps collapsing the ‘first garden’ is an 
objective for the thought of being, which is seeking the primacy of the poet 
metaphysician to create out of being. 
 In ‘The Hermitage at the Center’, collected in The Rock, description of the 
natural scene is wrapped around an absence of ‘place’: 
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 The leaves on the macadam make a noise -  
  How soft the grass on which the desired 
  Reclines in the temperature of heaven -  
 
 Like tales that were told the day before yesterday -  
  Sleek in a natural nakedness, 
  She attends the tintinnabula -  
 
 And the wind sways like a great thing tottering - 
  Of birds called up by more than the sun, 
  Birds of more wit, that substitute -  
 
 Which suddenly is all dissolved and gone -  
  Their intelligible twittering 
  For unintelligible thought. 
 
 And yet this end and this beginning are one, 
  And one last look at the ducks is a look 
  At lucent children round her in a ring.836
As is now familiar, this pastoral scene never quite comes to presence. It is withheld 
from the centre where this time the ‘desired’ woman is. Derrida had maintained that: 
‘The thinking of Being is not a pagan cult of the Site, because the Site is never a 
given proximity but a promised one.’
 
 
 837
                                                          
836 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Hermitage at the Center’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 430. 
837 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 145. 
 Certainly, through the use of language this 
pastoral Site is not a ‘given proximity’. It is the ‘noise’ of the leaves that we hear, we 
are not given the leaves themselves. Equally, it is the softness of the ‘grass’ that is 
presented, not the grass itself. It is only the ‘desired’ that remains, together with the 
‘wind’, which is ‘like a great thing tottering’, not fully itself, at any moment to 
topple, evoking the fragility of the scene. The ‘Birds’ are not simply ‘birds’, they are 
‘Birds of more wit’, substitutions connected to something greater. Ultimately, all of 
these ‘near’ presences are ‘all dissolved and gone’ as the potential for the ‘existent’ 
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collapses into the centre. The only thing that finally comes to presence are the 
‘ducks’, but they themselves are hiding the ‘desired’ one.  
 I am indebted once again to Howard Pearce for his analysis of ‘The 
Hermitage at the Centre’ as that of Ovid’s tale of Diana and Actaeon recounted in 
Metamorphoses.838
 For Stevens, ‘The death of one god is the death of all’ in a denial of 
anthropomorphic deities. It is much more important to Stevens to let the sun ‘be/ In 
the difficulty of what it is to be.’
 However, although Stevens would certainly seem to be using the 
Ovidean construct of the ‘divine’ at the heart of this pastoral idyll, I am still inclined 
to follow Derrida’s ‘symptom’ and suggest that a sense of being is still in primacy 
here. I would argue that a sense of being is still the ultimate driver, to which 
mythology naturally attunes itself for reasons we will investigate in the next chapter. 
I also consider that although the conception of ‘Diana’ fulfils the image of the object 
of metaphysical Desire for Stevens, and that any glimpse of being (the ‘desired’) 
would be fleeting (like the phoenix in the palm combusting in flame at the merest 
glance), that this is not ultimately grounded in the pagan Site, though it is certainly 
using that machinery. 
839
                                                          
838 Howard Pearce, ‘Poiesis and the Withdrawal: The Garden-Motive in Henry James, Wallace 
Stevens and David Mamet’, Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, p. 
265. 
839 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 330. 
 If we consider that Stevens’ refers to Ovid’s 
story as a tale ‘told the day before yesterday’, then we are posed with a question: 
Why should Diana’s pastoral Site be ‘temporally’ collapsed into such close 
proximity with ‘today’?  And why should it be that ‘this end and this beginning are 
one’? The answer would seem to be that a sense of being is in primacy, in the 
moment of a new poesis. The scene with ‘ducks’ that Stevens is apparently 
considering at Elizabeth Park in Hartford, has collapsed to the oneness of the myth 
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of Actaeon (the tale ‘told the day before yesterday’), which itself has been collapsed 
into what Stevens considers as the eternal fundamental primacy of beings orbiting 
being.840 In both ‘places’ it is envisaged as a ‘ring’, reminiscent of the plenum of 
Parmenides’ sense of the ‘it is’.841
‘Divinity’ and ‘Deity’ Without God 
 Because being is conceived as eternal, the two 
scenes are one and being is in primacy as history is suppressed. 
 Just as the ‘ducks’ form a ring approximate to the pond, so the ‘lucent 
children’ crowd around Diana to hide her. Stevens’ point is that both are models of 
the eternal ‘law’ of the physical orbiting the metaphysical, of form radiating from the 
absent central ground. Stevens is the Actaeon, the poet, seeking to glimpse his 
heart’s Desire, an ontological Desire. The pastoral Site however is again withheld to 
allow for the two things to be forged together in the poem. It is notable in this 
instance how close Stevens was standing, proximally, to the old myths through the 
oneness of being as a philosophical concept that could marry together the physical 
and the metaphysical in the oneness of a poesis. 
 
 Derrida raises a final symptom of the thinking of being in primacy, 
concerning the conception of ‘deity’ that does not operate. As we have noted, 
Derrida had maintained that the Site that is withheld by the thought of being is not a 
pagan cult of the Site. The Site in context of the thought of being is not pagan for 
Derrida because, as with many of Stevens’ pastoral Sites, it ‘is never a given 
                                                          
840 Vendler notes that Stevens took regular walks in this park, and that it had a duck pond. (Helen 
Vendler, Wallace Stevens: Words Chosen Out of Desire (Cambridge MA & London: The University 
Press/Knoxville, 1984), p. 59) 
841 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 179. 
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proximity but a promised one.’842
The sacred of which it speaks belongs neither to religion in general, not to a 
particular theology, and thus cannot be determined by any history of religion. It is 
first the essential experience of divinity or of deity.
 Derrida infers from the fact that this Site is still 
associated with ‘the sacred’ that: 
843
For Derrida, the thought of being opens up a space which is ‘within faith and 
atheism.’
 
 
844 The thought of being means that ‘in a sense which is neither 
chronological nor logical, nor ontical in general, it precedes every relationship to 
God’.845
 As shapes, though they portend us, are.
 For our final proof that the concept of being is the animating primacy of 
Stevens’ poetry, let us consider being as the ‘space’ which for Stevens opens up the 
possibility of God. For Derrida, such a thought would only result in a conceptual 
divinity and deity without God. In ‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’, Stevens 
had written: 
 If there must be a god in the house, must be, 
 Saying things in the rooms and on the stair, 
 
 Let him move as the sunlight moves on the floor, 
 Or moonlight, silently, as Plato’s ghost 
 
 Or Aristotle’s skeleton. Let him hang out 
 His stars on the wall. He must dwell quietly. 
 
 He must be incapable of speaking, closed, 
 As those are: as light, for all its motion, is; 
 
 As color, even the closest to us, is; 
846
                                                          
842 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 145. 
843 Ibid., p. 145. 
844 Ibid., p. 145. 
845 Ibid., p. 145. 
846 Wallace Stevens, ‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 288. 
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 Derrida maintains that God is excluded from this thinking that only opens the 
space of the Sacred and the light of the deity, and that this: 
is at once the limit and the wellspring of finite-Being as history. Limit because 
divinity is not God. In a sense it is nothing. ‘The sacred it is true, appears. But the 
god remains distant.’ Wellspring, because this anticipation as a thought of Being (of 
the existence of God) always sees God coming, opens the possibility (the 
eventuality) of an encounter with God and of a dialogue with God.847
That is, ‘Not as a god, but as a god might be’.
 
 
848 Or ‘If there must be a god in the 
house, must be’, it must be one who is ‘incapable of speaking’.849 The possibility of 
the ‘god’ is always there, but as we have read it is a ‘god’ that is withheld, dumb, 
does not operate. Stevens had declared that ‘The death of one god is the death of all’, 
but the ‘sacred’ and the notion of ‘divinity’ had never departed from his poetry.850 
Rather, ‘Phoebus was/ A name for something that never could be named.’851
 It is the highly ‘pointed’ and accentuated ‘is’ and ‘are’ that end the last three 
lines above, that denote the presence of the thought of being. Reading it, the commas 
hold enough of a pause to fill these statements of being with the most pronounced 
ontological meaning. Thus the thought of being, as it had for Heidegger in his 
Parmenidean entrenchment, annihilates Aristotle and Plato and apparently, the 
possibility of God. Adorno sees the concept of destroying any thinkers who stand 
 For 
Stevens ‘deities’ are expendable, coming and going according to various names. In 
his poetry that which is first, is sacred, is divinity, is opened up by a poetry rooted in 
the thought of being. It is divinity that does not operate, a key symptom for Derrida 
that the thought of being is in primacy. 
                                                          
847 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 146. 
848 Wallace Stevens, ‘Sunday Morning’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 56. 
849 Wallace Stevens, ‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 288. 
850 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 329. 
851 Ibid., p. 329. 
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between Parmenides and the present to be evident in Heidegger also, contending 
that: 
It is because this insufficiency led to analysis – with the result that the magical 
extraterritoriality of Being as a vagrant between essence and fact was caught in the 
web of concepts – that Heidegger, to save the privilege of Being, must condemn the 
concept’s critical labours as a history of decay, as if philosophy might occupy a 
historical standpoint beyond history while on the other hand obeying a history that is 
ontologized itself, as is existence.852
That the Deity of God, which permits the thinking and naming of God, is nothing, 
and above all is not God himself, is what Meister Eckhart, in particular, said this 
way…. ‘God operates, deity does not operate, has nothing to operate, has no 
operation in it, has never any operation in view’.
 
 
This elimination of philosophers like ‘Plato’ and ‘Aristotle’ who had engulfed being 
in a ‘web of concepts’ includes God for Stevens. Arguably, both Stevens and 
Heidegger can be read as attempting to set up a supra-historical wormhole that 
stands on the ever present ground of Parmenides’ ‘supreme’ poesis of the ‘truth’ of 
being. Ontological poetry and the poet magician take on the role of creator, 
something which suited Stevens’ modernism, clearly evidenced in a figure like the 
‘metaphysician in the dark’. Derrida continues: 
853
 Of which we are too distantly a part.
 
 
‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’ continues: 
 If there must be a god in the house, let him be one 
 That will not hear us when we speak: a coolness, 
 
 A vermillioned nothingness, any stick of the mass 
854
That ‘vermillioned nothingness’ perhaps raises a sense of the ‘gold vermilion’ that 
Manley-Hopkins envisages in his poem dedicated to ‘Christ our Lord’, ‘The 
 
 
                                                          
852 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 118. 
853 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 146. 
854 Wallace Stevens, ‘Less and Less Human, O Savage Spirit’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 288. 
245 
 
Windhover’.855
 We have moved into a dialogue that obviously involves Stevens, but that 
equally involves Heidegger, Derrida and Levinas. However, despite appearances 
Stevens is not necessarily philosophically two or three generations ahead of his time. 
The connection between Stevens and the phenomenological ontology of the 
twentieth century, appears to find its strongest parallel in the common bond of the 
poetic philosophy of the pre-Socratics. What the critique of a ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’, adopted from Derrida and Levinas has shown, is the destructive nature 
of the thought of being in primacy to the existent. It has shown its tyranny in 
totalizing the notion of the ‘Other’, suggesting that only being can open up the 
existent, or the poet who has become the ‘intelligence’ of being, the author of the 
poesis that uses a conceptual ‘cosmic poetry’ to enforce reductions. For thinkers 
such as Adorno, the failure of twentieth century ontology in the hands of Heidegger 
has been its inability to convincingly extricate being from the galvanised form of a 
concept.
 The ‘god’ is forcefully reduced to the totality of the whole because 
for Stevens it was always equal to ‘any stick of the mass/ Of which we are too 
distantly a part’. What is interesting is the way in which Derrida and Levinas have 
provided symptoms so accurate in diagnosing the thought of being in Stevens, just as 
they had in Heidegger and Parmenides. 
856
He reaches out for mythology, but his mythology too remains one of the twentieth 
century. It remains the illusion unmasked by history, an illusion made striking by the 
utter impossibility of reconciling the myths with the rationalized form of reality with 
which every possible consciousness is entwined. Heidegger’s type of consciousness 
presumes to mythological status as if it could have that status without being 
mythological in kind.
 Of Heidegger, Adorno suggests that: 
857
                                                          
855 Bernard Richards, ed., English Verse 1830 – 1890 (London & New York: Longman group 
Limited, 1980), p. 510. 
856 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 118. 
857 Ibid., p. 118. 
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Heidegger may have reawakened the question of the meaning of being that lay 
buried beneath the Platonic rubble, but his concept of it, much like Parmenides’ 
conception, will fall into history. What remains is mythos, always in danger of a new 
totalizing concept. Being becomes conceptual mythos when pressed back upon the 
existent by ‘the mind of one man’.858
It has been easy for critics to conclude that Stevens was serious, even maniacally so, 
in his insistence that “[e]thics are no more a part of poetry than they are of 
painting”.
 
We approach then the question of poetry, of what poets are for and the nature 
of the evidence presented thus far has been demanding that we ask this question. If 
ontological thought is as destructive as Derrida and Levinas suggest, and if Stevens 
is entirely grounded in notions of being that resemble the Parmenidean model, then 
what does it matter? Indeed, does it matter? Stevens himself would seem to totally 
separate the ethical from poetry. Vaught Brogan has touched on the nuances of 
Stevens’ position: 
859
Altieri believes that Stevens’ metaphor making through the ‘as’ allows for the 
mystical ‘whole’ in a manner that, like Wittgenstein’s ‘Modernist adaptations’, 
allows ethics and aesthetics to be one.
 
 
860 For Altieri this demonstrates the way in 
which Stevens’ abstract poetry and the act of reading it shows us how ‘the unreal can 
play a cogent part in the world’.861
However, Altieri wants to argue that ‘The being of beings is simply a matter 
of how the I manipulates “the intricate evasions of as”’, when in fact Stevens’ 
 
                                                          
858 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 8th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 360. 
859 Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, The Violence Within The Violence Without - Wallace Stevens and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Poetics, p. 26. 
860 Charles Altieri, ‘Why Stevens Must be Abstract’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, pp. 
110 - 111. 
861 Ibid., p. 109. 
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‘reduction of metaphysics’, as a concept in advance of the language of the poem, the 
‘I’ and the reading ‘Other’, does not allow such a subjective position to come forth. 
Altieri recognises that ‘attributing social force to the grammar of “is” and “as” would 
be a dangerously abstract means of proclaiming a sense of community’, but this 
leads him to move away from the implications of Stevens’ ontological ‘sense of 
community’, towards the ‘distinctive’ ‘lyric force’ of the poetry.862 However, rather 
than reading around Stevens’ ‘reduction of metaphysics’, the next chapter will 
address the origins and structure of this ‘force’, as a concept that for Stevens is there 
in advance of the manipulation of the ‘intricate evasions of as’. Ethics are not a part 
of Stevens’ poetry and nor are they a part of what he means by ‘poetry’. Stevens felt 
that: ‘The morality of the poet’s radiant and productive atmosphere is the morality of 
the right sensation.’863 ‘Sensation’ precedes the ‘as’ in the ‘candor’ of the poet’s 
‘radiant’ ‘atmosphere’, that is itself productive, as the ‘shape without a word’ 
produces the ‘shape of life’ that the poet subsequently describes as he is ‘flicked by 
feeling’.864
Stevens’ ‘morality of the right sensation’ is reminiscent of the ‘post-modern’ 
thinking of Vattimo. Vattimo’s connecting of the thought of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger creates a dual-headed ground from which he envisages Nietzsche’s sense 
of ‘accomplished nihilism’ to spring.
 It is the thought of being that determines the need for the ‘as’ for 
Stevens, not the other way around. 
865
                                                          
862 Charles Altieri, The Art of Twentieth-Century American Poetry: Modernism and After, p. 137. 
863 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, p. 679. 
864 Wallace Stevens, ‘Banjo Boomer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 475. 
865 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, trans by. Jon R. Snyder (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 
p. 19. 
 Vattimo’s alignment of Nietzschean and 
Heideggerian conceptions of nihilism leads him to suggest that the post-modern 
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requires that ‘we begin to be, or to be able to be, accomplished nihilists.’866 Altieri 
has suggested that Stevens’ poetry of the abstract ‘there’ ‘provides a substantial 
theory for living here.’867 However, this assumes that ‘the right sensation’ makes any 
distinction between ‘here’ and ‘there’ in its absolute reduction. One of Vattimo’s 
aims, in the tradition of Heidegger and Gadamer, is to ‘open up a non-metaphysical 
conception of truth which would interpret truth...on the basis of the experience of art 
or the model of rhetoric’.868 Such a post-metaphysical view has affinity with 
Stevens’ sense of ‘the morality of the right sensation’, though this also does not 
necessarily portend that Stevens is ahead of his time. As we progress to chapter four 
we shall increasingly assess if this sense of the ‘post-modern’ really moves forward 
in a freedom from the historically grounded lineage of the pre-Socratics, and 
whether, like Vattimo, it tries to argue that it does not mark a ‘return’ to Parmenides, 
which of course is in opposition to Levinas’ own conscious break with 
Parmenides.869
 Gerald L. Bruns has argued of Stevens’ sense of ‘otherness’ that ‘the 
phenomenon of the voice of the other always threatens this outlook, and that this is 
the truth that Stevens’ poetry teaches us, particularly in the way in which otherness is 
obsessively aestheticized.’
  
870
                                                          
866 Ibid., p. 19. 
867 Charles Altieri, ‘Why Stevens Must be Abstract’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, p. 
116. 
868 Ibid., p. 12. 
869 Ibid., p. 5. 
870 Gerald L. Bruns, ‘Stevens Without Epistemology’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, ed. 
Albert Gelpi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 35. 
 What are poets for? This is Heidegger’s question. My 
question here is, what is the poet based upon and does this basis present itself as a 
historical idea? Where does the idea of the destruction and recreation of humanity as 
part of the whole originate for pre-Socratic poetic thought? Further, is Stevens’ 
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poetry doing something more fundamental than just showing us that ethics and 
aesthetics are one? Is it doing more than simply relating a ‘truth’ about the potential 
interruption of the ‘Other’? 
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Chapter Four 
The Mythological Structure of Stevens’ ‘Rock’  
  
 
Post-this, post-that, post-the-other, yet in the end 
 Not past a thing.871 
 
 
Having seen the ethical implications of the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to 
being in Stevens' poetry, the following chapter will 
Vattimo has made a conscious effort to align Nietzschean and Heideggerian 
thought. His approach is to ‘place these two fields of thought in direct contact with 
each other’ and this ‘contact’ ‘means to discover in them both new and richer aspects 
of truth.’
investigate the dialogue between 
the pre-Socratic philosophy and the mythological elements that also appear to exist 
in Stevens’ poetry. We will look at the common elements extant in poetic ontological 
philosophy and Greek tragic poetry. The aim of this analysis will be to establish the 
ground of the claim for a truth-telling function for the work of art, and to evaluate 
why Levinas and Derrida consider a reduction to being to be ‘violent’. In the course 
of this analysis we will also make some reference to how these ‘elements’ 
characterize Stevens’ response to Keats’ poetry, as representative of romanticism. 
872 The ‘aspects of truth’ that Vattimo sees in Nietzsche and Heidegger are 
connected to the future of the ‘ontological meaning of art’.873
if one wants to indicate the direction of a thought that attempts to recover the 
ontological meaning of art, one can name immediately Nietzsche and Heidegger – 
especially Heidegger – who separate themselves from the general tendency to empty 
 Vattimo says: 
                                                          
871 Seamus Heaney, ‘On His Work in the English Tongue’, Electric Light (London: Faber and Faber, 
2001), p. 61. 
872 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, p. 1. 
873 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, p. 42. 
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art of its ontological content and open new paths to recover the ontological bearing 
of art.874
In an early work entitled The End of Modernity (1988), Vattimo decries any 
contemporary philosophical positions that ‘call for a return to the origins of 
European thought, sometimes even by citing Nietzsche and Heidegger’.
 
 
875 More 
disturbing still to Vattimo is the view that “there might not have to come out of these 
same origins what has in fact come out of them. This is far more serious, for 
probably a ‘return’ to Parmenides would mean only to start again from the 
beginning”.876 
However, Vattimo’s will not to return to Parmenides seems to overlook the 
violence that Levinas and Derrida identify in this reductive poetic thought. Why, for 
example, is the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ to being 
The Mythology of an ‘Antimythological’ Poet
violent and for our purposes, 
why are its symptoms found in Stevens' reductive poetry? To answer that question I 
propose to look at the mythological origin of the concept of the ‘oneness’ of being, 
and to consider it as a historically grounded idea that has original affinity with 
primal violence. 
 
877
Heidegger has argued that the 'goddess' who teaches Parmenides that 
‘being’ and ‘seeming’ are part of the 'it is', is called 'truth'.
 
878 This 'goddess' is not 
'the goddess of truth' for Heidegger, as Artemis is called the 'goddess of hunting' by 
the ancient Greeks, but 'she' is proposed as simply 'truth' in an unqualified sense.879
                                                          
874 Ibid., p. 42. 
875 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, p. 5. 
876 Ibid., p. 5. 
877 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 259. 
878 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, p. 5. 
879 Ibid., p. 5. 
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The 'truth' ‘she’ encompasses is that ‘being’ and ‘seeming’, or if we adopt Stevens' 
language, 'reality' and the 'imagination', are unified in the enlarged 'truth' of the 
'goddess' who Parmenides reaches through a poesis. Parmenides' philosophy 
therefore relies on calling a 'goddess' 'truth'. What Stevens’ seems to want from this 
kind of thought is Parmenides’ sense of an enlarged reality that includes the 
imagination, and also the sense of ‘travelling’ through a poesis to mean an ecstatic 
transport of this enlarged sense of present reality. This is the model, or fiction, that 
Stevens chooses to believe. 
Stevens had said he was about to write 'Description Without Place' two days 
before considering 'the supremacy of a figure like Parmenides'.880 For Bloom, ‘the 
puzzle of the poem is why he wrote it.’881 Stevens chose to open that poem with the 
line: 'It is possible that to seem - it is to be'.882
            By her own seeming made the summer change.
 The poem continues with a reference 
to a woman of 'divine' magnitude: 
            Her green mind made the world around her green.  
            The queen is an example…This green queen 
  
            In the seeming of the summer of her sun 
883
'She' is presented as the anonymous 'deity' of both being and change and I would 
argue that 'she' appears consistently throughout Stevens’ poetry, just as for 
Parmenides 'she' was reached through a 
 
   
poesis that unites ‘being’ and ‘seeming’.884
                                                          
880 A Letter to Henry Church, April 4th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 494. 
& A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
881 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 239. 
882 Wallace Stevens, ‘Description Without Place’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 296. 
883 Ibid., p. 296. 
884 In light of the Parmenidean connection to this poem, I disagree with Arnd Bohm’s suggestion that 
Stevens’ ‘green queen’ refers to Elizabeth I. (Arnd Bohm, “The Identity of the ‘Green Queen’ in 
‘Description Without Place.’” The Wallace Stevens Journal, Vol. 27 No 2 (Fall 2003): 225-254). 
 
In section V Stevens links the ‘seeming’ of ‘description without place’ to the ‘desire’ 
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for ‘A palm that rises up beyond the sea’, which as Bloom notes, appears to foretell 
of Stevens’ sense of being from ‘Of Mere Being’.885 What seems to fascinate 
Stevens is that when a poetry like Parmenides’ penetrates to what he considers to be 
the real, then the mind immediately presents this ‘first idea’ as a figure. Stevens 
continues in ‘Description Without Place’: 
 In the golden vacancy she came, and comes, 
 And seems to be on the saying of her name. 
 
 Her time becomes again, as it became, 
 The crown and week-day coronal of her fame.886
If a new poesis opens being as it apparently had for Parmenides, then that moment is 
the moment when the mind applies fictitious concepts to that sense of being. It is the 
moment in which poetry is born. However, viewed conceptually, the historical 
ground of being in the Parmenidean tradition is itself derived from a fiction that is 
consistently revived in Stevens (‘Her time becomes again’). The mythical concept of 
the ‘goddess’ stands behind the concept of being as a ‘oneness’.
 
 
887 Both concepts are 
mythological and derived from the imagination as poetry, which is why Stevens 
understands that: ‘The first idea is an imagined thing’.888
                                                          
885 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 372. 
886 Wallace Stevens, ‘Description Without Place’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 297. 
887 A similar concept has been traced by Arthur O. Lovejoy in his work entitled: The Great Chain of 
Being (1936). 
888 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 334. 
 It is also why the 
Heraclitean fire that generates flux was presented as the non-existent ‘firecat’ in 
‘Earthy Anecdote’, and why being was presented as the ‘invisible’ ‘Angel’ in ‘Angel 
Surrounded by Paysans’. The imagination had in Stevens’ view, necessarily wrapped 
the nothing of the ‘first idea’ in an imagined form, to allow being to be manifest on 
the terms that humans decree for it. 
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Vendler has suggested that ‘Description Without Place’ is ‘enclosed in a kind 
of baby talk in which the complicated and abstract philosophical vocabulary usual to 
such arguments is deliberately replaced by its simplest and most primitive 
substitutes, as “appearance” becomes “seeming,” “reality” becomes “the sun,” 
“imagination” becomes “a queen.”’889 Though I am not relying upon a source based 
reading it seems clear that Vendler is describing a close parallel with Parmenidean 
philosophy, which unites ‘seeming’ and ‘being’ in this ‘queen’ through a poesis. 
‘Seeming’ and ‘being’ are proposed as one in the ‘goddess’ for this thinking, as 
reality becomes a theatre of appearance: ‘Let be be finale of seem’.890
Precisely as Heidegger had said, Aetios records that, at the centre of 
Parmenides’ Entity ‘“is the goddess who steers the course of all things.”’
 Violence 
occurs in the moment in which Stevens reduces reality to the fiction of the ‘goddess’ 
as an ‘ontological’ ground. 
891 For 
Aristotle: ‘The science of the Entity for what it is and the science of God, the Entity 
par excellence, are one and the same science.’892
We are further told by Aetios that this goddess was called Ananke and the “Holder 
of Lots.” We know already that she “steers the course of all things,” that is, that she 
regulates the motions of the celestial bands. Simplicius adds, unfortunately without 
quoting the actual words, that she sends souls at one time from the light to the 
unseen world, at another from the unseen world to the light…and so here once more 
we seem to be on Pythagorean ground. It is to be noticed further that in fr. 10 we 
read how Ananke took the heavens and compelled them to hold fast the fixed courses 
of the stars, and that in fr. 12 we are told that she is the beginner of all pairing and 
birth. Lastly, in fr. 13 we hear that she created Eros first of all the gods. So we shall 
 Burnet, who Stevens had read by 
1945, says of Parmenides' ‘goddess’ that: 
                                                          
889 Helen Vendler, On Extended Wings – Wallace Stevens’ Longer Poems, p. 219. 
890 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Emperor of Ice-Cream’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 50. 
891 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 189. 
892 Julian Marias, History of Philosophy, p. 65. 
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find that in Empedokles it is an ancient oracle or decree of Ananke that causes the 
gods to fall and become incarnate in a cycle of births.893
 Guthrie notes of Parmenides’ poem that: ‘The religious intensity of the passage, and 
its allusion to the traditional functions of Ananke, must not be set aside any more 
than the fact that the whole exposition is a revelation from a goddess.’
 
 
894
Jonathan Barnes is more sceptical. Barnes suggests that Parmenides’ 
allegorical prologue concerning a ‘journey’ to the ‘goddess’, is ‘for the most part of 
little philosophical importance’.
 
895 Such an assessment seems correct, but since 
Stevens appears to use a model akin to the ‘religious’ form of Parmenides’ poem, we 
are at liberty to pursue Stevens’ poetry according to the model of this mythology. 
This liberty is derived from the fact that Stevens had been writing about Parmenides' 
'goddess', ‘Ananke’896, either directly or indirectly from his earliest collection, 
calling 'her' ‘The One of Fictive Music’ in Harmonium897, and 'the final god' in 
‘Owl’s Clover’898
That glistens on your face and hair.
: 
The sense of the serpent in you, Ananke, 
And your averted stride 
Add nothing to the horror of the frost 
899
                                                          
893 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 190 - 191. 
894 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Volume II - The Presocratic Tradition From 
Parmenides to Democritus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 35 - 36. 
895 Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 156. 
896 Bloom suggests that Stevens may have taken his use of ‘Ananke’ as the emblem of ‘Necessity’ 
‘from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, or from Shelley.’ (Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our 
Climate, p. 255). Although I don’t dispute these possible sources, I want to draw parallels between 
Stevens and Parmenides and argue that they both blend the figure of ‘Necessity’ with the notion of 
being in their poetry. 
897 Wallace Stevens, ‘To the One of Fictive Music’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 70. 
898 Wallace Stevens, ‘Owl’s Clover’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 162. 
899 Wallace Stevens, ‘Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 122. 
 
  
In 1940 Stevens wrote to Hi Simons to explain some details concerning ‘The 
Greenest Continent’ from ‘Owl’s Clover’, as follows: 
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If one no longer believes in God (as truth), it is not possible merely to disbelieve; it 
becomes necessary to believe in something else. Logically, I ought to believe in 
essential imagination, but that has its difficulties. It is easier to believe in a thing 
created by the imagination. A good deal of my poetry recently has concerned an 
identity for that thing. While Ananke may have been an improvisation, or an 
importation from Italy, still it was, at the time the poem was written, that thing...I 
think that the history of belief will show that it has always been in a fiction. Yet the 
statement seems a negation, or, rather, a paradox.900
I would argue that from ‘Sunday Morning’, the machinery of Ananke as a 
replacement for religion was firmly in place. It was the totalizing song that reduced 
the heavens at Key West. It was the absolute expression of the Necessity of belief 
that was ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’. It was the ‘must it be?’/ ‘it must be’ 
experience of the implacable ‘rock’, with which Stevens was trying to enact ‘the 
necessity’ ‘of a final accord with reality’.
 
 
901 It was also the nightmare of The 
Auroras. Ananke, or the philosophical veneer that covered Ananke, was always the 
‘thing’ that Stevens necessarily reverted to after choosing to ‘no longer’ believe ‘in 
God (as truth)’.902
Riddel has said that in Stevens, ‘mythology, stripped of belief, becomes a 
form.’ Certainly it would seem to be true that Stevens rejected every 
anthropomorphic sense of a 'god'. However, Vendler references in a footnote that, 
‘Ananke was, at the time Owl’s Clover was written, the only thing in which he 
believed.’
 
903 If Stevens ‘believed’ in any 'deity', then it was the amorphous entity of 
being 
                                                          
900 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 28th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 370. 
901 A Letter to Charles Tomlinson, June 19th, 1951. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 719. 
902 That ‘Ananke’ was an ‘improvisation’ for the first time in ‘Owl’s Clover’ seems questionable 
considering that the model is present in earlier poems such as ‘To the One of Fictive Music’ of 
Harmonium, and ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’ from Ideas of Order. That the concept was 
imported from Italy forms a loose line of connection to Parmenides who came from ‘Velia’, or ‘Elia’ 
in Italy. 
903 Helen Vendler, On Extended Wings – Wallace Stevens’ Longer Poems, p. 324. 
in whom reality and the imagination stood as one, an enlarged ‘real reality’ 
which brings him into dialogue with Parmenides. Stevens’ reasons for awakening 
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this kind of thinking may be that, as for Heidegger and Gadamer, it allowed for the 
notion that poetry has a truth-telling function through its connection to being. 
However, such 'truth' manifests itself as just another fiction, envisaged at times as 
‘Ananke’, the mythological ground of the notion of being as a unified ‘oneness’. 
Critchley and Ziarek want to emphasize the ‘powerlessness’ of Stevens’ 
ontological poetry, and Ziarek argues that this is904
reminiscent of the way in which Heidegger tries to think ‘being’ as ‘power-free’ 
(macht-los): it is not powerlessness as in being without or devoid of power but rather 
‘power-free’, released or disengaged from the operations of power.
: 
905
However, Stevens very clearly calls the ‘first idea’ the ‘excitation’ of ‘a pure 
power’.
 
 
906 This 'pure power' advocated in the 'Notes' is not the polemos evident 
in Stevens' poetry of the late 1930’s and early 1940’s, rather it is being established as 
a oneness in advance of (and therefore over and against) individual beings in their 
apparent struggle. Heraclitus had considered that this absolute absence of struggle 
would bring about 'the destruction of the universe' in which all things 'pass away'.907 
The ecstasy of Stevens' 'pure power' ‘Beating in the heart’ recalls Derrida, who notes 
that: ‘By another paradox, the philosophy of the neutral communicates with a 
philosophy of the site, of rootedness, of pagan violence, of ravishment, of 
enthusiasm, a philosophy offered up to the sacred, that is, to the anonymous divinity, 
the divinity without the Deity.’908
                                                          
904 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 81. 
905 Krzysztof Ziarek, ‘Without human meaning’: Stevens, Heidegger and the Foreignness of Poetry’, 
Wallace Stevens Across the Atlantic, p. 87. 
906 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 331. 
907 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 136. 
908 Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas’, 
Writing and Difference, p. 97. 
 Stevens’ sense of ‘the body quickened and the 
mind in root’ through the immanence of the ‘rock’, reveals the binary opposition at 
the heart of his poetry (through the re-birth of ‘man’ into the universal Necessity as 
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‘female’ to create ‘major man’) and the ontological ‘meaning’ of the work of art as 
Vattimo conceives of it.909 Altieri seems to rejoice in this process, making the 
assumption that the subjective reader can still stand under the reduction and that the 
act of reading Stevens’ poems makes us ‘become, in effect, “like rubies reddened by 
rubies reddening” because our “read-ening” intensifies our capacity to participate in 
what cannot change, but what can appear as a new emblem for our own powers.’ 910
Showing up, along with Heidegger’s concept of Being, is the mythical concept of 
fate...The eulogized undividedness of existence and essence in Being is thus called 
by name as what it is: the blind context of nature; the doom of concatenation; the 
absolute negation of the transcendence whose tremolo notes quiver in the talk of 
Being.
 
Inadvertently, this allowing of the self to be ‘played’ binds us into the conceptual 
ground of Parmenidean philosophy. However, Adorno has said that: 
911
If Aristotle transformed mythos to mere fiction, or fable, Stevens, in a model 
that is reminiscent of the pre-Socratics and the tradition that revered them, had 
returned to the historically grounded concept of a universal mythos.
 
 
912 As part of a 
post-theological age Stevens’ poetry chooses to believe a fiction. In a letter of 1940 
Stevens implies that ‘the heaven in Europe is empty, to recognize Ananke, who, now 
more than ever, is the world’s “starless crown”.’913
Faith in Being, a dim weltanschauung derived from critical premonitions, really 
degenerates into a bondage to Being, as Heidegger incautiously defined it once.
 What Stevens does not appear to 
consider is Adorno’s contention that: 
914
                                                          
909 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Rock’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 446. 
910 Charles Altieri, ‘Why Stevens Must be Abstract’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, p. 
114. 
911 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 118 - 119. 
912 Gianni Vattimo, Art’s Claim to Truth, p. 9. 
913 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 28th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 370. 
914 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 68. 
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At times Adorno is even more pointed in his critique of a ‘Faith in Being’, 
suggesting that ‘Heidegger promotes slave thinking.’915
‘Ananke’ originally conveyed the idea of ‘binding’ and Heinz Schreckenberg 
has found evidence that in Homeric phrases Ananke “means ‘fetters,’ ‘yoke,’ or 
‘bonds’” and that ‘she’ held ‘the cosmos together in inescapable bonds.’
  
916 We will 
recall that in forging his ‘rock’, Stevens had outlined ‘One of the limits of reality’, 
experienced through ecstatic poetic ‘transport’.917
Necessity and Fate, Ananke and Moira, were in Parmenides’s day mighty personal 
beings, of whom Ananke appears also in the second part of the poem. Just as here 
she holds the one being in the bonds of a peirar, and her companion Moira fetters it 
to be unmoved, so in the world as it appears to mortals she herself ‘fetters’ or 
compels the heaven to hold the peirata of the stars. Whatever the relation between 
the two worlds of reality and the seeming, the language of each is designed to remind 
us of the other; and the Ananke who controls the sky and the stars is the same cosmic 
goddess who in Plato’s Republic holds the spindle on which all the circles of the 
stars revolve.
 Guthrie, in investigating the link 
between Ananke and Parmenides, provides the perfect description of the 
Parmenidean model: 
918
Such a description is highly reminiscent of Stevens’ account of the ‘Fixing’ of 
‘emblazoned zones and fiery poles’ in the ‘Key West’ poem.
 
 
919
                                                          
915 Ibid., p. 89. 
916 Mihai I. Spariosu, God of Many Names – Play, Poetry and Power in Hellenic Thought From 
Homer to Aristotle, p. 76. 
917 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 323. 
918 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Volume II - The Presocratic Tradition From 
Parmenides to Democritus, p. 35. 
919 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Idea of Order at Key West’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 106. 
 What Stevens 
appears to want from the fictional concept of ‘Ananke’ as perpetual creator of order, 
is a form of poetry as the base of reality (being) that his own poetry can replace, 
using its precise model. What I want to investigate here is why the ‘reduction of 
metaphysics’ to being (conceived from the concept of Ananke), through a poesis, has 
a dialogue with ‘violence’. 
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Heidegger sees the pre-Socratic notion of the unification of 'being' and 
'seeming' to be at work in the 
The Ontological Nature of Greek Tragedy in Wallace Stevens' Poetry 
poesis
For the thinking of the early Greek thinkers, the unity and antagonism of Being and 
seeming were powerful in an originary way. However, this was all portrayed at its 
highest and purest in Greek tragic poetry. Let us consider Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. 
Oedipus, who at the beginning is the savior and lord of the state, in the brilliance of 
glory and the grace of the gods, is hurled out of this seeming….In the end, he is 
unconcealed in his Being as the murderer of his father….The path from this 
beginning in brilliance to this end in horror is a unique struggle between seeming 
(concealment and distortion) and unconcealment (Being).
 of Greek tragedy: 
920
Something of the mechanics of 'the thinking of the early Greek thinkers' is found in 
Greek tragedy, that is seen as ‘powerful in an originary way’. It is the 'unity and 
antagonism of Being and seeming' that forms part of the structure of the poesis of 
Greek tragedy for Heidegger, and he calls it power. Oedipus
 
 
 is described by 
Heidegger as being ‘hurled’ out of one state and into another. This implies that 
Oedipus as an individual is utterly subject to the two warring powers and is 
fundamentally transformed by them, through violence. This 'antagonism' between 
'Being and seeming' is reminiscent of the pre-Socratic concept of polemos and 
parallels the antagonism that exists between 'the lion in the lute' 
(seeming/imagination) and 'the lion locked in stone' (reality/being), to which Stevens 
had reduced himself on the way to creating ‘major man’.921 
                                                          
920 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 111 - 112. 
921 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
I would argue that the destruction and renewal of the tragic hero on 
ontological terms is precisely the mechanics that Stevens uses in creating ‘major 
man’. In other words, according to Heidegger’s interpretation of Parmenides, the 
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destruction and rebirth of the tragic hero is a rebirth into the ‘it is’ of ‘Ananke’, who 
binds ‘Being’ and ‘seeming’ as one. In Stevens this imagery is fulfilled in the unison 
of the reigniting ‘phoenix’ and the evergreen ‘palm’, located in the ‘bronze’ 
‘underworld’. Guthrie maintains of Ananke that “in Aeschylus, as here in 
Parmenides, she is ‘one form with many names’”, and that ‘she’ was evident to 
Parmenides’ ‘Pythagorean-trained mind’.922
Altieri, in an essay concerned with Stevens and elements of Husserl, 
considers Critchley’s emphasis on: “the ideal of ‘letting be’ and a corresponding 
eagerness to celebrate what manages to resist the ego’s demands and the 
rhetorician’s skills” as follows
 As we proceed I propose to demonstrate 
that the same structure that Heidegger sees in Greek tragedy is at work in Stevens' 
poetry. This will be done in order to identify the source of this reductive ‘violence’ 
in ‘early Greek’ thinking and to demonstrate its existence in Stevens’ poetry.  
923
I think this model is neither sufficiently rich in its affirmations nor sufficiently dark 
in its sense of tragedy to be adequate to late Stevens. (The appropriate sense of 
tragedy has to involve finding an aspect of the will that can come to terms with 
necessity.)
: 
924
At this point we will turn to the late Laureate, Ted Hughes, in order to make 
use of the comparative mythology that he employs in his elucidation of the 
 
 
I agree with Altieri in this instance that Critchley’s effort brackets philosophy in 
such a way as to separate it from a mythos common to Attic tragedy. Here I will 
consider that symbiotic relationship in early and late Stevens and his attempt to 
establish its connection to ‘necessity’. 
                                                          
922 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Volume II - The Presocratic Tradition From 
Parmenides to Democritus, p. 64. 
923 Charles Altieri, ‘Stevens and the Crisis of European Philosophy’, Wallace Stevens Across the 
Atlantic, p. 70. 
924 Ibid., p. 70. 
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mechanics of Shakespearean tragedy. Hughes and Stevens are of course radically 
different poets in almost every respect. However, I want to use Hughes’ comparative 
mythology as a model to illuminate the connections between pre-Socratic poetic 
mysticism, Greek tragic poetry and the mythological references in Stevens’ poetry. 
The purpose of this is to attempt to account for the source of reductive, poetic 
‘violence’, and to demonstrate how a reworking of historical concepts for ‘modern’ 
ends also accounts for the primal violence at work in that same ‘modern’ poetry, in 
its dialogue with the past. 
In his Shakespeare and the Goddess of Complete Being (1992), Hughes 
traces the fusing of the Apollonian and the Dionysian in Shakespeare’s tragedies, 
and in this instance in context of Heraclitus: 
“The Pythia, with raving mouth, uttering her unlaughing, unadorned words, reaches 
us over a thousand years with her voice - through the inspiration of the god,” says 
Heraclitus. It is worth a glance, just in passing the shrine at Delphi, to see that 
Dionysus, the archetypal dying and resurrected god, was buried here and that the 
Delphic priesthood regarded him as the cyclic, or dying and reborn, inner being of 
Apollo.925 
 
'Let Phoebus slumber and die' says Stevens in the 'Notes'.926 Stevens knows that 
'Phoebus' was just 'a name for something that never could be named', but he retains 
the precise model as he introduces his 'major man', that is the 'human' reborn 
(‘swaddled’) into the fullness of amorphous complete being.927 In an early chapter of 
his posthumously published work, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, Nietzsche had 
written on the ‘Mythical Preliminary Stage of Philosophy’.928
                                                          
925 Ted Hughes, Shakespeare and the Goddess of Complete Being (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 
1992), p. 373. 
926 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 329. 
927 Ibid., p. 335. 
928 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, p. 10. 
 Prior to elaborating 
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upon Heraclitus, Parmenides and the other pre-Platonics, Nietzsche suggests that in 
‘Delphi’ ‘we find an epicenter of philosophical theology.’929
Hughes shows that for the Greeks the tension between the Apollonian and 
Dionysian, which results in the ‘death’ and ‘rebirth’, takes place within the context 
of ‘the ecstatic wave of a Goddess mystery religion’, that is, in his own terms, in 
context of the ‘Goddess of Complete Being’.
 
930
Apollo’s shrine at Delphi was originally the shrine of the great serpent, Python. The 
oracular priestess, the Pythia, spoke literally with the voice of the Earth as the 
original serpent – the great Serpentine Goddess as Total, Unconditional Being.
 Hughes is suggesting that in the 
traditional model of tragic poetry, the Apollonian and the Dionysian are forged 
together in the woman of ‘Complete Being’ through a process of ‘death’ and 
‘rebirth’, symbolically uniting the rational and the irrational in the renewed ‘oneness’ 
of the ‘goddess’. For Stevens, such mythic machinery appears to suit his modern 
aims, as the rational and existent forms are overpowered, infinitely destroyed and 
made anew in the fiction of the ‘goddess’ as the ultimate ground.  
Hughes notes further that: 
931
The Greeks believed the site of Delphi to be the centre of the earth, represented by a 
stone, the omphalos or navel, which was guarded by Python. Stevens’ ‘Fat girl’ 
(earth) had needed the ‘irrational distortion’ to be included to achieve his sense of 
the ‘rock’, which was the ‘centre’ that Stevens had sought. The conception of the 
‘goddess’ was consistently identified with serpents for Stevens: From the ‘aspic 
nipples’ mentioned in the early poem, ‘In the Carolinas’
 
 
932
                                                          
929 Ibid., p. 10. 
930 Ted Hughes, Shakespeare and the Goddess of Complete Being, p. 374. 
931 Ibid., p. 373. 
932 Wallace Stevens, ‘In the Carolinas’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 4. 
; to ‘The snake’ who had 
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‘left its skin upon the floor’ in ‘Farewell to Florida’933; to the ‘sense of the serpent in 
you, Ananke’, of ‘Like Decorations’934; to that terrible encounter with the ‘bodiless’ 
‘serpent’ with ‘Skin flashing’ in ‘The Auroras of Autumn’.935
In her later forms, throughout the Middle East, she takes on a double existence as 
Inanna (Ishtar, Astarte, Athtar, etc.), who is Goddess of Love and Reproduction, and 
as Ereshkigal (Allatu, etc.), who is Goddess of the Underworld. Her consort was 
Thammuz, or Dumuzi, ‘the son of the deep waters’, who spent one part of the year in 
the upper world, with the Love Goddess, and the other part in the Underworld with 
the Queen of Hell. In the Babylon known to the Hebrew prophets she was Ishtar, 
whose consort was Thammuz. In Jerusalem, down to the sixth century BC, as the 
lover of Astoreth, Asherah, or Anath, for whom the Temple was first built, her 
consort was Thammuz or Baal (Ezekiel heard the woman mourning Thammuz at the 
north gate). His title was Adonis, ‘Lord’.
 Whether derived from 
romanticism, Nietzsche, Müller or Parmenides, Stevens is enacting a fiction that he 
chooses to believe, even though he knows it to be a fiction. 
 In his comparative mythology, Hughes notes of the idea of the woman of 
‘Complete Being’ that: 
936
Kingsley, in a section entitled ‘Parmenides and Babylon’, implies that the 
Babylonian woman and her consort is the ultimate origin of the nature of the 
metaphysics of Parmenides
 
 
937
What has not so far been adequately emphasised, however, is the fact that not just 
the motif of a descent to the great Goddess in the underworld but also Parmenides’ 
detailed imagery of guarded doors, gates, bolts, bars, keys, and locks preventing or 
providing access to the underworld is a central feature of Babylonian cosmic 
mythology. What is more, the gateways in question are routinely described in 
Babylonian sources as lying on the paths of the sun and moon - just as Parmenides’ 
guarded gates stand on “the paths of night and day”.
: 
938
                                                          
933 Wallace Stevens, ‘Farewell to Florida’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 97. 
934 Wallace Stevens, ‘Like Decorations in a Nigger Cemetery’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 122. 
935 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Auroras of Autumn’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 355. 
936 Ted Hughes, Shakespeare and the Goddess of Complete Being, p. 6. 
937 Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic - Empedocles and Pythagorian Tradition,  
p. 392 - 393. 
938 Ibid., p. 392 - 393. 
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Kingsley makes the astonishing case that the archaeological evidence suggests that 
‘Parmenides himself was a priest of Apollo.’939 Or more specifically, a priest of 
‘Apollo Oulios - the god who destroys and makes whole’.940 In mythology, when 
Apollo killed the Python, he was supposed to have taken on its serpent powers 
himself. Stevens believed that any conception of a ‘god’ was a product of the 
imagination and it seems certain that Barnes’ analysis would disagree with 
Kingsley’s assessment. However, something very close to what Kingsley considers 
to be the Parmenidean model remained. Stevens says that: ‘The poet is the priest of 
the invisible.’941
Read purely as a comparative mythology, Hughes’ analysis would suggest 
that the root of Parmenides’ ‘philosophy’ shares a common ancestry to Greek tragic 
poetry, as Heidegger and Guthrie’s assessments would also imply. Indeed, Hughes 
considers that Dionysus was a Greek embodiment of the earlier consort, 
Thammuz.
 It is the same model, but Stevens is self-consciously choosing to 
believe a fiction. 
942
                                                          
939 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 274. 
940 Ibid., p. 295. 
941 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 908. 
942 Hughes makes it clear that Dionysus is a type of the dying and reborn Thammuz, that originates 
from Babylon and the Great Goddess is his Mother (Ishtar). (Ted Hughes, Shakespeare and the 
Goddess of Complete Being, p. 373.) 
 Hughes goes on to elaborate how this line of mythology emerged in 
ancient Greece as Aphrodite and Adonis, having its parallel in the myth of Actaeon, 
where, according to Hughes, in both cases the rational heroes are torn to pieces by 
the enraged ‘Queen of Hell’ nature of the ‘goddess’, only to be ‘reborn’ in the 
‘oneness’ of ‘her’ ‘love’, just as the sun appeared to be ‘reborn’ daily from the 
‘underworld’. Stevens may well have been familiar with the model of the ‘goddess’ 
and the dying and reborn sun ‘god’ from the pages of Müller, a father of comparative 
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mythology, who he had read when he was ‘young’.943 In his Introduction to the 
Science of Religion, Müller elaborates on much of what Hughes utilizes for his own 
comparative mythology.944
Another female goddess is Ashtoreth or Ashtaroth (plural), a name which 
presupposes a masculine deity, Ashtor. Traces of this god or goddess have been 
discovered in the Ishtar of the Babylonian inscriptions, where Ishtar is always 
feminine, the Queen of heaven and earth.
  For example, Müller notes that:  
945
The catagories by which Western philosophy defined its everlasting natural order 
marked the spots once occupied by Oncus and Persephone, Ariadne and Nereus. The 
pre-Socratic cosmologies conserve the moment of transition.
 
 
Adorno suggests that: 
946
You are that white Eulalia of the name.
 
 
In ‘Certain Phenomena of Sound’ there may be evidence of Stevens’ 
consciousness of a rebirth into the Babylonian matriarch as the ultimate ground of a 
universal fiction: 
 I write Semiramide and in the script 
 I am and have a being and play a part. 
947
Vaught Brogan notes that, ‘the “vital I” is potentially reduced to a linguistic sign 
inscribed in the word Semiramide.’
 
 
948 In legend, Semiramis was purported to be the 
woman who established and built “Babylon”.949
                                                          
943 A Letter to Leonard C. van Geyzel, December 9th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 381. 
944 Max Müller, Introduction to the Science of Religion; Four Lectures Delivered at the Royal 
Institution, in February and May 1870 (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1882), pp. 114 - 118. 
945 Ibid., p. 116. 
946 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 5 - 6. 
947 Wallace Stevens, ‘Certain Phenomena of Sound’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 257. 
948 Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, The Violence Within The Violence Without - Wallace Stevens and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Poetics, p. 19. 
949 Simon Price and Emily Kearns, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of Classical Myth & Religion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 504 - 505. 
 Indeed, Semiramide is the name of 
Rossini’s opera, itself based upon Voltaire’s tragedy, Semiramis. With one hand 
Stevens is denying her name as just a ‘word’ - ‘You were created of your name’. Yet 
with the other, in the ‘dark-syllabled’ name of that same ‘script’, he says, ‘I am and 
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have a being and play a part.’950 ‘Semiramide’ is seen as a root of all things as 
fictions to which Stevens reduces the rational ‘I’. According to Hughes, this kind of 
reduction enacts the mythology that informs Greek tragic poetry, as the symbolic 
‘death’ and ‘rebirth’ collapses the subjective self into the ‘oneness’ of the ‘goddess’. 
Indeed, the case would seem definitive when we consider Stevens' reference to the 
'white Eulalia of the name'. Cook makes the connection to St. Eulalia, but also to the 
Greek eulalon, which means "sweetly spoken", as well as being 'one name of 
Apollo'.951 This equates with Bloom’s assessment that the Harmonium poem, ‘Tea at 
the Palaz of Hoon’, enacts ‘the re-birth of the poet as Apollo.’952 In ‘Certain 
Phenomena of Sound’ the rebirth of the consort (Apollo) into the dual aspect 
‘goddess’ appears to facilitate the kinds of connections that Stevens has consistently 
associated with being
With this in mind we will now proceed to read Stevens' enacting of the model 
of Attic Greek tragedy through the lens of Nietzsche's 
, such as connecting the 'dark' and the 'white' and the French 
language to English as one ‘whole’ language. 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872). 
From this analysis I seek to demonstrate that a belief in a totalizing myth produces a 
violent reduction of the ‘self’, and to agree with Adorno that the ‘oneness’ of 'being' 
is always conceptual. Indeed, my line of argument will concur with Adorno and 
Horkheimer, who in their work entitled Dialectic of Enlightenment, see such a return 
to myth as inevitable for ‘enlightenment’ thinking.953
                                                          
950 Wallace Stevens, ‘Certain Phenomena of Sound’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 256 - 257. 
951 Eleanor Cook, A Reader’s Guide to Wallace Stevens, p. 173. 
952 Harold Bloom, Yeats (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 37. 
953 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xvi. 
 This process will stand as a 
critique of Vattimo's desire to not 'return' to Parmenides, but to move into a post-
modernism characterised by a complete hermeneutics that is not interested in 
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revisiting what Parmenides actually means by 'truth'. How then does the unity of the 
‘goddess’ appear in Stevens as what I am calling 'the play of violence'? 
 Stevens shows himself to be aware of the Greek ‘art-worlds’ of the 
Apollonian and the Dionysian, when he says in ‘Two Prefaces’ (1956) that: 
M. Séchan speaks of the fact that both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were influential 
forces at the time when Valéry was maturing. But he regards Dance and the Soul as 
Apollonian rather than Dionysian, because as Apollonian it corresponds better with 
the Greek genius.954
In opposition to the Apollonian persona of “Hymn to a Watermelon Pavilion” who 
conveys the dreamworld of phenomena, the persona of “Peter Quince” receives the 
Dionysian knowledge of that which exists behind phenomena.
 
 
Leggett argues that the Apollonian and the Dionysian are evident in Stevens’ early 
poetry. In a chapter entitled ‘Apollonian and Dionysian in Harmonium’, Leggett 
writes extensively of Stevens’ use of these two ‘art-worlds’, making observations 
such as: 
955 
 
In what follows I will attempt to illuminate additional examples of how the union of 
the Apollonian and the Dionysian in the ‘goddess’, forms the structure of certain 
poems. In doing this I wish to show that the mythological forms of Greek tragic 
poetry parallel the forms of pre-Socratic poetic conceptions: that the 'antagonism' 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian is akin to the polemos between 
the imagination and reality, between seeming and being, between the rational and 
irrational and between sculpture and music. Further that this polemos is only 
neutralized in the oneness of the mythical ‘goddess’ (being as a single unity
                                                          
954 Wallace Stevens, ‘Two Prefaces’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 891. 
955 B.J. Leggett, Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext, p. 82. 
) in 
whom all things are forcibly reduced to a totalitarian fiction. 
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 In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche initially defines the separate ‘art-worlds’ 
of the Apollonian and the Dionysian respectively, as ‘sculpture’ and the ‘non-plastic’ 
‘art of music’.956
These two distinct tendencies run parallel to each other, for the most part openly at 
variance; and they continually incite each other to new and more powerful births, 
which perpetuate an antagonism, only superficially reconciled by the common term 
“Art”; till at last, by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will, they appear coupled 
with each other, and through this coupling eventually generate the art-product, 
equally Dionysian and Apollonian, of Attic tragedy.
 It is the coupling of these two ‘art-worlds’ that creates the 
phenomenon known as Attic tragedy according to Nietzsche: 
957
Nietzsche’s use of the phrase ‘powerful births’ is reminiscent of Heidegger’s sense 
that these same ‘forces’ were ‘powerful’.
 
 
958
music is identified with the form-destroying Dionysian impulse; it is identified with 
desire, and music/desire is the force that moves the poem, the agency of change. The 
relation between music and scene in the poem is not that between lyric and narrative 
but rather between two resources of the lyric - the musical mood as the language of 
feeling and the image or scene as the form given to feeling. The shifts in tone and 
mood correspond to the shifts in imagery, and these suggest the stages of the 
transformation of the speaker, who moves from Apollonian individuality to 
Dionysian oneness to the Dionyso-Apollonian affirmation of the world of becoming 
that ends the poem.
 Such ‘power’ is only associated with 
annihilation and ‘rebirth’ into a fiction. Leggett suggests of the Harmonium poem, 
‘Peter Quince at the Clavier’, that: 
959 
 
Stevens had said of poem XI of ‘Blue Guitar’ that: ‘The chord destroys its elements 
by uniting them in the chord. They then cease to exist separately.’960 In ‘The Glass of 
Water’ Stevens had written that, ‘The metaphysica, the plastic parts of poems/ Crash 
in the mind’.961
                                                          
956 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1995), p. 1. 
957 Ibid., p. 1. 
958 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 112. 
959 B.J. Leggett, Early Stevens: The Nietzschean Intertext, pp. 81 - 82. 
960 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 10th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 363. 
961 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Glass of Water’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 182. 
 The constant struggle of the unifying nature of music and the plastic 
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images of art, are evidently involved in an antithetical struggle in Stevens’ verse, that 
are ultimately united in the fiction of the ‘goddess’. 
 If we think of Stevens’ poetry in this context, then it is possible to argue that 
the plastic ‘arts’ had come head to head with unbounded nature in the Harmonium 
poem, ‘Anecdote of the Jar’. We might suggest that as with Keats’ ‘urn’, the 
dominance of the sterile Apollonian plastic form has left the Dionysian inert at its 
exterior (‘no longer wild’).962
 Nietzsche shows that for ancient Greek thinking the Apollonian ‘rationalism’, 
manifested as the ‘I’ of the rational ego, is constantly at war with the Dionysian 
reduction of everything to the ‘Primal Unity’.
 Stevens appears to be somewhat mocking Keats’ 
poem, suggesting that art needs to involve the antagonism of the two ‘art-worlds’, 
not the dominance of the Apollonian. As Stevens’ art develops the Dionysian aspect 
will be used to destroy Keats’ Apollonian-centric romanticism in an effort to induce 
the rebirth that incorporates both ‘art-worlds’ as non-anthropomorphic, metaphysical 
concepts. Stevens’ poesis shows acute consciousness of the import of the relation 
between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, in a similar way as the Greeks had 
coupled them in creating tragedy in the unity of the conceptual ‘goddess’. 
963 In an essay of 1948, ‘Imagination as 
Value’, Stevens had written that: ‘What, then, is it to live in the mind with the 
imagination, yet not too near to the foundations of its rhetoric…Only the reason 
stands between it and the reality for which the two are engaged in a struggle.’964
                                                          
962 Wallace Stevens, ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 61. 
963 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 11 - 12. 
964 Wallace Stevens, ‘Imagination as Value’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 
729. 
 
Stevens had mounted an attack on the rationalists from his first collection. The 
confrontation with ‘reason’ came either overtly: ‘Rationalists, wearing square hats,/ 
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Think, in square rooms’965, or more fundamentally with the collapse of the ego into 
the ‘evilly compounded, vital I’966, into the amorphous unity (‘One must have a 
mind of winter’).967 
Of course, Heidegger has argued that Nietzsche is the last in a long line of 
‘metaphysicians’ who inadvertently advocate a subjectivity locked out of the 
question of the 'meaning' of being.968 In his four volume work on Nietzsche, 
originally offered as four lecture courses between 1936 to 1940 at the University of 
Freiburg-im-Breisgau, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's philosophy remains 
embroiled in the old problems of metaphysics, which addresses beings and not the 
meaning of Being.969 It is the aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy such as 'The Will To 
Power', 'nihilism', 'the superman' and the 'Eternal Return of the Same' etc., that 
leads Heidegger to conclude that Nietzsche is the last in a long line of  
metaphysicians still excluded from the first question of philosophy, concerning the 
meaning of being. However, judging from Heidegger's own assertions about being 
and seeming in Attic Greek tragedy, as well as his own destruction of 'man' in favour 
of Dasein, Nietzsche's early work on tragedy suggests that Heidegger and Nietzsche 
share an influence from a common ‘mythic’ ground (which for Vattimo, curiously 
amounts to 'aspects of truth').970 
                                                          
965 Wallace Stevens, ‘Six Significant Landscapes’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 60. 
966 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Poems of Our Climate’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 179. 
967 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Snow Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 8. 
968 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche – Volumes One and Two, trans. by David Farrell Krell (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991), p. 18. 
969 Ibid., p. 18. 
970 Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity, p. 1. 
The key to unlocking one of the widest vistas onto the highly 
nuanced philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger is arguably found in their deep 
study and adoration of the pre-Socratics, Attic tragedy and the world of the ancient 
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Greeks. According to the arguments put forward in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche's 
promotion of the Dionysian establishes a 'Primal Unity'.971 This ‘Primal Unity’ is 
conceived from within the terms of what Nietzsche had elsewhere called the 
‘Mythical Preliminary Stage of Philosophy’ at Delphi, the site of the cult of the 
dying and reborn ‘god’.972 We have to consider that when Nietzsche in the mask of 
Zarathustra spoke 'thus' to the personified sun and went 'down', he was taking onto 
himself the mythical model of the Dionysian ‘inner being’ of Apollo, who sank into 
the underworld (on ‘the paths of night and day’) in order to reground humanity in a 
universal fiction for the perpetual remaking of the self973
Like thee must I go down, as men say, to whom I shall descend.
: 
Therefore must I descend into the deep: as thou doest in the evening, when thou 
goest behind the sea, and givest light also to the nether-world, thou exuberant star!  
 
974 
 
This aligning of the subjective self with the model of Apollo who in Greek myth 
descends nightly to the ‘nether-world’ of Tartarus where the 'goddess' 'is', in order to 
be ‘reborn’, may just be a metaphor for the rays of 'knowledge' descending to 
humanity, but only a 'knowledge' that operates according to the 
originating mythology of Dionysus being the 'dying and reborn inner being of 
Apollo', or as Nietzsche signed himself in the letters he wrote after his collapse in 
Turin in 1881, 'the Crucified one', or ‘Dionysus’.975  
                                                          
971 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 11. 
972 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, p. 10. 
973 Peter Kingsley, Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic - Empedocles and Pythagorian Tradition,  
p. 392 - 393. 
974 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. by Thomas Common (Ware: Wordsworth 
Editions Limited, 1997), p. 3. 
975 Richard Schacht, Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality – Essays on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), p. 234. 
It is from the enlarged ground of the dead ‘god’ (‘Apollo’), presumably 
chosen for its total ‘otherness’ to the Biblical account of the resurrection to eternal 
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life, that Nietzsche suggests ‘the first decent human being'976 will emerge, a 
'superman'.977 I would argue that this ‘superman’ is conceived as ‘the sacrifice of its 
highest types to its own inexhaustibility’, as what Nietzsche calls the ‘Dionysian’.978 
It is what Nietzsche further refers to as ‘being oneself the eternal joy of becoming, 
that joy that also encompasses the joy of destruction.’979 If ‘being oneself’ is being 
‘the eternal joy of becoming’, then what Nietzsche calls “the concept of ‘being’” as a 
stasis, is passed over in favour of an ontology of becoming and struggle.980 
In accordance with the Dionysian terms, Nietzsche embraces the destruction 
of ‘self’ in favour of the amorphous ontology of universal life and death. This is in 
line with Nietzsche’s very clear rejection of the Son of God in favour of the ‘sun 
god’, or at least ‘his’ dancing Dionysian ‘inner-being’. Further, Nietzsche also 
determines that this rebirth into an ontological ground of flux as ‘this doctrine of 
Zarathustra’s’, ‘could also have been taught already by Heraclitus.’981 The ‘rebirth’ 
is not conceived as a rebirth to rationally conscious life, rather it is a ‘rebirth’ into 
the blind ‘otherness’ of life and death in meaningless cycle. The ‘Dionysian’ is a 
‘yes’ saying to that cycle at the expense of the rational self. 
This ‘yes’ saying is of course not religion for Nietzsche, as for Stevens, it is 
what they, like Parmenides and Heraclitus (in their different ways) call ‘reality’, 
though it is inherited from Greek religion, presented as religion and speaks in 
religious terms. The conception that 'God is dead'982
                                                          
976 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, trans. by Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
p. 88. 
977 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 6. 
978 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 47. 
979 Ibid., p. 47. 
980 Ibid., p. 48. 
981 Ibid., p. 48. 
982 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, p. 5. 
, or in Stevens' terms 'the death 
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of one god is the death of all'983, is never the end of mythology. Rather, under its 
own terms of conception it is only the collapse of the consort (‘Apollo’) into the 
unity of the ‘goddess’ who, according to myth, 'causes the gods to fall and become 
incarnate in a cycle of births', as an ultimate fictional ground lodged at the base of 
Western metaphysics.984 ‘Man’ may have assumed the place of these mythical ‘gods’ 
(who lead not to ‘life’, but to renewal into the amorphous cycles of the universe 
under ‘Necessity’), but the machinery remains the same, because the rebirth is into a 
purported enlargement of ‘reality’ (the ‘goddess’) that includes ‘good’ and ‘evil’. 
We may maintain that for Nietzsche and Stevens this model remains 
conceptual; I do not contest that at all, but it still remains a fiction that retains its 
original mythic violence against the extant 'self', who in reality is present in advance 
of all myth making. Violence is retained because the ‘rebirth’ we are being asked to 
make is into a reductive concept of the non-anthropomorphic, blind reality, from 
which the artist can paint an enlarged sense of ‘human’. Such writing may be called 
pharmakon, at once poison and ‘cure’ (‘of the ground’).985 It is that which in 
Derrida’s sense puts ‘play’ into ‘play’.986 
Arguably, Western metaphysics was founded upon a poetic fiction that began 
with the Pre-Socratics and Heidegger's ‘reduction of metaphysics’, like Stevens' 
own, is only an enacting of more mythology as Adorno's thought would suggest.987
                                                          
983 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 329. 
984 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 191. 
985 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, trans. by Barbara Johnson (London & New York: Continuum, 
1981), p. 98. 
986 Ibid., p. 97. 
987 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 118 - 119. 
 
By diverting philosophy into the question of the ‘meaning’ of being, Heidegger has 
already accepted the myth of the concept of being as a ‘oneness’ inherited from 
Parmenides. I would argue that Heidegger’s philosophy conceptually begins where 
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Parmenides’ ends, after the ‘rebirth’ from the ‘underworld’ where the unification is 
founded according to the myth. Stevens had denied that Nietzsche's 'superman' was a 
model for 'major man', and the Empedoclean and Xenophanean models seemed to 
confirm that.988 However, I would suggest that the myth that Nietzsche is using in 
generating the imagined 'superman' is ultimately connected to the myth that underlies 
Parmenides’ descent to the ‘goddess’ in the ‘underworld’, Empedocles’ death and 
‘rebirth’ into complete being and the amorphous, non-anthropomorphic ‘god’ of the 
protestant Xenophanes, as advocates of the ‘One’.989 If Stevens and Nietzsche lend 
themselves to comparison in any defining way, then arguably it is as figures who 
reject inherited forms of religion on the terms of an inherited form of Greek poetic 
‘religion’, that allows for the perpetual making of oneself as a new fiction. It is the 
perpetuum-mobile of modernism. 
If Nietzsche's philosophy embraced the myth of the role of the consort 
through his own aligning of his subjective self with the non-subjective 'otherness' of 
the Dionysian 'Primal Unity' (as a name for the enlarged reality that cannot be 
named), then under the same model, or in this case, parallel, Heidegger's philosophy 
embraces the 'Goddess of Complete Being' as 'truth' via Parmenides. That is why 
Heidegger appears to be at odds with Nietzsche, because Nietzsche focuses on the 
Dionysian moment of destruction and abides in it, though in the wider vista of the 
complete mythology, it becomes clear how they are connected. Gadamer notes that 
the ‘true predecessor’ of Heidegger ‘was neither Dilthey nor Husserl, then, but rather 
Nietzsche’.990
                                                          
988 A Letter to Henry Church, June 12th, 1942. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 409. 
989 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 119. 
990 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 248. 
 This may indicate why Vattimo would sense this connection, though 
he proceeds to erroneously call it ‘truth’. Stevens’ poetry urges Apollo to 'slumber 
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and die' and then advances the universal 'pure power' of the 'first idea', through 
which ‘major man’ is born991, ‘understanding’ that ‘the irrational is rational’.992 The 
reader is being ‘played’ in ways that cannot be fully grasped without the perspective 
of the original driving concept, as demonstrated in Altieri’s enthusiastic acceptance 
that, ‘as we entertain the “as” we become figures of desire participating in the life of 
major man.’993 Of course in Stevens, the antagonism between the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian continues to incite them to ‘new and more powerful births’ as they are 
united in the model of the 'Goddess of Complete Being'.994
 It was the rational ‘I’ who had placed the jar in Tennessee and it was the 
rationally constructed jar that made nature ‘slovenly’.
 
995
Just how the jar, an artefact, comes to represent the intellect is not clear.....In any 
event, jar clashes with “slovenly wilderness”.
 This provides an answer to 
some musings by Riddel, who wonders: 
996
Certainly the jar ‘comes to represent the intellect’ and the rational intellect is itself a 
signifier of the Greek Apollonian ‘art-world’, that ‘clashes’ with the Dionysian sway 
of unbounded nature. Stevens’ word ‘dominion’ (the jar ‘took dominion 
everywhere’) does not seem to imply man’s ‘dominion’ over the earth, as set down 
at Eden, but it implies the assertive (‘took’) ‘dominion’ of the Apollonian ‘art-
world’, which is a more primeval ground for Stevens in conjunction with the 
Dionysian element, to which ‘man’ and ‘garden’ are implicitly reduced as we saw in 
the last chapter.
 
 
997
                                                          
991 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 329 - 331. 
992 Ibid., p. 351. 
993 Charles Altieri, ‘Why Stevens Must be Abstract’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, p. 
112. 
994 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 1. 
995 Wallace Stevens, ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 60. 
996 Joseph N. Riddel, The Clairvoyant Eye: The Poetry and Poetics of Wallace Stevens, p. 43. 
997 Wallace Stevens, ‘Anecdote of the Jar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 61. 
 This defines the destructive struggle between the two ‘art-worlds’ 
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within the bond of the poesis as the ultimate ground of Stevens’ reductive, universal 
fiction. 
From this line of hypothesis we can surmise further about Stevens’ 1944 
critique of Allan Tate for not having enough of the peasant about him, stating that for 
his own part, he (Stevens) ‘liked sap and lots of it’.998 Guthrie clarifies in context of 
Xenophanes that: ‘Bacchus, god of the grape, was god also of all life-giving juices. 
He made the difference between a pliant, green and sappy bough and a dead, dry and 
brittle one’.999 Perhaps this is why the ‘pine’ and the ‘palm’ (as evergreens) 
combined with the metaphysical amount to Stevens’ conception of complete being? 
It would appear to be the encounter of this irrational Dionysian element and the 
‘rational’ Apollonian element that ‘Anecdote of the Jar’ plays out. Keats’ 
‘unravish’d bride’ encircled by the ‘leaf-fringed legend’ that ‘haunts’ about thy 
shape in the form of ‘wild ecstasy’, seems to have been parodied in Stevens’ poem as 
we have said.1000 What subsequent poems would show is how Stevens was 
conceptually waiting with ‘Bacchus and his pards’ to destroy Keats’ Apollonian 
poetics, and in doing so, enact the rebirth of the two into the universal ‘oneness’ of 
the ‘goddess’.1001
 In Attic tragedy the antithetical struggle of the ‘rational’ element with the 
‘Primal Unity’, seems to be a consistent theme.
 
1002
                                                          
998 A Letter to Henry Church, January 21st, 1944. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 461. 
999 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Volume I – The Earlier Presocratics and the 
Pythagoreans, pp. 372. 
1000 John Keats, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’, The Works of John Keats, p. 233. 
1001 Ibid., p. 231. 
1002 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, pp. 11 - 12. 
 Nietzsche had argued in The Birth 
of Tragedy that because Prometheus gave fire to man, he must be torn to pieces by 
vultures, ‘because of his excessive wisdom which could solve the riddle of the 
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Sphinx, Oedipus must be plunged into a bewildering vortex of crime.’1003 We might 
add that because of his rationalising, Pentheus was also torn to pieces. In each case 
the irrational element overwhelms the rational as both are united through a rebirth in 
the ‘oneness’ of the unseen ‘goddess’. The reason for this may well prove to be that 
tragedy for the Greeks was ‘part of the rite of Dionysus, the term tragoidia (goat 
song) from which the word tragedy is derived, probably referring to the sacrificial 
goat.’1004 However, despite the presence of strong parallels the general consensus 
among scholars has been that ‘there is no satisfactory explanation of this name’, and 
it remains enigmatic.1005 Yet what we do know for certain is that tragedy was 
performed at the festival called the ‘Great Dionysia’ and that the ‘tragedians set 
individual characters, entire plays, and indeed the tragic genre as a whole in a 
distinct Dionysiac ambience.’1006
 These musicians dubbing at a tragedy
 
Stevens’ work plays with references to the Greek stage, masks, and festivals, 
which at times point to something akin to the festival of the ‘Great Dionysia’. For 
example, Stevens had written the following lines (that clearly remember Keats’ 
Grecian urn) in ‘The Auroras of Autumn’: 
 We stand in the tumult of a festival. 
 
 What festival? This loud, disordered mooch? 
 These hospitaliers? These brute-like guests? 
1007
The localized technê of Keats’ Grecian urn, as indicative of the Apollonian 
subjectivism, is universalised in the destructive Dionysian flow of ‘The Auroras of 
 
 
                                                          
1003 Ibid., p. 11. 
1004 Euripides, Bacchae, trans. by, Henry Hart Milman (Mineola: Dover Publications, Inc., 1997), p. v. 
1005 M.C. Howatson and Ian Cilvers, ed., The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature 
(Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 548. 
1006 Simon Price and Emily Kearns, ed., The Oxford Dictionary of  Classical Myth and Religion, pp. 
168 & 172. 
1007 Wallace Stevens, The Auroras of Autumn’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 358 - 359. 
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Autumn’. This clearly demonstrates how modernism universalised the metaphysics 
of romanticism as ‘truth’ (on non-anthropomorphic terms), in this case enlarging its 
scope by including the Dionysian ravishment that destroys the Apollonian idyll of 
piping without music, plastic form and the correlation of beauty and truth at the 
exclusion of the ugly, that Keats’ poem proposes.1008 The romantic project gets re-
worked by modernism in part through a playing out of the original terms of the 
myth, fragments of which are already lodged within the work of certain romantic 
poets. Whereas Keats’ ‘swallows’ ascend into the sky in the perpetual ripeness of 
Autumn, Stevens’ undulating ‘pigeons’ ‘sink,/ Downward to darkness’.1009
                                                          
1008 John Keats, ‘Ode on a Grecian Urn’, The Works of John Keats, pp. 233 - 234. 
1009 John Keats, ‘To Autumn’, The Works of John Keats, p. 246. & Wallace Stevens, ‘Sunday 
Morning’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 56. 
 In other 
words, Stevens tips the balance to first destroy romanticism, only for both ‘art-
worlds’ to be reborn into the ‘oneness’ of the ‘goddess’ in an effort to surpass 
romanticism. This mythology is neither romantic nor modern, it is a historical 
concept that both ‘movements’ are using different aspects of, in its Greek tragic 
form, to achieve their own desired ends. 
An additional reference to the Dionysian ‘festival’ seems to have appeared 
earlier in ‘Blue Guitar’: 
In the cathedral, I sat there, and read,  
Alone, a lean Review and said, 
 
"These degustations in the vaults  
Oppose the past and the festival. 
 
What is beyond the cathedral, outside,  
Balances with nuptial song. 
 
So it is to sit and to balance things  
To and to and to the point of still, 
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To say of one mask it is like,  
To say of another it is like, 
 
To know that the balance does not quite rest,  
That the mask is strange, however like."1010
Nietzsche also defines the separate ‘art-worlds’ of the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian in terms of ‘dreams’ and ‘drunkenness’ respectively.
 
 
In the ‘nuptial song’ that happens ‘outside’, ‘beyond the cathedral’, Stevens seems to 
speak of the act of balancing the polarities of the masks of Dionysus and Apollo, 
apparently embracing ‘the festival’. 
1011
 In red weather.
 The ‘coupling’ of 
dreams and drunkenness is also apparent in early Stevens, as Howard Pearce has 
insightfully elucidated: 
 Only, here and there, an old sailor, 
 Drunk and asleep in his boots, 
 Catches tigers 
1012
Pearce, as with the examples uncovered by Leggett, seems perfectly correct to see 
the Nietzschean conception of this coupling of dreams and drunkenness, as having 
its origin for Stevens in The Birth of Tragedy.
 
 
1013 I also agree with Pearce in 
surmising that: ‘The figure of the poet that appears in Nietzsche’s thought is made 
possible by Nietzsche’s exploration of the prehistory of the Greek world.’1014 For 
Nietzsche it was in ‘the drunken reveller Archilochus sunk down in slumber’ that 
these impulses were fused together in the Bacchae.1015
                                                          
1010 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 148. 
1011 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 1. 
1012 Wallace Stevens, ‘Disillusionment of Ten O’Clock’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 53. 
1013 Howard Pearce, ‘Poiesis and the Withdrawal: The Garden-Motive in Henry James, Wallace 
Stevens and David Mamet’, Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, p. 
271. 
1014 Ibid., p. 271. 
1015 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 14. 
 Pearce suggests that: ‘The 
figure of Stevens’s old sailor seems in particular to be a reversion to Nietzsche’s 
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Archilochus’.1016 Large predatory cats (‘tigers’) were also an indicator of Dionysus 
in the ancient Greek world, as of course was intoxication.1017 The union of this with 
the slumber and dreams of the Apollonian, demonstrates how Stevens is attempting a 
‘coupling’ of these ‘art-worlds’ through a poesis. The machinery of ‘being without 
description’ evokes the unseen ‘goddess’ who is ‘presented’ as the ultimate fictional 
ground.1018
 The tension between the two ‘art-worlds’ was never completely resolved in 
Stevens, though at times a peace of sorts was achieved. Stevens says in ‘The 
Irrational Element in Poetry’ that: ‘One is always writing about two things at the 
same time in poetry and it is this that produces the tension characteristic of 
poetry.’
 
1019
 A metaphysician in the dark
 In ‘Of Modern Poetry’ Stevens spoke of the ‘new stage’ with the 
‘insatiable actor’ (tragic actor), performing the ‘coupling’ of the two ‘art-worlds’: 
    expressed 
 In an emotion as of two people, as of two 
 Emotions becoming one. The actor is 
1020
Nietzsche had said that it was only ‘by a metaphysical miracle of the Hellenic will’ 
that the Apollonian and the Dionysian were ‘coupled with each other’.
 
 
1021 Stevens is 
here attempting the ‘coupling’ of the two ‘art-worlds’ in a poesis, according to the 
structure of Attic Greek tragedy, which, as we said earlier is also reminiscent of 
Heraclitus’ polemos. 
                                                          
1016 Howard Pearce, ‘Poiesis and the Withdrawal: The Garden-Motive in Henry James, Wallace 
Stevens and David Mamet’, Analecta Husserliana: The Yearbook of Phenomenological Research, p. 
273. 
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(Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 4.) 
1018 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Latest Freed Man’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 187. 
1019 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Irrational Element in Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 785. 
1020 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 219. 
1021 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 1. 
The proximity of the ‘metaphysician in the dark’ arguably 
follows the model of the reduction of the rational self into the ‘dark-syllabled’ name 
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of ‘Semiramide’.1022
Only in so far as the genius in the act of artistic creation coalesces with this 
primordial artist of the world, does he catch sight of the eternal essence of art; for in 
this state he is, in a marvellous manner, like the weird picture of the fairy-tale which 
can turn its eyes at will and behold itself; he is now at once subject and object, at 
once poet, actor, and spectator.
 ‘Of Modern Poetry’ presents Stevens directly after the 
reduction of ‘the lion in the lute’ and ‘the lion locked in stone’ to himself, standing 
upon the stage of a totality grounded in a fiction. Nietzsche defines it in its tragic 
nature, elucidating the underlying model of the ‘metaphysician in the dark’, by 
saying: 
1023
Heidegger presents Nietzsche as having failed to overcome metaphysics.
 
 
1024
 It is ‘the act of artistic creation’ coalescing with ‘the primordial artist of the 
world’ that puts the single, ‘eternal essence’ of art into ‘play’, in very similar terms 
to Gadamer and Stevens (‘act of the mind’/‘candor’). Gadamer’s sense of ‘play’ that 
we identified in chapter one as a model comparable to ‘Of Modern Poetry’, endorses 
precisely the same ‘unity’ that Nietzsche describes in suggesting that ‘subject and 
object’ and ‘poet, actor, and spectator’ are all ‘one’. In Truth and Method one of 
Gadamer’s relatively few references to Nietzsche mentions him in terms of his 
‘experimental extremism’.
 Yet 
when Heidegger speaks of the ‘powerful’ portrayal of ‘Being’ and ‘seeming’ in the 
same terms as Nietzsche speaks of the Apollonian and the Dionysian in The Birth of 
Tragedy, he illuminates the failure of the question of the ‘meaning’ of being to 
extricate itself from myth, as Adorno has argued.  
1025
                                                          
1022 Wallace Stevens, ‘Certain Phenomena of Sound’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 256 - 257. 
1023 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 17. 
1024 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche – Volumes One and Two, p. 18. 
1025 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 535. 
 Yet at the same time, Gadamer seems concerned that 
Heidegger would criticise his own lack of ‘ultimate radicality’ in the conclusions 
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drawn in Truth and Method.1026
When science expands into a total technocracy and thus brings on the “cosmic night” 
of the “forgetfulness of being,” the nihilism that Nietzsche prophesied, then may one 
not gaze at the last fading light of the sun setting in the evening sky, instead of 
turning around to look for the first shimmer of its return?
 Standing on the precipice of a mountain top 
reminiscent of Zarathustra’s, Gadamer justifies his restraint with the following 
remark: 
1027
However, like Nietzsche, Gadamer’s interpretation of the tragic demonstrates that he 
is already thinking from within the machinery of the myth of ‘oneness’. He notes 
that the spectator of tragedy ‘participates in the communion of being present’, which 
would imply an encounter with being achieved through a work of tragic art. 
However, Gadamer’s language evidences slippage as he reveals the mythical ground 
that existed before the encounter with the tragic by suggesting that: ‘there is more in 
the continuing effect of such tragic works and themes than merely the continuing 
influence of a literary model.’
 
 
1028 The ‘more’ than the ‘literary model’ is complicit 
with Heidegger’s sense of the ‘powerful’1029 struggle in tragedy and Nietzsche’s 
sense of the ‘powerful’ in the tragic that conceals an ‘eternal essence’ of art.1030
We noted earlier Shelling's comments in his 
 The 
encounter with the work of art may be a representing of ‘oneness’, but it is only ever 
the representing of a myth that was already believed in, already conceived of as a 
‘more’, as a ‘power’. The ‘truth’ that Gadamer finds in tragic art is a fiction, a 
violent reductive fiction when asserted as ‘truth’. 
System of Transcendental 
Idealism
                                                          
1026 Ibid., p. xxxiv. 
1027 Ibid., p. xxxiv. 
1028 Ibid., pp. 128 - 129. 
1029 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 1. 
1030 Ibid., p. 17. 
 that art could 'open' for the philosopher the 'holy of holies', the 'single 
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flame' of 'eternal and original unity', 'that which in nature and history is rent 
asunder'.1031 For Schelling 'philosophy was born and nourished by poetry in the 
infancy of knowledge' and his expectation was that knowledge in 'completion' would 
'flow back like so many individual streams into the universal ocean of poetry', a 
poetry moreover that is founded upon what Schelling calls an undivided 
'mythology'.1032
The difficulty Stevens appears to have encountered at times, was retaining 
the balance between the two ‘art-worlds’. In the late poem, ‘The Course of a 
Particular’, Stevens notes that: ‘though one says that one is part of everything,/ There 
is a conflict, there is a resistance involved’.
 It is not a question of any reductive danger lurking in art as a fiction; 
rather it is a question of the implications of fiction becoming a ground for reality 
through a violent reduction. 
1033 The conflict comes in the plasticity of 
the hard-edged ‘res-istance’. In unveiling his ‘rock’ in ‘Credences of Summer’, 
Stevens had attempted to bind ‘The physical pine’ and ‘the metaphysical pine’ 
together as a static apex (‘fix it in eternal foliage’, ‘with arrested peace’, ‘Joy of such 
permanence’).1034 Critics have noted the tensions resulting in triumph and sadness in 
this poem, sadness particularly in the latter sections. For example, Bloom states that: 
‘Credences is a celebratory poem, but the celebration is thwarted by the rival 
eloquence of mere nature, which resists being reimagined.’1035
                                                          
1031 F.W.J. Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 231. 
1032 Ibid., p. 232. 
1033 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Course of a Particular’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 460. 
1034 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 322 - 323. 
1035 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, pp. 243 - 244. 
 I would argue that it 
is possible to read the poem in a way that suggests that it is the sudden dominance of 
the barbaric ‘Dionysian’ ‘art-world’ that causes the melancholy for Stevens, who is 
trying to unite the physical and the metaphysical in a poesis. The two ‘art-worlds’, 
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whether presented as ‘philosophic’ or mythic, will apparently not stay coupled for 
long and a return to extreme violence ensues, as the one annihilates the other. Altieri 
again seems to celebrate Stevens’ poems of bare reality that highlight the 
compounding of the imagination, on the basis that they help us in ‘ritually 
manifesting where we are positioned.’1036
Bloom maintains that the ‘They’ of canto VII is ‘the Romantics, but Stevens 
also’, however canto VII in my reading incorporates the Maenads meeting with 
Pentheus, the ‘Dionysian’ impulse overpowering the ‘rational’ element
 
1037
 Fully made, fully apparent, fully found.
: 
 Far in the woods they sang their unreal songs, 
 Secure. It was difficult to sing in face 
 Of the object. The singers had to avert themselves 
 Or else avert the object. Deep in the woods 
 They sang of summer in the common fields. 
 
 They sang desiring an object that was near, 
 In face of which desire no longer moved, 
 Nor made of itself that which it could not find… 
 Three times the concentred self takes hold, three times 
 The thrice concentred self, having possessed 
 
 The object, grips it in savage scrutiny, 
 Once to make captive, once to subjugate 
 Or yield to subjugation, once to proclaim 
 The meaning of the capture, this hard prize, 
1038
 This is the death of Pentheus in my reading, with its clear parallel in Orpheus’s own 
demise at the hands of the Maenads. The three triumphal moments denoted by the 
accumulation of the word ‘once’, is the rending of Pentheus’ head, gripped in the 
‘savage scrutiny’.
 
 
1039
                                                          
1036 Charles Altieri, The Art of Twentieth-Century American Poetry: Modernism and After, p. 146. 
1037 Ibid., p. 251. 
1038 Wallace Stevens, ‘Credences of Summer’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 325. 
1039  Euripides, Bacchae, pp. 42 - 44. 
 In Greek mythology, Dionysus and Pentheus are both born of 
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daughters of Cadmus, and they are in effect the rational and irrational tensions that 
remain connected as cousins.1040 It is the music of the ‘unreal songs’ that are in 
tension with the rational ‘face/ Of the object’, that which is plastic and has rational 
form.1041 The word ‘face’ for how an object shows itself recalls Levinas’ thesis that 
the sway of Heideggerian and Parmenidean ‘ontology’ reduces the face of the 
‘Other’ to mere 'otherness', and that this is violent. It is comparable to another 
example found in ‘Blue Guitar’ where Stevens had sought ‘A dream’ ‘in which/ I 
can believe’.1042 The belief in this dream was also to take place ‘in face of the object’ 
in a further attempt to ‘play’ the two ‘art-worlds’ together as one, a process of 
reduction that annihilates the subjective self according to the older fiction of the 
‘goddess’ who ‘Must’ come first.1043 It was only after Stevens had brought ‘the lion 
in the lute’ ‘Before’ the face of ‘the lion locked in stone’ and reduced himself to this 
unity of ‘otherness’, that he could ‘face’ the men and women of the time in ‘Of 
Modern Poetry’, to ‘play’ them into the same enlarged ground.1044
In a sense, ‘It Must be Abstract’ and ‘It Must Change’ can be read as 
representative of the Apollonian and the Dionysian respectively, on apparently non-
mythic terms. This fusion of the two halves of ‘reality’ ‘Must Give Pleasure’ as a 
 This is why 
Stevens’ ritual manifestations do not show us ‘where we are positioned’, as Altieri 
suggests, rather they ‘play’ us into a ground of mythic violence. 
                                                          
1040 M.C. Howatson and Ian Cilvers, eds., The Concise Oxford Companion to Classical Literature, p. 
79. 
1041 Critchley seems correct to suggest that Stevens’ perspective of the tensions between what might 
be called ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’ could have been embellished by his reading of Maurice Blanchot’s 
essays in Nouvelle Revue Française, perhaps even introducing Stevens to the thought of Levinas 
concerning the face. (Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace 
Stevens, p. 86). 
1042 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 143. 
1043 Ibid., p. 143. 
1044 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Man with the Blue Guitar’ & ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and 
Prose, pp. 143 & 218 – 219. 
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tragic form in the moment in which they appear to be coupled through the ‘death’ of 
‘Apollo’ which begins the whole work. In reality it is the machinery of an absolute 
reductive violence, as demonstrated in ‘The Auroras of Autumn’ when the agent of 
change in ‘Ananke’ overwhelmed reality at rest for Stevens. Kingsley suggests of 
Parmenides’ ‘goddess’ that: ‘One face of the goddess is movement; the other, utter 
stillness.’1045
For a moment in the central of our being
 Before Stevens enacted the death of Apollo in poem I of ‘It Must Be 
Abstract’, he addressed this woman: 
In the uncertain light of single, certain truth, 
Equal in living changingness to the light 
In which I meet you, in which we sit at rest, 
1046
For this Ananke Stevens says ‘I feel love’ and what ‘she’ brought to him was 
‘peace’. For ‘her’, Stevens would ‘press the extremest book of the wisest man’ 
‘Close’ to him, ‘hidden’ in him, like Empedocles’ poetic knowledge of the ‘One’: 
‘For these things grow of themselves into thy heart’.
 
 
1047 Indeed it was Empedocles 
who had claimed to be an ‘eternal’ ‘exile and a wanderer from the gods’ by an 
‘oracle of Necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods’ that resulted in him ‘being 
born throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms’, given up to ‘insensate 
strife’.1048 In ‘Owl’s Clover’ Stevens had referred to the ‘hymn’, ‘psalm’, and 
‘cithern song of praise’ to ‘Fateful Ananke’, as ‘the exile of the disinherited’.1049
But if we observe how, under the pressure of this treaty of peace, the Dionysian 
power revealed itself, we shall now recognise in the Dionysian orgies of the Greeks, 
 
 Nietzsche suggests that for the Greeks, the tensions between the Apollonian 
and the Dionysian also erupted in the notion of ‘transfiguration’: 
                                                          
1045 Peter Kingsley, Reality, p. 220. 
1046 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 329. 
1047 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 221. 
1048 Ibid., p. 222. 
1049 Wallace Stevens, ‘Owl’s Clover’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 162. 
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as compared with the Babylonian Sacaea with their reversion of man to the tiger and 
the ape, the significance of festivals of world-redemption and days of 
transfiguration.1050
 Its muscles are his own…
 
 
For Stevens it was ‘lions’ and ‘oxen’ and ‘bears’ that illustrated the oneness of all 
things, the tension of the volcanic heart of ‘corazon’ (the ‘center’/‘underworld’) with 
which he enacted an alignment: 
 He is like a man 
 In the body of a violent beast. 
1051
In ‘The Latest Freed Man’ Stevens would enact a transformation into what 
resembled the imagined ox ‘deity’ of Xenophanes, who’s own ‘deity’ was the 
amorphous ‘One’. The imperative, as we have suggested was that it was an ‘ox-like 
struggle’, which denotes polemos or in the mythic terms, ‘transfiguration’ under the 
‘pressure’ of the ‘treaty of peace’.
 
 
1052 As struggle, polemos is a violence against the 
violence of the 'pure power' of amorphous being
Thus far we have considered the Apollonian and its antithesis, the Dionysian, as 
artistic energies which burst forth from nature herself, without the mediation of the 
human artist; energies in which nature’s art-impulses are satisfied in the most 
immediate and direct way: first, on the one hand, in the pictorial world of dreams, 
whose completeness is not dependent upon the intellectual attitude or the artistic 
culture of any single being; and, on the other hand, as drunken reality, which 
likewise does not heed the single unit, but even seeks to destroy the individual and 
redeem him by a mystic feeling of Oneness.
. To reduce to either ‘state’ is to 
destroy the individual and its terms are derived from the myth of ‘Necessity’, who 
contains the warring elements of both being and change. 
Nietzsche provides a language for this ‘being an ox’, this ‘being without 
description’: 
1053
                                                          
1050 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 6. 
1051 Wallace Stevens, ‘Poetry is a Destructive Force’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 178. 
1052 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 6. 
1053 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, p. 5. 
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To achieve ‘Oneness’, the ‘art-worlds’ must first close together (as they had for the 
‘latest freed man’ on the edge of the bed, between dreams and reality), and ‘destroy 
the individual’. It is in this sense that Ziarek is incorrect to justify these modes of 
thought in Stevens, via Heidegger’s “attempt to refashion ‘man’ and thought in a 
non-anthropic manner”, because this argument completely overlooks their very real 
origins with primal, mythic violence.1054 This is not the unfolding of being; it is a 
historical, human concept, the embracing of mythos. Clearly we should review the 
origins of such thought before entertaining Altieri’s Modernist enthusiasm that ‘we 
must lean further into this enchanting sight.’1055
The violence of the Heraclitean struggle (polemos) of individual beings to 
establish themselves out of being is certainly present in Stevens as an animalistic 
struggle that announces itself as part of nature, as it had for Heraclitus. In ‘Notes’ it 
is the ‘lion’ who ‘Defies red emptiness to evolve his match’ and the ‘elephant’ who 
‘Breaches the darkness of Ceylon with blares’.
 
1056 The implication is that both 
animals have struggled forth out of the ‘One’, in a mode of violence: ‘There was a 
muddy centre before we breathed’.1057 Interestingly, Jeff Wallace in his introduction 
to the 1998 edition of The Origin of Species (1859) notes with regard to Darwin’s 
theory that: “A philosophical tradition can be traced back at least to the early Greek 
philosopher Heraclitus’ conception of the world in a perpetual state of flux or 
‘fire’.”1058
                                                          
1054 Krzysztof Ziarek, ‘Without human meaning’: Stevens, Heidegger and the Foreignness of Poetry’, 
Wallace Stevens Across the Atlantic, p. 90. 
1055 Charles Altieri, ‘Why Stevens Must be Abstract’, Wallace Stevens: the Poetics of Modernism, p. 
115. 
1056 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 332. 
1057 Ibid., p. 331. 
1058 Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998), Introduction 
p. IX. 
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Stevens denied both the anthropomorphic conception of the ‘gods’ and 
paganism as we have seen. Riddel notes: ‘Rejecting the “pagan in a varnished car,” 
the poet is left without a deity but not without the guitar.’1059
 In terms of a model for the ‘supreme fiction’, Stevens had said that ‘the 
greatest piece of fiction’ was ‘Greek mythology’.
 However, 
paradoxically, the rhythms of paganism that had once animated Attic Greek tragedy 
are firmly in place, if only for ‘playing’ upon the ‘guitar’; in other words, for making 
into ‘art’. Fusing the Apollonian and the Dionysian in a poesis is not a religious act 
for Stevens; it is an ‘artistic’ one. Concepts do fall into history as Adorno had 
suggested, mythos however remains a consistent spectre to which the mind can apply 
varying forms, but unlike the universality of mythos with which Heidegger’s 
ontology and Gadamer’s hermeneutics have a dialogue, mythos is surely not 
universal and may equally be rejected by the liberty of the individual mind when that 
mythos is presented as reductive ‘truth’. 
1060
                                                          
1059 Joseph N. Riddel, The Clairvoyant Eye: The Poetry and Poetics of Wallace Stevens, p. 141. 
1060 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 915. 
 However, the effort of Stevens’ 
poesis is to universalize the terms of the myth to the ‘ontological’ level, so that they 
are allowed to extend far beyond the theatre of art (and beyond the anthropomorphic 
forms of the ‘gods’ found in romanticism). This is why the images of the old tragic 
theatres in Stevens’ poems are usually collapsed or collapsing, as Stevens de-creates 
the paraphernalia of the old platform for these ‘art-worlds’ and universalizes his 
fiction to include ‘reality’ as well. This is ‘violent’ because it is an enforced 
reduction of extant reality to mythos. In ‘Repetitions of a Young Captain’ Stevens 
would write: 
 A tempest cracked on the theatre. Quickly, 
 The wind beat in the roof and half the walls. 
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 The ruin stood still in an external world. 
 
 It had been real. It was something overseas 
 That I remembered, something that I remembered 
 Overseas, that stood in an external world. 
 
 It had been real. It was not now. The rip 
 Of the wind and the glittering were real now, 
 In the spectacle of a new reality.1061
Stevens is universalizing the Greek tragic stage and reducing reality to the terms of 
mythos.
 
 
1062
For Heidegger nihilation is the enabling force of letting-be, which makes it possible 
for beings to be what they are, and frees them from the ways in which power 
articulates the spatio-temporal play of experience into entities, objects or facts. 
Nihilation is neither the power of negation nor the powerlessness of inactivity, but 
instead the power-free unfolding of ‘being’.
 
Ziarek states that: 
1063
 Just as near the end of his life Stevens thinks that Heidegger is ‘Swiss’, so this 
reading is detached from the symbiosis of mythos and early Greek poetic 
philosophy.
 
 
1064
                                                          
1061 Wallace Stevens, ‘Repititions of a Young Captain’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 271. 
1062 The possibility arises that the ‘tempest’ refers to Shakespeare’s departure from the art of tragedy 
following his last play of that name. 
1063 Krzysztof Ziarek, ‘Without human meaning’: Stevens, Heidegger and the Foreignness of Poetry’, 
Wallace Stevens Across the Atlantic, p. 90. 
1064 A Letter to Paule Vidal, July 29th, 1952. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 758. 
 Stevens’ effort to reduce the ground of reality to the fiction of the 
‘goddess’ is violent because it is an enforced reduction on universal, ‘ontological’ 
terms. Hence Stevens’ use of the words ‘cracked’, ‘beat’ and ‘rip’ to redefine the 
‘new reality’ as the ‘glittering’ ‘spectacle’ of a universal fiction. What has been 
unfolded in poetry can equally be folded up again by the poet. In precisely this sense 
Stevens had said that: ‘Suppose the poet discovered and had the power thereafter at 
will and by intelligence to reconstruct us by his transformations. He would also have 
292 
 
the power to destroy us.’1065 What Ziarek and Critchley fail to observe with regard to 
what they see as the ‘powerlessness’ of Stevens’ ontological poetry, is that Stevens 
has clearly placed his own intellect (‘intelligence’) and human ‘will’ between 
himself and his audience, and that he is absolutely conscious of the ‘power’ of the 
poet to press back and ‘destroy us’, even if he is pressing back with “the power-free 
unfolding of ‘being’.”1066
What he saw, the teaching of law in becoming and the play of necessity, must be seen 
from now on in all eternity. He raised the curtain on this greatest of all dramas.
 
In the posthumously published, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, 
Nietzsche says of Heraclitus that: 
1067
 And mountains running like water, wave on wave
 
 
Equally, the ‘new’ theatre Stevens envisages is entirely universal, presented in a 
form more familiar to the pre-Socratics whose cosmological poetry collapses reality 
into a ground of mythos: 
 It is a theatre floating through the clouds, 
 Itself a cloud, although of misted rock 
1068
This ‘misted rock’ is the ‘rock’ of what I have argued is a sense of complete being, 
in all of its 'otherness'. The role of modern poetry for Stevens is to stand at the heart 
of ‘reality’, in place of the old Greek tragic theatre and to universalize its form 
precisely. The ‘metaphysician in the dark’ replaces the tragic ‘actor’ and ‘plays’ the 
audience into the ground of that universal mythos, into the unity of the model of the 
‘goddess’, the final fiction that Stevens chooses to believe, knowing it to be a 
 
 
                                                          
1065 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, p. 670. 
1066 Krzysztof Ziarek, ‘Without human meaning’: Stevens, Heidegger and the Foreignness of Poetry’, 
Wallace Stevens Across the Atlantic, p. 90. 
1067 Friedrich Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. by Marianne Cowan 
(Washington DC: Regency Publishing, Inc., 1962), p. 68. 
1068 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Auroras of Autumn’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 359. 
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fiction.1069
In essence, the reduction of existence to an imagined ground is no different in 
implication than Hannah Arendt’s contention in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(1951) that German National Socialism was a reduction of history to racial struggle, 
and Marxism was a reduction of history to class struggle. It is the reduction to a 
totalizing myth that destroys individuality. We may offer an answer to Levinas’ 
question of the connection between Mein Kampf and Being and Time as follows
 The mythological names that the Greeks used have gone. The precise 
model of their mythic structure is entirely retained in Stevens’ poetry. 
1070: 
where humanity is reduced to the terms of blind fate (‘Necessity’/‘Ananke’) as a 
catalyst for a compulsion to total ‘struggle’ matched only by the competing and 
equally urgent compulsion of the same ‘blind fate’ for a totality of absolute 
‘oneness’, a complete annihilation is established over and against existence. Both 
reductions destroy the individual and when operating at once, resemble totalitarian 
‘government’. Heidegger politicized his engagement in this myth when he made the 
catastrophic error of trying to play philosopher king to the National Socialists. To a 
far lesser degree, Stevens politicized his own advancement of the myth when he 
suggested that: ‘The defeat or triumph of Hitler are parts of a war-like whole’.1071
Despite the myth playing out as a human construct, there is nothing human in 
National Socialism or Heidegger’s sense of being. The reduction to a totalizing myth 
is a reduction to precisely what lies outside of individual humanity, that is, the notion 
of blind ‘oneness’ that precedes the human and will not allow the human to come 
forth in the form in which humanity has already come forth. When form is reduced 
to a crude biologism that begins with a particular race, then we see that Arendt is 
 
                                                          
1069 Wallace Stevens, ‘Of Modern Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 219. 
1070 Howard Caygill, Levinas and the Political (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 30. 
1071 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Noble Rider and the Sound of Words’, The Necessary Angel, Collected 
Poetry and Prose, p. 656. 
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correct to consider that the first race outlined for annihilation is the first group in a 
list that ends with the last human being (including the aggressors themselves).1072
far from wielding its power in the interest of one man, it is quite prepared to sacrifice 
everybody’s vital immediate interests to the execution of what it assumes to be the 
law of History or the law of Nature.
 
Arendt notes of totalitarianism that: 
1073
First and last race or class are one, as the very existence of such a mobilized 
reduction had already declared war on every last human being. For Arendt: ‘In the 
language of the Nazis, the never-resting, dynamic “will of the Fuehrer ... becomes 
the “supreme law” in a totalitarian state.’
 
 
1074
The ‘artist tyrants’ labour under the delusion that there will be anything left 
of humanity reduced to ‘Necessity’, from which to paint what ‘humanity’ will be. 
Altieri wants it both ways, suggesting that: ‘We have to align entirely with necessity, 
but at a distance, in another tree’.
 
1075 But the totalizing ground of the myth does not 
allow for compromise, and nor does Stevens. Enforcing old and violent mythology 
as a fundamental ground of existence, in an effort to destroy the perceived errors of 
the present, is an act of violence. Arendt notes that: ‘From the totalitarian point of 
view, the fact that men are born and die can be only regarded as an annoying 
interference with higher forces.’1076
It [totalitarian government] substitutes for the boundaries and channels of 
communication between individual men a band of iron which holds them so tightly 
together that it is as though their plurality had disappeared into One Man of gigantic 
dimensions.
 Arendt suggests further that: 
 1077
                                                          
1072 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego, New York & London: Harcourt 
Brace & Company, 1979), p. 464. 
1073 Ibid., p. 365. 
1074 Ibid., pp. 461 - 462. 
1075 Charles Altieri, The Art of Twentieth-Century American Poetry: Modernism and After, p. 146. 
1076 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, p. 466. 
1077 Ibid., pp. 465 - 466. 
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Hitler had said in a speech to the SA: ‘All that you are, you are through me; all that I 
am, I am through you alone.’ 1078
 In the land of war. More than the man, it is 
 A man with the fury of a race of men, 
 A light at the centre of many lights, 
 A man at the centre of men.
 Stevens had only used the ‘mind of winter’ to 
destroy ‘romantic tenements/ Of rose and ice’, but he recognized that mind as 
synonymous with Hitler’s mind: 
1079
In the iron band of terror, which destroys the plurality of men and makes out of 
many the One who unfailingly will act as though he himself were part of the course 
of history or nature, a device has been found not only to liberate the historical and 
natural forces, but to accelerate them to a speed they never would reach if left to 
themselves.
 
 
Of this ‘major man’ Arendt says: 
 1080
In this context we can agree with Levinas in refusing ‘any Christological account of 
the other’ when the ‘Other’ is proved to be no more than a man seeking to bind 
humanity to blind ‘natural forces’ that only destroy life.
 
 
1081
Vattimo’s efforts to produce an ‘accomplished nihilism’ denote a reluctance 
to view the origin of his own structures of thought. I would argue that the ‘oneness’ 
of this mythos informs Gadamer’s connection of art work and audience, and shows 
the truth-telling function of the work of art to be a collapse into the acceptance of 
mythos as ‘truth’. This reconnects us to the first chapter where we noted that in Truth 
and Method 
  
Gadamer had said that: ‘In that our hermeneutical theory seeks to show 
the interconnection of event and understanding, it sends us back to Parmenides’.1082 
                                                          
1078 Ibid., p. 325. 
1079 Wallace Stevens, ‘Man and Bottle’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 218. 
1080 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism , p. 466. 
1081 Howard Caygill, Levinas and the Political, p. 123. 
1082 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 456. 
Equally it was Stevens who had referred to ‘the supremacy of a figure like 
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Parmenides’.1083
That gives a candid kind to everything.
 By linking ‘event and understanding’, Gadamer suggests that his 
theory ‘sends us back to Parmenides’. Stevens says of the ‘first idea’ that: 
    It satisfies 
 Belief in an immaculate beginning 
 
And sends us, winged by an unconscious will, 
To an immaculate end. We move between these points: 
From that ever-early candor to its late plural 
 
And the candor of them is the strong exhilaration 
Of what we feel from what we think, of thought 
Beating in the heart, as if blood newly came, 
 
An elixir, an excitation, a pure power. 
The poem, through candor, brings back a power again 
1084
We have seen how such a position allowed post-Kantian philosophers and 
poets to attempt to reconnect with the ‘thing-in-itself’, but that such a reconnection 
was performed at the expense of the ‘Other’, as a violent reduction to 'otherness'. I 
have argued that it is only by tracing the roots of that thinking, of restoring its status 
as a historical concept generated through the human mind, that we can illuminate its 
irrational, mythological foundation, a foundation that Stevens used to structure his 
complete ‘rock’, his universal, self-perpetuating ‘supreme fiction’, and the universal 
 
 
A historical dialogue that mines poetic myth is precisely how Adorno and 
Horkheimer had presented the inevitable development of ‘enlightenment’ thinking. 
The act of pressing back with the notion of a ‘oneness’ of being over and against the 
liberty of the already existent ‘self’, that Levinas sees in the form of the face, 
remains caught in a web of mythical concepts (‘a pure power’) that constitute 
Stevens’ poetic ‘rock’, the satisfaction of ‘belief’. 
                                                          
1083 A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
1084 Wallace Stevens, ‘Notes Toward a Supreme Fiction’, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 330 - 331. 
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freedoms of ‘major man’. The modern work of art becomes the ground of a new 
world for this mode of thought, only because the work of art is a fiction. The 
acceptance of a fiction as the ground of all reality forgets that, in Levinasian terms, 
the human face precedes the moment of the work of art.  
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Conclusion 
Mythos and Literature - Violence And Language 
 
 
 The englistered woman is now seen 
 In an isolation, separate 
 From the human in humanity1085
mythos and logos are not, as our current historians of philosophy claim, placed into 
opposition by philosophy as such; on the contrary, the early Greek thinkers 
(Parmenides, fragment VIII) are precisely the ones to use mythos and logos in the 
same sense.
 
 
 
 What is the poet based upon? Heidegger has an inadvertent answer to this 
that we can apply to Stevens. He writes: 
1086 
 
That logos ultimately derives from mythos, and that mythos 
 The analysis undertaken has attempted to show in what way Stevens was in 
line with post-Kantian philosophers and poets in viewing art as a means of 
experiencing the ‘thing-in-itself’. Further that, contrary to Critchley’s analysis, the 
is ‘philosophical’ is the 
perfect evocation of Stevens’ poetry. This fact has not been evident in critics who 
seek solely for a more contemporary comparative ‘philosophy’ in Stevens, as in the 
case of Ziarek, Critchley, Hines and Bové. To connect the philosophical to the 
mythological in Stevens is essential for understanding Stevens’ solipsism, his 
emphasis upon reduction, and his apparent conflation of anthropomorphic mythic 
structures. To read Stevens as connected to just philosophy, will miss the dominant 
symbiosis with mythos. To read only mythical structures will miss the 
‘philosophical’, pre-Socratic locution. 
                                                          
1085 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Sail of Ulysses’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 467. 
1086 Martin Heidegger, ‘What Calls for Thinking?’, Basic Writings (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 
375 - 376. 
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development of this ‘experience’ owed as much to the poetic ontology of the pre-
Socratics as to romanticism, which itself showed signs of utilizing pre-Socratic 
thought and poetry, not least in the form of Hölderlin, who Heidegger had said was 
‘deeply wedded to the spirit of Heraclitus.’1087
In a move away from Bloom and Riddel, who have read Stevens as the anti-
realist poet of the imagination, Critchley wants to emphasize Stevens as a poet who 
engages with reality through the imagination.
 In fact, it was through the Heraclitean 
sense of language as part of nature, that Stevens viewed poems as ‘things in 
themselves’ that could be mined for the ‘first idea’. Such conceptions of a 
connection to the ontological through art have also allowed us to demonstrate how 
Lentricchia’s critique of the social detachment of Stevens’ poetry does not allow for 
the ontological reduction that Stevens enacts in ‘engaging’ with ‘society’. What the 
analysis demonstrated was how potentially violent such a reduction was against the 
individual, despite its efforts to ‘heal’ the polemos of division in the oneness of 
being. 
1088 However, it is because Critchley is 
more concerned with Stevens’ poetry as a possible solution to the problem of 
epistemology, that he detaches his analysis from the mythological elements in 
Stevens’ poetry, which in reality connect with Stevens’ assessment of ‘the 
supremacy of a figure like Parmenides’ and demonstrate in what way Stevens is 
collapsing the mind/world division.1089
                                                          
1087 Gregory Fried, Heidegger’s Polemos – From Being to Politics, p. 29. 
1088 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 26 - 27. 
1089 A Letter to José Rodríguez Feo, April 6th, 1945. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 495. 
 Mind and world were connected in Stevens’ 
poetry from his first collection, because both were one in being and becoming, which 
in conceptual origin are the two aspects of the mythical ‘goddess’, and are presented 
as such. In other words, despite the deft handling of the philosophy that Critchley 
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provides, Stevens is not ‘philosophically significant’ in terms of allowing us to ‘cast 
away’ ‘the basic problem of epistemology’.1090
If Empedocles indeed founded rhetoric, we might say that rhetoric rose out of 
shamanism or religious poetry, and so was more oracular than oratorical in its 
origins. But there is the fine speculation of Eric Havelock, in his Preface to Plato, 
that Empedocles was Plato’s precursor in trying to wrest language from the image-
thinking of the poets to the concept-thinking of the philosophers, or from doxa 
(opinion) to truth. Can we surmise that Empedocles invented rhetoric to help him in 
this transformation? Yet, though Plato tries to move the trope from Homer’s figures 
of will to a figure of knowing, rhetoric remains incurably poetic, a drive toward will-
to-identity rather than toward a knower/known dualism. Tropes are perverse; they 
are para-phusis, unnatural, deviant.
 Rather, Stevens grounds the 
imagination and reality in a myth and enacts a rebirth into that totalizing mythology, 
to become the master of all the life in the world, an anti-realist act of the mind which 
subjects reality to a violent reduction. 
 The question of the intertwined nature of mythos and logos for the pre-
Socratics, has in itself, not gone unnoticed by Bloom. In Wallace Stevens: The 
Poems of Our Climate, Bloom raises the question of ‘rhetoric’ and its meaning for 
the history of philosophy and poetry. In the concluding chapter he says: 
1091
By taking Bloom’s position as our point of departure, rather than as a conclusion, 
and questioning into the implications of the ‘conceptual’ links between Stevens and 
the pre-Socratics, we have seen that it is Parmenides who raises doxa (the seeming 
that is intimately linked to ‘opinion’) to the status of in being (‘truth’). Ultimately it 
is this model that illuminates the much larger universe of Stevens’ conception of 
‘reality’. A trope like ‘major man’ is ‘unnatural’ because for the pre-Socratics, and 
through their influence, for Heidegger, ‘trope’ was never considered to be para-
phusis, but rather, in a way that could not wholly be controlled, was considered to be 
 
 
                                                          
1090 Simon Critchley, Things Merely Are – Philosophy in the Poetry of Wallace Stevens, p. 30. 
1091 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 388. 
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part of how phusis fundamentally opens up. As we have seen, trope inhabited the 
pre-Socratic sense of the ‘One’ (as ‘Ananke’) before being wrested into 
‘philosophy’. To express poetry as completely aligned with the philosophy of the 
‘One’ is not to use philosophy as materia poetica, rather the work of art itself will be 
where the mythos that lies beneath that philosophy is at use, producing its original 
effects. It was already there. It is only through an understanding of the affinities of 
Stevens and the pre-Socratic tradition that we have been able to see the full and 
primary influence of the non-rational origins that account for the violence and 
solipsism, as characteristic of the opening up of oneness, over and against the 
‘existent’.  
 Heidegger notes that: 
Mythos and logos became separated and opposed only at the point where neither 
mythos nor logos can keep to its pristine essence. In Plato’s work this separation has 
already taken place. Historians and philologists, by virtue of a prejudice modern 
rationalism adopted from Platonism, imagine that mythos was destroyed by logos.1092
The epoch of time before Plato is the ultimate ground of the machinery of Stevens’ 
poetry of ‘reality’. Critics of Stevens have not always appreciated this breach in 
fundamental modes of thinking. There has been a tendency to attempt to explain 
Stevens on one side of the breach, while he was clearly standing upon the other. 
Bloom has pointed to that breach, but it is only through questioning into its ultimate 
relationship with the pre-Socratics that we can understand its violent nature and its 
link to ‘philosophy’ within Stevens’ verse. In questioning into it, it is clear how this 
same violence is connected with the ‘violence’ that Levinas and Derrida had seen in 
Heidegger’s ‘reduction of metaphysics’. It is also clear why Ziarek, Hines and Bové, 
among others, have sensed a Heideggerean parallel in Stevens. 
 
 
                                                          
1092 Martin Heidegger, ‘What Calls for Thinking?’, Basic Writings, p. 376 
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 Bloom has said that: ‘To deconstruct a poem would mean to uncover 
whatever its rhetoricity conveyed, even if the poem, the poet, and the tradition of its 
interpretation showed no overt awareness of what implicitly was revealed by such 
word-consciousness.’1093 Stevens’ poetry would suggest that it has collapsed the 
‘religious’, the ‘mythic’ into ‘philosophic concepts’, collapsed ‘Apollo’ into the 
difficulty of the sun in its being, which is what ‘Apollo’, or any conception of a 
‘god’ always ‘was’ for Stevens. However, as we have seen, the pre-Socratic sense of 
being was born out of an even older mythological lineage than the Greeks, and that it 
was the pre-Socratics who had retained the precise mythic structure under different 
names, as Adorno, Kingsley and Guthrie have argued. This means that the 
relationship of logos to mythos in Stevens is unstable, a fact which Stevens’ verse 
exploits as a means of generating drama, as with the dominant revival of ‘Ananke’ in 
‘The Auroras’. It is the precise dilemma that Guthrie faced in trying to equate 
Parmenides’ use of ‘shamanism’ as at once religious and allegorical.1094
When the ‘revolutionary’ ‘vigour’ of modernism ‘Must’ make it new, as an 
act connected to being as a ‘oneness’, then it is only ever re-presenting what is old 
and bound to mythology. In other words, a modernism founded upon the thought of 
being is only ever an act of opening the myth once again, in a way that shows 
modernism to be historically grounded, while the myth remains untouched by 
change, not new at all. It is myth remade again as it was, not a making new of the 
myth itself. Rather, it is the effort to remould a changed reality to the myth. When 
Heidegger opposes the Platonic tradition, he opposes it for its subjective view of 
metaphysics. Yet ‘learn to know thyself’ was also inscribed in the pronaos 
 
                                                          
1093 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, pp. 385 - 386. 
1094 W.K.C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Volume II - The Presocratic Tradition From 
Parmenides to Democritus, p. 13. 
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(forecourt) of the temple of Apollo, at Delphi. If we read Stevens through Platonic 
eyes, whether we are aware of it or not, we will divide the myth within the terms of 
the myth, which itself remains a unity. However, if we unlearn Platonism, we can see 
the connection of Heidegger and Plato in the ‘Mythical Preliminary Stage of 
Philosophy’.1095
Socratic, theoretical, or canny critics, on the one hand, and Apollonian/Dionysian, 
tragic, or uncanny critics, on the other.
 It is only from this vista that we can step completely outside of the 
terms entertained in the introduction, of Hillis Miller’s perspective of Stevens critics 
as either: 
1096
For Hillis Miller the struggle that exists between the Socratic and tragic critical 
approaches finds ‘a fit emblem’ ‘in the polemos of Apollo and Dionysus’.
 
 
1097 
Criticism only adds to ‘the rock’ for Hillis Miller, and in terms of the dichotomy 
above we can completely agree with him when he states that: ‘One can never escape 
from the labyrinth because the activity of escaping makes more labyrinth’.1098
 Stevens, at times, wrote poetry entirely at the direction of an ontological 
position, which he believed to be inherently poetic. The implications that this holds 
for language are, as  described in ‘The Creations of Sound’, that language changes 
from ‘meaning’, to ‘opening’, from the description derived from the ego (‘I 
wandered lonely as a cloud’
 
However, the preceding thesis may reply with Levinas that the ‘face’ of the ‘Other’ 
is in advance of all myth making and breaks down all totalities. 
1099) to aletheia (‘It comes about’).1100
                                                          
1095 Friedrich Nietzsche, The pre-Platonic Philosophers, p. 10. 
1096 J. Hillis Miller, Theory Now and Then, p. 121. 
1097 Ibid., p. 122. 
1098 Ibid., p. 123. 
1099 William Wordsworth, The Works of William Wordsworth (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 
1994), p. 187. 
1100 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Curtains in the House of the Metaphysician’, Collected Poetry and Prose, 
p. 49. 
 For Stevens, ‘The 
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word must be the thing it represents otherwise it is a symbol.’1101 Further, ‘poetry 
must be irrational.’1102 This is why Vaught Brogan senses that Stevens’ ‘sister of the 
Minotaur’ is the ‘madwoman in a maze, specifically, a linguistic maze.’1103 
Language, in the hands of an ontologically conscious poet like Stevens, comes after 
being and becoming. It is born of them, not of the ego as the poet is ‘flicked by 
feeling’. The connection of Stevens’ universal ‘supreme fiction’ to Gadamer’s 
universal hermeneutics is in Gadamer’s belief that ‘Being that can be understood is 
language.’1104
 Vaught Brogan has noted of lines from ‘Description Without Place’, which 
we said was written in context of Stevens reading about and reflecting upon 
Parmenides, that it ‘celebrates what could be accurately called a “logocentric theory” 
of poetry, that is, that words are ultimately grounded in being.’
 
1105 In this respect, 
being and becoming in Stevens replaced the intellect as the source of poetry, 
producing the ‘poem of poems’, operating to the ‘philosophic theme’.1106 As a result, 
any attempt to read a poetry that is ontological in primacy according to the outward 
‘meaning’ of the words on the page, will never fully open an interpretation of ‘the 
poem’. In this regard, poetry for Stevens ‘consists of more than lies on the 
surface.’1107
                                                          
1101 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 907. 
1102 Wallace Stevens, ‘Materia Poetica’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 919. 
1103 Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, The Violence Within The Violence Without - Wallace Stevens and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Poetics, p. 104. 
1104 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 470. 
1105 Jacqueline Vaught Brogan, The Violence Within The Violence Without - Wallace Stevens and the 
Emergence of a Revolutionary Poetics, p. 10. 
1106 Wallace Stevens, ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 854. 
1107 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 902. 
 It serves to explain the impenetrable nature of Stevens’ poetry and why 
the underlying concepts need to be identified in context of a more traditional 
interpretation. 
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 If the archê of phusis is established in primacy then the function of language 
is only to allow the ‘first idea’ to be disclosed at the ‘centre’. In that sense language, 
in the hands of Stevens, becomes syntactically peculiar and stylistically plastic in 
order to allow a reduction to being and becoming. In short, language becomes a 
succession of breaks, doors, gates, bolts, bars, keys and locks, preventing or 
providing access to what lies ‘beyond’, or in actuality, the eruption of that far older, 
irrational pool of ‘meaning’ which is bound up in a web of concepts. Stevens 
expressed his own technique as follows: ‘The thing said must be the poem not the 
language used in saying it.’1108 Though language is obviously the final resting place 
of the expression of poetry, for Stevens it is not the fullest sense of the poem, which 
itself is only a part of the larger poetic life, what Stevens calls the ‘poetic spirit’.1109 
Heidegger, as another proponent of ‘spirit’, was adamant that it was a more careful 
use of language that was required to elucidate the renewal of an authentic being, and 
that poets were advanced practitioners in the art. For Heidegger, language ‘is the 
house of the truth of Being.’1110 Further, that it ‘is language that tells us about the 
essence of a thing, provided that we respect language’s own essence.’1111
 It is conceivable for the words of a poem to point to a subject or object, to 
shed light upon that object, essentially, what Stevens criticised Carlos Williams 
for.
 
1112
                                                          
1108 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 905. 
1109 Wallace Stevens, ‘Adagia’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 912. 
1110 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on Humanism’, Basic Writings, p. 223. 
1111 Martin Heidegger, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’, Basic Writings, p. 348. 
1112 Wallace Stevens, ‘Rubbings of Reality’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 815. 
 In the case where the thought of being has given birth to the words of poetry, 
then the totalizing opacity of being is what the words illuminate in primacy. 
Language is the end of expression for this mode of poetry, not the beginning, which 
is why language is a ‘crust’ or a ‘shed’ skin to Stevens as we have seen. We may 
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surmise that as the poesis of Ezra Pound’s Cantos might be called mimēsis, in its 
effort to incorporate an astonishing range of history into poetry, then Stevens’ poesis 
might be referred to as an event of appearing that seeks to effortlessly touch a 
conceptual sense of complete being. This is a generalisation of the Cantos that will 
not stand up on its own, but perhaps on closer analysis, such apparent differences 
might account for the ground of Marjorie Perloff’s sense of a gap between Stevens 
and Pound?1113
According to Levinas and Derrida, the ‘first idea’ as a ‘oneness’ is only ever 
a violent totality, a ‘reduction of metaphysics’ that is itself derived from a myth. 
Stevens, like Heidegger, attempted to use that myth, but with a contradictory slight-
of-hand, as if myth could be used without the resulting work being mythological in 
 In any case the preceding thesis has argued that we create poems, but 
we cannot manipulate the ground of a conceptual being except as a delusional 
experience that manifests itself as the destruction of the existent ‘Other’. 
The illumination of only the ontological is precisely where the ‘human’, the 
rational, the existent, cannot go. The danger, according to Levinas, in placing the 
thought of being in absolute primacy, is that it causes the inevitable reduction of the 
‘Other’ to ‘otherness’, which for Levinas amounts to violence. The mythological, 
historical origins of the notion of reducing a human being to mere being, which 
Vattimo is reluctant to revisit, provides fertile ground for its irrational violence. It 
seems clear that Stevens was subject to these notions and that this accounts for why 
his verse is solipsistic and reductive. It is why violence is at play within his poetry. 
                                                          
1113 Marjorie Perloff, ‘Pound/Stevens: Whose Era?’, New Literary History, 13 (1982), pp. 485 – 495. 
See also: Glen MacLeod, ed., The Wallace Stevens Journal, Vol. 26 No. 2 (Fall 2002) Special Issue: 
Wallace Stevens and Ezra Pound. 
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kind. Stevens defines his conception of the nature of poetry in the introduction to 
The Necessary Angel as follows: 
A force capable of bringing about fluctuations in reality in words free from 
mysticism is a force independent of one’s desire to elevate it. It needs no elevation. It 
has only to be presented, as best one is able to present it.1114
He continues by saying that the essays of The Necessary Angel have nothing to do 
with ‘criticism’, ‘philosophy’ or literature, but rather, ‘with one of the enlargements 
of life’, which amounted to his definition of poetry.
 
 
1115 It was in ‘only’ presenting 
this ‘force’ (‘with the least possible manipulation’) that Stevens was unlocking the 
totality of the concept of being, and all of its mythological history that had been 
adapted by the pre-Socratics.1116 He seems to have thought he was opening 
something equal to being as infinity, which would provide an enlarged freedom for 
the scope of ‘humanity’.1117
 In Derrida’s terms, when a system lacks a centre, ‘play’ becomes infinite. 
When a system has a centre, ‘play’ is restrained.
 In reality however, the infinite renewal of being as a 
‘oneness’ is only infinite bondage to a conceptual totality. 
1118
                                                          
1114 Wallace Stevens, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry and Prose, pp. 639 - 640. 
1115 Ibid., p. 640. 
1116 A Letter to William Rose Benét, January 24th, 1933. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 264. 
1117 Wallace Stevens, ‘A Collect of Philosophy’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 856. 
1118 Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences’, Writing and 
Difference, pp. 278 - 293. 
 For Stevens, as for the post-
theological era, when God was no longer considered to be the centre, the system 
lacked a centre and it is with this thought of ‘nothing’ that Stevens’ ‘saxophones’ 
begin to squiggle, as ‘play’ becomes ‘infinite’. However, Stevens ultimately 
attempted to replace God with the conception of ‘Ananke’, or the ‘Goddess of 
Complete Being’, the ‘goddess’ of all bonds who was conceptually made whole by 
her dying and reborn sun ‘god’. ‘She’ was shown to be the original ground of the 
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ontological conception of being and becoming passed down from the pre-Socratics. 
The peculiar nature of this particular fatalistic mythology is to perpetuate the static 
and the variable in equal measure, at the same time. As such the centre was replaced 
by a concept that as a fiction, allowed for infinite ‘play’ (thus resisting rationalism 
and religious structures), but which also provided for the need for a fixed centre in 
which Stevens could believe, willingly. However, the tensions that this old structure 
‘played’ out from its origins, was in fact a universal violence enacted according to a 
violent and dehumanizing myth. 
 Bloom says: ‘Poems lie primarily against three adversaries’, themselves, 
other poems and time.1119
Strong poems strengthen us by teaching us how to talk to ourselves, rather than how 
to talk to others. Satan is strongest when he talks to himself, like his Shakespearean 
precursors, though an immense loss in self-delight is felt when we move from Iago 
to Satan. Against whom does Satan lie most persuasively: himself, his precursor, 
time?
 He questions: ‘Why do we believe one liar and not 
another?’ Answering: 
1120
 Bloom’s conclusion is that: ‘Deconstruction touches its limit because it cannot 
admit such a question.’
 
 
1121
                                                          
1119 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, pp. 386 - 387. 
1120 Ibid., p. 387. 
1121 Ibid., p. 387. 
 When being is elevated to the status of ‘ultimate truth’, 
and poetry is reduced to an opening of being as ‘truth’, the effect is to legitimate 
what is not true by virtue of its status of ‘in being’. In other words, the moment of 
poetic opening is presented as ‘truth’ that precedes extant humanity. It is because 
being is used to justify, that everything becomes subject to being. If the multiplicity 
of already existent beings is reduced to the ‘One’ of being, then all multiplicity, all 
individuality, is annihilated under the conceptual sway of that oneness. As Stevens 
says, the poet would ‘have the power to destroy us. If there was, or if we believed 
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that there was, a center, it would be absurd to fear or to avoid its discovery.’1122 It is 
the absurdity that demonstrates Stevens’ unthinking suppression of both origins and 
implications in favour of the desire to make it new. Thus it was with the same slight 
regard for anything other than ‘the right sensation’, that ‘Ananke’ as a product of the 
imagination became ‘that thing’ in which he could believe, as an ‘improvisation’ or 
an ‘importation’.1123
In conceiving of and attempting to manipulate being (to become ‘the master 
of all the life in the world’) Stevens automatically makes being a historical concept, 
changing ‘it’ from what ‘it’ ‘is’ in the extant presence of the form of the ‘Other’, to a 
regenerated piece of history that can be manipulated by the will of ‘the mind of one 
man
 Stevens’ achieved the satisfaction of belief, but in achieving it 
he opened the ‘reduction of metaphysics’ and the play of violence. 
’.1124 This mythological concept is shown to be a mythological hijacking of the 
concept of being and has historical affiliations with violence and the totalizing of the 
‘Other’. Adorno suggests that: ‘Heidegger’s rudiments of material ontology are 
temporal; they have come to be, and they will pass as Scheler’s did before.’1125
I agree with Bloom that, ‘The limits of a purely rhetorical criticism, however 
advanced, are established by its inevitable reductiveness, its necessary attempt to see 
poetry as being a conceptual rhetoric, and nothing more.’
 
1126
                                                          
1122 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Figure of the Youth as Virile Poet’, The Necessary Angel, Collected Poetry 
and Prose, p. 670. 
1123 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 28th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 370. 
1124 A Letter to Hi Simons, August 8th, 1940. Letters of Wallace Stevens, p. 360. 
1125 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 108. 
1126 Harold Bloom, Wallace Stevens: The Poems of Our Climate, p. 386. 
 Indeed, who do we 
believe? If a poetry is itself reductive in primacy, in both origin and meaning, and 
this reductiveness is according to Levinas and Derrida only ever violent, then is that 
poetry more than ‘conceptual rhetoric’, or does its inherent ‘poetic’ value take 
precedence over the implications of its ‘meaning’? Further, how far can we critique 
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Stevens when Western metaphysics itself has its origins in poetry, as Schelling 
understood? We can consider this by assessing Stevens’ own musings: ‘When we 
find in poetry that which gives us a momentary existence on an exquisite plane, is it 
necessary to ask the meaning of the poem?’1127 We might reply with: ‘If Orphism 
were a philosophy, one would say it was a philosophy whose ethic was made duly 
dependent on its metaphysic.’1128 The realization of the ‘exquisite plane’ in Stevens’ 
poetry reduces the ‘Other’ to a concept reminiscent of Parmenides’ interpretation of 
being, that which ‘is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning 
and without end’.1129 Hillis Miller writes of Stevens’ thinking that: ‘All entities come 
together in the realm of things as they are, the realm of the “is” which yokes them 
together in the unity of being. These equivalences might be run together in a 
chain’.1130
The more the machinery of thought subjects existence to itself, the more blind its 
resignation in reproducing existence. Hence enlightenment returns to mythology, 
which it never really knew how to elude. For in its figures mythology had the 
essence of the status quo: cycle, fate, and domination of the world reflected as the 
truth and deprived of hope.
 Adorno and Horkheimer contend that: 
1131
                                                          
1127 Wallace Stevens, ‘The Irrational Element in Poetry’, Collected Poetry and Prose, p. 786. 
1128 W.K.C. Guthrie, Orpheus and Greek Religion, p. 73. 
1129 John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, p. 175. 
1130 J. Hillis Miller, Poets of Reality, p. 275. 
1131 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 27. 
 
 
The more consoling news, for Levinas as a post-metaphysical thinker, is that the 
form of the face still stands. The individual being of our mortal existences is always 
and already in advance of any conceptual totality conceived from ‘the mind of one 
man’. 
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